Issues: Whether depreciation on fixed assets is allowable as application of income where the cost of acquiring those assets was not claimed as application of income.

Analysis: Section 11(6) bars depreciation as application of income only where acquisition of the relevant asset has already been claimed as application of income in the same or an earlier year, thereby preventing a double deduction. The financial records showed that the capital expenditure on the fixed assets was not included in the revenue expenditure claimed as application of income, while depreciation alone was claimed in respect of those assets. The statutory bar was therefore inapplicable.

Conclusion: Depreciation was allowable as application of income; the finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the interim status quo protecting the company's assets should continue pending appointment of a valuer and determination of the proposed buyout of the appellant's shareholding.

Analysis: The valuation process contemplated for the proposed share buyout had not commenced because a valuer was yet to be appointed. The earlier continuation of status quo was confined to preserving the position until that process could proceed. The remaining allegations of oppression and mismanagement were not adjudicated in this appeal.

Outcome: The status quo order was continued until the valuation and decision on the buyout proposal.

Issues: Whether an inspection and measurement of premises claimed as part of the liquidation estate could be directed despite a third party's disputed claim of title and possession.

Analysis: Section 60(5) permits adjudication of matters arising from or relating to the liquidation process, but does not ordinarily extend to deciding complex disputed questions of title and possession between third parties. The direction was confined to inspection and measurement for identifying and segregating the area claimed for the liquidation estate. It neither determined title nor disturbed the appellants' possessory rights; any further action by the liquidator was required to be taken in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The inspection and measurement direction was within the permissible scope of the liquidation process and did not adjudicate the disputed ownership or possession rights.

Issues: Whether the order initiating reassessment and the consequential notice were invalid for non-grant of a personal hearing, alleged reliance on material beyond the show-cause notice, and lack of a prima facie basis for escapement of income.

Analysis: The statutory procedure was complied with because a show-cause notice was issued, the petitioner was invited to respond, and the objections were disposed of by a reasoned order. Personal hearing at the preliminary stage is not an absolute right where a substantive opportunity to contest the allegations and produce evidence remains available in reassessment. The alleged unexplained cash credit and cash deposit were intrinsically connected with the information concerning escapement of income and could be considered together. At this stage, only a prima facie opinion is required; examination of the loan's identity, creditworthiness and genuineness belongs to reassessment.

Conclusion: The reassessment initiation was valid; the petitioner must receive a proper personal hearing and consideration of its material during reassessment, with merits left open.

Issues: Whether the allotment and buy-back of shares in the names of job workers constituted a benami transaction under Section 2(9)(C) where the alleged owners acknowledged knowledge of the transactions during cross-examination.

Analysis: Section 2(9)(C) applies where the owner is unaware of, or denies knowledge of, ownership of the property. The statements made during cross-examination in the benami proceedings established that the job workers knew of the share allotment, subsequent buy-back and receipt of consideration in their bank accounts. Those statements prevailed over inconsistent earlier statements recorded in income-tax proceedings. Allegations concerning fictitious trade payables or tax evasion could not independently establish a benami transaction without fulfilment of the statutory requirement that the owner lack knowledge of ownership. The income-tax settlement order could not override the separate benami statute, although it was relevant that the alleged tax issue was independently dealt with.

Conclusion: The share transactions were not benami transactions under Section 2(9)(C), and the refusal to confirm the provisional attachment was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: A transaction cannot be classified as benami under Section 2(9)(C) when the ostensible owner acknowledges knowledge of the ownership transaction and related consideration; allegations of tax evasion alone do not satisfy the statutory definition.

Issues: Whether veterinary-grade active pharmaceutical ingredients, Clopidol (VET) and Amprolium 100% (VET), qualify as drugs and medicines eligible for 5% IGST under Serial No. 226 of Schedule I to Notification No. 09/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025.

Analysis: The expression "drug" is not defined in the IGST rate notification or the customs law. The inclusive definition in Section 3(b) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 covers medicines for animals and substances intended for use as components of a drug. Active pharmaceutical ingredients and bulk drugs, being pharmaceutical substances used as such or in medicinal formulations, therefore fall within that statutory meaning. The goods were established as veterinary therapeutic APIs, subject to drug-import licensing and intended exclusively for prevention and treatment of coccidiosis in poultry.

Analysis: Serial No. 226 is a description-based entry for all drugs and medicines and extends to goods falling under Chapter 30 or any other chapter. It is not confined to finished dosage forms. The specific entry for drugs and medicines prevails, for rate purposes, over the general Chapter 29 entry for organic chemicals. The products were also not among the drugs listed for nil rate under Serial No. 113 of Notification No. 10/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025.

Conclusion: Clopidol (VET) and Amprolium 100% (VET) qualify as "All Drugs" under Serial No. 226 of Schedule I to Notification No. 09/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 and are eligible for IGST at 5%, provided they are not specified under Serial No. 113 of Notification No. 10/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025.

Ratio Decidendi: Veterinary APIs and bulk drugs that possess established therapeutic use and statutory recognition as drugs are covered by a specific rate entry for all drugs and medicines, notwithstanding their tariff classification under a general chemical chapter.

Issues: (i) Whether the Section 7 application was maintainable where debt and default exceeding the statutory threshold were admitted, but the corporate debtor disputed the quantum and contractual interest; (ii) Whether Section 10A barred initiation of CIRP for the asserted default; (iii) Whether the partial amount deposited by the corporate debtor required interference with CIRP admission.

Issue (i): Whether the Section 7 application was maintainable where debt and default exceeding the statutory threshold were admitted, but the corporate debtor disputed the quantum and contractual interest.

Analysis: Under Section 7, the relevant enquiry is whether a financial debt and default are established and whether the default exceeds the threshold under Section 4(1). The exact quantification of dues, including the challenge to the agreed interest component, need not be determined at the admission stage. The debt and default were not disputed, the default exceeded the applicable threshold of Rs. 1 crore, and limitation was not challenged.

Conclusion: The Section 7 application was maintainable, in favour of the financial creditor.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 10A barred initiation of CIRP for the asserted default.

Analysis: The OTS had been revoked in January 2020 and payment was demanded before the Section 10A period. The default continued thereafter, and the default recorded in the Section 7 application was dated 28.06.2022, outside the protected period. Section 10A did not immunise a continuing default extending beyond that period.

Conclusion: Section 10A did not bar the CIRP application, in favour of the financial creditor.

Issue (iii): Whether the partial amount deposited by the corporate debtor required interference with CIRP admission.

Analysis: The amount offered was substantially below the financial creditor's claimed dues, and the financial creditor did not accept settlement. The precedent concerning refusal of complete satisfaction of the creditor's claim was therefore inapplicable.

Conclusion: A partial deposit did not warrant interference with the CIRP admission, in favour of the financial creditor.

Final Conclusion: The statutory prerequisites for commencement of CIRP were fulfilled, and neither the Section 10A plea nor the dispute over quantum or partial settlement offer displaced them.

Ratio Decidendi: Once financial debt and default exceeding the statutory threshold are established, admission under Section 7 follows; Section 10A does not protect a default that arose before, or continued beyond, its protected period.

Issues: (i) Whether possession of assets disproportionate to known sources of income under the scheduled offence can constitute money-laundering without a specific allegation of bribery; (ii) Whether attachment was impermissible because the properties were acquired through lawful sources and included the spouse's property; (iii) Whether provisional attachment lacked the statutory basis under Section 5(1); (iv) Whether the challenge based on alleged cash deposits was established.

Issue (i): Whether possession of assets disproportionate to known sources of income under the scheduled offence can constitute money-laundering without a specific allegation of bribery.

Analysis: Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is a scheduled offence. Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 covers concealment, possession, acquisition or use of proceeds of crime and their projection or claim as untainted property. A disproportionate-assets offence does not require an allegation of bribery or acceptance of undue benefit; such allegations concern distinct offences. The dismissal of the discharge application supported the existence of a prima facie case, without prejudging the criminal trial.

Conclusion: Possession and projection of disproportionate assets as untainted property can prima facie amount to money-laundering notwithstanding the absence of a bribery allegation.

Issue (ii): Whether attachment was impermissible because the properties were acquired through lawful sources and included the spouse's property.

Analysis: The attachment was restricted to the quantified value of disproportionate assets after accounting for known income, loans and expenditure, rather than extending to assets proportionate to lawful income. The claim that the spouse's property derived from her independent source did not displace the finding concerning the amassed disproportionate assets, particularly when the discharge application had been dismissed.

Conclusion: The attachment to the extent of the disproportionate assets, including the challenged spouse-related property, was not shown to be unlawful.

Issue (iii): Whether provisional attachment lacked the statutory basis under Section 5(1).

Analysis: The predicate offence and the apprehension of alienation supplied the basis for immediate attachment. No order evidencing a prior attachment by the investigating agency was produced despite opportunity; the asserted prior attachment could therefore not invalidate the provisional attachment.

Conclusion: The statutory requirements for provisional attachment under Section 5(1) were satisfied.

Issue (iv): Whether the challenge based on alleged cash deposits was established.

Analysis: No bank statement or documentary material was produced to controvert the finding concerning cash deposits.

Conclusion: The challenge concerning cash deposits was not established.

Final Conclusion: The confirmation of attachment of property representing the quantified disproportionate assets remains legally sustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A scheduled disproportionate-assets offence may generate proceeds of crime, and their possession, acquisition or projection as untainted property attracts the money-laundering framework; attachment may validly be maintained to the quantified extent of such assets where the statutory basis is established.

Issues: Whether the adjudication order under Section 73 was non-speaking and violative of the principles of natural justice for non-consideration of the reconciliation and reply.

Analysis: Reasons required of a quasi-judicial authority depend upon the facts, the noticee's response, and the nature of the controversy. The adjudication order reflected application of mind to the discrepancies between GSTR-2A, GSTR-3B and GSTR-9, the reply, and the opportunity of hearing. The assessee bore the burden to substantiate the claimed input tax credit and explain the discrepancies through documentary evidence, rather than merely a reconciliation chart. Recording that reconciliation had not been made constituted a sufficient basis to reject the explanation where no further factual explanation or evidence had been furnished. The assessee also did not seek additional time before the adjudicating authority for filing further material.

Conclusion: The adjudication order was not completely non-speaking and did not warrant interference on the asserted ground of breach of natural justice; the factual objections may be urged with further evidence in appellate proceedings.

Issues: (i) Whether the taxpayer had established reversal of the excess input tax credit forming the disputed demand; (ii) Whether interest and penalty attributable to the disputed input tax credit required fresh computation and consideration of statutory waiver.

Issue (i): Whether the taxpayer had established reversal of the excess input tax credit forming the disputed demand.

Analysis: The reconciliation statements, DRC-03 debit entries and revenue acknowledgement in DRC-04 established reversals through the electronic cash and credit ledgers that covered the disputed excess input tax credit. The absence of a reason in column 8 of DRC-03 did not invalidate the reversals, since that field is optional. The benefit under Section 16(5) also displaced the objection based on the time limit in Section 16(4) for the specified financial years.

Conclusion: The reversal of the disputed excess input tax credit stood established, in favour of the taxpayer.

Issue (ii): Whether interest and penalty attributable to the disputed input tax credit required fresh computation and consideration of statutory waiver.

Analysis: The first appellate order did not determine the interest and penalty consequences of the residual demand. Demands under Section 73 for the relevant period fall within Section 128A, which permits waiver of interest or penalty subject to compliance with the prescribed procedure. Computation is required in accordance with the applicable departmental instructions after affording a hearing.

Conclusion: The question of interest and penalty is remitted for fresh computation, with the taxpayer entitled to seek waiver under Section 128A if liability is determined.

Final Conclusion: The finding that the principal excess input tax credit had been reversed remains undisturbed, while the consequential interest and penalty liability is to be determined afresh by the first appellate authority.

Ratio Decidendi: Documented DRC-03 reversals corroborated by ledger debits, reconciliation material and revenue acknowledgement cannot be rejected merely because the optional reasons field in DRC-03 is blank; consequential interest and penalty must be separately determined under the applicable statutory framework.

Issues: Whether exemption under section 54 could be denied solely because the capital gain was not deposited in the Capital Gains Account Scheme before the due date under section 139(1), despite investment in a new residential house within the stipulated period.

Analysis: Section 54 is a beneficial provision intended to encourage investment in residential housing and must receive a liberal construction. The statutory substance is investment of the capital gain in a new residential house within the prescribed period. The assessee acquired a fifty per cent share in a new residential property before the extended return-filing date, and the amount invested exceeded the capital gain. Non-deposit in the Capital Gains Account Scheme was only a procedural lapse and could not override substantive compliance where the genuineness and timely investment in the new asset stood established.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to deduction under section 54; the addition made by disallowing the claim was deleted.

Issues: Whether the High Court could entertain writ applications challenging an order of the National Company Law Tribunal when a statutory appellate remedy before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal was available.

Analysis: An aggrieved party against an order of the National Company Law Tribunal must pursue the appellate remedy before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal. No sufficient reason existed to invoke writ jurisdiction against the National Company Law Tribunal's order.

Conclusion: The High Court ought not to have entertained the writ applications; the aggrieved respondents may pursue an appropriate remedy before the competent forum in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether conversion and packaging of biscuits under output-based agreements constituted supply of manpower or a process amounting to manufacture exempt from service tax; (ii) Whether service-tax demands under reverse charge for security services, GTA services and legal services were sustainable; (iii) Whether the extended period of limitation and consequential penalties were invocable.

Issue (i): Whether conversion and packaging of biscuits under output-based agreements constituted supply of manpower or a process amounting to manufacture exempt from service tax.

Analysis: The conversion charges were fixed by reference to the quantity of goods packed rather than personnel deployed. As biscuits were Third Schedule goods, packing, repacking, or treatment rendering them marketable constituted manufacture under Section 2(f)(iii) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Note 5 to Chapter 19 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. Such activity fell within Section 66D(f) of the Finance Act, 1994 and Entry 30 of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012. The identical contractual arrangement had already been treated as manufacture, and departure from that binding precedent without reasons was untenable.

Conclusion: The activity amounted to manufacture and not supply of manpower; the related service-tax demand and interest were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether service-tax demands under reverse charge for security services, GTA services and legal services were sustainable.

Analysis: The security-services demand was based on expenditure from an incorrect financial year despite nil expenditure in the relevant year; moreover, the provider was a body corporate that had charged service tax, making reverse charge under Notification No. 30/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 inapplicable. The GTA balance demand related to non-GTA expenses recorded in the secondary-freight ledger, while the amount identified during audit had already been paid and adjusted. For legal services, the invoices showed payments to consultants rather than advocates, so reverse-charge liability did not arise.

Conclusion: The demands for security services, GTA services and legal services were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the extended period of limitation and consequential penalties were invocable.

Analysis: The dispute concerned an interpretational question and was founded entirely on statutory records produced during audit. No fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, or suppression with intent to evade was established. The departmental treatment of the issue as dependent on related litigation further negated the basis for alleging suppression.

Conclusion: The extended period was not invocable and the penalties were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: No service-tax liability, interest, or penalty survived in respect of the impugned demands.

Ratio Decidendi: Packaging of Third Schedule goods for consideration determined by output quantity is a process amounting to manufacture, and an interpretational dispute revealed solely through audited records cannot sustain extended limitation absent proof of suppression with intent to evade.

Issues: (i) Whether sanitation, housekeeping and cleaning activities undertaken under the work orders were classifiable as manpower recruitment or supply agency service; (ii) Whether service-tax demand could be sustained solely on a mismatch between income-tax returns and ST-3 returns without corroboration of taxable services.

Issue (i): Whether sanitation, housekeeping and cleaning activities undertaken under the work orders were classifiable as manpower recruitment or supply agency service.

Analysis: Rule 2(g) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and Circular No. 190/9/2015-Service Tax distinguish manpower supply from performance of a contracted job. Manpower supply requires personnel to be placed at the recipient's disposal and under its effective control and supervision, with consideration ordinarily correlated to the number of personnel deployed. The work orders required sanitation, housekeeping and cleaning for hospitals and educational institutions; the personnel remained under the service provider's control, and the agreed consideration was for cleaning activity rather than for deployment of persons.

Conclusion: The activities were cleaning services and not manpower recruitment or supply agency service; the principal service-tax demand, consequential interest and penalties were unsustainable. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether service-tax demand could be sustained solely on a mismatch between income-tax returns and ST-3 returns without corroboration of taxable services.

Analysis: A disparity between income-tax disclosures and service-tax returns may arise from differing revenue-recognition norms, valuation principles, abatements and exemptions. Such mismatch, without corroborative evidence establishing the taxability and value of services, does not establish service-tax liability or justify the demand.

Conclusion: The demand founded only on information from income-tax returns and ST-3 returns, without further corroboration, was legally unsustainable. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned fiscal liability was substantially eliminated, while the admitted tax and interest relating to receipt of legal services remained payable without penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: A contract for execution of cleaning work does not constitute manpower supply where the service provider retains control over the personnel and consideration is for the completed service; tax liability cannot rest solely on uncorroborated discrepancies between income-tax and service-tax returns.

Issues: (i) Whether services of facilitating Indian students' admission to foreign educational institutions for commission constituted intermediary services and were consequently ineligible for treatment as export of services; (ii) Whether commission received from domestic educational institutions was liable to service tax despite the small-service-provider exemption threshold.

Issue (i): Whether services of facilitating Indian students' admission to foreign educational institutions for commission constituted intermediary services and were consequently ineligible for treatment as export of services.

Analysis: The respondent rendered services to foreign universities and received consideration from them, while students paid fees directly to the institutions and were not invoiced by the respondent. The arrangement did not establish the essential elements of intermediary service: three parties, two distinct supplies, and facilitation of a main service supplied by another person. Labelling the respondent as an agent and payment of commission did not by themselves establish intermediary status. The respondent supplied the relevant service on its own account. The settled decisions on materially identical arrangements also applied; Revenue's attempt to contest reliance on an earlier accepted decision was contrary to judicial discipline.

Conclusion: The services were not intermediary services and qualified for export-of-service treatment, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether commission received from domestic educational institutions was liable to service tax despite the small-service-provider exemption threshold.

Analysis: The commission earned from domestic institutions during the relevant financial years was below the aggregate-value threshold under the exemption notification. The value of exported services could not be included for computing that threshold.

Conclusion: No service tax was payable on the domestic-institution commission, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The proposed service-tax liability on both the foreign-university and domestic-institution commissions was unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A service provider acting on its own account is not an intermediary unless the arrangement involves facilitation between distinct parties of a separate main supply, with the requisite principal-agent relationship.

Issues: Whether penalty could be imposed upon the appellant under Rule 26(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 for alleged abetment of wrongful availment of CENVAT credit by the purchaser.

Analysis: Rule 26(2) applies where a person issues an excise-duty invoice without delivery of goods, abets issuance of such invoice, or abets preparation of a document on the basis of which ineligible benefit is likely to be or has been taken. The record did not establish that the appellant had issued or abetted issuance of any excise invoice or other document enabling the purchaser to avail ineligible credit. Mere receipt of goods from a broker could not establish abetment of the purchaser's alleged wrongful credit availment.

Conclusion: The penalty under Rule 26(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the ingredients of cheating under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, were established against the appellants; (ii) Whether the charge of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, was proved against the appellants.

Issue (i): Whether the ingredients of cheating under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, were established against the appellants.

Analysis: Cheating requires proof of a fraudulent or dishonest false representation, deception of the complainant, and consequent delivery of property or legally cognisable loss or harm. The record did not show that the Income Tax Department acted on any false representation or that the appellants dishonestly induced issuance of the certificate under Section 230A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. There was also no evidence that the alleged collateral title deeds were furnished as security, that a mortgage was created in favour of the Department, or that the appellants derived a monetary benefit from the transaction.

Conclusion: The essential ingredients of cheating were not proved; the finding is in favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the charge of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, was proved against the appellants.

Analysis: Criminal conspiracy requires cogent proof of an agreement or prior meeting of minds between two or more persons to commit an illegal act or to achieve a lawful act by illegal means. Suspicion, association, or circumstances without proof of such agreement are insufficient. No direct or substantive evidence established a prior agreement between the accused, and the evidence did not explain how the original title deeds reached the Income Tax Department. The acquittal of the public servant alleged to be the principal beneficiary, coupled with the absence of independent evidence against the remaining accused, left the conspiracy charge unproved.

Conclusion: The prosecution failed to prove criminal conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt; the finding is in favour of the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The prosecution evidence did not establish the requisite dishonest inducement or agreement to commit an unlawful act, and the convictions and sentences lacked a sustainable evidentiary foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: A conviction for cheating or criminal conspiracy requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of, respectively, dishonest deception causing the requisite consequence and a definite agreement or meeting of minds to commit an unlawful act; suspicion or association alone cannot substitute such proof.

Issues: Whether the pending reply to the show-cause notice proposing cancellation of GST registration required expeditious consideration by the tax authorities.

Analysis: The petition was confined to seeking an early decision on the reply already filed against the show-cause notice. No adjudication was made on the allegations underlying the proposed cancellation of registration.

Outcome: The respondent authorities were directed to consider and decide the matter expeditiously, preferably within three weeks.

Issues: Whether the statutory appellate remedy against cancellation of GST registration could be reopened despite delay beyond the limitation prescribed for appeal.

Analysis: The adopted ruling recognises that cancellation of GST registration has serious consequences for the conduct of business. Though the Appellate Authority is bound by the statutory outer limit for condoning delay, constitutional writ jurisdiction may be exercised in an appropriate case where the delay is plausibly explained and refusal to entertain the appeal would cause disproportionate hardship. The merits of the cancellation proceedings, including service of notice and compliance with natural justice, remain for the Appellate Authority.

Conclusion: The appellate remedy must be reopened and the appeal must receive merits consideration without rejection on limitation.