Issues: Whether a fresh application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was maintainable after the claimant had abandoned the earlier arbitral proceedings and whether the later application was barred as being founded on the same cause of action.

Analysis: The jurisdiction under Section 11 is confined primarily to the existence of an arbitration agreement, but principles analogous to Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 can apply where a party abandons earlier proceedings without liberty to institute a fresh one. Abandonment cannot be lightly inferred, but a clear communication declining to participate further and the surrounding conduct may establish that the claimant has given up the earlier proceeding. On the facts, the later application did not arise from a new cause of action merely because the earlier unrelated litigation concerning the auction of the land had concluded; the dispute between the parties remained the same and had already been invoked earlier.

Conclusion: The subsequent application under Section 11(6) was not maintainable and was barred by the principles governing abandonment and fresh proceedings on the same cause of action.

Issues: Whether the addition made under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of cash deposits during the demonetisation period was sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee explained that the cash deposited represented money received from the family corpus created by the late mother, supported by an affidavit and surrounding circumstances. The explanation was also linked to the wedding expenses and the asserted source of funds, while the Revenue did not effectively rebut the specific factual defence. In these circumstances, the explanation was treated as credible and the unexplained nature of the deposit was not established.

Conclusion: The addition under section 69A was not sustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the writ petition should be entertained against the adjudication order and rectification rejection order, or the petitioner should be relegated to the statutory appellate remedy with consideration of delay arising from pendency of the rectification application and writ proceedings.

Analysis: The order records that the petitioner questioned the adjudication on merits and also challenged the rejection of rectification. The Court, without examining the merits of the tax demand, held that the petitioner may approach the appellate authority and raise all grounds of law and fact. It further directed that, if an appeal is filed with statutory pre-deposit and a delay condonation application, the appellate authority should consider the explanation for delay by taking into account the period spent in pursuing the rectification application and the writ petition.

Conclusion: The petitioner was relegated to the appellate remedy, with the appellate authority to consider delay in the manner indicated and then decide the appeal in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether a State GST officer had jurisdiction to initiate and continue proceedings for IGST on imported goods, where the levy and collection arise at the stage of customs assessment; (ii) whether cross-empowerment under the GST framework enabled a State GST officer to proceed against a taxpayer administratively allotted to the Central jurisdiction; (iii) whether the impugned notice could survive when it travelled beyond the original intimation and covered multiple years and issues.

Issue (i): Whether a State GST officer had jurisdiction to initiate and continue proceedings for IGST on imported goods, where the levy and collection arise at the stage of customs assessment.

Analysis: The levy on imported goods is governed by the IGST framework read with the customs law provisions that link IGST collection to customs duty assessment at the point of import. The statutory scheme shows that the determination of duty, tax, cess or other sums on imported goods is carried out by the customs machinery, including assessment and recovery provisions under the Customs Act. Since the IGST on imports is collected in accordance with the customs valuation and levy mechanism, the officer empowered under the State GST regime could not assume jurisdiction over that subject matter.

Conclusion: The jurisdiction to assess and collect IGST on imported goods lay with the customs authorities, not with the State GST officer.

Issue (ii): Whether cross-empowerment under the GST framework enabled a State GST officer to proceed against a taxpayer administratively allotted to the Central jurisdiction.

Analysis: The cross-empowerment provisions permit State and Central officers to act as proper officers only within the limits created by the statutory scheme and the notified allocation of taxpayers. Where proceedings on the same subject matter are already initiated by one side, the other side cannot independently proceed, and the officer must also be the proper officer for the taxpayer concerned. As the taxpayer had been administratively allotted to the Central jurisdiction, the State GST officer could not invoke cross-empowerment to assume authority in the matter.

Conclusion: Cross-empowerment did not confer jurisdiction on the State GST officer in respect of a taxpayer allotted to the Central jurisdiction.

Issue (iii): Whether the impugned notice could survive when it travelled beyond the original intimation and covered multiple years and issues.

Analysis: The later notice went beyond the scope of the earlier intimation by introducing additional matters and covering multiple years. A notice of that kind was treated as impermissible in the light of the governing procedural principles applied by the Court. Once the foundational notice itself was without jurisdiction, the expanded notice could not be sustained on the wider issues also raised therein.

Conclusion: The impugned notice was unsustainable on this ground as well.

Final Conclusion: The proceeding was quashed in relation to the imported-goods IGST demand, and the petitioner obtained complete relief from the impugned notice.

Ratio Decidendi: IGST on imported goods is to be assessed and collected through the customs framework, and cross-empowerment under GST cannot be used by a non-jurisdictional State officer to proceed against a taxpayer allotted to the Central jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether commission paid to non-resident agents and ocean freight payments were liable for tax deduction at source and consequential disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The payments were made to foreign agents who rendered services outside India and had no business connection or permanent establishment in India. On the settled legal position, income of a non-resident is chargeable in India only if it accrues, arises, or is deemed to accrue or arise in India under section 9 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Commission for procuring export orders, where no operations are carried out in India, is not taxable in India and does not constitute fees for technical services. Where the sum paid is not chargeable to tax in India, section 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 does not require withholding, and disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 does not arise. The ocean freight payments were also covered by the applicable legal position relied upon by the first appellate authority.

Conclusion: The payments were not liable to TDS and the disallowance was unsustainable; the Revenue's challenge failed.

Issues: Whether the amount paid by the director from a personal mortgage loan, subsequently repaid by sale of her property, constituted a financial debt owed by the corporate debtor so as to sustain an application under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The director had obtained the loan in her own name by mortgaging her personal property, and the board resolution only recorded that the company would avail mortgage finance on the director's property. The essential requirement under Section 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is that the debt must be disbursed against consideration for the time value of money. On the facts, there was no direct disbursement by the director to the corporate debtor and no transaction showing that the corporate debtor had borrowed the amount from the director with any commercial effect of borrowing. The relied upon authority on stakeholder funding did not apply because the present case did not involve funds infused by the director into the company as a borrowing transaction.

Conclusion: The amount claimed did not constitute a financial debt and the Section 7 application was not maintainable. The appeal failed.

Issues: (i) Whether officers appointed under the Andhra Pradesh GST law could exercise powers under the CGST and IGST enactments by virtue of cross-empowerment, and if so, to what extent in relation to taxpayers administratively allotted to the State. (ii) Whether proceedings under sections 129 and 130 could be sustained in relation to IGST movement of goods originating outside Andhra Pradesh and culminating outside Andhra Pradesh, particularly on grounds of valuation or quantification.

Issue (i): Whether officers appointed under the Andhra Pradesh GST law could exercise powers under the CGST and IGST enactments by virtue of cross-empowerment, and if so, to what extent in relation to taxpayers administratively allotted to the State.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of cross-empowerment operates through the relevant GST provisions and the administrative allocation of taxpayers between Centre and States. An officer appointed under the State enactment becomes a proper officer only for the function assigned and, in respect of the taxpayer allotted to the State, can discharge corresponding functions under the parallel Central and Integrated enactments. The scheme does not confer an unqualified or automatic authority on a State officer to act under the Central or Integrated enactments in the absence of the relevant administrative allocation and functional assignment. The objective is to avoid parallel proceedings and conflicting determinations while preserving the jurisdictional limits of each authority.

Conclusion: Cross-empowerment exists, but only within the limits of taxpayer allocation and assigned function; there is no automatic universal jurisdiction.

Issue (ii): Whether proceedings under sections 129 and 130 could be sustained in relation to IGST movement of goods originating outside Andhra Pradesh and culminating outside Andhra Pradesh, particularly on grounds of valuation or quantification.

Analysis: Sections 129 and 130 are directed to detention, seizure, release, and confiscation by the proper officer in transit cases. Their use cannot be expanded to permit an intermediary State to appropriate penalties or fine in relation to a transaction that does not generate taxable revenue for that State. For IGST movements beginning and ending outside the State, the State officer in Andhra Pradesh cannot exercise confiscatory jurisdiction under sections 129 and 130 merely because the vehicle passed through the State. Further, valuation or quantification disputes at the stage of interception do not justify detention or confiscation unless the statutory conditions for invoking the severe power are otherwise satisfied.

Conclusion: Proceedings under sections 129 and 130 were not sustainable for the impugned IGST inter-State movements on the grounds invoked.

Final Conclusion: The impugned detention and confiscation proceedings were set aside, while the authorities were left free to forward the records to the proper officers concerned for any lawful action.

Ratio Decidendi: Cross-empowerment under the GST framework is confined to the proper officer's assigned function and the taxpayer's administrative allocation, and transit powers under sections 129 and 130 cannot be used by an intermediary State to confiscate or detain goods in an IGST movement wholly outside its taxable nexus or merely to assess valuation disputes at interception.

Issues: (i) Whether training services provided by an MSDE/NSDC affiliated training partner conducting NSQF-aligned digital marketing courses are exempt from GST under Sl. No. 69 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate); (ii) whether the amendment omitting NSDC-approved training partners and the subsequent circular permit exemption for the intervening period from 10.10.2024 to 15.01.2025.

Issue (i): Whether training services provided by an MSDE/NSDC affiliated training partner conducting NSQF-aligned digital marketing courses are exempt from GST under Sl. No. 69 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate).

Analysis: The entry grants exemption to services provided by a training partner approved by the National Skill Development Corporation or the Sector Skill Council, when the services are in relation to the National Skill Development Programme, a vocational skill development course under the National Skill Certification and Monetary Reward Scheme, or any other scheme implemented by NSDC. The applicant was found to be an NSDC-approved training partner, and the digital marketing course was accredited by NSDC and mapped to the relevant skill framework. The services were treated as falling within the exempt entry.

Conclusion: The services were exempt from GST under Sl. No. 69 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate).

Issue (ii): Whether the amendment omitting NSDC-approved training partners and the subsequent circular permit exemption for the intervening period from 10.10.2024 to 15.01.2025.

Analysis: The amended entry temporarily removed the express reference to training partners approved by NSDC and restricted the exemption to training bodies accredited with an awarding body recognised by NCVET. The later notification restored the NSDC route from 16.01.2025. The circular then regularized GST payment for the intervening period on an "as is where is" basis, meaning the past position would stand as regularized according to whether tax had been paid or not.

Conclusion: No exemption was available for the intervening period, but the liability for that period stood regularized on an "as is where is" basis.

Final Conclusion: The applicant's training services were held exempt generally, while the temporary withdrawal period was separately dealt with through regularization under the circular, resulting in only partial relief for that interval.

Issues: Whether input tax credit is admissible on input services used for construction of foundation and structural support for plant and machinery installed within the factory for manufacture of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients, in view of the restriction under section 17(5)(c) of the CGST Act, 2017.

Analysis: The applicant's manufacturing activity required installation of reactors, filters, dryers, condensers, boilers, and allied equipment on RCC and steel structures to ensure stability, alignment, and vibration control. Such equipment and the supporting foundation and structural works were held to be integral to the business of manufacturing APIs and therefore connected with the course or furtherance of business under section 16 of the CGST Act, 2017. The restriction in section 17(5)(c) applies to works contract services used for construction of immovable property, but the Explanation to section 17 specifically includes foundation and structural support within the expression "plant and machinery" and excludes only land, building, other civil structures, telecommunication towers, and pipelines laid outside the factory premises. Applying this definition, the supporting foundations and structural works for the machinery were treated as part of plant and machinery and not as disallowed civil structures. Reliance was also placed on the engineering report and the CBIC clarification concerning components integral to a functional plant network.

Conclusion: Input tax credit on the input services used for construction of foundation and structural support for the plant and machinery was held to be admissible and not hit by section 17(5)(c) of the CGST Act, 2017.

Ratio Decidendi: Foundation and structural support forming an integral part of plant and machinery, and used for making outward supply, fall within the statutory definition of plant and machinery and are not barred by the works contract restriction under section 17(5)(c).

Issues: Whether input tax credit is admissible on input services used for construction of foundation and structural support for plant and machinery installed within the factory for recovery of solvents and treatment of wastewater in API manufacture.

Analysis: The registered person was found to be using the solvent recovery and effluent treatment plants in the course of its business of manufacturing and supplying APIs, so the related construction services were business inputs. The restriction in Section 17(5)(c) applies to works contract services used for construction of immovable property, but the Explanation to Section 17 defines plant and machinery to include apparatus, equipment and machinery fixed to earth by foundation or structural support, and also includes such foundation and structural support while excluding only land, building, other civil structures, telecommunication towers and pipelines laid outside the factory premises. The foundations and supporting structures were treated as integral to the machinery, not as excluded civil structures, and the supporting evidence showed that the machinery required such structures for stability, vibration control and proper functioning.

Conclusion: Input tax credit on the input services used for construction of foundation and structural support for the plant and machinery is admissible and is not blocked by Section 17(5)(c) of the CGST Act, 2017.

Ratio Decidendi: Foundation and structural support that are integral to plant and machinery fall within the statutory definition of plant and machinery under the Explanation to Section 17, and works contract services used for such construction are not hit by the block under Section 17(5)(c).

Issues: (i) whether cash deposits of specified bank notes during demonetisation were liable to be treated as unexplained money under section 69A; (ii) whether the assessee's claim of agricultural income could be disallowed in full or the income had to be accepted as declared; and (iii) whether rejection of books under section 145(3) and estimation of business profit was justified, and if so, at what rate.

Issue (i): whether cash deposits of specified bank notes during demonetisation were liable to be treated as unexplained money under section 69A.

Analysis: The assessee did not produce audited books, bills, vouchers, or corroborative material to establish that the deposits represented genuine sales receipts. The records called for from the agricultural market channels were not furnished in support of the explanation. In these circumstances, the explanation for the source and nature of the cash deposits remained unproved, and adverse inference was permissible.

Conclusion: The addition under section 69A was rightly restored and the deletion by the first appellate authority was reversed, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): whether the assessee's claim of agricultural income could be disallowed in full or the income had to be accepted as declared.

Analysis: The assessee's agricultural source was accepted, but the authorities below adopted inconsistent and ad hoc approaches to quantify the income without adequate factual or empirical basis. The Revenue did not establish a sustainable basis to deny the agricultural source altogether, and the assessee's claim could not be varied merely on a conjectural estimation of yield.

Conclusion: The declared agricultural income was directed to be accepted without variation for the year, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): whether rejection of books under section 145(3) and estimation of business profit was justified, and if so, at what rate.

Analysis: Non-production of books, stock records, vouchers, and invoices, coupled with inconsistencies in the audit report, justified rejection of books and resort to best judgment estimation. However, the estimation at 10% was held to be ad hoc and unsupported by material. A reasonable estimate had to be made on the facts and the nature of business, leading to a moderated rate.

Conclusion: Rejection of books and estimation of profit were upheld, but the profit rate was reduced to 8%, resulting in partial relief to Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue succeeded on the unexplained cash deposit issue, the assessee succeeded on the agricultural income issue, and the business profit addition was sustained only to a reduced extent, so the appeal was partly allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee withholds primary books and corroborative evidence, adverse inference may be drawn and income may be determined on best judgment, but the estimate must still rest on a reasonable and fact-based basis rather than an ad hoc rate.

Issues: Whether the addition made on account of alleged unexplained stock under section 69B could be sustained without properly examining the assessee's claim of melting loss and the supporting evidence.

Analysis: The excess stock was found during survey and the assessee had offered the amount in the return, but the dispute remained whether the resulting difference represented unexplained investment or a business-related melting loss arising from conversion of old jewellery into refined gold. The explanation required examination of the contemporaneous vouchers, refinery receipts, and other documentary material relied upon to show the weight reduction attributable to melting and refining. As the explanation of the alleged huge melting loss was not satisfactorily verified on the existing record, the matter required fresh factual examination by the Assessing Officer.

Conclusion: The addition was not finally upheld or deleted on merits and the issue was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after giving the assessee an opportunity to produce further evidence.

Final Conclusion: The assessee obtained a remand and the appeal was treated as allowed for statistical purposes, leaving the substantive tax issue open for reconsideration.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the explanation for an alleged stock discrepancy depends on a claimed melting loss supported by documentary evidence, the issue cannot be conclusively decided without fresh verification of the underlying facts.

Issues: Whether the Adjudicating Authority was bound to direct reconsideration of the repayment plan under section 114(3) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, after the Committee of Creditors rejected the plan by the requisite voting majority.

Analysis: The repayment plan proposed by the personal guarantor was for a sum far below the admitted dues of the financial creditor. The plan was placed before the Committee of Creditors and was rejected by the creditor holding 71.22% voting share, and the plan did not secure the minimum required voting support. Section 114(1) requires the Adjudicating Authority to act on the basis of the report of the meeting of creditors, while section 114(3) confers only an enabling discretion to direct reconsideration where the Authority forms an opinion that modification is required. Such power is not automatic and can be exercised only when the record discloses sufficient circumstances justifying modification.

Conclusion: The Adjudicating Authority was not obliged to direct reconsideration of the repayment plan, and no interference with the order accepting the rejection of the plan was warranted.

Outcome: Delay condoned. The special leave petition was dismissed and the interlocutory application(s), if any, stood disposed of.

Issues: (i) Whether the methodology adopted for examining profiteering in a real estate project, by comparing the ratio of credit to purchase value and computing project-wise savings per square foot, was valid; (ii) whether the benefit of input tax credit had been passed on to the complainant and other homebuyers; (iii) whether the EPC contractor's input tax credit flow required separate verification for determining profiteering by the respondent; and (iv) whether the treatment of ITC reversal, unsold units, and the difference between the earlier and later reports affected the conclusion under section 171.

Issue (i): Whether the methodology adopted for examining profiteering in a real estate project, by comparing the ratio of credit to purchase value and computing project-wise savings per square foot, was valid.

Analysis: Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires any benefit of input tax credit to be passed on by commensurate reduction in prices. The methodology in real estate matters is not confined to a rigid formula, and the relevant exercise must reflect the peculiar facts of the project. The comparison of pre-GST and post-GST credit ratios to purchase value, as applied after the guidance in Reckitt Benckiser, was accepted as a fair method for the project under investigation because there is no direct correlation between turnover and ITC in a construction project.

Conclusion: The methodology was upheld and the objection to it failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the benefit of input tax credit had been passed on to the complainant and other homebuyers.

Analysis: The record included ledger entries and confirmation of adjustment of a quantified amount against the complainant's dues. The respondent also placed material showing that ITC benefit had been passed on to other homebuyers through credit notes, and confirmations were obtained from some recipients. The complainant did not displace this material with reliable evidence.

Conclusion: The objection that no ITC benefit was passed on was rejected.

Issue (iii): Whether the EPC contractor's input tax credit flow required separate verification for determining profiteering by the respondent.

Analysis: The EPC contractor supplied work contract services to the respondent and did not sell units to homebuyers. The investigation examined the contractor-related documents, but the liability under section 171 depended on the respondent's own supply position and whether any benefit accrued to it for onward passing. The contractor had no active role in the accrual of benefit to homebuyers for this purpose.

Conclusion: The objection regarding failure to examine the contractor's ITC flow was rejected.

Issue (iv): Whether the treatment of ITC reversal, unsold units, and the difference between the earlier and later reports affected the conclusion under section 171.

Analysis: Units sold after completion were excluded from the scope of taxable supply, and ITC relating to unsold units at the time of occupancy certificate had to be reversed. The net ITC position for the entire project was therefore relevant. The later report used the methodology approved after the earlier approach was found flawed, so the divergence from the earlier report did not undermine the final conclusion. The criticism that the data were selective or unverified was also rejected because the report showed independent checking against GSTR-9 and chartered accountant certifications.

Conclusion: The objections based on ITC reversal, unsold units, and alleged inconsistency in reports were rejected.

Final Conclusion: The report concluding that no contravention of section 171 was made out was accepted, and the anti-profiteering objections were rejected in full.

Ratio Decidendi: In real estate anti-profiteering matters, the existence of profiteering must be assessed on a project-wise basis by a fair and reasonable methodology that reflects the absence of a direct turnover-ITC correlation, and ITC relating to amounts not retained or to supplies outside the scope of tax cannot be treated as benefit available for passing on.

Outcome: Special Leave Petition dismissed on the ground of delay and on merits.