Issues: (i) Whether the rejection of the assessee's Chartered Accountant-certified segmental financial statements for the software development segment was justified for determining the arm's length price; (ii) Whether the separate adjustment made on overdue receivables was sustainable and whether working capital adjustment and foreign-currency benchmarking required reconsideration.

Issue (i): Whether the rejection of the assessee's Chartered Accountant-certified segmental financial statements for the software development segment was justified for determining the arm's length price.

Analysis: The assessee had maintained segmental results for AE and non-AE businesses, and the evidence before the lower authorities included a Chartered Accountant-certified segmental analysis. The rejection was based substantially on the absence of audit status and on wide margin variation between the two segments. Such grounds, by themselves, were insufficient to discard the evidence at the threshold. The segmental allocation methodology and the basis of expense apportionment required proper examination, and the evidence could not be rejected without first testing its reliability and, if necessary, calling for further clarification or verification.

Conclusion: The rejection of the segmental financial statements was not sustained. The issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination and redetermination of the arm's length price after considering the segmental data.

Issue (ii): Whether the separate adjustment made on overdue receivables was sustainable and whether working capital adjustment and foreign-currency benchmarking required reconsideration.

Analysis: The receivables adjustment had to be examined in the context of the transfer pricing exercise as a whole. The claim for working capital adjustment required reconsideration on the basis of the comparables selected and the principles governing arm's length computation. If working capital adjustment was found allowable, the separate receivables adjustment would not survive. If not, the transaction could still be treated as a separate international transaction, but the benchmark could not rest on State Bank of India PLR when the invoices were in foreign currency; a foreign-currency benchmark such as LIBOR with appropriate markup was indicated.

Conclusion: The receivables issue was allowed to the extent of requiring reconsideration of working capital adjustment and foreign-currency benchmarking, with consequential impact on the addition.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only in part, with the transfer pricing additions not finally upheld and the matter remitted for fresh determination on the identified issues.

Ratio Decidendi: Chartered Accountant-certified segmental results cannot be discarded merely because they are unaudited or show margin variation, and a separate receivables adjustment must be tested in the light of the transfer pricing analysis, including working capital effects and appropriate foreign-currency benchmarking.

Issues: Whether reassessment was vitiated because the Assessing Officer did not dispose of the assessee's objections to reopening by a separate speaking order before completing assessment.

Analysis: The assessment was reopened under the provisions governing reassessment, and the core controversy was whether the objections raised against the notice were properly decided before the reassessment was completed. The Tribunal applied the principle that objections to reopening must be disposed of by a speaking order before proceeding further. It found, on the record, that the communication relied upon by the Revenue did not deal with the assessee's objections in substance and therefore did not amount to a valid disposal of objections. The Tribunal also treated dismissal of the earlier special leave petition at the threshold as not constituting a declaration of law binding under Article 141.

Conclusion: The reassessment was held unsustainable for non-disposal of objections in the prescribed manner, and the assessee succeeded.

Issues: Validity of the assessment on the ground that the notice under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was issued by an officer not competent to do so under CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011, resulting in a jurisdictional defect.

Analysis: The additional ground was entertained as a pure question of law requiring no fresh factual investigation. The assessment was tested against CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011 issued under section 119 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which governs allocation of jurisdiction on the basis of pecuniary limits. On the facts, the declared income was below the threshold prescribed for the Assistant Commissioner, so the power to issue the notice under section 143(2) vested in the Income-tax Officer. Since the notice initiating assessment was issued by an officer lacking such competence, the assumption of jurisdiction for the assessment under section 143(3) was held to be invalid. The objection raised in relation to pecuniary jurisdiction was treated as materially different from a mere issue of concurrent territorial jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The additional ground was allowed and the assessment was quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where jurisdiction to issue a notice for scrutiny assessment is allocated by a binding CBDT instruction under section 119 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, a notice issued by an officer lacking such pecuniary competence vitiates the assessment proceedings.

Issues: Whether the imported poultry feed premix products, containing vitamins, pro-vitamins, amino acids, stabilisers and carriers, are classifiable under heading 2309 as preparations of a kind used in animal feeding or under heading 2936 as provitamins and vitamins.

Analysis: The products were found, on the basis of their composition, manufacturing process, declared end-use and technical literature, to be compound preparations customised for poultry feeding and not vitamins of general use. The HSN Explanatory Notes to heading 2309 include premixes used for making complete or supplementary animal feeds, particularly where active ingredients are combined with carriers to secure homogeneous dispersion in feed. The notes to heading 2936 cover vitamins and their stabilised forms only where additives are for preservation or transport and do not render the product specially suitable for a specific use. Here, the carriers and other ingredients were not merely preservative or transport aids but were integral to the product's specific function in poultry feed. The classification was also supported by the cited circulars and precedents recognising feed premixes containing vitamins and amino acids as animal feed preparations.

Conclusion: The goods are classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading 2309, more specifically under CTI 2309 90 90, and not under heading 2936.

Issues: (i) Whether contravention of Regulation 5(1)(iv) of the Foreign Exchange Management (Deposit) Regulations, 2000 could sustain penalty against the account holders, notwithstanding that the provision also regulated the authorised dealer and had been omitted later; (ii) Whether confiscation of the amounts lying in the NRNR accounts could be sustained without recorded reasons.

Issue (i): Whether contravention of Regulation 5(1)(iv) of the Foreign Exchange Management (Deposit) Regulations, 2000 could sustain penalty against the account holders, notwithstanding that the provision also regulated the authorised dealer and had been omitted later.

Analysis: Regulation 5(1)(iv), read with Schedule 4, permitted NRNR accounts to be opened only by persons resident outside India and out of funds remitted from outside India through normal banking channels. The obligation was not confined to the authorised dealer alone; the account holder was also bound by the regulatory scheme. Contravention therefore attracted liability under Section 13(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999. The later omission of Regulation 5(1)(iv) did not erase prior violations or prevent proceedings in respect of conduct committed when the regulation was in force. The effect of omission was only prospective and did not nullify accrued liability.

Conclusion: The challenge to the penalty failed. The penalty against the assessees was sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether confiscation of the amounts lying in the NRNR accounts could be sustained without recorded reasons.

Analysis: Confiscation under Section 13(2) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 is discretionary and quasi-judicial in nature. The authority must record reasons showing why penalty alone is insufficient and why confiscation is warranted on the facts. Here, neither the Adjudicating Authority nor the Appellate Tribunal gave reasons for confiscating the amounts in the accounts, and the record showed that the loan transaction had been repaid through maturity proceeds with no loss of foreign exchange. A non-speaking confiscatory order could not stand. In view of the long lapse of time, remand was declined.

Conclusion: The confiscation directions were set aside.

Final Conclusion: The regulatory violation and consequent penalty were upheld, but the confiscation of the amounts in the NRNR accounts was annulled for want of reasons.

Ratio Decidendi: A provision omitted from a fiscal or regulatory regime does not obliterate liability incurred for its breach while it was in force, and discretionary confiscation affecting property must rest on recorded reasons demonstrating why penalty alone is inadequate.

Issues: Whether the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was barred by limitation and whether delay beyond the statutory condonable period could be excused under Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The appeal against the original order was filed after the expiry of the normal two-month period and also beyond the additional one-month period available on showing sufficient cause. Section 85(3A) permits filing within two months from receipt of the decision or order and authorises condonation only for a further period of one month. The statutory scheme does not confer power on the appellate authority to condone delay beyond that outer limit. The appellant's own pleaded date of communication established that the appeal had been filed after the condonable period. The limitation issue was therefore controlled by the express statutory restriction, and the cited authorities on limitation supported the view that the appellate authority lacks jurisdiction to entertain an appeal filed beyond the prescribed extended period.

Conclusion: The appeal was correctly dismissed as time-barred, and no further condonation could be granted.

Issues: Whether the direction to avail the alternative statutory remedy warranted interference.

Analysis: The impugned writ proceedings concerned a claim for differential duty. The High Court had declined to entertain the matter and directed the petitioner to pursue the appellate remedy. The Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with that course and permitted the petitioner to file an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals).

Outcome: The Special Leave Petition was disposed of, with liberty to avail the appellate remedy.

Issues: Whether the absolute confiscation of gold and the penalty imposed under Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable, and whether the penalty required reduction having regard to the appellant's role as a carrier.

Analysis: Gold is a notified item under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962, and the person in possession must prove lawful source and procurement. The appellant was found carrying 12 pieces of foreign-inscribed gold biscuits weighing 1199.570 grams without any supporting document. The explanation that he was merely a carrier did not displace the statutory burden, and the finding of smuggling was maintained. However, the appellant's limited role as a carrier earning a small amount was taken into account while considering the quantum of penalty.

Conclusion: The absolute confiscation of the gold and the imposition of penalty under Section 112(b) were upheld, but the penalty was reduced to Rs.1,00,000/-.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only to the limited extent of reduction of penalty, while the confiscation and the finding of liability were sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: In respect of notified goods under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962, failure to prove lawful possession or source justifies confiscation and penalty, though the quantum of penalty may be moderated based on the carrier's limited role.

Issues: Whether service tax, interest and penalty could be sustained when the amount was paid on departmental audit advice on a transaction later found not taxable, and whether the assessee's suo motu adjustment was impermissible because the refund claim had been rejected as time-barred and not separately challenged.

Analysis: The payment was made only on the instructions of the audit team, and the underlying transaction was found not liable to service tax. In that situation, the department could not retain the amount merely because the refund application was rejected on limitation or because the assessee did not appeal that rejection. The adjustment made by the assessee was treated as a technical correction of an erroneous payment and not as a mala fide or unlawful act. The consequential demand, interest and penalty could not survive once the foundation of taxability failed.

Conclusion: The service tax demand, interest and penalty were set aside, and the assessee succeeded.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were annulled and the appeal was allowed in full, resulting in relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where tax has been paid under departmental insistence on a transaction later found non-taxable, procedural rejection of a refund claim does not validate retention of the amount or sustain consequential demand and penalty.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was liable to discharge Goods and Services Tax on the services rendered and commission paid to its pigmy agents.

Analysis: The determinative question was whether the pigmy agents were independent service providers or employees of the bank. Applying the settled control and economic dependence tests, the engagement terms showed pervasive bank control over work, remuneration, security deposit, disciplinary oversight, notice requirements, and regulated termination. The arrangement bore the incidents of employment and not an independent contract for service. Once that conclusion was reached, the statutory exemption under Section 7(2)(a) and Schedule III of the CGST Act operated, because services rendered by an employee to the employer in the course of employment are neither a supply of goods nor a supply of services. The attempt to characterise the pigmy agents as business facilitators or correspondents was rejected as a misdescription, since their role was confined to deposit collection under the bank's scheme and did not answer the RBI-regulated intermediary model. On that footing, the show cause notices founded on GST liability failed for want of jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not liable to pay GST on the services rendered and commission paid to the pigmy agents, and the impugned show cause notices were liable to be quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the factual indicators establish an employer-employee relationship, services rendered in the course of that employment fall outside the scope of GST under Schedule III, and a contrary tax demand founded on treating such employees as business facilitators cannot stand.

Issues: Whether the additions made under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in respect of unsecured loans and share application money were sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee furnished ledger accounts, bank statements, income-tax returns, audited financial statements, confirmations and other supporting documents for the lenders and share applicants. The material showed that the transactions had moved through banking channels, the counterparties had responded to notices issued under section 133(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the amounts received by way of unsecured loans had been repaid, along with interest where applicable, before the notice under section 148. On the share application money issue, the documents placed on record supported the identity and capacity of the applicants and the genuineness of the receipts. In these circumstances, the evidentiary burden stood discharged and the additions were not sustainable.

Conclusion: The additions under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, were deleted and the assessee succeeded.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice under section 148 issued on 29.07.2022 for Assessment Year 2016-17 was valid when the approval was accorded by the Principal Commissioner instead of the higher specified authority under section 151(ii), and whether the consequent reassessment order could survive.

Analysis: The reassessment was initiated after more than three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, so the applicable approval requirement was the one prescribed for the extended time period under section 151(ii). The governing scheme required prior sanction from the higher specified authority before issuing the notice under section 148. Since the notice was issued with approval from the Principal Commissioner rather than the authority mandated by section 151(ii), the jurisdictional precondition was not satisfied. The defect went to the root of the assumption of jurisdiction for reassessment.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 was invalid and was quashed, and the consequent reassessment order under section 147 did not survive. The assessee succeeded on the legal challenge to the reassessment proceedings.

Issues: (i) whether the assessee's income from turnover could be estimated at 0.40% of gross sales in place of the rate adopted by the Assessing Officer, and (ii) whether penalty for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income survived after substantial relief in the quantum appeal.

Issue (i): whether the assessee's income from turnover could be estimated at 0.40% of gross sales in place of the rate adopted by the Assessing Officer.

Analysis: The assessment was framed after remand for determining the real turnover and the assessee's margin. The assessee's own case for the immediately preceding year had already been decided on similar facts, where the Tribunal accepted that the assessee operated as a pass-through entity with a thin commission margin and that its declared gross profit had been consistently around 0.29%. Following that precedent and applying the same factual approach to the year under appeal, the appropriate estimate was taken at 0.40% of gross sales in the interest of substantial justice.

Conclusion: The estimate of gross profit was upheld at 0.40% of gross sales, resulting in partial relief to the assessee.

Issue (ii): whether penalty for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income survived after substantial relief in the quantum appeal.

Analysis: Once the quantum addition was substantially reduced on estimation, the basis for the penalty ceased to be sustainable. The penalty issue was treated as dependent on the quantum outcome, and estimated additions of this nature did not justify a penalty for inaccurate particulars where the income was determined on a matter of estimation rather than on a finding of concealment.

Conclusion: The penalty was deleted.

Final Conclusion: The quantum appeal was partly allowed and the penalty appeal was allowed, giving the assessee relief on both the estimated addition and the consequential penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: Where income is determined by reasonable estimation on comparable facts and the quantum addition is substantially moderated, penalty for inaccurate particulars does not survive in the absence of a distinct finding of concealment or deliberate inaccuracy.

Issues: Whether the assessments framed under section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were liable to be annulled on the ground that the period for reopening had to be reckoned from the date of transfer of the case and handing over of seized material, and whether the orders of the first appellate authority required interference.

Analysis: The appeals arose from search proceedings in which incriminating material relating to the assessee was found and notices under section 153C were issued. The first appellate authority treated the date of centralisation and transfer of the case as the date on which the seized material was handed over to the Assessing Officer and, applying the settled position that the six-year period for action under section 153C is to be computed from the date of handing over of seized material or recording of satisfaction in the case of the searched person, held the assessment orders to be unsustainable. The Tribunal noted that this approach was consistent with the law laid down on the reckoning of the limitation period in search-related assessments.

Conclusion: The annulment of the assessments was not disturbed and the departmental appeals failed.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the appellate annulment of the assessments under section 153C and declined to interfere with the first appellate authority's view.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under section 153C, the relevant period for initiating assessment action is to be computed from the date on which seized material is handed over or satisfaction is recorded in the case of the searched person, and assessments contrary to that settled reckoning cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether the addition under section 56(2)(x)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was sustainable where the difference between the consideration and the fair market value determined by the Departmental Valuation Officer was within the enhanced tolerance limit.

Analysis: The dispute arose from the purchase of immovable property for a stated consideration, with the revenue invoking section 56(2)(x)(b) on the basis of stamp duty valuation. The valuation of the same property had already been determined by the Departmental Valuation Officer in connected proceedings, and that valuation showed a difference from the agreed consideration which was less than 10 per cent. The Tribunal noted that the Finance Act, 2020 increased the tolerance limit from 5 per cent to 10 per cent and relied on coordinate bench decisions holding that this enhancement was clarificatory and curative in nature. On that basis, the amended tolerance limit was treated as applicable retrospectively, and the small variation did not justify invoking the anti-avoidance addition.

Conclusion: The addition under section 56(2)(x)(b) was not justified and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the assessee could reduce the amount representing capital work-in-progress while computing capital gains under Section 50B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 through a revised computation filed during assessment, without filing a revised return of income.

Analysis: The undertaking was transferred by way of slump sale and the assessee had originally offered capital gains under Section 50B. It was found that capital work-in-progress had been omitted by mistake from the original computation, and the revised computation merely corrected that omission. The material on record, including earlier balance sheets and the fixed asset schedule, showed that the work-in-progress had been reflected consistently in the accounts, and no contrary material was brought by the department. The rejection was based only on the absence of a revised return, without any adverse finding on the correctness of the claim itself.

Conclusion: The revised computation was rightly accepted and the reduction of capital work-in-progress was permissible. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A bona fide correction in the computation of capital gains under Section 50B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 cannot be denied merely because it was made through a revised computation rather than a revised return, where the claim is supported by the record and does not amount to a fresh untenable claim.

Issues: (i) Whether the first appellate authority could dismiss the appeal for non-compliance with section 249(4) where no return was filed but the assessee had no taxable income in India and no advance tax liability arose. (ii) Whether the quantum matter required restoration for fresh adjudication on merits. (iii) Whether the penalty under section 271(1)(c) could survive independently once the quantum matter was remanded.

Issue (i): Whether the first appellate authority could dismiss the appeal for non-compliance with section 249(4) where no return was filed but the assessee had no taxable income in India and no advance tax liability arose.

Analysis: Section 249(4)(b) bars admission of an appeal, where no return has been filed, only if the assessee was liable to pay advance tax. On the facts found, the assessee was a non-resident earning income in Nigeria, and there was no material to show taxable income in India or any obligation to compute and pay advance tax in India. In such circumstances, the condition in section 249(4)(b) was held inapplicable, and dismissal of the appeal in limine on that ground was erroneous.

Conclusion: The dismissal of the quantum appeal under section 249(4) was not justified and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the quantum matter required restoration for fresh adjudication on merits.

Analysis: The assessment had proceeded ex parte on the basis of non-compliance with statutory notices and resulted in an addition for unexplained investment in property. As the first appellate authority had not adjudicated the merits and the assessee sought an opportunity to place supporting material, the matter was restored to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer for de novo consideration after granting due opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The quantum matter was remanded for fresh adjudication, with the assessee directed to cooperate.

Issue (iii): Whether the penalty under section 271(1)(c) could survive independently once the quantum matter was remanded.

Analysis: The penalty was consequential to the quantum addition. Since the quantum proceedings were restored for fresh adjudication, the penalty could not stand independently at that stage and also required reconsideration by the Assessing Officer.

Conclusion: The penalty order was set aside and the penalty matter was also restored for de novo consideration.

Final Conclusion: The first appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, and the penalty appeal was also allowed for statistical purposes, with both matters sent back for fresh adjudication on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: The requirement in section 249(4)(b) applies only where the assessee was actually liable to pay advance tax, and a consequential penalty cannot independently survive when the underlying quantum matter is remanded for fresh adjudication.

Issues: (i) whether the addition made on account of unexplained bank credits was to be sustained in full or restricted to estimated profit; (ii) whether the addition for unexplained investment in immovable property was to be confirmed or restored for limited verification of telescoping; (iii) whether notional rental income could be brought to tax in respect of commercial properties claimed to be used for business; and (iv) whether the separate addition for difference in receipts was sustainable when the bank deposits had already been subjected to estimation.

Issue (i): whether the addition made on account of unexplained bank credits was to be sustained in full or restricted to estimated profit.

Analysis: The credits in the bank accounts were treated as unexplained, but the surrounding material showed that the assessee was engaged in embroidery job work and the deposits had the character of business receipts. In such a case, taxing the entire gross credits would not reflect the real income. Only the profit element embedded in the receipts could be brought to tax, and the absence of proper books did not justify assessment of the whole turnover as income.

Conclusion: The addition was restricted to 8% of the bank credits, and the balance was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): whether the addition for unexplained investment in immovable property was to be confirmed or restored for limited verification of telescoping.

Analysis: The assessee claimed that part of the investment came from business income and withdrawals from partnership concerns, but supporting bank statements, transaction details, and confirmations were not produced. The source could not be verified on the existing record. Since the claim of telescoping required factual examination, the matter was remitted for limited verification with an opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for limited examination of telescoping, and the disposal was for statistical purposes, partly in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): whether notional rental income could be brought to tax in respect of commercial properties claimed to be used for business.

Analysis: The properties were stated to be used for business by partnership firms, and no income from house property was shown. On the facts, the properties were treated as business-use properties and no basis remained for charging notional income as annual letting value.

Conclusion: The addition for deemed rental income was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): whether the separate addition for difference in receipts was sustainable when the bank deposits had already been subjected to estimation.

Analysis: The disputed amount represented the same business receipts already covered by the estimation applied to the bank deposits. A separate addition on that account would amount to double taxation of the same income element.

Conclusion: The separate addition was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The dispute was substantially resolved in favour of the assessee, with one addition restricted to estimated profit, one issue remitted for limited verification, and the remaining additions deleted.

Ratio Decidendi: Where bank credits represent business receipts, only the profit element embedded in those receipts can be taxed, and a separate addition for the same turnover or receipts cannot survive as double taxation.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition on account of on-money receipts could be restricted to the amount of unexplained unsecured loans brought into the books, rather than the entire estimated on-money receipt. (ii) Whether the assessee was entitled to telescoping of income already declared in the earlier year against the addition sustained for the relevant years.

Issue (i): Whether the addition on account of on-money receipts could be restricted to the amount of unexplained unsecured loans brought into the books, rather than the entire estimated on-money receipt.

Analysis: The record showed that the partners had admitted the receipt of on-money and the use of the cash generated from such receipts in the form of accommodation-like unsecured loans routed through shroffs. At the same time, the authorities found that the Assessing Officer had estimated a gross on-money figure and brought the whole amount to tax, although the unsecured loans actually introduced into the books represented only a part of that estimated gross receipt. The appellate finding that gross estimated on-money could not be taxed as such, while the unexplained unsecured loans brought into the books could still be brought to tax, was accepted as the proper approach on the facts.

Conclusion: The restriction of the addition to the amount of unexplained unsecured loans was upheld, and the Revenue's challenge failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee was entitled to telescoping of income already declared in the earlier year against the addition sustained for the relevant years.

Analysis: The claim for telescoping was not accepted because the sustained addition related to unexplained unsecured loans routed through the books as part of the same on-money modus operandi, and the assessee did not establish a basis for granting the earlier declared income credit against the additions sustained in the relevant assessment years. The appellate authority's factual findings on the extent of the amounts brought into the books and their link with the unexplained cash flow were not shown to be perverse.

Conclusion: The telescoping plea was rejected, and the assessee's challenge failed.

Final Conclusion: The common appellate order was left undisturbed, and the additions sustained by the first appellate authority for both years remained in force.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee's on-money receipts are partly routed into the books as unexplained unsecured loans, only the amount so introduced may be taxed as unexplained income on the proved facts, and a generalized estimate of the entire on-money receipt cannot be brought to tax in the absence of separate basis for such wider addition.

Issues: (i) Whether the Monitoring Committee could alter the distribution mechanism already approved by the Committee of Creditors and incorporated in the approved resolution plan; (ii) whether the dissenting financial creditor was entitled to receive payment in accordance with section 30(2)(b) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 on the basis of the liquidation value attributable to its security interest; (iii) whether the impugned direction wrongly included any entitlement from the auto unit proceeds.

Issue (i): Whether the Monitoring Committee could alter the distribution mechanism already approved by the Committee of Creditors and incorporated in the approved resolution plan.

Analysis: The distribution mechanism was consciously approved by the Committee of Creditors in its meetings and formed part of the framework of the approved resolution plan. Once the plan was approved, it attained finality and bound all stakeholders, including any committee constituted only for implementation. The Monitoring Committee had no authority to revisit or modify the commercial decision already taken by the Committee of Creditors, and any departure from that mechanism would amount to rewriting the resolution plan.

Conclusion: The Monitoring Committee could not alter the approved distribution mechanism, and the challenge on this ground fails.

Issue (ii): Whether the dissenting financial creditor was entitled to receive payment in accordance with section 30(2)(b) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 on the basis of the liquidation value attributable to its security interest.

Analysis: Section 30(2)(b) requires that a dissenting financial creditor receive not less than the amount payable in liquidation under section 53. The resolution plan and the Committee of Creditors' approved mechanism contemplated payment of the liquidation value attributable to each secured financial creditor, as determined by the evaluation advisor. The amount awarded to the dissenting financial creditor was treated as its statutory entitlement and not as any premium, and the appellate challenge seeking reduction of that amount was inconsistent with the approved plan and the statutory minimum protection.

Conclusion: The payment directed to the dissenting financial creditor was in accordance with section 30(2)(b) and the approved distribution framework.

Issue (iii): Whether the impugned direction wrongly included any entitlement from the auto unit proceeds.

Analysis: The plan provided that the auto unit sale proceeds would go to assenting financial creditors, while the computation for the dissenting financial creditor was confined to the liquidation value of the steel unit. The record showed that the amount awarded to the dissenting financial creditor was computed only on that basis and did not confer any share in the auto unit proceeds. The objection that the impugned order granted an unwarranted benefit from the auto unit was therefore unfounded.

Conclusion: The impugned direction did not include any entitlement from the auto unit proceeds.

Final Conclusion: The approved resolution plan and the distribution mechanism based on liquidation value remained binding, the Monitoring Committee could not modify them, and the appeal was liable to fail.

Ratio Decidendi: Once a resolution plan is approved and incorporates a distribution mechanism, neither the Monitoring Committee nor subsequent stakeholders can alter that mechanism, and a dissenting financial creditor must receive at least the amount payable in liquidation under section 30(2)(b) read with section 53.