Issues: (i) Whether the appellant was entitled to interest or compensation for the period after the refund of the pre-deposit till the later date on which interest was actually paid.

Analysis: The appellant had deposited amounts under section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and the refund of the deposit was ultimately sanctioned on 07.08.2017. Section 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944 governs interest on delayed refund of such deposit and permits interest from the date of payment of the amount till the date of refund of that amount. The statutory requirement was treated as having been satisfied when the refund and the interest attributable to the deposit were paid up to the date of actual refund. The further claim for interest from 07.08.2017 to 07.02.2023 was treated as a claim for compensatory interest beyond the statute. The authorities relied upon by the appellant were found distinguishable, and the principle that only statutory interest is recoverable, with no further interest on such statutory interest, was applied.

Conclusion: The appellant was not entitled to any further interest or compensation beyond 07.08.2017, and the restriction of interest up to the refund date was upheld against the assessee.

Issues: Whether the cancellation of GST registration and the rejection of the revocation application were liable to be set aside for failure to consider the petitioner's explanation and for want of reasons in the show-cause notices and impugned orders.

Analysis: The cancellation proceedings were founded on a finding that no business activity was being carried on at the registered premises, but the petitioner had explained that the business had only become temporarily non-operational because of the proprietor's serious illness. The show-cause notices and the consequential orders did not deal with that explanation and contained no effective reasons or discussion. An order cancelling registration, which visits the assessee with civil consequences, must reflect application of mind and comply with the principles of natural justice. A vague or mechanical notice cannot sustain a consequential cancellation or refusal to revoke registration.

Conclusion: The cancellation and revocation orders were quashed and set aside, and restoration of GST registration followed.

Issues: (i) Whether the provisional attachment and the finding of benami transaction were sustainable on the material collected; (ii) Whether statements recorded during income-tax search proceedings could be relied upon in proceedings under the Benami Act; (iii) Whether denial of cross-examination vitiated the action.

Issue (i): Whether the provisional attachment and the finding of benami transaction were sustainable on the material collected

Analysis: The attachment and adjudication were supported by search material, shareholding pattern, director details, property records, and financial data showing that the entities were controlled through intermediary shareholders by the Lunia family. The Tribunal found that the source of the funds shown as capital, reserves, loans, advances, and repayments was not satisfactorily explained, while the pattern of cash routing through hawala channels and the acquisition of properties in the names of the companies pointed to use of the entities as fronts for the real controller. The existence of company reserves or disclosed returns did not, by itself, negate a benami arrangement where the real source and control were not established.

Conclusion: The provisional attachment and the conclusion that the transactions fell within benami transaction parameters were upheld, against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether statements recorded during income-tax search proceedings could be relied upon in proceedings under the Benami Act

Analysis: The Tribunal held that statements recorded under one fiscal statute may be used in proceedings under another where the statutes operate in aid of each other and there is no express bar. The material obtained in the income-tax search was corroborated by independent records, including shareholding analysis and property documents, so the statements were not treated as stand-alone or uncorroborated evidence. The retraction was found to be belated and unpersuasive.

Conclusion: Reliance on the income-tax statements was held to be permissible and valid, against the appellants.

Issue (iii): Whether denial of cross-examination vitiated the action

Analysis: The Tribunal held that cross-examination is not an automatic or invariable component of proceedings under the Benami Act. In the facts of the case, the impugned action was not founded solely on third-party statements but on a broader evidentiary matrix, and therefore absence of cross-examination did not invalidate the proceedings.

Conclusion: The plea of denial of cross-examination was rejected, against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed because the Tribunal found sufficient corroborated material to sustain the benami findings and the consequential provisional attachment.

Ratio Decidendi: Benami liability may be established through a cumulative assessment of control, source of funds, surrounding circumstances, and corroborated material, and statements from another fiscal proceeding may be relied upon where they are relevant and supported by independent evidence.

Issues: Whether the provisional attachment of the shares held by the individual appellants was justified when the alleged proceeds of crime had been received by the education society and no material showed receipt or personal benefit by the appellants.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted that the allegations and the material on record related to receipt of funds by the society, while the amounts were shown as having been utilised for servicing a loan and for payments to other entities. No specific material established that the individual appellants had received any part of the alleged proceeds of crime or derived direct or indirect benefit from them. Mere status as President and Secretary of the society was held insufficient to sustain attachment of their personal shareholdings in the absence of allegations or evidence connecting them individually with the proceeds.

Conclusion: The provisional attachment of the shares held by the individual appellants was not justified and was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded and the attachment orders against the individual shareholdings were quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: Personal property cannot be provisionally attached under money-laundering proceedings unless there is material linking the individual concerned to receipt, possession, concealment, or benefit from the proceeds of crime.

Issues: Whether the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was barred by limitation and whether the delay could be condoned on the facts proved regarding service and receipt of the order.

Analysis: Under Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994, an appeal had to be filed within two months from the date of receipt of the decision or order, and the appellate authority could extend the period only by a further one month on sufficient cause being shown. The evidence on record supported dispatch and deemed service of the order, and the appellant's own pleadings did not establish a credible basis to displace that presumption. Once the appeal was filed long after the outer condonable limit, the Commissioner (Appeals) had no jurisdiction to condone the delay. The rule in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 supported the presumption of service by post, and the explanation for delay was found unsatisfactory.

Conclusion: The delay was not condonable and the rejection of the appeal as time-barred was ; the challenge failed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed because the statutory time limit for filing the first appeal had expired beyond the maximum condonable period, leaving no scope for interference on limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute prescribes a normal limitation period and a strictly limited further period for condonation, the appellate authority cannot entertain an appeal filed beyond that outer limit, even if delay is asserted to have arisen from delayed receipt of the order.

Issues: Whether the cancellation of GST registration based on the cancelled status of suppliers' registrations, without a cogent finding on the petitioner's documents and the genuineness of the input tax credit claim, was sustainable and whether the matter required remand for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The impugned order relied substantially on the alleged fraudulent chain of transactions and the cancellation of suppliers' registrations, but it did not record a clear finding on the tax invoices, e-way bills, ledger statements and bank statements produced by the petitioner. Cancellation of a supplier's registration, by itself, could not justify cancellation of the petitioner's registration unless supported by tangible material showing the petitioner's involvement in an established illegality in relation to the claimed input tax credit. The absence of such independent findings on the petitioner's bona fide transactions and the factual trail rendered the order arbitrary and showed non-application of mind.

Conclusion: The cancellation order was set aside and the proceedings were remanded for fresh adjudication after granting the petitioner an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: Whether the orders rejecting refund claims under the GST regime could be sustained when the appellate authority had not recorded a finding on the contractual terms governing the service arrangement and the consequent characterisation of the supply as export of services or intermediary services.

Analysis: The petitions concerned refund of IGST paid on ship management services rendered under a longstanding agreement. The challenge was that the appellate authority had not examined the agreement in the context of the nature of the services actually provided, nor recorded a finding on whether the supplies satisfied the conditions of export of services and therefore qualified as zero-rated supplies. In the absence of such findings, and in view of the similar approach adopted in earlier cases involving comparable service agreements, the impugned orders could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The refund rejection orders were quashed and the matters were remanded to the appellate authority for de novo consideration and fresh orders in accordance with law after hearing the parties.

Ratio Decidendi: A refund rejection under the GST regime cannot stand where the appellate authority fails to examine the governing agreement and record findings on whether the transaction is an export of services or an intermediary service; such failure justifies quashing of the order and remand for fresh adjudication.

Issues: Whether the notice treating the petitioner as an assessee in default under Section 220 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustainable in view of the alleged non-service of the underlying demand orders and the unexplained lapse of time.

Analysis: The petitioner's case was that the orders and intimations generating the tax demands were never served and that the demand was surfaced only through the impugned notice. The table of demands showed multiple assessment years, substantial amounts, and dates stretching back several years. The Court found it difficult to accept that an assessee faced with large liabilities would remain inactive if service had in fact been effected, and equally difficult to believe that the Department would remain silent for years and act only after such delay. On that basis, the Court accepted that the impugned demand notice could not be sustained as issued.

Conclusion: The notice declaring the petitioner an assessee in default was quashed and set aside, with liberty preserved for the petitioner to seek the relevant documents, raise objections, and pursue statutory remedies, and for the Department to proceed afresh in accordance with law if so advised.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded, the impugned demand notice was invalidated, and the petitioner was afforded consequential liberty to seek records and pursue remedies without being defeated by limitation for the period directed by the Court.

Ratio Decidendi: A demand notice under Section 220 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 cannot be sustained where the surrounding circumstances make the alleged service of the foundational orders implausible and the long departmental inaction is inconsistent with the existence of a duly served and pursued demand.

Issues: Whether the impugned Order-in-Original should be set aside and the matter remitted to the stage of show cause notice.

Analysis: The adjudication order was passed ex parte, without a reply to the show cause notice and without availing the opportunity of personal hearing. The Court also relied upon its earlier order in connected matters, which had remitted similar disputes and directed the authorities to keep in mind specified questions relating to taxability, exemption, liability, and limitation while reconsidering the matter. In that backdrop, the impugned adjudication was not sustained and the proceedings were sent back for fresh consideration from the show cause notice stage, with liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh reply and with all contentions kept open.

Conclusion: The impugned Order-in-Original was set aside and the matter was remitted to the authorities for reconsideration from the stage of show cause notice, in favour of the petitioner.

Issues: Whether the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was barred by limitation and whether delay beyond the prescribed period could be condoned under Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The statutory scheme allowed the Commissioner (Appeals) to condone delay only up to one month beyond the initial period for filing the appeal. The appeal was filed several months after receipt of the adjudication order, and the pendency or rejection of a rectification application did not enlarge the statutory limitation. The prescribed period could not be extended beyond the limited condonable window.

Conclusion: The appeal was rightly treated as time-barred, and the delay could not be condoned beyond the statutory limit.

Issues: (i) Whether the 13-day delay in filing Form 10-IC for availing the concessional tax regime under Section 115BAA deserved condonation under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the 13-day delay in filing Form 10-IC for availing the concessional tax regime under Section 115BAA deserved condonation under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The delay was short, supported by undisputed facts, and arose from the demise of a key promoter and family member, which disrupted the company's functioning. The option under Section 115BAA was a substantive statutory entitlement, while filing Form 10-IC was only the procedural mode for exercising that option. A procedural lapse could not defeat the substantive benefit where eligibility was not in dispute. The refusal to condone would have imposed a substantial additional tax burden and caused grave hardship, with no prejudice to the Revenue.

Conclusion: The delay was rightly condoned and the rejection of condonation was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside, the delay was condoned, and the respondents were required to process the matter as if Form 10-IC had been filed within time.

Ratio Decidendi: A short, bona fide and satisfactorily explained delay in filing the procedural form for exercising a substantive tax option may be condoned under Section 119(2)(b) where refusal would unjustly defeat the statutory benefit and cause disproportionate hardship without prejudice to the Revenue.

Issues: Whether, in a case governed by section 170A(2)(a), the Assessing Officer could issue notices under sections 143(2) and 142(1) to reopen the entire assessment, or was confined to modifying the completed assessment to give effect to the amalgamation order and the modified return.

Analysis: Section 170A creates a distinct framework for business reorganisation. Where the assessment or reassessment stood completed on the date of the modified return, clause (a) requires the Assessing Officer to pass an order modifying the total income determined in the completed assessment in accordance with the reorganisation order and the modified return. The provision draws a clear distinction from clause (b), which applies only where assessment proceedings are pending and permits assessment or reassessment. In the completed-assessment situation, the statutory scheme does not permit a fresh or de novo scrutiny of the entire return through notices under sections 143(2) and 142(1); the inquiry is limited to giving effect to the reorganisation and the modified return.

Conclusion: The notices under sections 143(2) and 142(1) were unsustainable and were quashed, and the consequential assessment order was also set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: When section 170A(2)(a) applies because the assessment is already completed on the date of the modified return, the Assessing Officer's power is confined to modifying the existing assessment to give effect to the business reorganisation order and cannot be used to reopen the assessment by issuing notices for a fresh scrutiny.

Issues: Whether the reassessment proceedings were vitiated because prior approval under Section 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was obtained from the authority under clause (i) instead of the authority under clause (ii), and whether the notice under Section 148 and the consequential orders were liable to be quashed.

Analysis: The challenge to reopening turned on the validity of the sanction granted for issuing the notice under Section 148 after the order under Section 148A(d). The material facts were not disputed, and the issue was treated as covered by the earlier decision of the same Court, which had applied the Supreme Court's ruling that, on the facts of an assessment year of this kind, approval had to be obtained from the authority contemplated by Section 151(ii). Non-compliance with that requirement was held to go to the root of jurisdiction and to invalidate the notice issued under Section 148, with the consequential reassessment proceedings also falling with it.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice and consequential proceedings were invalid for want of sanction from the proper authority, and the writ petition was allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute requires prior approval from a particular specified authority before issuing a notice for reassessment, sanction from an incorrect authority vitiates the jurisdiction to reopen the assessment and renders the notice and consequential proceedings unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether bad and doubtful debts are to be added back while computing book profits under Section 115JA of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the audit report required for deduction under Section 80IA(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be produced at the appellate stage.

Issue (i): Whether bad and doubtful debts are to be added back while computing book profits under Section 115JA of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 115JA governs computation of book profits, and the Explanation treats amounts set aside as provision for diminution in the value of assets as includible for the purpose of book profit adjustment. The retrospective amendment inserted by Explanation (g) to Section 115JA(2) with effect from 01.04.1998 brings within its sweep provisions relating to bad and doubtful debts, requiring such amounts to be added back while computing book profits.

Conclusion: The addition towards bad and doubtful debts was rightly required to be made. The issue is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the audit report required for deduction under Section 80IA(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be produced at the appellate stage.

Analysis: The requirement of furnishing the audit report under Section 80IA(7) was held to be directory and not mandatory for the relevant period. The report may therefore be filed at any stage before completion of assessment, and the subsequent production of the audit report before the appellate authority does not by itself defeat the deduction claim.

Conclusion: Filing of the audit report at the appellate stage was permissible. The issue is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeds on one issue and fails on the other, resulting in a partial allowance with the respective findings on the two questions of law.

Ratio Decidendi: A retrospective amendment to the book-profit provision governs the inclusion of bad and doubtful debts, while the audit-report requirement for deduction under Section 80IA(7) is directory and may be satisfied before completion of assessment or at the appellate stage.

Issues: Whether the matter required fresh examination in the light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 2(15) and the conditions governing cancellation of registration under section 12AA(3).

Analysis: The objects and activities of the respondent institution were considered against the post-amendment test under section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The governing framework drawn from the Supreme Court's decision on general public utility was treated as controlling, including the principle that activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or services in relation thereto, must be assessed on the basis of the nature of receipts, the connection with the stated objects, and the applicable monetary threshold. The Court noted that institutions claiming general public utility status require close scrutiny and that the record must be examined afresh in the light of the later authoritative pronouncement.

Conclusion: The case was remitted to the Directorate of Income Tax (Exemption) for fresh consideration within the prescribed time, and no final adjudication was made on the respondent's entitlement to exemption or on the validity of cancellation on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: When an earlier view on charitable status is tested against a later binding interpretation of section 2(15), the matter may be sent back for a fresh year-wise examination of the assessee's activities and receipts under the controlling legal standard.

Issues: (i) Whether the Assessing Officer could, in the consequential proceedings under section 263, make an addition towards renovation and interior decoration expenses when the revisionary directions were confined to excess cash and excess stock; (ii) whether the excess cash found during survey was liable to be assessed as unexplained income under sections 69, 69A and 115BBE; (iii) whether the excess stock found during survey was to be treated as unexplained income or as business income.

Issue (i): Whether the Assessing Officer could, in the consequential proceedings under section 263, make an addition towards renovation and interior decoration expenses when the revisionary directions were confined to excess cash and excess stock.

Analysis: The revisionary order had directed examination only of the excess cash and excess stock found and whether they were connected with the assessee's business and source of investment. In the consequential assessment, the Assessing Officer travelled beyond those directions by bringing in renovation and interior decoration expenditure, which was not the subject of the revision. Such enlargement of the scope of the consequential proceedings was not permissible.

Conclusion: The addition towards renovation and interior decoration expenses was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the excess cash found during survey was liable to be assessed as unexplained income under sections 69, 69A and 115BBE.

Analysis: The assessee claimed that the cash represented business-generated funds, but the explanation and supporting material were found insufficient to dislodge the concurrent findings of the lower authorities. On the record, the cash could not be accepted as duly explained business income for the purpose of avoiding the deeming provisions.

Conclusion: The addition relating to excess cash was sustained against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the excess stock found during survey was to be treated as unexplained income or as business income.

Analysis: The assessee was engaged in the business of sweet manufacturing and sale, and the profit and loss account reflected sales, indirect income and closing stock. The excess stock was linked to the business operations, and the revenue did not bring corroborative material to establish that it arose from an unexplained source. In these circumstances, the stock difference was not liable to be taxed as unexplained income under the deeming provisions.

Conclusion: The addition relating to excess stock was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only in part, with relief granted on the renovation addition and the excess stock addition, while the treatment of excess cash remained undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: In consequential proceedings under section 263, the Assessing Officer cannot expand the scope beyond the specific revisionary directions, and where survey-disclosed stock is shown to be integrally connected with the regular business and unsupported by contrary evidence, it cannot be assessed as unexplained income.

Issues: Whether, after a revisionary order under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Assessing Officer was required to issue a fresh notice under section 143(2) before passing the assessment order under section 143(3) read with section 263, and whether the absence of such notice rendered the assessment invalid.

Analysis: The assessment originally framed under section 143(3) had already been preceded by a valid notice under section 143(2). The subsequent order under section 263 only directed the Assessing Officer to deal with the specific matter identified in the revisionary order and did not amount to a fresh, plenary assessment or a reassessment requiring a new return. The Tribunal held that proceedings pursuant to section 263 are a continuation of the original assessment proceedings and are confined to the scope of the revisionary directions. On that footing, section 143(2) does not mandate issuance of a fresh notice merely because the assessment is modified or reworked under section 263. The reliance placed on decisions concerning block assessment or search-related proceedings was held to be misplaced.

Conclusion: A fresh notice under section 143(2) was not mandatory in the circumstances, and the CIT(A) was in quashing the assessment on that ground.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessment is redone only in consequence of a revisionary order under section 263 and remains confined to the issues directed by the revisional authority, the original valid notice under section 143(2) suffices and no fresh notice is required.

Issues: (i) Whether the provisional attachment of the petitioners' bank accounts under Section 110(5) of the Customs Act, 1962 ceased to operate on expiry of six months in the absence of an order extending the attachment for a further period.

Analysis: Section 110(5) permits provisional attachment of a bank account during proceedings under the Customs Act for a period not exceeding six months, and the proviso authorises extension only by a reasoned written order passed before expiry of that period. The attachment orders in question were issued on 8 July 2025, and no extension order was passed before 7 January 2026. The earlier interim order protecting revenue could not dilute or override the statutory requirement of extension under the proviso. In the absence of such extension, the statutory consequence was that the provisional attachment came to an end by operation of law.

Conclusion: The provisional attachment had lapsed, the impugned orders were illegal and invalid, and the petitioners were entitled to operate the bank accounts.

Issues: Whether, after rejection of time-barred rebate claims in respect of exports on payment of duty, the petitioner could directly seek re-credit or cash refund in writ proceedings under the transitional provisions, or was required to file a substantive application before the designated officer under Section 142(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The petitions concerned exports made on payment of duty under Rule 18 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 read with Notification No. 21/2004-C.E. (N.T.) dated 06 September 2004. The rebate claims had already been rejected as time-barred, and the petitioners advanced an alternative case that the duty paid on exports, being excess duty, had to be returned in the same form and could be claimed under the transitional mechanism. The Court held that such entitlement was not part of the proceedings culminating in the impugned orders and had to be specifically asserted by way of a substantive application. The petitioners were therefore required to approach the designated officer under Section 142(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Conclusion: Direct writ relief for cash re-credit was not granted, and the petitioners were directed to file a substantive application before the designated officer for consideration of the claimed return of excess duty.

Issues: Whether the retrospective cancellation of GST registration was valid when the show cause notice did not specifically propose retrospective cancellation and the assessee was not afforded seven working days to respond.

Analysis: Retrospective cancellation of GST registration is permissible, but only when the assessee is put to clear notice of that proposed action and is given the statutory opportunity to respond. Rule 22 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 requires a show cause notice in FORM GST REG-17 and grants at least seven working days from service of notice to file a reply. A notice that does not disclose the proposal for retrospective cancellation, or which is served without the mandated response time, does not satisfy the statutory requirement or the standard of fair procedure. On the facts, the later notice and email did not cure the defect because the petitioner was not afforded the prescribed time before the cancellation order was passed.

Conclusion: The retrospective cancellation of GST registration was unlawful and the cancellation order was set aside. The action was held to be in violation of Rule 22 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 and the requirement of fair notice.

Ratio Decidendi: Retrospective cancellation of GST registration can be sustained only if the assessee is specifically put to notice of that proposal and is granted the statutory period of at least seven working days to .