Issues: (i) Whether the delay in filing the appeal before the first appellate authority stood excluded in view of the COVID-19 limitation orders. (ii) Whether the notice under section 143(2) was barred by limitation and issued without jurisdiction, rendering the assessment invalid.

Issue (i): Whether the delay in filing the appeal before the first appellate authority stood excluded in view of the COVID-19 limitation orders.

Analysis: The assessment order and the filing of the appeal both fell within the period covered by the Supreme Court's suo motu extension of limitation during the COVID-19 period. In such circumstances, the delay counted by the first appellate authority could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The appeal before the first appellate authority was treated as valid and not time-barred.

Issue (ii): Whether the notice under section 143(2) was barred by limitation and issued without jurisdiction, rendering the assessment invalid.

Analysis: The return had been filed on 31.10.2019, while the notice under section 143(2) was issued after the prescribed limitation period. The notice was also found to have been issued before the transfer of jurisdiction became effective under section 127. On these facts, the notice suffered from both limitation and jurisdictional defects, which vitiated the assessment framed thereafter.

Conclusion: The notice under section 143(2) was invalid and the assessment order was quashed.

Final Conclusion: The jurisdictional defect in the notice under section 143(2) succeeded, the assessment was annulled, and the assessee's appeal was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: A notice issued under section 143(2) beyond the statutory time limit and before the acquiring of jurisdiction by the assessing authority is invalid, and the assessment founded on such notice cannot survive.

Issues: Whether the addition made under section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, treating the bitcoin investment as unexplained, was sustainable where the assessee claimed that the investment was disclosed and the transaction resulted in a loss.

Analysis: The record showed that the assessee had made an investment of Rs. 12.50 lakhs through banking channels and later received only compensatory amount under the settlement arrangement, while the material also indicated bitcoin transactions of a higher aggregate value. The authorities below treated the balance as unexplained investment, but the appellate record indicated that the original investment and the receipt of compensation were both disclosed. In these circumstances, the addition could not be sustained without proper verification of the loss claim and the transaction details. The matter required fresh examination by the Assessing Officer on the evidentiary basis of the alleged loss and the absence of taxable gain.

Conclusion: The addition was not finally upheld and the issue was remitted for verification by the Assessing Officer, resulting in relief to the assessee in part.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was leviable where the quantum appeal had been admitted by the High Court and the addition was therefore debatable.

Analysis: The admission of the quantum appeals by the High Court and the framing of substantial questions of law showed that the sustainability of the addition had not attained finality. In such a situation, the issue ceased to be clear-cut and became debatable. Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) can be sustained only where concealment of material particulars or furnishing of inaccurate particulars is established, and not where the underlying addition itself remains open to serious judicial scrutiny. The reasoning was consistent with the jurisdictional High Court decisions relied upon, which treat admission of a substantial question of law as a circumstance indicating that penalty is not warranted.

Conclusion: The deletion of penalty was upheld and the revenue's challenge failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a quantum addition is pending in appeal before the High Court on substantial questions of law, the addition is treated as debatable and penalty for concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is not leviable.

Issues: Whether the return could be treated as invalid for want of an audit report when the assessee claimed to have no income from business or profession and whether the matter required factual verification before denying rectification and refund-related relief.

Analysis: The assessee's consistent case was that it had earned income only from capital gains and other sources and, therefore, was not required to furnish an audit report. The lower authorities did not examine this core factual plea and instead shifted responsibility between the CPC and the jurisdictional Assessing Officer. The Tribunal held that the authorities were required to verify whether any business or professional income actually existed and, on that basis, determine whether an audit report was mandatory. The Tribunal also noted that a bona fide mistake in the return should not, by itself, prevent appropriate relief if the substantive claim is found correct.

Conclusion: The order of the CIT(A) was set aside and the matter was restored to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer for fresh examination of the assessee's claim, with consequential relief to follow if the claim is found correct.

Issues: (i) Whether reopening of assessment under sections 147 and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid when it rested only on general information about a penny stock and did not show assessee-specific material or an independent nexus. (ii) Whether the additions made towards alleged unexplained sale consideration under section 69A, alleged commission under section 69C, and consequential interest addition could survive on merits.

Issue (i): Whether reopening of assessment under sections 147 and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid when it rested only on general information about a penny stock and did not show assessee-specific material or an independent nexus.

Analysis: The reassessment was founded on information regarding manipulation in the scrip and on general allegations that beneficiaries had obtained bogus gains. The record did not show any specific material linking the assessee, his broker, or his transactions to the alleged accommodation entry network. The reasons recorded were based on borrowed satisfaction and lacked an independent formation of belief on the basis of material relatable to the assessee. In the absence of a live-link between the information and the assessee's case, the jurisdictional requirement for reopening was not met.

Conclusion: The reopening was invalid and bad in law, and the reassessment could not be sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether the additions made towards alleged unexplained sale consideration under section 69A, alleged commission under section 69C, and consequential interest addition could survive on merits.

Analysis: The addition of the entire sale consideration treated the share-sale proceeds as unexplained money without proving that the assessee's transactions were sham or that the assessee was part of any rigging scheme. No evidence showed receipt or payment of commission by the assessee, and the alleged commission addition was unsupported. Once the reassessment itself failed, the consequential interest addition also could not stand.

Conclusion: The additions under sections 69A and 69C, together with the consequential interest addition, were deleted.

Final Conclusion: The assessment reopening was quashed and all additions made in the reassessment were deleted, resulting in relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment cannot be sustained on the basis of general third-party information alone unless the Assessing Officer forms an independent belief, supported by material having a live-link with the assessee, that income has escaped assessment.

Issues: (i) Whether a show cause notice for recovery of customs duty could be issued without challenging the bill of entry or out-of-charge order; (ii) whether Boronated Calcium Nitrate imported by the appellant was entitled to the concessional benefit under Notification No. 50/2017-Cus. dated 30.06.2017.

Issue (i): Whether a show cause notice for recovery of customs duty could be issued without challenging the bill of entry or out-of-charge order.

Analysis: The relevant legal framework permitted recovery proceedings under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 for non-levy or short-levy of duty. The order records that assessment could be reviewed through statutory proceedings under Section 28, and that the absence of a separate challenge to the bill of entry or out-of-charge order did not bar issuance of notice. The appellant's reliance on finality of assessment was held not to assist it on this point.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellant and in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether Boronated Calcium Nitrate imported by the appellant was entitled to the concessional benefit under Notification No. 50/2017-Cus. dated 30.06.2017.

Analysis: The notification granted concessional duty only to calcium nitrate as a specified water-soluble fertilizer. The imported product was treated as Boronated Calcium Nitrate and was found to be a distinct product from calcium nitrate, with different composition and characteristics under the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1985. The exemption notification was required to be strictly construed, and the burden to establish eligibility rested on the claimant of exemption. Since the product did not squarely fall within the notified entry, the benefit could not be extended.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellant and in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were not maintainable on the appellant's exemption claim and the duty demand was sustained, resulting in dismissal of all connected appeals.

Ratio Decidendi: A customs exemption notification must be strictly construed, the claimant must prove clear entitlement to the concessional entry, and a product that is materially distinct from the notified commodity cannot claim the exemption by implication; recovery proceedings under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 may also proceed notwithstanding the absence of a separate challenge to the bill of entry or out-of-charge order.

Issues: (i) Whether the amount lying with the corporate debtor could be used for payment of gratuity dues of erstwhile employees if such claims were admitted. (ii) Whether the liquidator could utilise the corporate debtor's funds for prosecuting the arbitration against BSNL.

Issue (i): Whether the amount lying with the corporate debtor could be used for payment of gratuity dues of erstwhile employees if such claims were admitted.

Analysis: The appellant had given no objection for utilisation of the bank balance towards gratuity dues, but the liquidator stated that the claims received were belated and had not been admitted. The entitlement to payment therefore depended on whether such gratuity claims were accepted in liquidation.

Conclusion: The amount could be applied towards gratuity only if the claims were admitted; failing admission, the amount was to be made available to the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the liquidator could utilise the corporate debtor's funds for prosecuting the arbitration against BSNL.

Analysis: The sale notice provided that any proceeds from the BSNL arbitration would be distributed to creditors under the insolvency framework, but that did not prohibit the liquidator or the stakeholders' consultation committee from using the corporate debtor's funds to continue the arbitration.

Conclusion: The challenge on this ground was rejected and the liquidator was permitted to use the funds for prosecuting the arbitration.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was modified only to permit payment of gratuity if the claims were admitted, otherwise the amount was to be released to the appellant, while the refusal to restrain use of funds for the BSNL arbitration was sustained.

Issues: (i) whether the absence of confirmation of seizure under Section 37A of FEMA, and the competent authority's rejection of the seizure, extinguished the foundation for the show cause notice and adjudication proceedings; (ii) whether the High Court and the Adjudicating Authority were justified in treating Section 37A(4) of FEMA as permitting adjudication to proceed without awaiting the departmental appeal against the competent authority's order.

Issue (i): whether the absence of confirmation of seizure under Section 37A of FEMA, and the competent authority's rejection of the seizure, extinguished the foundation for the show cause notice and adjudication proceedings.

Analysis: Section 37A creates a preventive mechanism based on a tentative seizure supported by a reason to believe, but the competent authority's scrutiny under sub-sections (2) and (3) is a substantive check on whether the material can sustain even a prima facie inference of contravention. The refusal to confirm seizure, on a finding that no foreign security of value was shown to have been held and that the suspicion had no foundation, materially supported the appellants' challenge. In these peculiar facts, the show cause notice was not immune from writ scrutiny, because a notice may be interdicted where there is patent lack of jurisdiction, non-application of mind, or abuse of process.

Conclusion: the foundation for the show cause notice could not be treated as unaffected by the competent authority's order, and the challenge to the notice was maintainable.

Issue (ii): whether the High Court and the Adjudicating Authority were justified in treating Section 37A(4) of FEMA as permitting adjudication to proceed without awaiting the departmental appeal against the competent authority's order.

Analysis: Section 37A(4) operates where seizure is confirmed and continues till disposal of adjudication proceedings; it does not govern a case where seizure was not confirmed. By treating the interim seizure as having decisive bearing on the final adjudication, and by relying on the High Court's observations despite the pending statutory appeal against the competent authority's order, the adjudicating process effectively foreclosed the appellate remedy and ignored the legal effect of the un-reversed refusal to confirm seizure. The resulting adjudication was held to be contrary to law.

Conclusion: the High Court's dismissal of the writ challenges and the adjudicating authority's order could not stand, and the departmental appeal against the competent authority's order had to be decided first.

Final Conclusion: the impugned orders were set aside, the proceedings were revived from the stage of the show cause notice, and the departmental appeal against the competent authority's order was directed to be decided first before the show cause proceedings were carried forward.

Ratio Decidendi: a show cause notice and consequential adjudication under FEMA cannot be sustained on a footing inconsistent with a competent authority's un-reversed refusal to confirm seizure, and a statutory appeal against that refusal must be decided before the adjudication proceeds further where the later proceedings depend on the same foundational facts.

Issues: Whether penalties under Sections 76, 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 were sustainable in respect of service tax on renting of immovable property service, where the levy for the relevant period arose from a retrospective amendment and the assessee had already paid the tax and interest.

Analysis: The dispute relating to renting of immovable property service was under prolonged litigation and the levy for the relevant period was introduced by retrospective amendment. In such a situation, the non-payment during the interregnum was treated as arising from an interpretational controversy rather than a deliberate attempt to evade tax. The Tribunal also considered the statutory protection under Section 80, including the later immunity provision in Section 80(2), and held that even if the strict conditions of Section 80(2) were disputed, the assessee still had reasonable cause for the default within the meaning of Section 80(1). The Tribunal further held that the ingredients necessary to invoke penalty under Section 78 were absent.

Conclusion: The penalties under Sections 76, 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 were not sustainable and were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where tax liability arises from a retrospective levy and the default is attributable to a bona fide interpretational dispute without deliberate intent to evade, penalties under Sections 76, 77 and 78 are not leviable if the assessee establishes reasonable cause under Section 80.

Issues: (i) Whether loading of cut iron goods on trucks for onward transport to the buyer's premises was classifiable as Cargo Handling Service under Section 65(23) of the Finance Act, 1994 for the period before and after the 2008 amendment. (ii) Whether penalty could be waived under Section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 on the ground of reasonable cause and bona fide belief.

Issue (i): Whether loading of cut iron goods on trucks for onward transport to the buyer's premises was classifiable as Cargo Handling Service under Section 65(23) of the Finance Act, 1994 for the period before and after the 2008 amendment.

Analysis: The loaded goods were intended for transportation to the customer and were therefore in the nature of cargo. The factual setting did not match the cited decisions relied upon by the appellant, which turned on different situations such as transportation service, mining area activities, or handling within factory premises. On the facts found, the loading activity was treated as falling within the scope of Cargo Handling Service even for the period prior to 2008.

Conclusion: The loading charges were liable to Service Tax under Cargo Handling Service, and the demand was upheld on merits in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty could be waived under Section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 on the ground of reasonable cause and bona fide belief.

Analysis: The appellant was already registered for road transport services and entertained a bona fide belief that separate tax was not payable on the loading activity, supported by competing views in judicial decisions and the surrounding business circumstances. On that basis, reasonable cause for non-payment was accepted for the relevant period, making the penalty provisions inapplicable by virtue of Section 80.

Conclusion: Penalty under Sections 77 and 78 was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The tax demand was sustained, but statutory penalties were deleted, resulting in partial relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Loading of goods intended for immediate transport to the buyer may constitute Cargo Handling Service on the facts of the case, while penalty can be waived where non-payment occurred under a bona fide belief amounting to reasonable cause under Section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Issues: (i) Whether the refund claim was barred by limitation under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the appellant's payment through Cenvat credit amounted to contravention of Rule 3(4) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 or was a bona fide wrong payment of duty.

Issue (i): Whether the refund claim was barred by limitation under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, 2017.

Analysis: The refund arose from duty paid twice, once through Cenvat credit and again in cash after audit pointed out the mistake. The claim was rejected below as time-barred, but the governing principle applied was that tax paid under a mistake of law is not to be denied merely because the period under Section 11B has expired. The decision relied on the view that limitation under Section 11B does not defeat refund of duty paid by mistake, and that retention of such excess tax would be inconsistent with Article 265 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The refund claim was not barred by limitation and was admissible.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant's payment through Cenvat credit amounted to contravention of Rule 3(4) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 or was a bona fide wrong payment of duty.

Analysis: The record showed that the appellant had availed the benefit of Notification No. 01/2011-CE dated 1st March, 2011 and, by mistake, paid duty from the Cenvat account instead of cash. The mistake was corrected after audit by cash payment, resulting in double payment. No material showed a deliberate or wilful misuse of credit; the payment from credit account was treated as an inadvertent error rather than a contravention attracting adverse consequences.

Conclusion: The payment from Cenvat credit was a bona fide mistake and not a contravention of Rule 3(4) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

Final Conclusion: The impugned rejection of refund was set aside and the refund claim was allowed with consequential reliefs.

Ratio Decidendi: Refund of duty paid under a bona fide mistake cannot be denied on the ground of limitation under Section 11B when the excess payment is shown to be inadvertent and its retention would amount to collection without authority of law.

Issues: Whether the Revenue appeals were maintainable in view of the monetary limit prescribed under the litigation policy and whether the penalties imposed under Section 112(b) and Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962, involving less than Rs. 50 lakhs in each case, warranted adjudication by the Tribunal.

Analysis: The appeals arose from a common order confirming penalties in individual matters where the disputed amount was below the threshold monetary limit fixed by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs through its instruction dated 02.11.2023. The Tribunal noted that Section 131BA of the Customs Act, 1962, empowered the Board to frame such litigation policy instructions to reduce government litigation. The dispute did not fall within any stated exception permitting the Revenue to pursue the appeals despite the low tax effect. Accordingly, the appeals were considered barred by the applicable litigation policy.

Conclusion: The Revenue appeals were not maintainable and were dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal declined to entertain the Revenue's challenge on account of the prescribed monetary threshold under the Customs litigation policy, leaving the impugned order undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the tax effect in each appeal is below the prescribed monetary threshold and no exception under the applicable litigation policy applies, the appeal is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand for the period 2009-10 and 2010-11 could survive against the partnership firm in the absence of a fresh show cause notice after remand. (ii) Whether the construction of a community hall and fruit and vegetable stalls was taxable as commercial construction. (iii) Whether TDS and refundable security amounts were includible in the taxable value, and whether boundary walls, sports complex and landscaping were exigible to service tax.

Issue (i): Whether the demand for the period 2009-10 and 2010-11 could survive against the partnership firm in the absence of a fresh show cause notice after remand.

Analysis: The earlier remand had specifically held that a single show cause notice covering both the erstwhile proprietorship concern and the newly formed partnership firm was not executable and had left it open to the Department to issue separate notices in accordance with law. The post-remand adjudication proceeded without any fresh notice addressed to the partnership firm for the later period. In that situation, the demand for the later financial years could not be sustained against the partnership firm.

Conclusion: The demand for 2009-10 and 2010-11 was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the construction of a community hall and fruit and vegetable stalls was taxable as commercial construction.

Analysis: The community hall was treated as a public utility and the record did not establish that it was non-commercial merely because it served public functions. The fruit and vegetable stalls were inherently commercial structures intended for trade. On the facts, the community hall and the stalls fell within taxable works executed for commercial use, while the assessee's plea of non-commercial character was not accepted.

Conclusion: The demand on these items was upheld against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether TDS and refundable security amounts were includible in the taxable value, and whether boundary walls, sports complex and landscaping were exigible to service tax.

Analysis: Service tax was held leviable on the gross amount charged under the valuation provision, but statutory TDS deducted and deposited under income-tax law did not represent consideration for the service and was not includible. Refundable security deposits also did not form part of taxable value. Boundary walls erected for public or semi-public use were treated as non-commercial works, and the Department failed to establish a commercial character. The sports complex and landscaping were found to be for public use and predominantly non-commercial, so the exemption or non-taxability adopted by the adjudicating authority was sustained. As regards the EWS house contracts, the assessee's payment was accepted subject to departmental verification.

Conclusion: TDS and refundable security amounts were excluded from valuation, the departmental challenge on boundary walls, sports complex and landscaping failed, and verification was permitted for the EWS house payment.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal failed, while the assessee obtained partial relief by having the later-period demand quashed and by securing exclusion or acceptance of specified valuation components, with certain demands on commercial construction sustained.

Issues: (i) whether service tax demand could be sustained when the adjudicating authority confirmed it under Works Contract Service though the show cause notice proposed a different taxable category; (ii) whether the construction activity relating to Coronation Park, including parking and connected structures, was covered by the exemption for services rendered in relation to a historical monument under Notification No. 25/2012-ST.

Issue (i): whether service tax demand could be sustained when the adjudicating authority confirmed it under Works Contract Service though the show cause notice proposed a different taxable category.

Analysis: The show cause notice was the foundation of the demand and proceeded on the basis of one taxable category, while the adjudication order confirmed liability under a different head. A demand cannot be sustained on a classification not put to the assessee in the notice, because the assessee must be able to meet the precise charge. The change in classification from the notice to the order amounted to travelling beyond the notice and offended natural justice.

Conclusion: The demand confirmed under Works Contract Service was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): whether the construction activity relating to Coronation Park, including parking and connected structures, was covered by the exemption for services rendered in relation to a historical monument under Notification No. 25/2012-ST.

Analysis: Coronation Park was treated as a historical site of national importance, and the exemption under Sl. No. 12 of Notification No. 25/2012-ST extended to services by way of construction and allied works for a historical monument. The parking facility associated with the park was found to be for public utility and not commercial in nature. The department's attempt to sustain demand on parts such as the International Centre and Restaurant also failed because the confirmed demand had been made under a different head than the one proposed in the show cause notice.

Conclusion: The exemption was held applicable and the revenue's challenge was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded on the principal demand, while the revenue's cross appeal failed, resulting in complete relief to the assessee on the disputed levy.

Ratio Decidendi: A service tax demand cannot be confirmed under a taxable category different from the one proposed in the show cause notice, and exemption for services connected with a historical monument extends to non-commercial public utility works falling within the notified entry.

Issues: (i) Whether transportation charges collected in addition to clearing and forwarding charges were includible in the taxable value of clearing and forwarding agent service; (ii) whether Cenvat credit on outdoor catering services was allowable; (iii) whether the extended period of limitation was invokable.

Issue (i): Whether transportation charges collected in addition to clearing and forwarding charges were includible in the taxable value of clearing and forwarding agent service.

Analysis: The agreements showed that the appellant arranged transportation on behalf of the principals and the transport expenses were separately billed and reimbursed. The taxable value under section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 is confined to the gross amount charged for the service rendered, and reimbursable expenditure cannot be added unless the statute so permits. Rule 5(1) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 could not justify inclusion of such charges for the relevant period, and in any event the principle laid down in Intercontinental Consultants excluded reimbursable expenses from valuation before the 2015 amendment.

Conclusion: The transportation charges were not includible in the taxable value, and the demand on this count was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether Cenvat credit on outdoor catering services was allowable.

Analysis: Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, as substituted from 01.04.2011, specifically excluded outdoor catering services when used primarily for personal use or consumption of employees. The appellant's availed credit related to outdoor catering, and the exclusion applied for the relevant period. The credit was, therefore, not admissible, though the dispute was interpretative in nature.

Conclusion: The denial of Cenvat credit was upheld for the normal period.

Issue (iii): Whether the extended period of limitation was invokable.

Analysis: The appellant had been filing returns and there was no allegation or proof of wilful suppression, fraud, collusion, or misstatement with intent to evade tax. The valuation dispute had also been the subject of earlier proceedings, which weakened the Revenue's case for invoking the longer limitation period. The burden to establish the exceptional conditions for extended limitation was not discharged.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invokable, and the credit demand was confined to the normal period.

Final Conclusion: The demand for inclusion of transportation charges and the related interest and penalties were set aside, the outdoor catering credit was disallowed only for the normal period, and the appeal succeeded in part.

Ratio Decidendi: For the relevant period, reimbursable transportation expenses incurred by a clearing and forwarding agent on behalf of the principal do not form part of the taxable value under section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994, and extended limitation cannot be invoked without proof of wilful suppression or other statutory ingredients.

Issues: Whether the failure to grant a personal hearing under Section 75(4) before adjudication could be cured by a hearing in appeal.

Analysis: Section 75(4) of the West Bengal Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 mandates an opportunity of personal hearing before an adverse adjudication. Denial of that statutory opportunity constitutes a breach of natural justice going to the root of the adjudication. A subsequent hearing at the appellate stage cannot cure the defective original adjudication, and specific prejudice need not be separately established.

Conclusion: An adjudication made without the mandatory personal hearing is legally unsustainable, and the subsequent appellate hearing does not validate that defect.