Issues: Whether reassessment was vitiated for want of notice under section 143(2) after the assessee filed return in response to notice under section 148, and whether section 292BB could cure the complete absence of such notice.

Analysis: Once the assessee filed return in response to notice under section 148, the Assessing Officer could not complete reassessment to the assessee's detriment without issuing notice under section 143(2). The requirement of notice under section 143(2) is jurisdictional and mandatory in reassessment as well, and delay in filing the return does not dispense with that obligation. Section 292BB cures defects in service of notice only where a notice has in fact been issued; it does not cure complete non-issuance of notice. Since no notice under section 143(2) was issued before the assessment order, the reassessment suffered from a jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: The reassessment was invalid and was rightly annulled; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: In reassessment proceedings, once a return is filed in response to notice under section 148, issuance of notice under section 143(2) is a mandatory jurisdictional requirement, and section 292BB cannot cure the complete absence of such notice.

Issues: Whether the addition of interest income on fixed deposits required interference, and whether the matter should be restored for de novo assessment after granting reasonable opportunity to the assessee.

Analysis: The record showed that the assessee was not given an effective opportunity before the Assessing Officer or the first appellate authority to establish that its facts were distinguishable and that the controversy was not fully covered by the cited Supreme Court decisions. In these circumstances, the appellate order could not be sustained without affording the assessee an opportunity to place its case on facts and law. The matter therefore required fresh examination by the Assessing Officer in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The impugned appellate order was set aside and the addition was restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment after granting reasonable opportunity to the assessee.

Issues: Whether, in reassessment proceedings, the assessee could raise a claim for deduction under section 54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether the consideration receivable under a joint development agreement, in the form of allotted residential units, could qualify as investment in the construction of a new residential house for the purposes of section 54F.

Analysis: Reassessment proceedings under section 147 are confined to escaped income and do not permit an assessee to reopen concluded matters unrelated to the escapement. However, a claim that is directly relatable to the income brought to tax in reassessment may be examined, even if it was not raised in the original return, where the relevant material is already on record or can be considered in appeal. On the substantive exemption issue, the share in the residential units agreed to be allotted under the development arrangement was treated as consideration invested in construction of a residential house. The agreed allotment of constructed residential units under the development arrangement was held to fall within the scope of section 54F.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to raise the section 54F claim in relation to the reassessed capital gains, and the allotment under the development agreement could qualify for exemption under section 54F, but the matter required fresh adjudication by the Assessing Officer on the remaining conditions.

Final Conclusion: The addition was not finally sustained on the exemption issue, and the matter was sent back for reconsideration with directions to examine the assessee's claim under section 54F.

Ratio Decidendi: In reassessment, an assessee may raise a claim that is directly connected to the escaped income, and consideration receivable as allotted residential units under a development agreement can constitute investment in construction of a residential house for section 54F purposes.

Issues: Whether reassessment initiated beyond four years from the end of the relevant assessment year was valid when the recorded reasons did not allege any failure by the assessee to fully and truly disclose all material facts necessary for assessment.

Analysis: The reassessment was initiated after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year. In such a case, the first proviso to Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires not only tangible material for reopening but also a recorded allegation that the assessee failed to fully and truly disclose all material facts necessary for assessment. The reasons recorded for reopening referred only to information from the Investigation Wing and did not state any such failure on the part of the assessee. The absence of this jurisdictional requirement in the recorded reasons went to the root of the validity of the reopening.

Conclusion: The reopening was invalid and the reassessment order was quashed for want of valid assumption of jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: Where reassessment is initiated beyond four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the recorded reasons must expressly disclose failure by the assessee to fully and truly disclose all material facts necessary for assessment; in the absence of such a jurisdictional allegation, the reopening is void.

Issues: (i) whether the reassessment was validly initiated under the reopening provisions; (ii) whether the assessee was entitled to exemption for the capital gains claimed in respect of the residential house investment; (iii) whether the amount treated as income from other sources, including rent from agricultural land, was liable to be added as taxable income.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment was validly initiated under the reopening provisions.

Analysis: The reopening was made after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year. The recorded reasons did not disclose any failure by the assessee to make a full and true disclosure of material facts, and the reopening was founded on a reappraisal of the existing assessment record rather than fresh tangible material. The approval under the sanction provision was also found to be mechanical.

Conclusion: The reassessment initiation was invalid and failed on jurisdictional grounds, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee was entitled to exemption for the capital gains claimed in respect of the residential house investment.

Analysis: The record showed that the assessee had disclosed the capital gains computation and the house investment details during the original assessment proceedings. The entitlement to the exemption was not defeated merely because the claim was reiterated in reassessment proceedings or because the exemption was not separately claimed in the return in the manner suggested by the Revenue. The appellate authority was competent to entertain and grant the lawful claim on the materials already on record.

Conclusion: The exemption claim was allowable and the disallowance was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the amount treated as income from other sources, including rent from agricultural land, was liable to be added as taxable income.

Analysis: The assessee produced material to show agricultural operations and lease of agricultural land for agricultural purposes. The treatment of the receipts as unexplained or as income from other sources was not supported by the evidence. The estimated disallowance made by the appellate authority was therefore unsustainable on the facts recorded.

Conclusion: The addition was not justified and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned reassessment and the related additions could not be sustained, and the assessee succeeded on all substantive grounds.

Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment beyond four years requires a demonstrable failure to disclose material facts fully and truly, and a reopened assessment cannot rest on mere reappraisal of the existing record or change of opinion; appellate authorities may also allow a lawful exemption claim supported by the record.

Issues: Whether the rejection of the rectification application under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, seeking deletion of surcharge and education cess on income taxed under the India-USA Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, was justified.

Analysis: The request made in rectification was in substance an attempt to revisit the merits of the earlier appellate order, which had already considered and rejected the claim against levy of surcharge and education cess. Such a dispute did not disclose any mistake apparent from the record. A rectification jurisdiction cannot be used for reappreciation of the issue or for modification of a concluded view. The decision also noted that the levy issue had been decided against the assessee in the applicable precedent and that the treaty position did not warrant interference in rectification.

Conclusion: The rejection of the rectification application was upheld and the challenge to the levy failed.

Issues: (i) Whether interest was payable on refunds granted in the first set of petitions where the refund was sanctioned within the statutory period after the refund applications were filed; (ii) Whether interest was payable in the connected petitions where reassessment was sought years earlier, the refunds were granted only after prolonged delay, and the refund orders were passed beyond the statutory period.

Issue (i): Whether interest was payable on refunds granted in the first set of petitions where the refund was sanctioned within the statutory period after the refund applications were filed.

Analysis: The refunds in the first set of petitions followed reassessment or directions issued in earlier proceedings, and the refund applications were processed and sanctioned within three months of their filing. Interest under the statutory scheme becomes payable only when a duty ordered to be refunded is not refunded within three months from receipt of the application. The record also showed that the Department acted upon the reassessment and refund proceedings without undue delay once the applications were made in the manner contemplated by law.

Conclusion: Interest was not payable on the refunds in the first set of petitions.

Issue (ii): Whether interest was payable in the connected petitions where reassessment was sought years earlier, the refunds were granted only after prolonged delay, and the refund orders were passed beyond the statutory period.

Analysis: In the connected petitions, the importers had sought reassessment long before the refund orders were passed, and the reassessment itself was completed only after a substantial lapse of time. After reassessment, the Department ultimately accepted that the excess duty was not payable and sanctioned refund, but the refunds were issued well after the statutory three-month period from the refund applications in several matters. Since the delay in completing reassessment and in granting refund was attributable to the Department, the importers could not be deprived of compensation for being kept out of their money.

Conclusion: Interest was payable in the connected petitions from the date of the first reassessment application until the date of actual refund.

Final Conclusion: The challenge succeeded only in part. The claim for interest was rejected in the first set of petitions, but allowed in the connected petitions where prolonged departmental delay in reassessment and refund justified payment of statutory interest.

Ratio Decidendi: Interest on customs refund is payable only when the refund is not made within the statutory period after a valid refund application, and where departmental delay in reassessment postpones the refund beyond that period, the claimant is entitled to statutory interest for the delayed period.

Issues: Whether the custodian was liable to pay duty under section 45(3) of the Customs Act, 1962 and the connected penalties were sustainable, when the disputed containers had earlier examination reports showing cement blocks and no evidence that the seals were broken, tampered with, or substituted while in custody.

Analysis: Custody of imported containers moves on a said-to-contain basis until customs opens and examines them. The custodian is liable only if imported goods are pilfered while in its custody or if there is evidence that the seal was broken and the contents were substituted during such custody. The record contained prior examination reports for the same containers signed by customs officers and the custodian's representative, and those reports did not show broken seals or tampering. The later inventory report and discrepancy with the IGM, without proof of pilferage in custody, was insufficient to fasten duty liability on the custodian.

Conclusion: The duty demand and the consequential penalties were unsustainable and the appeal succeeded in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Duty under section 45(3) of the Customs Act, 1962 can be fastened on a custodian only on proof that imported goods were pilfered or substituted while in its custody, and a mere discrepancy between the IGM description and later found contents, without evidence of tampering or seal breakage during custody, is insufficient.

Issues: Whether the demand of customs duty, confiscation and penalties were sustainable on the allegation that the ISO certificate and in-house test reports were forged, and whether the exports made under DFIA and Advance Authorisation schemes could be denied benefit in the absence of diversion of imported materials.

Analysis: The export promotion schemes and the Board circular permitted reliance on in-house test results for manufacturer-exporters having ISO certification, and also permitted reliance on test reports drawn by Customs, provided the reports disclosed the required technical characteristics. The record showed that samples were in fact drawn by the Department and test reports were available, with no adverse finding that the exported goods failed the applicable norms or that the imported raw materials were diverted. The ISO certificate was treated as a procedural facilitation document and not a substantive condition for availing advance authorisation benefits. The prior action taken for the same alleged lapse, including imposition of penalty under the Customs Act, also indicated that the controversy concerned procedural irregularity rather than a basis to sustain repeated penal consequences and duty demand.

Conclusion: The allegation of forged ISO certification and test reports did not justify denial of exemption benefits, nor sustain the demand, confiscation or penalties. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders could not be sustained, and the appeals succeeded with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Where exports under DFIA or Advance Authorisation are supported by Customs-drawn test reports and there is no allegation of diversion of imported inputs, a procedural defect in ISO-related testing facilities cannot by itself justify denial of exemption benefits, duty demand or penalties.

Issues: Whether the conversion or amendment of shipping bills after export could be allowed despite the time limit in the Board circular, and whether the exporter was entitled to the benefit of duty drawback on that basis.

Analysis: The dispute turned on the scope of amendment of shipping bills under Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962. The Board circular prescribing a three-month time limit was treated as non-statutory and, therefore, not binding so as to defeat a request otherwise eligible under the statute. The decision also proceeded on the principle that a clerical or procedural error in the shipping bill should not deprive the exporter of a substantive drawback benefit where the export was otherwise eligible.

Conclusion: The amendment or conversion of the shipping bills was validly allowed, and the Revenue's challenge failed.

Final Conclusion: The order permitting conversion of the shipping bills was sustained, and the Revenue appeal was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: A time limit contained only in a Board circular cannot override the statutory power to amend shipping bills under Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962, and a procedural or clerical omission should not by itself defeat an otherwise admissible drawback claim.

Issues: Whether concessional rate of duty under Notification No. 57/2017-Customs dated 30 June 2017 is available to inputs and parts imported for use in manufacture of PCBA and cellular mobile phones which are subsequently scrapped during the manufacturing process.

Analysis: The notification grants concessional duty to goods imported "for use" in manufacture, and the IGCR framework requires the imported goods to be put to use for manufacture. The expression "for use" was treated as covering intended use and not only goods that physically remain in the finished product. Scrap generated after the goods have been put to use in the manufacturing process was distinguished from unutilised or defective goods, and the absence of any express exclusion for manufacturing scrap in the notification or the IGCR Rules was treated as significant. The reasoning also rejected reliance on SION norms and on the MOOWR regime under Section 65 of the Customs Act, 1962 as determinative for this notification.

Conclusion: The concessional rate of duty is available to the imported inputs and parts even if they are subsequently scrapped during the manufacturing process, subject to compliance with the IGCR Rules, 2022.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a customs exemption notification grants benefit to goods imported "for use" in manufacture, the exemption extends to inputs actually put to use in the manufacturing process even if they are later lost as process scrap and do not form part of the finished product, unless the notification expressly excludes such scrap.

Issues: Whether the scheme approval and the impugned order could be reopened on the allegation of fraud despite prior affirmation of the scheme by the Tribunal and the Supreme Court.

Analysis: The challenge rested on the claim that certain observations in the impugned order were factually incorrect and therefore amounted to fraud. The record showed that the scheme had been approved by a substantial creditor majority, no objections had been filed by the appellant before the company court, and the authorities said to have been wrongly recorded had not themselves challenged the scheme. The earlier appellate order approving the scheme had already been affirmed by the Supreme Court, attracting the doctrine of merger. On the facts placed, the alleged mistake in recording objections did not amount to fraud so as to nullify the approval.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellant and in favour of the respondent. The scheme approval was not liable to be recalled or interfered with on the ground of fraud.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned observations concerning Tower 5 and the development rights agreement called for interference on the ground of lack of notice or adjudication beyond the scope of the interlocutory application. (ii) Whether the inclusion of Tower 5 and the reference to arbitration/interim orders affected the maintainability of the Section 7 petition or the corporate insolvency resolution process.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned observations concerning Tower 5 and the development rights agreement called for interference on the ground of lack of notice or adjudication beyond the scope of the interlocutory application.

Analysis: The interlocutory application was confined to placing the Delhi High Court and arbitral interim orders on record and seeking that the insolvency order not conflict with those orders. The observations in the impugned order regarding the development rights arrangement were treated as contextual observations made in the course of considering the limited prayer and not as findings finally determining title or ownership. The Appellant had not sought adjudication of title before the Adjudicating Authority, and no final finding on Tower 5 rights was recorded.

Conclusion: The challenge on this ground failed, and the impugned observations did not warrant interference.

Issue (ii): Whether the inclusion of Tower 5 and the reference to arbitration/interim orders affected the maintainability of the Section 7 petition or the corporate insolvency resolution process.

Analysis: The project was treated as a single integrated real estate project, and the Adjudicating Authority was required to examine the statutory threshold under Section 7 on the basis of the total units and the number of applicants. Development rights were treated as capable of constituting property and, therefore, assets within the insolvency framework. The interim orders in arbitration were held not to operate in rem, while the moratorium and overriding effect under the Code meant that arbitration could not hinder the CIRP. The Appellant's remedy, if any, lay in the insolvency process and before the Resolution Professional.

Conclusion: The inclusion of Tower 5 for threshold and insolvency purposes was upheld, and the arbitration-related objections were rejected.

Final Conclusion: No ground for appellate interference was made out, and the challenge to the impugned order was rejected, leaving the CIRP undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Development rights can constitute property and assets of the corporate debtor for insolvency purposes, and interim arbitration orders do not prevent a Section 7 admission or the operation of the moratorium and overriding provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issues: Whether the impugned order, which disposed of the application without recording reasons or findings, could be sustained in law and whether the matter required remand for a reasoned decision.

Analysis: The operative part of the impugned order disclosed no substantive examination of the rival contentions and no discernible reasoning on the basis of facts or law. A quasi-judicial order affecting rights must reflect application of mind and must state the basis of the conclusion reached. A cryptic disposal that merely directs execution of documents and payment of rent, without addressing the competing claims under the approved resolution plan, does not satisfy the requirement of a speaking order. In the absence of reasons, appellate review becomes impossible and the order cannot be tested for legality.

Conclusion: The impugned order could not be sustained and the matter was required to be set aside and remanded for fresh decision by a reasoned order after hearing both sides.

Issues: Whether the fixed deposit amount of Rs. 1,18,88,924/- lying with the Registry of the Appellate Tribunal, together with accrued interest, should be released in favour of the financial creditor after the settlement and dismissal of the section 7 insolvency petition as withdrawn under section 12A of the Code.

Analysis: The parties had settled the dispute and the Adjudicating Authority had already allowed the application under section 12A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, dismissed the section 7 petition as withdrawn, and directed that the amount deposited with the Appellate Tribunal be received by the financial creditor as per the settlement agreement. The Tribunal also noted that its earlier order had contemplated that the deposited amount would be dealt with in accordance with the order passed on the section 12A application. In view of the settlement, the order of the Adjudicating Authority, and the absence of objection from the suspended director, no impediment remained to release the deposit.

Conclusion: The application was allowed and the Registry was directed to release the fixed deposit amount of Rs. 1,18,88,924/- along with accrued interest in favour of the financial creditor after removing the lien.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a settlement is accepted and the insolvency petition is withdrawn under section 12A, the deposited amount may be released to the financial creditor in terms of the settlement and the consequential direction of the Adjudicating Authority.

Issues: (i) whether the adjudicating authority correctly applied Section 10A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 while computing the date of default and the amount excluded from the insolvency petition; (ii) whether a pre-existing dispute existed so as to defeat the Section 9 application; and (iii) whether the difference between the amount stated in the demand notice under Section 8 and the amount claimed in the Section 9 petition rendered the application invalid.

Issue (i): whether the adjudicating authority correctly applied Section 10A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 while computing the date of default and the amount excluded from the insolvency petition.

Analysis: The credit period under the dealership arrangement was not uniform for all invoices. Invoices relating to goods supplied from the Indian warehouse were governed by a 40-day credit period, while only invoices for goods supplied after import attracted a 90-day period. The exclusionary computation adopted below treated certain Indian-warehouse invoices as if they carried a 90-day period, which distorted the default date and the amount said to fall within the Section 10A window. On the correct contractual construction, the unpaid amount remaining outside the barred period crossed the statutory threshold.

Conclusion: The Section 10A computation was and the claim could not be rejected on that basis.

Issue (ii): whether a pre-existing dispute existed so as to defeat the Section 9 application.

Analysis: The alleged dispute arose from a tripartite arrangement executed after the default had already occurred. No reply to the demand notice was shown, and the later email relied upon by the adjudicating authority related to a distinct transaction and was sent long after the notice under Section 8. Such post-default material did not establish a dispute existing before the insolvency demand.

Conclusion: No pre-existing dispute was established for the purpose of rejecting the Section 9 application.

Issue (iii): whether the difference between the amount stated in the demand notice under Section 8 and the amount claimed in the Section 9 petition rendered the application invalid.

Analysis: The discrepancy was explained by part-payments made after the demand notice and by the addition of contractual interest in the petition. Where the operational debt otherwise remained above the statutory threshold, a variation between the notice amount and the petition amount did not by itself vitiate the application.

Conclusion: The mismatch in figures did not justify dismissal of the Section 9 petition.

Final Conclusion: The dismissal of the insolvency application was unsustainable, and the matter required fresh consideration before the adjudicating authority.

Ratio Decidendi: For deciding a Section 9 application, the contractual credit period and the correct default date must be applied to each invoice, and a post-default arrangement or later communication does not establish a pre-existing dispute; a difference between the demand notice amount and the petition amount is not fatal if the operational debt otherwise remains above the statutory threshold.

Issues: Whether anticipatory bail should be granted in a prosecution under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, in view of the statutory rigour of Section 45 and the need for custodial interrogation.

Analysis: The allegations concerned laundering of proceeds of crime through a network of companies and alleged diversion and disposal of assets, including conduct said to have continued during the period of interim protection. The statutory regime under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, applies to anticipatory bail as well, and the Court must assess the existence of reasonable grounds and the likelihood of further offending while on bail. On the material placed, the accused was found to have evaded investigation, given false answers during interrogation, filed statements inconsistent with those answers, and allegedly interfered with searches by directing an associate to suppress incriminating material. These circumstances, coupled with the stated need to trace assets and prepare an inventory for restoration to investors, justified custodial interrogation. The considerations urged for protection did not outweigh the seriousness of the conduct or the investigative .

Conclusion: Anticipatory bail was declined.

Issues: Whether refund of service tax paid under the erstwhile regime, where credit could not be availed after transition to GST, was admissible under the transitional provisions of the CGST Act.

Analysis: The refund claim arose from tax paid under the earlier service tax law after the appointed day, when the assessees could no longer take Cenvat credit because the GST regime had come into force. The governing provision was Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, 2017, which mandates that refund claims for amounts paid under the existing law are to be disposed of under that law and any amount found due is to be paid in cash. The Tribunal followed prior decisions holding that such claims are covered by the transitional scheme and that the inability to carry forward or utilise credit in GST does not defeat the substantive right to refund of amounts paid under the erstwhile law.

Conclusion: Refund of the service tax paid under the earlier law was admissible, and the matter was remanded to the jurisdictional authority to consider and allow the refund claims in accordance with the Tribunal's findings.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax was chargeable on invoices issued before completion of works contract services when the service recipient's project had not materialised and no payment was received; (ii) Whether invocation of the extended period and penalties was sustainable in the absence of suppression or intent to evade tax.

Issue (i): Whether service tax was chargeable on invoices issued before completion of works contract services when the service recipient's project had not materialised and no payment was received.

Analysis: Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 requires an invoice to be issued after completion of taxable service or receipt of payment, whichever is earlier. The invoices in question were treated as not representing completed services because the project had stalled and the recipient had not accepted the services or made payment. In the absence of completed service, the charging provisions under Section 66B of the Finance Act, 1994 and the statutory definition of service under Section 65(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 were held not to support levy merely on the basis of invoices raised.

Conclusion: Service tax was not chargeable on the invoices issued in these circumstances, and the demand was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether invocation of the extended period and penalties was sustainable in the absence of suppression or intent to evade tax.

Analysis: The records showed that the amounts were reflected in the books of account and balance sheet, the recipient had not paid, and the dispute was already visible from the surrounding facts. On that basis, the ingredients of suppression of facts and intent to evade tax required for the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 were not established. Once the demand itself could not survive, the consequential penalties under Sections 77(1), 77(2) and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 also could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The extended period and penalties were not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The demand of service tax was set aside and the appeal succeeded with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Service tax cannot be levied merely on invoices raised before completion of service where the service itself has not materialised, and the extended period and penalty provisions cannot be invoked without proved suppression or intent to evade tax.

Issues: (i) Whether Cenvat credit could be denied on the ground that the input service providers later appeared non-existent at their registered addresses and had not paid tax. (ii) Whether the demand was barred by limitation and whether the late fee was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether Cenvat credit could be denied on the ground that the input service providers later appeared non-existent at their registered addresses and had not paid tax.

Analysis: The credit was taken on invoices issued by registered service providers and the payments were made through banking channels. The record did not establish that the appellant had not received the services. The fact that the providers were not found at their declared addresses during a later investigation did not, by itself, show that the services were never received. The omission of the earlier condition under the relevant credit rules also meant that the recipient was not required to ensure deposit of tax by the service provider. The factual matrix showed bona fide availment of credit on valid documents.

Conclusion: The disallowance of Cenvat credit was not sustainable, and the related interest and penalty could not survive.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand was barred by limitation and whether the late fee was sustainable.

Analysis: The notice was issued after a long lapse, while the relevant figures had already been disclosed in the returns and the department relied on those very documents for the demand. No suppression with intent to evade was established, so the extended period was unavailable. At the same time, the returns were filed beyond time, and the statutory late fee remained payable.

Conclusion: The demand was time-barred, but the late fee was correctly confirmed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded on the main tax demand and consequential levy, but failed to the limited extent of the late fee.

Ratio Decidendi: Cenvat credit cannot be denied merely because the supplier is later found unavailable at its registered address, where receipt of service and payment on valid invoices are established and the recipient is not shown to have acted with suppression or collusion.