Issues: (i) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of ineligible CENVAT credit on the ground of suppression and intent to evade duty; (ii) Whether penalty was leviable under Rule 15(2) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 read with Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Issue (i): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of ineligible CENVAT credit on the ground of suppression and intent to evade duty.

Analysis: The Court held that the relevant test was whether the assessee's conduct attracted fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade duty so as to justify the extended period under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. It noted that the contractual arrangement with the foreign service provider was not disclosed, the service tax on maintenance charges was taken as credit suo motu instead of being pursued by refund, and the transaction as a whole disclosed suppression.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was validly invoked, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty was leviable under Rule 15(2) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 read with Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: The Court held that penalty follows where CENVAT credit is taken or utilised wrongly by reason of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade duty. On the facts found, the assessee had availed ineligible credit by suppressing the contractual obligation and without following the refund route.

Conclusion: Penalty was leviable, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the demand and penalty failed, and the recovery action and penal consequences were sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where ineligible credit is taken by suppressing material facts and with intent to evade duty, the extended limitation period and penalty provisions are attracted, and the remedy for erroneous tax payment lies in refund rather than suo motu credit.

Issues: Whether the petitioner established a case of unlawful assault, coercion and denial of legal access during examination under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, so as to warrant judicial relief and preservation of the alleged CCTV material.

Analysis: The allegations rested primarily on the petitioner's assertions and subsequent medical documents. The Court found no independent contemporaneous material conclusively linking the alleged injuries to the proceedings on 20.04.2026. The respondents denied the allegations and relied on CCTV material and the Incident Report of the same date, which indicated that the petitioner left the premises without visible injury. The Court also noted that no immediate complaint of assault or request for medical aid was shown to have been made at the premises. On the material before it, the Court was not persuaded to accept the claim of physical assault or coercion.

Conclusion: The petitioner failed to establish the alleged illegal assault or coercion, and the request for relief was rejected.

Issues: Whether a writ petition can succeed against dismissal of a statutory appeal filed after an inordinate delay beyond the condonable period, and whether such delay was sufficiently explained to warrant interference.

Analysis: The appeal against the order-in-original was filed after about seventeen months. The appellate authority held that the delay exceeded the period that could be condoned under the governing limitation provision. The explanation based on the petitioner's family medical difficulties was found insufficient, as no cogent or convincing material was placed to justify the prolonged delay. The Court applied the settled principle that where the statute prescribes a fixed limitation period with a limited condonable window, delay beyond that window cannot be condoned, and writ jurisdiction cannot be used to circumvent statutory limitation in the absence of sufficient cause.

Conclusion: The challenge to the dismissal of the time-barred appeal was rejected, and no interference was called for under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition failed because the statutory appeal was hopelessly delayed and the delay was not satisfactorily explained, leaving no basis for extraordinary relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Inordinate delay in filing a statutory appeal must be properly and convincingly explained, and writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to revive a time-barred appeal where the statute itself bars condonation beyond the prescribed limit.

Issues: (i) Whether the finding of stock suppression based on physical verification and the consequent addition in respect of marbles, cuddapah stones and granites called for interference in revision. (ii) Whether the separate treatment accorded to ceramic tiles, on the basis of documentary explanation and evidence, required a uniform conclusion for all commodities.

Issue (i): Whether the finding of stock suppression based on physical verification and the consequent addition in respect of marbles, cuddapah stones and granites called for interference in revision.

Analysis: The authorities below recorded a factual finding that the stock was physically verified and that there was suppression to the extent reflected in the assessment and appellate orders. The revision petitioner did not produce contra material to dislodge that finding. In revision, the Court found no basis to reappreciate the evidence or disturb the factual conclusion reached by the fact-finding authorities.

Conclusion: The finding of suppression and the related addition in respect of marbles, cuddapah stones and granites were upheld against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the separate treatment accorded to ceramic tiles, on the basis of documentary explanation and evidence, required a uniform conclusion for all commodities.

Analysis: The deletion of addition for ceramic tiles rested on a specific document and a plausible explanation accepted by the appellate authority. The Court held that where different commodities are supported by different explanations and evidence, there is no requirement of a uniform result across all items. The reasoning accepted for ceramic tiles could not automatically be extended to the other commodities.

Conclusion: The differential treatment of ceramic tiles and the other goods was held to be justified, and the challenge on this ground failed.

Final Conclusion: The revision failed on all substantial questions of law, and the assessment-related findings and additions sustained by the authorities below were left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Concurrent factual findings on stock suppression, supported by physical verification and evidence, will not be interfered with in revision absent contra material, and a commodity-specific evidentiary basis can justify different tax treatment for different items.

Issues: Whether gold coins embossed with Goddess Lakshmi, sold with making charges and value addition, retain the character of bullion and are taxable at the concessional rate applicable to bullion, or whether they constitute manufactured gold articles taxable at the higher rate.

Analysis: The classification turned on the ordinary and commercial meaning of bullion. Applying the common parlance test, bullion denotes gold in the mass, such as raw gold, bars or ingots, and not finished or manufactured products. Once gold bars or ingots are converted into coins and given embossing or engraving, they undergo a manufacturing process and acquire value addition, taking them out of the category of bullion. Gold coins with engraved images are therefore distinct commercial goods and cannot be treated on par with unwrought gold, especially where the trade itself reflects a higher value than bullion rate by including making charges and wastage.

Conclusion: Gold coins embossed with Goddess Lakshmi are not bullion in uncoined or unwrought form and are liable to be taxed as gold articles at the higher rate.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal's classification of the impugned gold coins as bullion was incorrect, and the assessment treating them as taxable gold articles was restored.

Ratio Decidendi: For sales tax classification, bullion means gold in the mass or unwrought form; once gold is manufactured into coins or similar finished items with embossing or engraving, it ceases to be bullion and falls to be classified as a manufactured gold article.

Issues: Whether a garnishee notice issued to a bank under the GST recovery provisions was liable to be interfered with in writ jurisdiction, and whether the objection based on alleged provisional attachment and the partner's resignation from the firm was sustainable.

Analysis: The writ petition was filed by the partnership firm in respect of recovery proceedings relating to the firm's tax liability for the relevant financial year. The communication to the bank was issued under Section 79(1)(c) of the GST enactments pursuant to crystallisation of the tax demand, and not as a provisional attachment under Section 83. The Court also noted that the petitioner had not challenged the original assessment order and that partners of a partnership firm remain personally liable for the firm's dues. Since the impugned action concerned the bank account of a partner linked to the firm's liability, no infirmity was found in the recovery notice.

Conclusion: The writ petition was dismissed, and no interference was warranted under Article 226.

Ratio Decidendi: A garnishee notice issued under the GST recovery provisions against a bank account connected with the firm's tax liability is not liable to be interfered with in writ jurisdiction where the underlying demand is unchallenged and the partner concerned was liable for the firm's dues during the relevant period.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 117 of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable against the Customs Broker for alleged movement of imported goods without out-of-charge, and whether the penalty could survive after discharge from proceedings under the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations.

Analysis: The vehicles were found to be available for sample drawal by the DRI and were not taken away from the Land Customs Station. The goods had already been assessed and duty had been paid. In these circumstances, the factual basis for alleging contravention attracting penalty under Section 117 was not made out. The Tribunal also noted that the appellant had already been discharged in the proceedings initiated under the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, making the impugned penalty unwarranted.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 117 of the Customs Act, 1962 was held to be not imposable and was set aside.

Issues: (i) Whether penalties under Sections 112(a) and 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 could be sustained when they were not proposed in the show-cause notice; (ii) Whether penalty under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable in the facts of the case.

Issue (i): Whether penalties under Sections 112(a) and 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 could be sustained when they were not proposed in the show-cause notice.

Analysis: The show-cause notice did not propose imposition of penalties under Sections 112(a) and 112(b). A penalty order travelling beyond the scope of the notice cannot be sustained.

Conclusion: The penalties imposed under Sections 112(a) and 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 were set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable in the facts of the case.

Analysis: Section 114AA applies where a person knowingly or intentionally makes, signs, uses, or causes to be made, signed or used, a false or incorrect declaration, statement, or document in the transaction of business for the purposes of the Act. On that construction, the provision was held applicable on the facts, and the contrary view taken in the cited revisionary order was not accepted.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded only to the extent of deleting the penalties under Sections 112(a) and 112(b), while the penalty under Section 114AA remained confirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: A customs penalty cannot be sustained when it is not proposed in the show-cause notice, but Section 114AA is attracted where a person knowingly or intentionally uses a false or incorrect declaration, statement, or document in the course of business for the purposes of the Act.

Issues: (i) whether royalty recovered on coal clearances is includible in the transaction value under the exclusion for "other taxes" and liable to central excise duty; (ii) whether Stowing Excise Duty is deductible from the assessable value and outside the duty base; (iii) whether invocation of the extended period of limitation was sustainable; and (iv) whether interest and penalty were leviable.

Issue (i): whether royalty recovered on coal clearances is includible in the transaction value under the exclusion for "other taxes" and liable to central excise duty.

Analysis: Royalty was held to be not in the nature of tax and, therefore, does not fall within the exclusion for "other taxes" under Section 4(3)(d) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. It is accordingly includible in the transaction value for levy of duty.

Conclusion: The demand of duty on royalty is sustainable for the normal period and is in favour of the Revenue to that extent.

Issue (ii): whether Stowing Excise Duty is deductible from the assessable value and outside the duty base.

Analysis: Stowing Excise Duty was treated as a duty of excise and, as such, covered by the exclusion for taxes while computing transaction value. No central excise duty was held payable on that amount.

Conclusion: The assessee succeeded on this issue and no duty is payable on the amount of SED.

Issue (iii): whether invocation of the extended period of limitation was sustainable.

Analysis: The dispute was treated as one of interpretation, and the record did not establish suppression of facts with intent to evade duty. The extended period could not, therefore, be invoked.

Conclusion: The demand covered by the extended period was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): whether interest and penalty were leviable.

Analysis: In view of the interpretational nature of the dispute and the failure to establish suppression, interest on the time-barred demand was not sustained and penalty under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was also not warranted.

Conclusion: Interest was disallowed on the extended-demand component and penalty was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were disposed of by sustaining duty only on royalty within the normal limitation period, while granting relief on the extended-period demand, SED, interest, and penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: Royalty is not "tax" for the purpose of exclusion from transaction value under Section 4(3)(d) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, whereas an excise-duty component such as SED may be excluded; in an interpretational dispute without proven suppression, the extended period and penalty cannot be invoked.

Issues: Whether the impugned show cause notice was without jurisdiction on the ground that the underlying construction project was executed outside India and, therefore, not amenable to GST, and whether a writ petition challenging the notice was premature.

Analysis: The challenge turned on factual questions concerning the location of supply, the place from which the service was rendered, the recipient's location, and the manner in which receipts, expenditure, and accounts relating to the Mauritius project were maintained. In such circumstances, the alleged lack of jurisdiction was not patent on the face of the record. The applicability of GST depended upon examination of the statutory provisions governing supply and place of supply, and the show cause notice itself did not suffer from an ex facie jurisdictional defect. A mere show cause notice does not by itself cause legal prejudice warranting interference, particularly when the objection raised requires factual adjudication.

Conclusion: The show cause notice was not liable to be quashed at the threshold, and the writ challenge was premature; the objection of want of jurisdiction was rejected.

Issues: Whether the appellant was liable to pay service tax on tour operator services in respect of buses operated under an agreement with the Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation.

Analysis: The dispute concerned buses operated beyond the appellant's regular stage carriage services, and the arrangement with the tourism corporation involved transportation of passengers with only a nominal amount retained for the corporation. The definition of tour operator service was considered in the context of planning, scheduling or arranging tours, and the distinction between a tour operation and mere transportation of passengers was applied. The earlier decision involving the same appellant and the cited Tribunal decisions supported the view that where passengers are carried from point to point without a common tour contract or organised tour activity, the service is more akin to passenger transport than tour operation.

Conclusion: The appellant was not liable to pay service tax on tour operator services.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was liable to be condoned by excluding the period spent by the appellant in pursuing rectification before the refund-passing authority and other authorities, and whether the matter was required to be remanded for decision on merits.

Analysis: The refund order was found to have been served without the prescribed preamble indicating the appeal form and limitation. The appellant had thereafter addressed letters to the refund-passing authority and the appellate authority seeking correction of the short payment, but no response was received. The Tribunal applied the principle that time bona fide spent in prosecuting a remedy before a wrong forum, or in a procedurally mistaken course induced by lack of proper intimation, can be excluded while computing limitation. Relying on the principle recognised in the law of limitation and the cited precedents, the Tribunal held that the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) fell within the condonable period after excluding the time so spent.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned and the matter was remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals) for decision on merits in accordance with law and natural justice.

Ratio Decidendi: Time bona fide spent in pursuing a remedy before a wrong forum, or in a mistaken procedural course attributable to lack of proper guidance, is excludable for computing limitation for filing the proper appeal.

Issues: Whether the assessee trust's one-time fund-raising programme constituted business activity so as to amount to a specified violation under section 12AB(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether the Commissioner could deny final registration by invoking section 13 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Court accepted the Tribunal's view that the fund-raising programme was a one-time activity and, on the facts found, was not an organised business activity akin to commercial trading. The surplus was applied towards the charitable objects of the trust, and the dominant object and profit motive tests, as applied in the earlier jurisdictional precedent, showed that the activity did not lose its charitable character merely because it was organised and generated funds. The Court also agreed that section 13 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 operates at the assessment stage and cannot be used to refuse registration at the stage of considering an application for registration under section 12AB.

Conclusion: The assessee trust was entitled to registration, and the Revenue's challenge failed.

Final Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's order, and the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: A one-time fund-raising activity applied wholly towards charitable objects does not, by itself, constitute business activity or a specified violation for denying registration, and section 13 cannot be invoked to refuse registration at the threshold stage.

Issues: Whether the assessee could be treated as an assessee in default for non-deduction of tax at source on commission payments made to non-residents and travel agents, and whether such payments attracted deduction under section 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Tribunal found that the assessee had furnished Form 15CB for the relevant transactions, filed the TDS returns, and deducted tax wherever applicable. The Court noted that the disputed commission payments related to hotel bookings through websites and travel-agent arrangements, and on the facts found by the Tribunal such payments were not covered by the charge under section 195. The Court also accepted that the record did not show non-compliance in the tax audit report and that the assessee had complied with the applicable tax deduction requirements in accordance with the Act and the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements.

Conclusion: The assessee was not liable to be treated as an assessee in default under section 201 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and no substantial question of law arose for consideration.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the payer establishes compliance with tax deduction obligations and the payment, on the facts found, is not chargeable under section 195, section 201 cannot be invoked to treat the payer as an assessee in default.

Issues: Whether the transfer pricing adjustment made in respect of availing of business-related support services was sustainable when the assessee had applied the Transactional Net Margin Method and the adjustment was made by rejecting that method without comparable uncontrolled transactions and on an ad hoc basis.

Analysis: The assessee had benchmarked the international transactions with associated enterprises by adopting the Transactional Net Margin Method and had supported the arm's length position with comparables and agreement terms. The transfer pricing adjustment was, however, made by discarding that approach and applying an other method without bringing on record comparable uncontrolled transactions, and the working adopted was found to be ad hoc. The record also showed that similar transactions in earlier assessment years had not led to any adjustment, reinforcing the inconsistency in the approach adopted. The adjustment was held to be contrary to the requirement that arm's length price be determined through one of the prescribed methods on a reasoned basis.

Conclusion: The transfer pricing adjustment was deleted and the grounds challenging the adjustment were allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the disallowance of long-term capital loss claimed on sale of jointly owned property, including indexed cost of acquisition and related documentary evidence, was sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee's claim arose from purchase and sale of the same property in identical factual circumstances as those accepted in the scrutiny assessment of the assessee's husband. The record also showed supporting documents for the acquisition payments and the computation of the claimed long-term capital loss. In these circumstances, the Department was not justified in taking a contradictory view on the same transaction and the disallowance could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The disallowance was deleted and the claim of long-term capital loss of Rs. 2,94,41,694/- was allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether reassessment initiated after four years from the end of the assessment year was valid when the assessee had disclosed the relevant facts in the original scrutiny proceedings.

Analysis: Reopening beyond four years is permissible only where the assessee has failed to fully and truly disclose all material facts necessary for assessment. The record showed that, in the original scrutiny, the assessee had furnished audited accounts, notes to financial statements, and the accounting policy explaining the change in method of depreciation from Straight Line Method to Written Down-Value Method. The original assessment was completed under scrutiny after considering these materials. The Revenue did not show any non-disclosure of material facts or any fresh tangible material demonstrating suppression by the assessee.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice was barred by the proviso to Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and was quashed along with the order disposing of objections; the challenge succeeded in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment after four years is invalid unless the Revenue establishes failure by the assessee to make a full and true disclosure of material facts necessary for assessment.

Issues: (i) Whether reassessment and final assessment could validly be made against an assessee when the proceedings were initiated and continued in the name and PAN of a dissolved, non-existing entity and no notice under Section 148 was issued to the company; (ii) Whether the assessment order was vitiated for non-compliance with the mandatory faceless assessment procedure under Section 144B, including failure to issue a draft assessment order.

Issue (i): Whether reassessment and final assessment could validly be made against an assessee when the proceedings were initiated and continued in the name and PAN of a dissolved, non-existing entity and no notice under Section 148 was issued to the company.

Analysis: The reassessment was commenced and carried forward in the name and PAN of the erstwhile partnership firm, although the firm had already ceased to exist upon conversion into the company. The company was not served a notice under Section 148, and no prior correspondence or show-cause notice was addressed to it before the final order was passed. The assessment thus suffered from a jurisdictional defect, since proceedings against a non-existing entity could not be sustained and the company could not be assessed without proper initiation in its own name.

Conclusion: The reassessment and assessment against the company were invalid and could not be sustained on this ground.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment order was vitiated for non-compliance with the mandatory faceless assessment procedure under Section 144B, including failure to issue a draft assessment order.

Analysis: Section 144B required the assessment to proceed in the prescribed faceless manner, including preparation and service of a draft assessment order before finalisation where variations prejudicial to the assessee were proposed. In the present case, no draft assessment order was issued and the final assessment order was passed directly. This amounted to non-compliance with a mandatory statutory procedure and constituted an independent procedural infirmity.

Conclusion: The assessment order was vitiated for breach of Section 144B.

Final Conclusion: The impugned assessment order and the consequential demand and penalty notices were quashed, while liberty was reserved to proceed afresh in accordance with law after addressing the assessee's objections and following the prescribed procedure.

Ratio Decidendi: A reassessment initiated against a non-existing entity, without a notice to the correct legal person, and a final assessment made without the mandatory draft order procedure under Section 144B, is jurisdictionally and procedurally unsustainable.

Issues: Whether the revisional court was justified in setting aside the order of attachment passed under section 107 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 on the ground that the satisfaction recorded by the Magistrate was based on assumption or suspicion rather than "reason to believe", and whether the absence of notice to a lessor or other claimant vitiated the attachment proceedings.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under section 107 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 requires a genuine formation of "reason to believe" on the basis of material, and not a mere assumption that property is proceeds of crime. The expression must be understood as an objective standard requiring rational connection between the material and the belief formed, with a live link between the facts and the conclusion. The Court also noted that the attachment procedure must be followed strictly, including notice to persons having an interest in the property, and that the statutory safeguards cannot be bypassed on the basis of non-response to notice alone. At the same time, the matter ought not to have ended with merely setting aside the attachment if the defect was procedural and capable of correction through a fresh lawful request.

Conclusion: The revisional court was correct in holding that the original attachment order could not stand, and the challenge to that view failed. The dismissal of the revision was maintained, while liberty remained to seek fresh attachment in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the show-cause notice, assessment order and consequential recovery action issued in the name of a deceased dealer could be sustained, and whether the impugned actions were liable to be quashed.

Analysis: The notice and order were issued against a person who had already died, and the subsequent recovery measures, including freezing of the bank account, flowed from those defective proceedings. The petitioner, a legal heir not connected with the business, was found to have been unnecessarily roped into the proceedings. In these circumstances, the proceedings suffered from a fundamental defect and could not be sustained, while leaving it open to the authorities to proceed in accordance with law against the petitioner if legally permissible for the outstanding demand.

Conclusion: The impugned notice, order and consequential recovery action were quashed and set aside, and relief was granted in favour of the petitioner.

Ratio Decidendi: Proceedings initiated and continued in the name of a deceased person are unsustainable and liable to be quashed when they form the basis of consequential recovery action.