Issues: Whether the assessment order passed under section 144 read with section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was vitiated for breach of natural justice on account of inadequate opportunity of hearing and denial of effective video conferencing, and whether it was liable to be quashed and remanded.

Analysis: The petitioner had received the show-cause notice and sought an adjournment, specifically requesting a hearing after a stated date so as to file an effective reply. Despite that request, the authorities issued a video conferencing intimation only a few hours before the scheduled hearing. The respondents did not dispute the short notice or the request for adjournment. In these circumstances, the opportunity afforded was found to be illusory and not in conformity with the requirement of a fair hearing under the faceless assessment procedure.

Conclusion: The assessment order was quashed and set aside, and the matter was remanded to the assessing authorities for fresh adjudication after granting a proper opportunity to file a reply and to participate in video conferencing.

Issues: Whether the recovery notice and the Order-in-Original were liable to be set aside for want of proper service of the show cause notice and denial of opportunity of hearing, and whether the matter should be remitted for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The petitioners asserted non-receipt of the show cause notice, non-furnishing of the adjudication materials and absence of any hearing before the Order-in-Original was passed. The respondents relied on despatch of communications by registered post, but the Court found it to ensure that the petitioners receive an effective opportunity to contest the proceedings. In the circumstances, the proceeding was directed to be taken up afresh by supplying the original show cause notice, granting sufficient time to reply, and affording a personal hearing.

Conclusion: The impugned recovery notice and the Order-in-Original were set aside and the matter was remitted for fresh adjudication after compliance with the requirements of notice and hearing, in favour of the petitioners.

Ratio Decidendi: An adverse tax adjudication cannot be sustained where the affected party asserts non-service of the show cause notice and denial of hearing, and the appropriate course is to set aside the order and direct fresh proceedings with effective opportunity to respond.

Issues: Whether the appellant could, in the confiscation proceedings, question the correctness of the seizure of the jewellery despite an earlier challenge to the show-cause notice having failed.

Analysis: The earlier order had declined interference at the stage of the notice proposing confiscation, but that did not amount to a determination on the legality of the seizure itself. The confiscation proceeding was a subsequent stage, and the appellant could not be denied an opportunity to explain the nature and ownership of the ornaments or to contend that the seizure was unlawful. A meaningful opportunity to meet the proposed confiscation necessarily included the right to contest the foundational seizure.

Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to raise objections to the seizure in the confiscation proceeding, and the authorities were required to grant an effective opportunity for that purpose.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was disposed of by preserving the appellant's right to contest the seizure in the pending confiscation proceedings and by directing that reasonable time be granted for a meaningful response.

Ratio Decidendi: A challenge to the legality of seizure can be raised in subsequent confiscation proceedings unless that issue has been finally adjudicated, and an effective opportunity to be heard must extend to contesting the foundational seizure.

Issues: (i) whether the refund claim arising from excess payment of service tax was governed by the limitation under section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as made applicable to service tax under section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994; and (ii) whether the doctrine of unjust enrichment and the absence of reassessment affected maintainability of the refund claim.

Issue (i): whether the refund claim arising from excess payment of service tax was governed by the limitation under section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as made applicable to service tax under section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The Tribunal held that the amount paid in excess of the statutory liability could not be treated as outside the refund regime merely because the payment exceeded the amount legally due. It found that any refund claim, other than cases falling within the recognised exceptions, must be examined under section 11B, which carries a statutory time limit. Since the refund application had been filed beyond the prescribed period, the departmental objection on limitation was accepted.

Conclusion: The refund claim was held to be subject to section 11B limitation and the Revenue's objection on time bar was accepted.

Issue (ii): whether the doctrine of unjust enrichment and the absence of reassessment affected maintainability of the refund claim.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted that the question of unjust enrichment required factual verification before final determination. It also observed that no reassessment had been pursued before filing the refund claim, which supported the view that the claim could not be finally granted on the present record. On that basis, the matter required reconsideration by the original sanctioning authority.

Conclusion: The refund claim was not finally adjudicated on merits and was sent back for fresh examination, including unjust enrichment and related factual verification.

Final Conclusion: The departmental challenge succeeded to the extent that the refund order was set aside and the matter was remitted for reconsideration under the statutory refund framework.

Ratio Decidendi: A refund of excess tax payment must be tested under the statutory refund provisions, including limitation and unjust enrichment, unless the claim falls within a recognised exception to that regime.

Issues: (i) whether the authorities were justified in insisting on the petitioner's personal appearance and refusing representation through an advocate, (ii) whether the authorities were required to proceed expeditiously and determine the matter under the statutory scheme governing detention of goods and vehicle.

Issue (i): whether the authorities were justified in insisting on the petitioner's personal appearance and refusing representation through an advocate.

Analysis: Section 116 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits appearance through an authorised representative, including an advocate, in proceedings under the Act. The insistence on personal appearance was therefore unwarranted, particularly when the petitioner had sought to appear through counsel and the invoice documents identified the consignor and consignee.

Conclusion: The insistence on the petitioner's personal appearance was unjustified, and representation through an advocate was permitted.

Issue (ii): whether the authorities were required to proceed expeditiously and determine the matter under the statutory scheme governing detention of goods and vehicle.

Analysis: The goods were stated to be perishable, yet no formal order of seizure had been passed even after a prolonged period from interception. The statutory scheme under Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 required prompt determination of ownership, hearing of the parties, and decision within the prescribed timeframe. The circular clarifying ownership under Section 129(1) indicated that where the invoice accompanied the consignment, either consignor or consignee could be treated as owner, and the respondents ought to have acted on that basis.

Conclusion: The authorities were directed to fix a hearing, permit representation through advocate, hear the consignee, and pass an order under Section 129(5) within the stipulated time, with release of the goods and vehicle if payment under Section 129(1)(a) was accepted.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded to the extent of securing procedural safeguards, a prompt hearing, and a time-bound statutory decision on release of the detained goods and vehicle.

Ratio Decidendi: A person proceeded against under the detention provisions of the GST law may be represented through an authorised advocate, and the authorities must determine ownership and complete the Section 129 process within the statutory framework without insisting on unnecessary personal appearance.

Outcome: Delay condoned. Special leave petition dismissed. Pending interlocutory applications disposed of.

Issues: (i) Whether the Commissioner could invoke revisional jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to set aside the block assessment and whether income shown in a return filed after search but before the block assessment order, together with advance tax payment, could be excluded from undisclosed income. (ii) Whether the deletion of addition for suppression of freight charges and the treatment of lorry hire charges and token booking income in block assessment were legally sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the Commissioner could invoke revisional jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to set aside the block assessment and whether income shown in a return filed after search but before the block assessment order, together with advance tax payment, could be excluded from undisclosed income.

Analysis: The revisional power under Section 263 extends to any assessment order that is erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue, including a block assessment made under Section 158BC read with Section 143(3). The Court held that the form of assessment does not limit the Commissioner's power where the record shows an apparent error and failure to apply the correct legal position. On the question of disclosure, the Court applied the later law declared by the Supreme Court that advance tax is only an estimate of current income and does not by itself amount to disclosure of total income. Since the return for the relevant assessment year was filed after the due date and after commencement of search, the income shown therein could not be excluded from the block assessment as disclosed income.

Conclusion: The revision under Section 263 was valid and the belated return and advance tax payment did not take the income outside the block assessment. This issue is decided in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the deletion of addition for suppression of freight charges and the treatment of lorry hire charges and token booking income in block assessment were legally sustainable.

Analysis: The deletion of the addition for suppression of freight charges based on the assumption that unaccounted receipts must necessarily have corresponding unaccounted expenditure was held to be perverse and legally unsustainable. The Court, therefore, interfered with that deletion. However, the deletion of the lorry hire charges addition was sustained on the footing accepted by the appellate authority and Tribunal that the liability was accounted for under the mercantile system and did not represent undisclosed income. As regards token booking income, the matter stood remanded for fresh consideration and that direction was left undisturbed.

Conclusion: The Revenue succeeded in challenging the deletion of the freight suppression addition, but the deletion of the lorry hire charges addition and the remand on token booking income were sustained. This issue is partly in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The assessee's challenge to the revisional order fails, while the Revenue secures relief on the freight suppression issue and succeeds overall in substantially restoring the block assessment, subject to the sustained deletion on lorry hire charges and the remand relating to token booking income.

Ratio Decidendi: A Commissioner may validly invoke Section 263 where a block assessment is erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue, and a return filed after search and after expiry of the due date does not render the disclosed income immune from inclusion in block assessment merely because advance tax was paid.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition made under section 69C by estimating 10% of purchases as unexplained expenditure was sustainable in the absence of any defect in the books of account or supporting evidence. (ii) Whether the addition relating to alleged TDS default required deletion or verification in light of the revised Form 26AS and revised TDS returns.

Issue (i): Whether the addition made under section 69C by estimating 10% of purchases as unexplained expenditure was sustainable in the absence of any defect in the books of account or supporting evidence.

Analysis: The purchases were supported by books of account, stock register, purchase and sales registers, bank statements, import documents and ledger accounts of suppliers. No discrepancy was pointed out in the quantitative records, no adverse inference was drawn from the sales, and the books were not rejected under section 145. In such circumstances, an ad hoc percentage disallowance could not be sustained, because estimation cannot replace evidence and section 69C applies only where the expenditure remains unexplained.

Conclusion: The addition under section 69C was rightly deleted and the finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition relating to alleged TDS default required deletion or verification in light of the revised Form 26AS and revised TDS returns.

Analysis: The discrepancy was stated to have been corrected through revised TDS returns, and the updated Form 26AS was placed before the appellate authority. A verification-based direction ensured that the addition would survive only if the claim was found incorrect and would be deleted if the revised records supported the assessee's explanation.

Conclusion: The direction for verification was upheld and the issue stands resolved in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's challenge failed, and the appellate relief granted to the assessee on the purchase-related addition was sustained while the TDS issue was left to verification on the updated record, resulting in an overall outcome favourable to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of defect in books of account, rejection of accounts, or tangible material showing bogus or unexplained expenditure, an ad hoc disallowance of purchases cannot be made under section 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether the second reassessment under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid when it was based on the same material as the earlier reassessment, despite the issue having already been examined and carried through the appellate hierarchy.

Analysis: The second reopening rested on the very same investigation material, the same alleged accommodation-entry information, the same parties and the same purchase figures as in the first round. No fresh tangible material had emerged after completion of the earlier reassessment. The reassessment power under section 147 requires reason to believe founded on new material and cannot be used to review an earlier conclusion on identical facts. Once the issue had already been adjudicated and given effect to through the appellate process, the matter had attained finality, and the provisory restrictions to section 147 barred reopening of the same issue again. The allegation of failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts also failed because the very basis of reopening had already been available and examined in the earlier round.

Conclusion: The second reassessment was without jurisdiction and was rightly quashed. The reopening was invalid, and the assessee succeeded on the jurisdictional challenge.

Issues: (i) Whether the presence of nominal or associate members, or the fact that the assessee is a housing co-operative society advancing loans to members, disentitles deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. (ii) Whether interest income from deposits and bank accounts with co-operative banks, an apex bank, and a nationalised bank qualifies for deduction under sections 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether interest from fixed deposits with a nationalised bank is assessable with corresponding deduction under section 57 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the presence of nominal or associate members, or the fact that the assessee is a housing co-operative society advancing loans to members, disentitles deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The governing principle applied was that eligibility under section 80P depends on the statutory character of the society and the nature of the relevant state co-operative law. Where the state law permits nominal or associate membership, the mere existence of such members does not by itself deny the benefit of deduction. The same principle was held applicable even where the society is a housing co-operative society, because the provision does not create a separate exclusion for such societies. The reasoning also distinguished cases where nominal membership was impermissible under the governing statute.

Conclusion: Deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) cannot be denied merely because the assessee has nominal or associate members or is a housing co-operative society advancing loans to its members; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest income from deposits and bank accounts with co-operative banks, an apex bank, and a nationalised bank qualifies for deduction under sections 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether interest from fixed deposits with a nationalised bank is assessable with corresponding deduction under section 57 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Interest on deposits kept with an apex bank pursuant to statutory compulsion was treated as attributable to the business of the assessee and therefore covered by section 80P(2)(a)(i). Interest on savings bank balances maintained as a necessary incident of banking operations was treated on the same footing. Interest earned from deposits with a co-operative bank was treated as eligible under section 80P(2)(d) because the recipient institution was a co-operative society. By contrast, interest from fixed deposits with a nationalised bank was treated as income from other sources, with consequential entitlement to deductions for cost of funds and proportionate administrative expenditure under section 57.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to deduction on the qualifying interest income under sections 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d), while the fixed-deposit interest from the nationalised bank is to be assessed under the head income from other sources with deduction under section 57; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The disallowance of deduction under section 80P was not sustained, and the assessment was modified to allow the eligible reliefs with a limited direction on the treatment of fixed-deposit interest from the nationalised bank.

Ratio Decidendi: A co-operative society is not denied deduction under section 80P merely because nominal or associate membership is permitted by the governing state law, and interest income must be classified according to its source, with statutory or co-operative-bank-related receipts potentially qualifying under section 80P and fixed-deposit interest from a nationalised bank falling under income from other sources with section 57 deductions.

Issues: (i) whether the adjustment of short-term capital gain arising from sale of depreciable assets against brought forward business loss could be rectified under section 154, (ii) whether the income realised by a bank under liquidation was diverted at source by overriding title in favour of DICGC, and (iii) whether the claim for bad debt written off was allowable.

Issue (i): whether the adjustment of short-term capital gain arising from sale of depreciable assets against brought forward business loss could be rectified under section 154

Analysis: The head of income on sale of depreciable assets was treated as short-term capital gain under section 50(2), but the question whether such gain could be adjusted against brought forward business loss required interpretation and was not free from doubt. A matter that requires a long-drawn process of reasoning or involves competing views cannot be treated as an apparent mistake for rectification. The existence of a contrary view supported the conclusion that the issue was debatable.

Conclusion: The rectification under section 154 could not be sustained and was quashed; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): whether the income realised by a bank under liquidation was diverted at source by overriding title in favour of DICGC

Analysis: The doctrine of diversion of income by overriding title applies only where income never reaches the assessee because of a superior enforceable obligation. On the facts considered, the payment obligation in favour of DICGC conferred a first preference over realisations available with the official liquidator, after meeting liquidation expenses, but did not establish that the income never accrued to the bank or stood diverted at source. The arrangement was therefore not treated as one of diversion by overriding title.

Conclusion: The plea of diversion of income at source was rejected and the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): whether the claim for bad debt written off was allowable

Analysis: The bad debt was written off in the books, and in the case of a banking business money lent in the ordinary course of business falls within the statutory framework for deduction. Once the debt is written off as irrecoverable, the assessee is not required to establish actual irrecoverability, and the disallowance was unsupported by reasons.

Conclusion: The disallowance of bad debt was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The first appeal succeeded on the challenge to rectification, while the second appeal succeeded on the bad debt claim, resulting in partial relief to the assessee overall.

Ratio Decidendi: A debatable question of law cannot be rectified as a mistake apparent from the record under section 154, and a bad debt written off in the books in the course of banking business is deductible without proof of actual irrecoverability where the statutory conditions are otherwise satisfied.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition made on account of alleged bogus purchases and corresponding sales was sustainable. (ii) Whether the assessment was invalid merely because the order referred to section 144 along with section 143(3).

Issue (i): Whether the addition made on account of alleged bogus purchases and corresponding sales was sustainable.

Analysis: The purchase and sale transactions were examined with reference to the stock register, replies received to notices issued under section 133(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the statements and invoices placed on record. The assessee did not produce the purchase invoices despite reference to them in the paper book, and the genuineness of the purchases was not established. The non-appearance of the parties in response to summons under section 131 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 supported the doubt raised by the Assessing Officer.

Conclusion: The addition based on bogus purchases was upheld in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment was invalid merely because the order referred to section 144 along with section 143(3).

Analysis: The assessee had participated in the assessment proceedings and had responded to notices. In that situation, the mere mention of section 144 did not render the assessment invalid, as the assessment was treated in substance as one made under section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Conclusion: The assessment was not invalid on this ground, and the objection was rejected.

Final Conclusion: Both appeals failed, and the additions and assessment approach challenged by the assessee were sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessee fails to establish the genuineness of purchases despite material scrutiny, the related addition can be sustained, and a mere misdescription of the assessment provision does not vitiate the assessment when the assessee has participated in the proceedings.

Issues: Whether the commission or profit element on cash deposits arising from cheque discounting and accommodation entry activity should be estimated at 0.35% or at the higher rate adopted by the Assessing Officer.

Analysis: The assessee accepted that the bank deposits related to accommodation entry operations involving receipt of cheques and corresponding cash movement. In such cases, the taxable income is confined to the commission or profit element embedded in the transactions. Considering the record and the judicial precedents referred to, the Tribunal found that an estimated profit rate of 0.35% would reasonably reflect the assessee's earnings from the activity.

Conclusion: The commission or profit was directed to be determined at 0.35% of the cash deposits of Rs. 17,53,885, in place of the higher estimation.

Final Conclusion: The assessee obtained partial relief by reduction of the estimated profit rate applied to the disputed bank deposits.

Ratio Decidendi: Where income is derived from cheque discounting and accommodation entry activity, only the commission or profit element embedded in the turnover is taxable and may be determined by reasonable estimation on the facts of the case.

Issues: (i) whether the statements recorded during investigation and the electronic records relied upon by the Department were admissible and reliable for proving undervaluation of export consignments; (ii) whether the Department had established receipt of additional consideration by the appellants so as to justify demand of differential duty and penalties.

Issue (i): Whether the statements recorded during investigation and the electronic records relied upon by the Department were admissible and reliable for proving undervaluation of export consignments.

Analysis: Statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 may be admissible, but where they are retracted and the witnesses are not offered for cross-examination, their evidentiary value is materially weakened unless supported by independent corroboration. The electronic material in the form of e-mails and printouts was also relied upon without a proper recovery record or compliance with the statutory requirements for electronic evidence. In the absence of a satisfactory foundation showing how the electronic records were obtained and without the required procedural compliance, such material could not be treated as reliable proof.

Conclusion: The relied-upon statements and electronic records were not sufficient and reliable evidence to establish the Department's case.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department had established receipt of additional consideration by the appellants so as to justify demand of differential duty and penalties.

Analysis: The Department was required to prove that the appellants, and not merely other overseas entities, received extra consideration over and above the declared FOB value. The record did not show a clear money trail, did not establish how the alleged differential amount was paid, and did not contain admissible corroboration linking the appellants to any higher receipt. The shipping bills had been finalised on the basis of banking documents, and there was no sufficient material to reopen the declared value on the basis of suspicion or assumptions. Since the foundational allegation of receipt of extra consideration failed, the consequential penalties also could not stand.

Conclusion: The demand of differential duty and the penalties were not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was unsustainable on the evidence and the appeals succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: A demand for differential customs duty based on undervaluation cannot be sustained on retracted statements and electronic records unless the Department establishes admissible, corroborated evidence and a clear nexus showing receipt of additional consideration by the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the sample test report from CRCL Kandla was adequate to determine the classification of the imported goods; (ii) whether enhancement of the assessable value was justified; (iii) whether the finalisation order was beyond the scope of the show cause notice; and (iv) whether the benefit of Notification No. 137/2000-Cus. dated 19.10.2000 was available to the respondent.

Issue (i): Whether the sample test report from CRCL Kandla was adequate to determine the classification of the imported goods.

Analysis: The imported goods were declared under a tariff entry applicable to fabrics containing 85% or more textured polyester filaments, but the CRCL Kandla reports recorded texturization of only 60% to 63.5%. The report was held to contain sufficient composition details for classification, and the record did not show that the report had been discarded or successfully disputed in time. A belated request for retest was made after many years and could not be acted upon due to non-availability of samples.

Conclusion: The CRCL Kandla report was treated as adequate for classification, and the classification adopted by Revenue was upheld in principle.

Issue (ii): Whether enhancement of the assessable value was justified.

Analysis: The declared value was rejected on the footing that the declared composition was not correct, but the determination of value had to follow the customs valuation framework after rejection of transaction value. Since the respondent had not been supplied with the relied-upon comparable data and invoices for effective rebuttal, the valuation exercise required fresh adjudication with full disclosure and opportunity.

Conclusion: The enhancement of assessable value was not finally sustained and the matter was remanded for fresh determination.

Issue (iii): Whether the finalisation order was beyond the scope of the show cause notice.

Analysis: The notice proposed denial of the exemption notification and challenged the declared value. However, the Tribunal declined to permit reliance on investigative material and allegations going beyond the notice, including matters relating to diversion and other factual assertions not formed part of the show cause basis for finalisation.

Conclusion: The adjudicating authority was directed not to travel beyond the show cause notice while re-deciding the matter.

Issue (iv): Whether the benefit of Notification No. 137/2000-Cus. dated 19.10.2000 was available to the respondent.

Analysis: The Letter of Permission was found to be unclear as to the exact raw materials permitted for import and use. The Tribunal held that clarification from the Development Commissioner was necessary before deciding whether the respondent could import fresh fabrics for manufacture of readymade garments and, if so, whether the exemption notification would apply to such imports in an SEZ setting.

Conclusion: The availability of exemption was left to be re-determined after obtaining clarification on the scope of the Letter of Permission.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only to the extent that the matter was sent back for fresh decision on valuation and exemption after clarification of the permission and after granting the respondent due opportunity.

Ratio Decidendi: Where classification is supported by reliable composition testing, but valuation and exemption depend on unresolved factual and documentary issues, the proper course is remand with disclosure of relied-upon material and a decision confined to the scope of the notice and the governing permission.

Issues: Whether import of Technical Grade Urea through a State Trading Enterprise on high seas sale basis, in the prevailing import policy, amounted to violation of the Foreign Trade Policy so as to justify confiscation under Section 111(d) of the Customs Act, 1962 and penalty under Section 112(a)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The applicable import policy used the expression "through" State Trading Enterprises and not "by" them. On that footing, import of Urea routed through MMTC or other State Trading Enterprises, including by high seas sale to the importer, was treated as a permissible mode of import and not as a prohibited import. The permission granted by the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers was also read as permitting import through a State Trading Enterprise, and no restriction prohibiting high seas sale was found in the conditions relied upon. Since the goods were imported through the State Trading Enterprise and cleared on payment of customs duty, the basis for confiscation and consequential penalty was not made out.

Conclusion: The import was held to be in accordance with the policy, and the confiscation and penalty were not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded and the impugned orders were set aside, with relief granted to the importer.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the import policy permits import "through" State Trading Enterprises, high seas sale by such enterprises to the importer does not by itself amount to a prohibited import attracting confiscation or penalty.

Issues: (i) Whether the amount deposited in Court pursuant to the interim order and realised through encashment of the bank guarantee formed an asset of the corporate debtor and was liable to be released to the Resolution Professional under the insolvency process; (ii) Whether the writ petition could be entertained in view of the statutory remedy under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 and the effect of the moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issue (i): Whether the amount deposited in Court pursuant to the interim order and realised through encashment of the bank guarantee formed an asset of the corporate debtor and was liable to be released to the Resolution Professional under the insolvency process.

Analysis: The amount was deposited to comply with the Court's interim direction requiring deposit of 75% of the awarded amount. The Supreme Court upheld that direction and ordered encashment of the bank guarantee. The deposit was therefore treated as money held in compliance of the Court's order and not as a transfer of title to the award-holder. Once corporate insolvency resolution proceedings had commenced, the corporate debtor's claim to the amount continued, and possession of the amount by the Court did not change its character as an asset of the corporate debtor. The decree-holder's claim was required to be dealt with in the insolvency process as a creditor's claim.

Conclusion: Yes. The deposited amount remained an asset of the corporate debtor and was directed to be released to the Resolution Professional.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petition could be entertained in view of the statutory remedy under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 and the effect of the moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The petitioners had a statutory remedy under Section 19 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, and the challenge to the award included jurisdictional objections capable of being raised before the statutory forum. However, by the time the matter was finally decided, corporate insolvency resolution proceedings had already commenced, a Resolution Professional had been appointed, and the moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 applied to continuation of proceedings and execution against the corporate debtor. In that situation, the writ proceedings could not be pursued to obtain release of the amount otherwise forming part of the insolvency estate.

Conclusion: The writ petition could not yield relief to the petitioners, and the amount was to be dealt with in the insolvency process.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the award did not result in any substantive relief to the petitioners, while the deposited amount was treated as part of the insolvency estate and released for distribution in accordance with the insolvency regime.

Ratio Decidendi: Money deposited in Court pursuant to a pre-insolvency judicial order remains an asset of the corporate debtor, and on commencement of corporate insolvency resolution proceedings it must be dealt with under the insolvency framework rather than as free proceeds of execution in favour of the decree-holder.

Issues: Whether refund of Cenvat credit relatable to service tax paid under Reverse Charge Mechanism after the commencement of GST is admissible under Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, 2017, and whether the refund could be denied by invoking Section 142(8)(a) of the CGST Act, 2017 and Rule 9(1)(bb) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

Analysis: Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, 2017 preserves claims for refund of amounts paid under the existing law and requires the amount eventually accruing to be paid in cash, subject only to the bar relating to unjust enrichment under Section 11B(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The fact that the service tax was paid after the appointed day did not destroy the entitlement, since the liability related to the pre-GST period and the credit arose under the existing law. The invocation of Section 142(8)(a) was held inapplicable to deny a refund that otherwise fell within Section 142(3). The allegation of suppression was found unsupported by evidence, and the objection based on Rule 9(1)(bb) was rejected as that provision did not apply to a service recipient.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to refund of the Cenvat credit in cash, and the rejection of the refund claim was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The refund claim was allowed and the impugned order was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A refund claim for Cenvat credit arising under the existing law remains payable in cash under Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, 2017 even if the corresponding tax is discharged after GST commencement, and it cannot be denied on an inapplicable procedural bar or unsupported allegation of suppression.

Issues: Whether grant-in-aid received under a government scheme for setting up and modernising a rice milling unit was consideration for a taxable declared service under section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994, so as to attract service tax.

Analysis: The grant was sanctioned as non-repayable financial assistance and was expressly stated to be reimbursement of expenditure already incurred on the project. The conditions in the sanction order were general conditions attached to the scheme and did not create a specific contractual obligation to transfer knowhow or intellectual property in return for the money received. No evidence showed that the appellant carried out research or generated intellectual property for the Government. In the absence of consideration, there was no service provider-service recipient relationship, and the receipt could not be treated as a declared service or taxable service under the Finance Act, 1994.

Conclusion: The grant-in-aid was not taxable as consideration for service, and the service tax demand could not survive.