Issues: Whether the order-in-appeal was liable to be set aside for want of proper notice of hearing and whether the appeal should be remitted for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The record disclosed repeated hearing dates, but it could not be ascertained with certainty that the intimations had actually been served on the assessee. In view of this uncertainty, the dispute whether notice was in fact served was not gone into in depth. The appellate order had proceeded on the assumption that hearing opportunities were served, yet the uncertainty surrounding service meant that the assessee may have been deprived of an effective opportunity to present its case. In such circumstances, adherence to the principles of natural justice required that the matter be reopened and heard afresh by the appellate authority.

Conclusion: The order-in-appeal was set aside and the appeal was restored to the file of the appellate authority for fresh adjudication after affording due opportunity of hearing.

Final Conclusion: The assessee obtained a remand on the ground of denial of effective hearing, and the appellate authority was directed to decide the appeal afresh by a reasoned order within the stipulated time.

Ratio Decidendi: Where service of hearing notice is uncertain and effective opportunity of hearing is not established, an appellate order decided ex parte cannot be sustained and the matter must be remanded for fresh decision after hearing the assessee.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to concessional tax treatment in the absence of timely production of original C and F Forms, and whether the rejection of the claim for want of such forms was sustainable.

Analysis: The relevant assessment years were 2015-16, 2016-17 and 2017-18. Rule 12(1) of the CST Rules required C and F Forms to be furnished within three months. The forms were not produced before the adjudicating authority, the first appellate authority, the Tribunal, or the Court, and remained absent from the record. The governing principle is that production of the original forms is mandatory and not a mere technicality. Strict compliance is required for claiming concessional treatment under the CST regime.

Conclusion: The rejection of the assessee's claim for want of C and F Forms was upheld, and the issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The revision petition failed because the statutory condition for concessional treatment was not satisfied on the record.

Ratio Decidendi: A dealer cannot claim concessional tax treatment under the CST framework without strict compliance with the requirement to furnish the original statutory forms within the prescribed time.

Issues: Whether the appeal dismissed by the first appellate authority as time barred required condonation of delay where the levy of late fee under section 234E was itself under challenge, and whether the matter should be restored for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The appeal was dismissed ex parte only on the ground of delay without examination of the jurisdictional challenge to the levy of late fee. The Tribunal followed the view that where the validity of the levy itself is questioned, delay in pursuing the appeal should not defeat consideration on merits. It accepted that the objection to levy under section 234E, in the context of processing under section 200A, warranted condonation of delay and fresh adjudication by the first appellate authority. The Tribunal therefore declined to enter into the merits of the fee demand and directed reconsideration after granting opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The delay was to be condoned, the ex parte dismissal was set aside, and the matter was restored to the first appellate authority for de novo decision. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: When the levy itself is assailed on jurisdictional grounds, dismissal of the appeal solely for delay is unjustified and the appellate authority should condone the delay and decide the matter on merits.

Issues: (i) Whether the composition of the Adjudicating Authority under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 was invalid because the impugned order was passed by a single-member Bench; (ii) Whether the order retaining seized materials and confirming the provisional attachment was barred by limitation under Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002; (iii) Whether the impugned orders were supported by material showing that the attached properties were proceeds of crime.

Issue (i): Whether the composition of the Adjudicating Authority under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 was invalid because the impugned order was passed by a single-member Bench?

Analysis: Section 6(2) contemplates the constitution of the Adjudicating Authority with a Chairperson and Members, but Section 6(5)(b) empowers the Chairperson to constitute Benches with one or two Members. Read together, the scheme permits adjudication by a single-member Bench and does not make a multi-member Bench mandatory in every case. The challenge based on coram non judice therefore fails, particularly when no lack of jurisdiction, qualification, or prejudice is demonstrated.

Conclusion: The composition of the Adjudicating Authority was valid and the challenge on this ground was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the order retaining seized materials and confirming the provisional attachment was barred by limitation under Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002?

Analysis: The period of limitation had to be computed by excluding the COVID-19 suspension of limitation granted by the Supreme Court. The adjudicating authority had recorded reasons for computation after exclusion of the affected period, and the petitioners did not show any demonstrable error or prejudice. A mere procedural irregularity in computation, without miscarriage of justice, does not invalidate the order.

Conclusion: The limitation challenge failed and the orders were not liable to be set aside on that ground.

Issue (iii): Whether the impugned orders were supported by material showing that the attached properties were proceeds of crime?

Analysis: At the stage of provisional attachment and its confirmation, the authority is required to reach only a prima facie satisfaction on the basis of material on record. The circumstances noted in the order, including the smuggling-linked background, the movement of property into the petitioners' names, the call detail records, and the failure to establish a credible source of funds, were treated as sufficient to indicate a link with proceeds of crime. The petitioners also failed to satisfactorily explain the source of the funds, justifying adverse inference and confirmation of the attachment.

Conclusion: The findings were supported by material and the attached properties were treated as prima facie proceeds of crime.

Final Conclusion: All three writ petitions were rejected, and the impugned orders retaining the seized materials and confirming the provisional attachment were upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 6(5)(b) permits adjudication by a single-member Bench, limitation under the Act must account for the COVID-related exclusion period, and at the attachment stage a prima facie link between the property and proceeds of crime is sufficient to sustain confirmation.

Issues: Whether interest income earned on bank deposits by a co-operative credit society is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The dispute turned on whether the interest earned from temporary deposits of surplus business funds retained for safe custody retained the character of income attributable to the business of providing credit facilities to members. The reasoning accepted that Section 80P is a beneficial provision intended to promote co-operative societies and that the expression "attributable to" is wider than "derived from". It also distinguished interest earned from surplus funds parked temporarily from income arising from an activity wholly alien to the assessee's credit business, and declined to treat the deposit of such funds with a bank as destroying the business character of the receipts. The contrary view based on investment with a non-co-operative bank was rejected on the facts of the case.

Conclusion: The interest income from the bank deposits was held eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether, in the absence of rejection of the books of account or recorded defects therein, a reference to the District Valuation Officer under Section 142A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be made and the valuation report relied upon for addition under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 142A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits a reference to the Valuation Officer only for the purpose of making an assessment or reassessment where estimation of the value of an investment under Sections 69 or 69B, or bullion, jewellery or other valuable article under Sections 69A or 69B, is required. The reference must be based on some material showing that the assessee's declared estimate is not reliable, and it cannot be used as a device for gathering information to reopen concluded assessments. In the present case, the books of account were neither rejected nor found defective, and no specific defects were established in the materials, labour charges or supporting records. In such circumstances, the valuation report by itself could not justify the addition, and the settled principle is that where the books are accepted, the DVO's report cannot be the sole basis for an addition.

Conclusion: The reference to the Valuation Officer was not justified, the addition based solely on the valuation report was unsustainable, and the issue is answered in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue failed to establish any ground for interference, and the appellate order deleting the addition was affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: A reference under Section 142A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is valid only when made for assessment or reassessment on the basis of material indicating unreliability of the declared investment, and where the books of account are neither rejected nor shown defective, a valuation report cannot, by itself, sustain an addition under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: (i) Whether the restriction of royalty on export sales to 1% instead of the 2.51% paid to the associated enterprise was justified under transfer pricing principles; (ii) Whether the assessee's acceptance of the 1% royalty rate in subsequent assessment years could be relied upon to sustain the restriction for the assessment year in question.

Issue (i): Whether the restriction of royalty on export sales to 1% instead of the 2.51% paid to the associated enterprise was justified under transfer pricing principles.

Analysis: The transfer pricing provisions constitute a self-contained code for determining arm's length price of international transactions, and the exercise must be undertaken on the facts of each case. Regulatory approvals by the RBI or the Government of India do not establish arm's length price for income-tax purposes, as they serve different statutory objectives and only indicate permissible ceilings. Comparative material relied on by the assessee was found insufficient for comparability, since arm's length determination depends on functional analysis, benefits derived, and surrounding commercial circumstances. The authorities below had examined the material and concluded that 1% represented the arm's length price, and no perversity or legal infirmity in that finding was shown.

Conclusion: The restriction of royalty to 1% was upheld and the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee's acceptance of the 1% royalty rate in subsequent assessment years could be relied upon to sustain the restriction for the assessment year in question.

Analysis: Each assessment year must ordinarily be examined independently, but the reference to subsequent acceptance was treated as only a corroborative circumstance and not the sole basis of the decision. The conduct in later years was considered relevant to the commercial necessity of the higher royalty claim, and the explanation that the lower rate was accepted merely to reduce litigation was not accepted as convincing. This factor reinforced, rather than supplanted, the transfer pricing finding already reached on the merits.

Conclusion: The subsequent-year acceptance was held to support the restriction and the issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose, the transfer pricing determination was sustained, and the appeals were dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Arm's length price in an international transaction must be determined independently on the facts of the particular year under the transfer pricing framework, and regulatory approvals or later-year acceptance do not by themselves establish or displace that determination.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition seeking refund and interest was maintainable without impleading the entity that had actually made the deposit and without first invoking the statutory refund mechanism under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962. (ii) Whether the writ petition was premature in view of the available statutory remedy and the pending time for availing appellate relief against the tribunal order.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition seeking refund and interest was maintainable without impleading the entity that had actually made the deposit and without first invoking the statutory refund mechanism under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The amounts in question were deposited through MMTC Ltd., which had not been impleaded in the writ proceedings, even though it was the entity shown to have made the payment. The tribunal had only indicated that the person who paid the duty or the person who bore the incidence of duty could seek refund by filing an appropriate application under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962 before the competent authority. No material was placed to show that such statutory procedure had been followed.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable for want of a necessary party and for non-compliance with the statutory refund procedure; the claim was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petition was premature in view of the available statutory remedy and the pending time for availing appellate relief against the tribunal order.

Analysis: The tribunal order was recent, and the statute provided an appellate remedy within the prescribed period. Instead of pursuing the statutory course, the petitioners invoked writ jurisdiction directly. In these circumstances, the Court treated the writ remedy as having been invoked prematurely.

Conclusion: The writ petition was premature and liable to be dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The Court declined to grant refund-related relief in writ jurisdiction and left the petitioners to pursue the statutory remedy in the manner known to law.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ petition for refund and interest will not be entertained where the claimed deposit was made through another entity that is not before the Court and the statutory refund mechanism has not been invoked under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issues: (i) whether the alleged excess interim payments made to certain secured creditors could be treated as recoverable with interest without prior notice and determination; (ii) whether the amount to be kept aside for belated or pending claims should be the full claimed amount or only the proportionate share payable on the same basis as other secured creditors.

Issue (i): whether the alleged excess interim payments made to certain secured creditors could be treated as recoverable with interest without prior notice and determination

Analysis: The amount said to be in excess had not been determined after issuing notice to the affected creditors. The available material did not establish, on the record, the exact extent of excess payment or the basis on which interest could be imposed. Recovery could not be ordered merely at the stage of proposing a further interim dividend, particularly when the entitlement dispute required notice and opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The alleged excess amount and interest were not directed to be recovered forthwith, and any such liability was left to be determined by the Official Liquidator after notice to the concerned creditors.

Issue (ii): whether the amount to be kept aside for belated or pending claims should be the full claimed amount or only the proportionate share payable on the same basis as other secured creditors

Analysis: Keeping aside the entire claimed amount for creditors who had not yet regularised their claims was found to be unjust when other secured creditors were receiving only proportionate payments. The reserve for such pending claims had to be aligned with the same ratio applied to the admitted secured creditors, so that distribution remained equitable among all claimants in liquidation.

Conclusion: Only the proportionate amount was required to be set apart for belated or pending claims, and the third interim dividend was to be recomputed on that basis and disbursed uniformly to eligible secured creditors.

Final Conclusion: The applications were disposed of with directions for recomputation of the dividend, proportionate reservation for pending claims, and interim disbursement to secured creditors on an equal basis, while recovery of any alleged excess payment was deferred to determination after notice.

Ratio Decidendi: In liquidation distribution, alleged excess interim payments cannot be recovered with interest without prior notice and determination, and amounts reserved for pending claims must be kept only in the same proportion as the dividend payable to admitted creditors.

Issues: Entitlement to interest on the delayed refund of the amount collected from the assessee and entitlement to further interest on the unpaid interest amount.

Analysis: The amount had been collected from the assessee without authority and remained with the Revenue for several years before refund. Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 mandates interest on delayed refunds after expiry of the statutory period. The principle applied is that wrongful withholding of money by the Revenue requires compensation, and the absence of an express provision does not defeat relief where the assessee's money has been retained without legal justification. At the same time, further interest cannot be claimed for the period during which the matter remained pending before the Court, since the Revenue cannot be penalized for delay not attributable to it.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to interest on the delayed refund and to further interest on the unpaid interest amount up to the date of filing before the Court, but not beyond that date.

Ratio Decidendi: Where money is wrongfully retained by the Revenue, interest on delayed refund is payable under the statutory refund provision, and compensation may also extend to unpaid interest, but not for periods attributable to pendency before the Court.

Issues: Whether deduction under section 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be denied on the ground that the new residential property was not registered and that certain payments were made before the transfer date.

Analysis: The assessee produced the booking and allotment letter, bank statements, and ledger accounts evidencing payment for acquisition of the new residential property. The material on record did not disprove the genuineness of the transaction. Registration of the conveyance deed was not treated as essential where the assessee had acquired enforceable rights and had substantially complied with the requirement of investment in the new asset. The timing of individual instalments was held to be less significant than the fact of purchase or acquisition of rights within the statutory framework, and the provision was read in a manner consistent with its beneficial object.

Conclusion: Deduction under section 54 was allowable and the disallowance was unsustainable; the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a post-disposal interlocutory application seeking modification or clarification of a final writ order was maintainable.

Analysis: The application was filed after disposal of the writ petition and sought reopening of the final order under the guise of modification or clarification. The Court held that it had become functus officio after final disposal and could not entertain an application that would in substance amount to a review. It further held that such post-disposal applications are maintainable only in rare cases involving clerical or arithmetical correction or where an executory direction has become incapable of implementation because of subsequent events, neither of which was shown here.

Conclusion: The interlocutory application was not maintainable and was dismissed.

Final Conclusion: A disposed writ proceeding cannot be reopened through a modification or clarification application that seeks review of the final order; only limited corrective applications of the recognised kind may be entertained.

Ratio Decidendi: After final disposal of a writ petition, the Court is functus officio and cannot entertain a post-disposal application that seeks substantive alteration of the final order in the guise of clarification or modification, save for limited correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes or exceptional executory situations.

Issues: Whether the cash deposits of Rs. 80,00,000 made during the demonetisation period were satisfactorily explained so as to escape addition as unexplained cash credit under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The explanation that the cash represented earlier withdrawals intended for an immovable property transaction was found to be unsupported by any documentary evidence, such as an agreement to sell, advance receipt, sale deed, or proof of charges paid. The burden under sections 68 and 69A lay on the assessee to establish the nature and source of the money, and a mere oral explanation was held insufficient. The surrounding circumstances, including repeated borrowings, multiple cash withdrawals, long retention of cash, and re-deposit of the identical amount, were treated as inconsistent with normal commercial conduct and contrary to human probabilities. The invocation of cash dealings for property purchase was also found untenable in the light of statutory restrictions on large cash transactions.

Conclusion: The cash deposits were not satisfactorily explained, and the addition under section 68 was upheld in favour of the Revenue.

Issues: (i) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked on the basis of Form 26AS and ST-3 return comparisons without proof of suppression or wilful misstatement. (ii) Whether reimbursable expenses received by the service provider were excludable from taxable value as amounts incurred as a pure agent under Rule 5(2) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006.

Issue (i): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked on the basis of Form 26AS and ST-3 return comparisons without proof of suppression or wilful misstatement.

Analysis: The appellant was registered and had been filing returns regularly. The demand was raised from comparison of departmental data with statutory returns, without any independent verification or material to show deliberate suppression, fraud, or wilful misstatement. In the absence of evidence establishing intent to evade tax, invocation of the extended period was not justified.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable, and the demand, interest, and penalty sustained only on that basis were liable to be set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether reimbursable expenses received by the service provider were excludable from taxable value as amounts incurred as a pure agent under Rule 5(2) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006.

Analysis: The agreement provided for separate fixed remuneration and reimbursement of actual expenses. The fixed remuneration had already suffered service tax. The reimbursed expenses were incurred on behalf of the recipient on actual basis, and the documentary record showed satisfaction of the conditions governing a pure agent under the amended valuation rules. Accordingly, such reimbursements were not includable in the taxable value.

Conclusion: The reimbursable expenses were excludable from the taxable value, and the associated service tax, interest, and penalty were unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned demand was held unsustainable both on limitation and on valuation, and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: A demand based only on comparison of departmental data with filed returns, without independent inquiry and without proof of suppression or wilful misstatement, cannot justify the extended period; and reimbursements received as a pure agent, where the Rule 5(2) conditions are met, are excluded from taxable value.

Issues: Whether the rejection of two rebate claims under Rule 18 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 for want of the triplicate ARE-1 and for discrepancies in export documentation called for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: Rebate under Rule 18 is not an automatic consequence of export and depends on proof of duty payment and correlation between the duty-paid goods and the exported goods. The triplicate ARE-1 is the primary statutory document for establishing that correlation. The three statutory authorities concurrently found that the required documentation was not furnished for the two claims and that there were discrepancies in the descriptions of goods in the excise records and shipping documents. The findings were based on documentary scrutiny, and no perversity, jurisdictional error, mala fides, or breach of natural justice was shown. Reassessment of the documents and acceptance of explanations rejected by the authorities would amount to impermissible reappreciation of evidence in writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The rejection of the two rebate claims was upheld and interference under Article 226 was declined.

Ratio Decidendi: Rebate claims under Rule 18 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 require strict documentary proof of duty payment and correlation of exported goods, and concurrent factual findings based on such documents will not be disturbed in writ jurisdiction absent perversity or jurisdictional error.

Issues: Whether the addition made as unexplained cash credit under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustainable when the assessee furnished the names, addresses, contact details and supporting records of the customers and the Assessing Officer made no independent verification.

Analysis: The assessee produced customer-wise particulars, sample invoices, bank records, cash book and other supporting documents showing receipt of advances from 611 customers. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim mainly on the ground that such collections on a single day during the demonetisation period appeared improbable, but did not carry out basic verification, including issuing notices under section 133(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 or making sample inquiries from the customers or other relevant authorities. On these facts, the assessee was held to have discharged the initial onus placed upon it, and the addition could not be sustained without proper enquiry by the Revenue.

Conclusion: The addition under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessee furnishes complete particulars and supporting material establishing the identity and source of cash receipts, an addition under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 cannot be sustained in the absence of meaningful verification by the Assessing Officer.

Issues: Whether the property acquired by the assessee was used for business purposes during the relevant previous year so as to fall outside section 22 and whether the notional annual letting value added under section 23 was sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee established through audited financial statements, ledger records, balance-sheet schedules, and contemporaneous receipts that the premises were actively deployed for running its pre-primary school and were not held as a passive investment. The receipts forming the disputed amount were shown to be advance collections and refundable deposits connected with school operations, later offered in the subsequent year in line with the matching principle. The Department's inference that the property was vacant or commercially idle was therefore inconsistent with the record. Once the property was found to be used for the purposes of business, the charging provision relating to income from house property did not apply, and the estimate of annual letting value on a percentage of cost basis had no legal foundation.

Conclusion: The addition made under section 23 was unsustainable and the deletion by the first appellate authority was upheld in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Property actually used for the assessee's business during the relevant year is excluded from the charge under section 22, and no notional annual letting value can be brought to tax under section 23 on a mere assumption of vacancy or earning capacity.

Issues: Whether underwriting fees received by a non-resident for ADR/GDR related services were taxable in India as fees for technical services or fees for included services under the Income-tax Act and the India-UK DTAA.

Analysis: The underwriting commission was paid for assuming liability to subscribe to any unsubscribed portion of the issue and did not involve imparting technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or process to the Indian client. Applying the treaty provisions, the decisive test was whether the services made available such technical knowledge or skill to the recipient. The services rendered only enabled the Indian companies to obtain the benefit of the transaction, without transferring any enduring technical capability to them. On that basis, the payment could not be brought within the scope of fees for technical services under section 9(1)(vii), and the more beneficial treaty position under section 90(2) also supported non-taxability.

Conclusion: The underwriting fees were not taxable as fees for technical services or fees for included services, and the revenue's challenge failed.

Issues: Whether the seized goods were liable to be released for re-export after the duty and penalties imposed under the adjudication and appellate orders had been deposited, notwithstanding the pendency of the Revenue's appeal and the subsequent demand notice.

Analysis: The petitioner had already deposited the customs duty and the penalties as modified by the appellate order. The Court noted that the respondent revenue did not dispute the original adjudication, the appellate modification, or the fact of deposit. It also recorded that although the Revenue had filed an appeal before the Tribunal, no stay order or interim protection had been shown. In these circumstances, the Court held that there was no embargo on release of the goods, particularly as the revenue interest stood secured by payment. The later demand notice was not treated as an impediment to release in the present proceedings.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to release of the goods for re-export upon confirmation of deposit of Rs. 78,00,000, and the respondent was directed to release the goods within 10 days.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the duty and penalty determined under the operative customs orders have been duly deposited and no stay of the appellate order exists, the customs authorities cannot withhold release of the goods, including for re-export, merely because a further appeal is pending.

Issues: Whether the petitioners made out a prima facie case for interim protection against retrospective demand of GST on insurance policies supplied to SEZ units, pending final adjudication.

Analysis: The challenge was to show cause notices and consequential orders seeking to levy GST retrospectively for the period from 01 July 2017 to 30 September 2023 on the footing that the amendment inserting the words "for authorised operations" into Section 16 of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 came into force only from 01 October 2023. The Court recorded that, prima facie, the designated officer may not have jurisdiction to retrospectively levy tax on the supplies in question, and noted that Section 2(93) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 defines the recipient by reference to the person liable to pay consideration. The Court found that arguable issues were raised requiring consideration at final hearing.

Conclusion: Interim protection was warranted and the impugned orders arising from the show cause notices were stayed pending final hearing.