Issues: (i) Whether penalty under section 271DA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained on the basis of electronic material found during search when the evidentiary chain and admissibility of such material were disputed. (ii) Whether the cash receipt alleged against the assessee attracted section 269ST of the Income-tax Act, 1961 when the receipt was treated as a loan transaction falling within the exception for transactions governed by section 269SS.

Issue (i): Whether penalty under section 271DA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained on the basis of electronic material found during search when the evidentiary chain and admissibility of such material were disputed.

Analysis: The penalty rested on electronic and digital material said to have been recovered during search. The Tribunal examined the earlier finding in the connected matter that the digital material relied upon by the Revenue was not supported by a complete and reliable chain of custody and did not satisfy the required evidentiary safeguards for electronic records. The Tribunal also noted that, where the Revenue seeks to rely exclusively on electronically retrieved material, authenticity, integrity, and admissibility must be established before such material can be used to fasten liability. On that footing, the electronic material could not safely form the sole basis of the penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty could not be sustained on the basis of the disputed electronic evidence and the assessee succeeded on this issue.

Issue (ii): Whether the cash receipt alleged against the assessee attracted section 269ST of the Income-tax Act, 1961 when the receipt was treated as a loan transaction falling within the exception for transactions governed by section 269SS.

Analysis: The Tribunal held that the nature of the transaction was a loan transaction and, on that characterization, the receipt did not fall within the mischief of section 269ST because the proviso excludes transactions covered by section 269SS. Since the penalty was founded on the supposed contravention of section 269ST, the statutory basis for penalty was absent on the facts as accepted by the Tribunal.

Conclusion: Section 269ST was held inapplicable and the penalty was unsustainable; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The penalties for all the concerned assessment years were set aside and the appeals were allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty under section 271DA cannot be sustained unless the Revenue establishes reliable and admissible evidence of contravention, and a receipt characterized as a loan transaction does not attract section 269ST where the statutory exception for section 269SS applies.

Outcome: Delay condoned. The special leave petitions were dismissed and the pending application(s), if any, stood disposed of.

Issues: Whether the enhancement of assessable value based on written acceptance by the importer, without a speaking order, was sustainable in law.

Analysis: The dispute concerned reassessment of imported goods under the Customs Act and the valuation framework under the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007. The Tribunal noted that the importer had repeatedly sought clearance under protest and that the correspondence could not be treated as a simple voluntary acceptance of enhancement. It followed the Delhi High Court's ruling that the waiver under Section 17(5) is confined to the obligation to pass a speaking order where reassessment is accepted in writing, and does not destroy the statutory right to question the reassessment on merits. The Tribunal also accepted that valuation cannot rest merely on a consent letter or on unsupported reliance on external data, without the procedural safeguards required by the valuation provisions.

Conclusion: The enhancement based solely on written acceptance was held unsustainable, and the impugned orders were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Acceptance in writing under Section 17(5) of the Customs Act, 1962 waives only the requirement of a speaking order and does not amount to an abandonment of the statutory right to challenge reassessment or valuation on merits.

Issues: (i) Whether transposition of a respondent to the category of appellant can be allowed post-withdrawal of the appeal; (ii) Whether the appeal under Section 10F of the Companies Act, 1956 was filed by the appellants in representative capacity of the review applicant; (iii) Whether the review applicant had prior notice of withdrawal of the appeal; (iv) Whether the review applicant is barred by estoppel and constructive res judicata from seeking transposition at this stage; (v) Scope of review - how far the questions urged can be re-agitated.

Issue (i): Whether transposition of a respondent to the category of appellant can be allowed post-withdrawal of the appeal.

Analysis: Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 permits addition and substitution of parties at any stage of a live proceeding, while Order XXIII Rule 1-A applies specifically where a suit or analogous proceeding is withdrawn or abandoned and a defendant seeks transposition. The provisions were read together to mean that transposition must be sought while the lis is still alive and cannot be directed after the appeal has already been withdrawn and ceased to exist. The cited authorities were distinguished on facts, including cases involving representative proceedings, partition suits, probate matters, or applications made before withdrawal.

Conclusion: Transposition after withdrawal of the appeal is not permissible. This issue is decided against the review applicant.

Issue (ii): Whether the appeal under Section 10F of the Companies Act, 1956 was filed by the appellants in representative capacity of the review applicant.

Analysis: Sections 397, 398 and 399 of the Companies Act, 1956 were construed to distinguish between a representative application under sub-section (3) of Section 399 and an individual application maintainable under sub-section (1) on the strength of qualifying shareholding. The original petition was held to have been filed by the contesting respondent in her individual capacity, not on behalf of other shareholders. The appeal under Section 10F was by persons aggrieved in their own right, and the appellants and the review applicant had distinct grievances and different grounds. The record also showed that the review applicant had earlier supported the findings of the company law forum.

Conclusion: The appeal was not filed in representative capacity of the review applicant. This issue is decided against the review applicant.

Issue (iii): Whether the review applicant had prior notice of withdrawal of the appeal.

Analysis: The Court relied on the postal record, tracking details, the common postal delivery channel, the service on the company in control of the review applicant, the advocate's letter, and the prolonged pendency of the withdrawal application in the cause list. These circumstances were held sufficient to establish prior notice before the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The review applicant's lack of appearance or timely transposition request despite such notice was held to be unexplained.

Conclusion: The review applicant had prior notice of the withdrawal of the appeal. This issue is decided against the review applicant.

Issue (iv): Whether the review applicant is barred by estoppel and constructive res judicata from seeking transposition at this stage.

Analysis: The prior order recording that the review applicant supported the findings of the company forum, coupled with the failure to press the transposition prayer at the recall stage and the absence of any timely transposition application, was held to attract estoppel, waiver, and constructive res judicata. The Court found that the review applicant was attempting to resile from an earlier accepted position and reopen issues already concluded on merits in the recall proceedings.

Conclusion: The review applicant is barred by estoppel and constructive res judicata from seeking transposition at this stage. This issue is decided against the review applicant.

Issue (v): Scope of review - how far the questions urged can be re-agitated.

Analysis: Review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was held to be confined to error apparent, discovery of new material, or analogous grounds. The earlier dismissal of the recall application had already adjudicated the material issues on merits, and the present grounds were available earlier and did not disclose any patent error. The Court held that review cannot be used as a substitute for appeal or as a device to re-agitate settled issues.

Conclusion: No ground for review was made out within the limited scope of review jurisdiction. This issue is decided against the review applicant.

Final Conclusion: The review application failed on all material issues, and the earlier order refusing recall stood confirmed, leaving the dismissal of the appeal as withdrawn undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Transposition under Order XXIII Rule 1-A read with Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 must be sought while the proceeding is still pending, and review jurisdiction cannot be used to reopen issues already decided on merits or to create a fresh right to contest an appeal after withdrawal.

Issues: Whether the impugned discharge order warranted interference in revision and whether the material on record disclosed grave suspicion sufficient to sustain the charges, including in relation to sanction and the evidentiary value of the CCTV footage and medical material.

Analysis: The scope of revisional interference was confined to legality, propriety and correctness, and the Court reiterated that at the stage of charge the material is to be tested only for a prima facie case and grave suspicion, without conducting a roving inquiry. On the facts, the allegations were found to be materially weakened by significant improvements and inconsistencies in the complainant's version, uncertainty regarding the injuries reflected in the medical documents, absence of reliable corroboration before the Magistrate, and the failure to establish the CCTV footage through the requirements governing electronic evidence. The Court also found no perversity in the Sessions Court's view that the record did not justify proceeding against the accused officers, and considered it unnecessary to decide the sanction issue separately once the case on merits failed.

Conclusion: The discharge of the accused was upheld and no ground for revisional interference was made out.

Final Conclusion: The complaint-based prosecution was not restored, and the revisional challenge to the discharge order failed.

Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of framing charge, interference in revision is unwarranted unless the record discloses grave suspicion supported by reliable material; where the complainant's case is materially inconsistent and the corroborative evidence is inadmissible or unreliable, discharge is justified.

Issues: Challenge to the High Court's reliance on the alternative-remedy doctrine, and the contention that Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 imposes an impossible condition for availing input tax credit.

Outcome: The matter was taken up for further hearing and listed on a later date after copies were directed to be served on the respondents.

Issues: Whether the appellate authority's refusal to sustain the refund sanction order should be interfered with and the matter remitted for fresh consideration after permitting the petitioner to produce a legible copy of the Bill of Lading and other relevant documents.

Analysis: The challenge arose from the appellate authority's finding that the record did not clearly establish whether the shipping lines involved were foreign or Indian shipping lines, as the enclosed Bill of Lading was not legible. The petitioner's request was that a legible copy could be produced for proper adjudication. In the circumstances, the Court found that the controversy should be reconsidered on merits after giving the petitioner an opportunity to place the necessary material before the appellate authority.

Conclusion: The matter was remitted to the appellate authority for fresh consideration after granting the petitioner an opportunity to produce a legible copy of the Bill of Lading and any other relevant documents, and the appeal stood disposed of accordingly.

Issues: Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was leviable on disallowance of society charges and depreciation made in assessment under section 143(3) read with section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, where no incriminating material was found during search.

Analysis: The additions on which penalty was founded were routine disallowances arising from examination of books of account and prior-year treatment, not from any seized or incriminating material. The claims for society charges and depreciation were disclosed in the return and financial statements, and there was no finding that the particulars furnished were false or that income had been concealed. In an unabated assessment year, additions made without incriminating material could not, by themselves, justify penalty. Penalty proceedings require an independent basis showing concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars, and mere non-acceptance of a claim does not establish either limb.

Conclusion: Penalty under section 271(1)(c) was not sustainable, and deletion of the penalty was upheld.

Issues: (i) Whether the deletion of additions made on account of alleged penny stock transactions and the grant of exemption under section 10(38) could be sustained on the material available; (ii) Whether the matter required restoration for fresh adjudication after confronting the assessee with all adverse material.

Issue (i): Whether the deletion of additions made on account of alleged penny stock transactions and the grant of exemption under section 10(38) could be sustained on the material available.

Analysis: The addition arose from the alleged sale of shares in a penny stock company, with the Assessing Officer treating the sale consideration as unexplained cash credit and the related commission as unexplained expenditure. The appellate relief had been granted on the basis of documentary evidence, lack of direct adverse material and non-confrontation of certain enquiry results. However, the record showed that the assessee had purchased the shares through an off-market preferential allotment, while the appellate findings relied on precedents dealing with different factual situations. The finding that the assessee had not been confronted with the replies, if any, to notices under section 133(6) and with the SEBI material was recorded without adequate verification of the assessment record.

Conclusion: The deletion of additions and allowance of exemption could not be sustained as such.

Issue (ii): Whether the matter required restoration for fresh adjudication after confronting the assessee with all adverse material.

Analysis: The assessee was entitled to be confronted with all material relied upon by the Assessing Officer, including the replies received in response to notices under section 133(6) and the SEBI report or order. Since the relevant material was not available on record before the Tribunal and the factual verification was incomplete, the proper course was to set aside the additions and direct fresh adjudication by the Assessing Officer after supplying the relied-upon material to the assessee and affording an opportunity of response.

Conclusion: The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication after due confrontation of the material.

Final Conclusion: The appeal resulted in only partial success for the Revenue, with the substantive tax issue sent back for fresh determination.

Ratio Decidendi: Where adverse material is relied upon in a penny stock dispute, the assessee must be confronted with that material before a final addition is sustained, and incomplete factual verification warrants remand for de novo adjudication.

Issues: Whether interest expenditure claimed as a deduction under section 57(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was allowable against interest income where the borrowed funds were also used for investment in shares and purchase of plots, and whether the resulting income computation required interference.

Analysis: Deduction under section 57(iii) is available only for expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of earning the relevant income. The decisive requirement is a direct and proximate nexus between the borrowed funds and the interest income sought to be earned. On the facts, the borrowing was not shown to have been used for earning interest income alone, and the record instead showed use of funds for other investments including shares and immovable property. In the absence of satisfactory documentary proof establishing the necessary nexus, the claim did not satisfy the statutory condition.

Conclusion: The disallowance of the interest expenditure was upheld and the assessee's claim under section 57(iii) was rejected.

Issues: Whether the addition made under section 56(2)(x)(b)(B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, on account of difference between the purchase consideration and the stamp duty value of immovable property, could be sustained for Assessment Year 2018-19 when the variation was 7.44% and the amended 10% tolerance band was claimed to be applicable retrospectively.

Analysis: The assessee purchased immovable property for Rs. 1,50,00,000/- against a stamp duty valuation of Rs. 1,61,16,500/-, resulting in a difference of Rs. 11,16,500/- or 7.44%. The Tribunal noted the consistent view of coordinate benches that the enhancement of the tolerance band from 5% to 10% is curative and beneficial in nature and is to be applied to Assessment Year 2018-19. It further held that the deeming provision under section 56(2)(x)(b)(B) cannot be extended to tax marginal variations that fall within the revised tolerance band, and that the Revenue's reliance on the general presumption against retrospectivity did not override the beneficial character of the amendment.

Conclusion: The addition under section 56(2)(x)(b)(B) was not sustainable and was directed to be deleted.

Ratio Decidendi: A curative and beneficial amendment enhancing the tolerance band for marginal difference between purchase consideration and stamp duty value applies retrospectively to pending assessments, and no addition can be made where the variation remains within that tolerance band.

Issues: Whether the addition made under section 68 and the disallowance of loss arising from the sale of shares in a penny stock scrip were justified in the absence of direct evidence showing that the assessee received unaccounted cash or derived any concealed benefit.

Analysis: The assessee produced contract notes, demat statements, bank records and other documentary evidence showing purchase and sale through recognised stock exchange channels. The recorded facts showed that the shares were actually purchased and sold at a loss. The addition was based only on generalized investigation material concerning manipulation in the scrip, but no direct material was brought to connect the assessee with any accommodation entry operator or to show receipt of any unaccounted consideration. The alleged motive to enter into a sham transaction was also not supported by the surrounding facts, including the assessee's substantial declared capital gains and taxes paid during the year. The authorities relied on by the Revenue were held distinguishable because they involved materially different facts concerning claimed exempt capital gains from abnormal price appreciation.

Conclusion: The addition under section 68 and the disallowance of loss were not sustainable and the assessee succeeded on this issue.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition made towards alleged bogus purchases was sustainable or required fresh verification on the footing that the disputed amount had been reversed and was not claimed as a deduction; (ii) Whether the disallowance of 50% of labour charges was justified for want of reliable supporting evidence.

Issue (i): Whether the addition made towards alleged bogus purchases was sustainable or required fresh verification on the footing that the disputed amount had been reversed and was not claimed as a deduction?

Analysis: The assessee claimed that a substantial part of the purchase entries had been reversed after non-supply of goods and that the amount was not debited as expenditure in the profit and loss account. The authorities below had not examined this factual assertion from the correct perspective. At the same time, the surrounding conduct of the assessee created doubt regarding the genuineness of the transactions. The Tribunal held that if the amount was in fact not claimed as a deduction, no disallowance could survive, but the factual position required verification from the books and supporting records. The matter therefore called for a fresh examination by the Assessing Officer of the purchase entries, reversals, and confirmations of the suppliers.

Conclusion: The addition on account of alleged bogus purchases was set aside for fresh verification, with directions to determine whether the disputed amount had actually been claimed as a deduction. This issue was partly in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the disallowance of 50% of labour charges was justified for want of reliable supporting evidence?

Analysis: The assessee produced only ledger extracts and cash vouchers, but no muster rolls, attendance records, wage sheets, identity proof of labourers, bank records, or other independent corroboration. In the absence of credible material to establish the genuineness of a substantial cash expenditure, the Tribunal found the claim unverifiable. The estimate made by the Assessing Officer, restricting the disallowance to 50% instead of rejecting the entire claim, was considered reasonable and supported by the record.

Conclusion: The disallowance of labour charges was upheld. This issue was against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only to the extent that the purchase addition was remitted for reconsideration, while the labour charge disallowance was sustained. The matter was thus disposed of with partial relief to the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether reassessment under the Income-tax Act was valid when no notice under section 143(2) was issued after initiation of proceedings under sections 147 and 148. (ii) Whether the penalty levied under section 271(1)(c) survived after the reassessment was quashed.

Issue (i): Whether reassessment under the Income-tax Act was valid when no notice under section 143(2) was issued after initiation of proceedings under sections 147 and 148.

Analysis: The reassessment proceedings were found to have been completed only on the basis of notices under sections 148 and 142(1), without issuance of notice under section 143(2). The Tribunal treated issuance of notice under section 143(2) as a mandatory jurisdictional requirement for framing reassessment where the return is scrutinised and higher income is proposed. The defect was held not curable by section 292BB. Reliance was placed on binding judicial authority to hold that absence of notice under section 143(2) goes to the root of jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The reassessment was held invalid and quashed as void ab initio, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty levied under section 271(1)(c) survived after the reassessment was quashed.

Analysis: Once the reassessment order itself was annulled, the penalty had no surviving foundation. The penalty was treated as consequential to the reassessment and incapable of independent survival after the basic assessment order was set aside.

Conclusion: The penalty was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Both appeals were allowed because the reassessment failed for want of mandatory jurisdictional compliance, and the penalty could not survive the collapse of the assessment order.

Ratio Decidendi: In reassessment proceedings, failure to issue notice under section 143(2) within the prescribed framework is a jurisdictional defect that renders the reassessment unsustainable, and any consequential penalty based on such reassessment falls with it.

Issues: (i) Whether duty could be demanded for alleged non-fulfilment of export obligation after the Export Obligation Discharge Certificates had been issued by DGFT and the bonds stood discharged; (ii) whether the demand could survive when contemporaneous proceedings of the Central Excise Department proceeded on the footing that the goods had been received by the buyer unit; (iii) whether denial of cross-examination of witnesses whose statements were relied upon vitiated the order, and whether extrapolation from a partial vehicle enquiry could sustain demand on all consignments; (iv) whether the extended period under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962 was invokable; (v) whether the recommendation under Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 could survive; and (vi) whether confiscation and redemption fine were legally sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether duty could be demanded for alleged non-fulfilment of export obligation after the Export Obligation Discharge Certificates had been issued by DGFT and the bonds stood discharged?

Analysis: The discharge certificates issued by DGFT after verification were treated as conclusive of fulfilment of export obligation. Once the licensing authority had verified compliance and the customs bonds had been released, the foundation for invoking the demand on breach of exemption conditions ceased to exist. The Tribunal relied on its earlier view that, after issuance of EODC and release of bond, confirmation of customs duty for alleged violation of the notification conditions is unsustainable.

Conclusion: The demand was not sustainable and this issue was answered in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand could survive when contemporaneous proceedings of the Central Excise Department proceeded on the footing that the goods had been received by the buyer unit?

Analysis: The contemporaneous show cause notices issued by the Central Excise Department to the recipient unit proceeded on the premise that the impugned raw materials had been received from the assessee. That departmental position contradicted the theory in the customs proceedings that no movement of goods had taken place. On that record, the allegation of diversion into the domestic market could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The demand was unsustainable on this ground and this issue was answered in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether denial of cross-examination of witnesses whose statements were relied upon vitiated the order, and whether extrapolation from a partial vehicle enquiry could sustain demand on all consignments?

Analysis: The order was founded on statements of witnesses without allowing cross-examination despite specific request. Reliance on such statements without testing them through examination and cross-examination was held to offend natural justice. The Tribunal also found that the vehicle inquiry covered only a limited portion of consignments and was inconclusive in a substantial part of that subset, so demand on the entire volume of imports could not be upheld by extrapolation.

Conclusion: The impugned order could not be sustained on these grounds and this issue was answered in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the extended period under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962 was invokable?

Analysis: The Tribunal found no positive act of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, or suppression with intent to evade duty. The issuance of EODCs and discharge of bonds were within the knowledge of the Department, and therefore the extended limitation provision could not be invoked on the facts of the case.

Conclusion: The extended period was not invokable and this issue was answered in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether the recommendation under Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 could survive?

Analysis: Once the demand itself failed and the factual foundation of alleged diversion was not established, the penal recommendation under Section 135 could not stand. The Tribunal held that the ingredients necessary for sustaining the penal consequence were absent in the circumstances found.

Conclusion: The recommendation under Section 135 could not survive and this issue was answered in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vi): Whether confiscation and redemption fine were legally sustainable?

Analysis: As the Tribunal accepted that the goods had been duly accounted for through the export obligation mechanism and the core demand failed, the goods could not be treated as liable to confiscation. In the absence of a sustainable confiscation, redemption fine also could not be imposed.

Conclusion: Confiscation and redemption fine were not sustainable and this issue was answered in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal set aside the customs demand, penalty-related consequences, confiscation, and redemption fine, and granted relief to the assessee and the co-noticees while rejecting the Revenue's challenge.

Ratio Decidendi: Where export obligation has been conclusively discharged and the customs bond has been released on the basis of an unrevoked EODC issued by the licensing authority, the customs demand for alleged breach of exemption conditions cannot survive, and consequential penalty, confiscation, and redemption fine also fail.

Issues: (i) Whether the product exported as MIGRAN, containing Ergotamine in preparation form, fell within Schedule-B of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Regulation of Controlled Substances) Order, 2013 so as to require a No Objection Certificate from the Narcotics Commissioner; and (ii) whether penalty could be imposed on the customs broker under Section 117 of the Customs Act, 1962 for the alleged violation of Regulation 10(d) of the Customs Broker Licensing Regulations, 2018.

Issue (i): Whether the product exported as MIGRAN, containing Ergotamine in preparation form, fell within Schedule-B of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Regulation of Controlled Substances) Order, 2013 so as to require a No Objection Certificate from the Narcotics Commissioner.

Analysis: Schedule-B specifically lists "Ergotamine and its salts" and does not refer to preparations thereof. The reasoning applied was that when the legislative intent is to include salts or preparations, the schedule says so expressly. On the facts, the product contained only a small percentage of Ergotamine and was treated as a preparation rather than the controlled substance itself. The absence of express coverage of preparations meant that the export did not attract the same NOC requirement as direct export of Ergotamine.

Conclusion: The product was not covered by Schedule-B as a controlled substance requiring a No Objection Certificate, and this issue was answered in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty could be imposed on the customs broker under Section 117 of the Customs Act, 1962 for the alleged violation of Regulation 10(d) of the Customs Broker Licensing Regulations, 2018.

Analysis: Section 117 is a residuary penal provision and cannot be invoked where the Regulations themselves contain a specific penalty mechanism. Regulation 18 of the Customs Broker Licensing Regulations, 2018 expressly provides for penalty for contravention or failure to comply with the Regulations and also states that such action is without prejudice to action under the Customs Act, 1962 or any other law. In the circumstances, the Regulations constituted a self-contained code for penalty, and recourse to Section 117 was impermissible. The absence of a clear basis to attribute technical knowledge to the customs broker on the disputed classification issue further weakened the penalty basis.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 117 of the Customs Act, 1962 was not sustainable against the customs broker, and this issue was answered in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The penalty order could not stand either on the classification issue or on the choice of penal provision, and the impugned order was set aside, resulting in allowance of the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a specific penalty provision exists in the governing regulatory framework, a residuary penalty under the Customs Act cannot be invoked, and a controlled-substance entry will not be extended to preparations unless the schedule expressly so provides.

Issues: (i) Whether an appeal lies against an ex parte ad interim order; (ii) Whether shareholding is a condition precedent to the status of director and the operation of Section 169 of the Companies Act, 2013; (iii) Whether Section 430 of the Companies Act, 2013 bars a civil court from injuncting a statutory process under Section 169 notwithstanding a collateral contractual dispute; (iv) Whether absence of locus standi before the NCLT revives civil court jurisdiction; (v) Whether an ad interim injunction can stand without recorded satisfaction on prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury.

Issue (i): Whether an appeal lies against an ex parte ad interim order.

Analysis: An ex parte ad interim injunction is appealable. The order challenged was not a mere procedural refusal but an interlocutory order with operative effect, and therefore fell within the appellate remedy under the Code.

Conclusion: The appeal was maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether shareholding is a condition precedent to the status of director and the operation of Section 169 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Analysis: The definition of director under Section 2(34) is functional and status-based. It turns on appointment to the Board and does not make shareholding or qualification shares a prerequisite. Once a person assumes the office of director, the statutory incidents of that office, including removal under Section 169, attach irrespective of equity ownership.

Conclusion: Shareholding is not a condition precedent, and the respondent remained subject to Section 169.

Issue (iii): Whether Section 430 of the Companies Act, 2013 bars a civil court from injuncting a statutory process under Section 169 notwithstanding a collateral contractual dispute.

Analysis: Section 430 creates a dual bar: it excludes civil court jurisdiction over matters empowered to be determined under the Act and also prohibits injunctions in respect of actions taken or to be taken under the Act. A collateral MoU or proposed share purchase arrangement does not confer a jurisdictional route to restrain a statutory notice issued for removal of a director. The contractual dispute may be pursued in the appropriate forum, but it cannot be used to freeze an internal corporate process regulated by the special statute.

Conclusion: The civil court was barred from granting the injunction against the Section 169 process.

Issue (iv): Whether absence of locus standi before the NCLT revives civil court jurisdiction.

Analysis: The Companies Act provides a statutory remedy structure, including the waiver power under the proviso to Section 244(1), which can enable a substantial stakeholder to approach the NCLT. The respondent's absence from the register of members did not create an open field for civil court intervention. The availability of the tribunal mechanism meant that civil jurisdiction could not be revived on the plea of lack of standing alone.

Conclusion: Civil court jurisdiction was not revived by the alleged lack of locus before the NCLT.

Issue (v): Whether an ad interim injunction can stand without recorded satisfaction on prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury.

Analysis: Grant of ex parte interim injunction requires an independent and reasoned assessment of the settled triple test. The impugned order lacked analytical findings on those requirements and proceeded in a boilerplate manner, making the exercise of discretion unsustainable. The surrounding facts also negatived equitable relief, including the respondent's partial payment, disputed conduct, and unclean hands.

Conclusion: The injunction order was vitiated for non-application of mind and lack of reasoned satisfaction.

Final Conclusion: The impugned injunction could not survive judicial scrutiny, the statutory corporate process could not be restrained by civil injunction, and the appeal succeeded by setting aside the order under challenge.

Ratio Decidendi: A person appointed to the Board is a director for purposes of the Companies Act irrespective of shareholding, and a civil court cannot injunct a statutory corporate process governed by the Act where Section 430 operates as an express bar and the company law remedy framework remains available.

Outcome: The Special Leave Petitions were dismissed and the accompanying interlocutory application(s), if any, were disposed of.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the appeal against the order approving the resolution plan was liable to be condoned, and whether the appellant could be permitted to proceed without initially filing the certified copy of the impugned order.

Analysis: The appeal was filed beyond the date of the impugned order, but the record showed that the order had been uploaded later, and the appellant sought to compute limitation from the date of uploading. The Tribunal considered the Supreme Court's decisions emphasising that a litigant is obliged to apply for the certified copy under Rule 22 of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016, while also recognising that an application for exemption from filing the certified copy can be entertained. The Tribunal further relied on the later Supreme Court order in Omkara Assets Reconstruction Private Limited, where delay was condoned on acceptance of the explanation furnished. The Tribunal also noticed that in a connected appeal against the same order, delay had already been condoned on the basis that the order was uploaded on 28.10.2025.

Conclusion: The delay in filing the appeal was condoned, and the appellant was permitted to pursue the appeal without immediate filing of the certified copy, with liberty to place it on record within two weeks.

Issues: Whether the co-developers were entitled to execute the registration documents in favour of the homebuyers and allottees in the Doon Square project under the Master Agreement dated 08.10.2024.

Analysis: The project had already been completed, the Occupancy Certificate had been obtained, the lender had issued a No Dues Certificate, and the project was being implemented in terms of the Master Agreement approved by the Tribunal. Clause 6 of the Master Agreement authorised the co-developers to sign, execute and present for registration the documents required for transfer and sale of units, including deeds and allied instruments in favour of prospective purchasers and allottees. In these circumstances, the communication seeking joint nomination of an authorised person was held to be capable of being complied with by the co-developers acting under the agreement.

Conclusion: The co-developers were held entitled to execute the registration documents in favour of the homebuyers and allottees in accordance with the Master Agreement dated 08.10.2024.