Issues: Whether the order-in-original passed under Section 73 of the Uttarakhand Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, was liable to be quashed for want of effective service of the show cause notices after cancellation of GST registration, and whether the assessee was entitled to an opportunity to reply and be heard before fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The GST registration of the assessee had already been cancelled, and the show cause notices were uploaded only on the GST portal. In the circumstances, the proceedings resulted in an ex parte adjudication without effective opportunity to contest the notices. The Court accepted the concession that the case was covered by the earlier co-ordinate decision on identical facts, and held that the impugned orders could not be sustained. The Court also directed that the assessee be given time to file a reply and that personal hearing be afforded in terms of Section 75(4) of the Uttarakhand Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, if so desired.

Conclusion: The impugned orders were quashed, and the matter was remitted for fresh order in accordance with law after giving the assessee an opportunity to reply and be heard.

Issues: (i) whether the deductee was entitled to credit of tax deducted at source on the basis of Form 16A and the bank certificates despite non-reflection on the portal, and (ii) whether the Department could withhold credit and consequential refund without verifying the genuineness of the certificates and TDS particulars.

Issue (i): Whether the deductee was entitled to credit of tax deducted at source on the basis of Form 16A and the bank certificates despite non-reflection on the portal.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under Sections 198, 199, 200, 200A, 201, 203, 203A, 205 and 206 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, together with Rule 37BA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, treats tax deducted and paid to the Central Government as payment on behalf of the deductee. The certificates issued by the deductor-bank contained the relevant particulars of deduction and deposit, and the Department did not dislodge their correctness by any affidavit or verified material. In these circumstances, mere non-display in Form 26AS or on the portal could not defeat the statutory right to credit.

Conclusion: The deductee was entitled to credit of TDS on the basis of the certificates and Form 16A, subject to verification of genuineness.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department could withhold credit and consequential refund without verifying the genuineness of the certificates and TDS particulars.

Analysis: The Department was required to verify the particulars furnished in the certificates and Form 16A within a reasonable time. Once the deductor's certificates were not shown to be false and no adverse material was placed on record, the Department could not keep the matter pending indefinitely or deny credit. If verification revealed no infirmity, full credit had to be given and refund issued after adjustment of any existing demand, with statutory interest from the date the refund became due.

Conclusion: The Department was directed to verify the TDS particulars and, if no adverse discrepancy was found, grant full credit and consequential refund with statutory interest.

Final Conclusion: The batch of writ applications succeeded, and the income tax authorities were obliged to verify the TDS certificates and, upon finding them genuine, extend credit and refund relief to the petitioners.

Ratio Decidendi: Where deduction and deposit of TDS are supported by statutory certificates containing requisite particulars and the Department does not establish any falsity, credit cannot be denied merely because the amount is not reflected on the portal; the authorities must verify and, if the particulars are found genuine, grant credit and consequential refund.

Issues: Whether the expenditure incurred on issue of market linked debentures and non-convertible debentures was allowable as business expenditure under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, or was required to be amortised under section 35D of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The assessee was an NBFC already engaged in borrowing funds and lending them in the ordinary course of business. The debentures were issued to raise funds for onward lending and repayment of borrowings, and not for setting up a new unit or for extension of the undertaking. The Tribunal relied on the principle that expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business is deductible as revenue expenditure, and on Circular No. 56 dated 19.03.1971, which clarifies that section 35D does not supersede an otherwise allowable deduction for debenture issue . The Tribunal also followed the ratio that the object of borrowing is irrelevant where the expenditure is incurred for securing the use of money for business purposes.

Conclusion: The expenditure on issue of debentures was held allowable as revenue expenditure under section 37(1) and not amortisable under section 35D.

Final Conclusion: The addition made by restricting deduction to one-fifth of the debenture issue was deleted and the assessee succeeded on the sole issue.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a company already in business incurs expenditure on issue of debentures for raising funds in the ordinary course of its business, and the expenditure is otherwise allowable as revenue expenditure under section 37(1), section 35D does not apply to compel amortisation.

Issues: Whether the seized imported consignment was liable to be released provisionally on conditions, pending adjudication by the customs authorities.

Analysis: The writ petition concerned only a seizure memo and sought interim release of the imported goods. The Court followed its earlier orders in similar matters and held that provisional release could be directed on conditions, including payment of the enhanced duty amount, furnishing of a bank guarantee equal to 10 percent of the total price of the goods, and compliance with the quantification to be made by the Customs authorities. The Court also protected the adjudicatory process by clarifying that the customs department could proceed further in accordance with law and that the adjudicating authority would decide the matter independently without being influenced by the conditional release order.

Conclusion: The goods were directed to be provisionally released on the stipulated conditions, and the petition was allowed.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant was ineligible under Section 29A(c) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 on account of an alleged past NPA and shortfall relating to another corporate debtor; (ii) Whether the appellant was ineligible under Section 29A(j) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 on the basis of the alleged ineligibility of its connected person.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant was ineligible under Section 29A(c) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 on account of an alleged past NPA and shortfall relating to another corporate debtor.

Analysis: The relevant point of time for testing disqualification under Section 29A(c) is the date of submission of the resolution plan. A past NPA that had already been resolved under an approved resolution plan, with the earlier dues extinguished and the corporate debtor operating on a clean slate, cannot be resurrected to deny eligibility later. The appellant was not itself an NPA on the date of submission of its plan, and the material did not show that its connected person was then managing or controlling any subsisting NPA account.

Conclusion: The appellant was not ineligible under Section 29A(c).

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant was ineligible under Section 29A(j) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 on the basis of the alleged ineligibility of its connected person.

Analysis: Section 29A(j) operates only if a connected person is independently disqualified under clauses (a) to (i). Once the supposed disqualification under Section 29A(c) was found unsustainable, the derivative disqualification under Section 29A(j) also could not survive. The record also did not establish any material connection between the appellant or its connected person and the prior resolved corporate debtor so as to attract the bar.

Conclusion: The appellant was not ineligible under Section 29A(j).

Final Conclusion: The disqualification findings were unsustainable, the impugned orders were set aside, and the appellant was held eligible to participate in the corporate insolvency resolution process with its resolution plan to be processed in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Eligibility under Section 29A(c) must be assessed with reference to the date of submission of the resolution plan, and a previously resolved NPA with extinguished dues cannot form the basis of disqualification thereafter.

Issues: Whether interest income earned by a co-operative credit society from deposits kept with co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and, alternatively, under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act.

Analysis: The deposits were made with co-operative banks which are co-operative societies. Section 80P(2)(d) allows deduction in respect of income by way of interest or dividend derived by a co-operative society from investments with another co-operative society. The reliance on Totgar's Co-operative Sale Society Ltd. was held to be misplaced because that decision concerned deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) and did not decide the scope of section 80P(2)(d) for investments with co-operative societies. The issue was treated as settled by consistent jurisdictional and coordinate bench decisions holding that such interest income qualifies for deduction under section 80P(2)(d).

Conclusion: The interest income was held deductible under section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the disallowance was directed to be deleted. The alternative claim under section 80P(2)(a)(i) was rendered academic and not adjudicated.

Ratio Decidendi: Interest earned by a co-operative society from investments with another co-operative society, including a co-operative bank, is deductible under section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Entitlement to credit of tax deducted at source where the corresponding receipts were assessed as income, and the matter required verification of Form 26AS and departmental records.

Analysis: The assessment was reopened on AIR information and the assessee did not file a return or comply with notice under section 148, leading to an ex parte assessment on receipts reflected in Form 26AS. Since those receipts were brought to tax and tax had been deducted at source on them, denial of corresponding credit merely because no return was filed would be technical. Credit for TDS is consequential to assessment of the related income, but it must be verified against Form 26AS and departmental records.

Conclusion: The assessee was held entitled to consideration of TDS credit after verification, and the issue was sent back to the Assessing Officer for grant of due credit in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether the first appellate authority was justified in setting aside the assessment for denovo adjudication on the basis of additional documentary evidence and in exercise of appellate powers under section 251(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. (ii) Whether the reassessment was vitiated for want of notice under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 despite the assessee's participation in the proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether the first appellate authority was justified in setting aside the assessment for denovo adjudication on the basis of additional documentary evidence and in exercise of appellate powers under section 251(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The assessee produced ledger accounts, tax invoices, gate passes, weighment slips, audited financial statements, tax audit report, bank statements and return acknowledgments before the first appellate authority. The assessment had been completed ex parte without proper examination of those materials. The appellate authority, acting within its co-terminus powers, directed fresh verification by the Assessing Officer. Such remand was treated as a legitimate exercise of appellate jurisdiction because the factual claims required scrutiny at the assessment stage.

Conclusion: The setting aside of the assessment for denovo adjudication was upheld and the Revenue's challenge failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the reassessment was vitiated for want of notice under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 despite the assessee's participation in the proceedings.

Analysis: The record showed that no notice under section 143(2) had been issued. The statutory requirement of such notice is mandatory for a valid reassessment, and section 292BB cures only defects in service, not complete absence of notice. On that basis, the reassessment proceedings were held to be fundamentally defective and incapable of being sustained.

Conclusion: The reassessment was held invalid and the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal failed, while the assessee's cross objection succeeded, resulting in deletion of the addition and invalidation of the reassessment.

Ratio Decidendi: A reassessment under the Income-tax Act, 1961 cannot be sustained in the complete absence of a notice under section 143(2), and section 292BB does not cure such total non-issuance of notice.

Issues: Whether the disallowance of excess interest expenditure of Rs. 2,37,375 claimed on unsecured loans was sustainable on the ground that the amount related to a subsequent year and whether the addition made by the Assessing Officer and affirmed by the first appellate authority was liable to be deleted.

Analysis: The interest payment was not found to be bogus and the expenditure was accepted as incurred for business purposes. The controversy was confined to the year of allowability of the interest expenditure under the mercantile system of accounting. The Court noted that the disputed exercise was revenue neutral and that no adverse finding existed on the genuineness of the expenditure. In these circumstances, the addition was not warranted.

Conclusion: The disallowance of Rs. 2,37,375 was deleted and the addition was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 04.04.2022 for Assessment Year 2015-16 was barred by limitation under the first proviso to section 149(1)(b), and whether the reassessment framed on that notice was invalid.

Analysis: The notice was issued after 31.03.2022, i.e. beyond the outer time limit applicable to Assessment Year 2015-16. The decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal, as reiterated in ITO v. Sai Kumar Mateti, was treated as governing the issue, and the coordinate Bench decisions following the same principle were applied. On that basis, the notice was held to be time-barred and incapable of sustaining the reassessment.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice was invalid as being time-barred, and the assessment founded on it was also invalid.

Ratio Decidendi: For Assessment Year 2015-16, reassessment notices issued after 31.03.2022 are barred by limitation under the first proviso to section 149(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and cannot sustain the reassessment.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was barred by limitation for Assessment Year 2015-16.

Analysis: The notice under Section 148 was issued on 04.04.2022 after proceedings under Section 148A(b) and an order under Section 148A(d). The relevant assessment year began on or before 01.04.2021, so the first proviso to Section 149(1) governed the outer limit for reopening. The Tribunal applied the settled position that the amended longer period cannot revive a notice already time-barred under the earlier regime, and that the later stages under Sections 148A(b) and 148A(d) do not extend the basic limitation where the six-year limit had already expired.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 148 was held to be barred by limitation and liable to be quashed.

Issues: Whether section 40A(2)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be invoked on the facts of the case to treat the alleged excess payment on acquisition of shares from an associate concern as excessive expenditure and sustain the addition.

Analysis: The shares acquired by the assessee were reflected in the balance sheet as non-current investments and were not routed through the profit and loss account. The character of the transaction could not be altered merely because the assessee's objects included dealing in shares. The Assessing Officer had also assumed the face value of the shares to be their fair market value without any valuation exercise or comparable material on record. In these circumstances, the foundation for the disallowance was found unsustainable and the matter required fresh examination.

Conclusion: The addition was set aside and the issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication.

Issues: Whether interest received on enhanced compensation for acquisition of land is taxable as income from other sources in the year of receipt, and whether such receipt is exempt under section 10(37) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Tribunal followed the coordinate bench decision on an identical question and applied the settled view that interest received under section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act forms part of taxable income under section 56(2)(viii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, to be assessed in the year of receipt. It further noted that the amount does not qualify for exemption under section 10(37) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and no distinguishing feature or contrary binding precedent was shown to warrant a different view.

Conclusion: The addition made by the Assessing Officer was upheld and the assessee's challenge failed; the issue was decided against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.

Ratio Decidendi: Interest received on enhanced compensation is taxable as income from other sources in the year of receipt and is not exempt under section 10(37) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned retention order was vitiated for non-supply of relied upon documents and breach of natural justice; (ii) whether retention of the seized cash and articles was justified despite the appellant's challenge to the source of the cash.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned retention order was vitiated for non-supply of relied upon documents and breach of natural justice.

Analysis: The relied upon documents were the punchnamas forming part of the record, and copies of those documents had been supplied to the appellant. No other document was shown to have been relied upon by the respondents. The appellant also did not invoke the statutory course for obtaining further documents. On that basis, the complaint of procedural illegality or denial of natural justice was not established.

Conclusion: The challenge based on non-supply of relied upon documents fails, and no breach of natural justice is made out.

Issue (ii): Whether retention of the seized cash and articles was justified despite the appellant's challenge to the source of the cash.

Analysis: The prosecution complaint had already been filed naming the appellant as an accused, and confiscation of the seized amount was sought therein. The appellant failed to satisfactorily disclose the source of the cash at the time of search or by the later documents produced, which did not reliably establish a genuine source of funds. In these circumstances, the seizure and continued retention of the cash, documents, and digital devices were treated as justified.

Conclusion: The retention of the seized cash and articles is upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is devoid of merit and the impugned retention order stands affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the relied upon documents are supplied and the appellant fails to substantiate the legitimate source of seized cash, continued retention of the property is sustainable under the money-laundering framework.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under section 148 and the consequential reassessment proceedings were barred by limitation and therefore void ab initio.

Analysis: The assessment year in question fell within the regime where the original limitation under section 149 had expired. The notice first issued in June 2021 was treated in the post-Ashish Agarwal framework as a deemed notice under section 148A(b), and the surviving time available to the Revenue had to be computed in accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Rajeev Bansal, including the exclusions under the third proviso to section 149 and the limited extension under the fourth proviso. On that computation, the notice under section 148 issued on 19.07.2022 was beyond the surviving period. The contention that section 148A(d) independently extended the time for completion was rejected.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 was held to be time barred and invalid. The reassessment proceedings and the assessment order passed in consequence were quashed, and the assessee succeeded on the limitation ground.

Issues: Whether the amount received back by the assessee from the counterparty could be treated as unexplained cash credit under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, when the assessee had earlier advanced the same money through banking channels and the transaction was supported by documentary evidence.

Analysis: The assessee had advanced Rs. 2 crore to the counterparty under an arrangement for procurement of land, and the advance was made through banking channels. The record showed the underlying memorandum of understanding, legal notices, and a subsequent settlement agreement, all indicating that the later receipts were towards refund of the earlier advance. The source of the advance was not doubted by the assessing authority. The addition was founded mainly on general statements concerning the counterparty's alleged role in accommodation entries, but there was no specific statement or direct incriminating material connecting the assessee's receipt to an unexplained entry. In the absence of such corroboration, the receipt could not be characterized as an unexplained credit merely because the counterparty was alleged to be a paper or entry provider entity.

Conclusion: The addition under section 68 was not sustainable and was rightly deleted; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal failed, and the deletion of the addition was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessee establishes by contemporaneous documents that the impugned receipt is a return of an earlier advance routed through banking channels, section 68 cannot be invoked in the absence of specific incriminating material or direct evidence showing that the receipt is an unexplained cash credit.

Issues: Whether the revisionary order under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid when the Assessing Officer had made enquiries on the scrutiny issues and the Principal Commissioner introduced a fresh ground not covered by the show-cause notice.

Analysis: The assessment record showed that the Assessing Officer had examined the scrutiny triggers, called for replies, and completed the assessment after considering the material furnished by the assessee. The Principal Commissioner's revision was founded on alleged violation of sections 269T, 73 and 185, and on non-verification of expenses. The Tribunal held that the expenses issue was not part of the show-cause notice and could not be introduced for the first time in the revision order. It further held that the transaction in question was a transfer of liability by journal entry under a tripartite arrangement and did not establish such lack of enquiry or prejudice as would justify section 263. The Tribunal reiterated that revision cannot be sustained for mere inadequacy of enquiry or for directing a roving and fishing investigation where the Assessing Officer has already taken a plausible view.

Conclusion: The revisionary order under section 263 was unsustainable and was quashed.

Final Conclusion: The assessment order was restored and the assessee succeeded on the ground that the conditions for invoking revisional jurisdiction were not satisfied.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 263 can be invoked only where the assessment order is both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, and not merely because the revisional authority prefers a fuller enquiry or seeks to introduce a new issue beyond the notice.

Issues: Whether the reward received from the US Securities and Exchange Commission for whistleblower assistance was taxable as income under the Income-tax Act, and whether it could be treated as a windfall gain or capital receipt outside the charging provisions.

Analysis: The receipt was examined in the light of the inclusive definition of income under section 2(24) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. A receipt need not be periodic or recurring to constitute income, and even a casual receipt may fall within the tax net if it partakes of the nature of income. The reward was not treated as an unsolicited or gratuitous payment: the whistleblower had planned the complaint, gathered evidence, engaged counsel on success-fee terms, filed a separate claim for reward, and actively assisted the enforcement process. The payment was therefore found to involve clear quid pro quo and to arise from a conscious, anticipated course of action rather than an unforeseen windfall. The claim that it was a capital receipt was also rejected because the payment was linked to the information supplied and the assistance rendered, not to any personal testimonial or detached bounty. The receipt was held not to fall within the exemption under section 10(17A) and, in any event, was taxable under the residuary head as income from other sources.

Conclusion: The reward received from the US Securities and Exchange Commission was taxable income and not a capital receipt or windfall gain; the addition was sustained and the assessee's challenge failed.

Ratio Decidendi: A whistleblower reward received pursuant to a statutory award scheme, where the recipient knowingly pursues the claim, supplies information, and renders assistance in expectation of reward, is taxable income with quid pro quo and is not exempt merely because the quantum is discretionary or the receipt is one-time.

Issues: Whether addition under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained in respect of share capital and share premium received by a duly incorporated assessee company from a third party.

Analysis: The assessee was found to be a genuine incorporated entity and the authorities below recorded categorical findings to that effect. The share investment was received from a third party, and any doubt about the source of funds in the hands of the investor, or about alleged control of that investor by other persons, did not by itself justify addition in the hands of the recipient assessee in the absence of evidence that the assessee itself had routed or passed on the money. The reasoning of the Tribunal, affirming the order of the first appellate authority, disclosed no perversity or serious error warranting interference.

Conclusion: The addition was not sustained against the assessee, and the challenge raised by the Revenue failed.

Issues: Whether the Customs Broker had knowledge, or was deemed to have knowledge, that the duty scrips used for debiting customs duty were forged and fraudulently re-registered, so as to attract penalty under section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The record showed that the original scrips had already been issued and utilised, but the same numbers were later re-registered in the EDI system without corresponding DGFT endorsement and were used repeatedly through different importers and brokers. The importer and the broker admitted that no physical copies of the scrips were provided to the broker, and the broker nonetheless used the particulars for duty payment. Under Regulation 11 of the Customs Broker Licensing Regulations, 2013 and the conditions in Notification No. 95/2009-Customs, the broker was required to verify the genuineness of the scrips and produce or insist on production of the physical scrip at the time of debit. The failure to seek the documents or verify them from DGFT was held to be a lack of due diligence amounting to conscious facilitation of the fraudulent use.

Conclusion: The penalty under section 114AA was upheld against the Customs Broker; the plea that it lacked knowledge or was itself a victim of the fraud was rejected.