Issues: (i) Whether reassessment for the relevant assessment year could be initiated on the basis of a loan received in an earlier assessment year; (ii) Whether loan transactions, repayments and interest payments routed through banking channels could be treated as unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether reassessment for the relevant assessment year could be initiated on the basis of a loan received in an earlier assessment year.

Analysis: Reassessment jurisdiction requires tangible material having a live link with income alleged to have escaped assessment for the relevant year. The loan had been received in the preceding assessment year, while the transactions in the year under consideration comprised repayments. The material relied upon did not relate to any income escaping assessment in the relevant year.

Conclusion: The reopening was without jurisdiction, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether loan transactions, repayments and interest payments routed through banking channels could be treated as unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The loan, its repayment and interest payment were routed through banking channels and reflected in the books and returns. No corroborative material established that the loan was fictitious or represented unexplained funds.

Conclusion: The addition as unexplained money was unsustainable and its deletion was upheld, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The relief deleting the impugned addition was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment must be founded on tangible material having a live nexus with income escaping assessment in the relevant assessment year.

Issues: Whether the petitioner should be afforded a further opportunity to respond to the show-cause notice and obtain adjudication on merits despite non-participation in the proceedings and expiry of the appellate limitation.

Analysis: The petitioner had previously deposited 25% of the disputed tax but did not participate in the consequential proceedings following the death of her husband, who had conducted the business. A further opportunity was considered appropriate upon the petitioner undertaking to deposit an additional 25% of the disputed tax and to submit a reply with supporting documents. The adjudicating authority was required to afford due notice before determining the matter on merits.

Conclusion: The petitioner is entitled to a further opportunity for adjudication on merits upon depositing an additional 25% of the disputed tax within the stipulated period and filing a reply to the show-cause notice.

Issues: Whether the addition for unexplained cash deposits under Section 69A was sustainable where the assessee claimed cash gift and family reimbursements as sources.

Analysis: Section 69A requires the assessee to satisfactorily explain the nature and source of money. A cash gift cannot be rejected solely because it was received in cash or because direct donor confirmation became unavailable after the donor's death; the donor's financial capacity and actual availability of funds must be tested on the preponderance of probabilities. Likewise, claimed reimbursements of advance-tax payments and housing-loan repayments require verification of the underlying bank payments, tax challans, loan records, financial capacity of the reimbursing persons, and nexus between the receipts and cash deposits. The explanations could not be rejected merely for delayed production or absence of confirmations without undertaking such objective verification.

Conclusion: The confirmation of the addition was set aside and the matter was remitted for limited verification of the claimed gift, reimbursements and the remaining unexplained balance. The addition is to be deleted to the extent the assessee establishes the source and nexus, and may be sustained only to the extent the explanation remains unproved.

Issues: (i) Whether, after holding the purchases to be non-genuine, the disallowance could be restricted to 12.5% rather than the entire purchases; (ii) Whether additions based on seized material and search statements could be deleted by treating earlier Settlement Commission findings as determinative for different assessment years without independent factual inquiry.

Issue (i): Whether, after holding the purchases to be non-genuine, the disallowance could be restricted to 12.5% rather than the entire purchases.

Analysis: The assessee failed to discharge the burden of proof for the genuineness of the impugned purchases, while the appellate findings had also accepted their non-genuine character. Where purchases recorded through accommodation entries remain unproved, a profit-rate estimate effectively allows deduction of the balance expenditure and is inconsistent with the treatment of unexplained expenditure. The jurisdictional decisions required the purchases to be accepted or disallowed in their entirety, not estimated as embedded profit. However, the Revenue had not challenged the restricted addition for the earlier assessment years.

Conclusion: The 12.5% addition remained undisturbed for AYs 2008-09 and 2009-10, but the entire bogus-purchase additions were restored for AYs 2013-14 and 2014-15, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether additions based on seized material and search statements could be deleted by treating earlier Settlement Commission findings as determinative for different assessment years without independent factual inquiry.

Analysis: An order of the Settlement Commission is conclusive only as to the matters and assessment years covered by it and does not confer blanket immunity for subsequent years. The appellate deletion proceeded on the earlier Settlement Commission orders without independently examining the material, obtaining factual verification, or addressing the other search statements. At the same time, the assessee had not been supplied all material relied upon by the Assessing Officer and had not received cross-examination of the persons whose statements were used. Principles of natural justice required supply of the relied-upon material and adequate opportunity before a fresh determination.

Conclusion: The deletions of the remaining additions for AYs 2013-14 and 2014-15 could not stand and require de novo adjudication by the Assessing Officer after furnishing the relied-upon material and granting adequate hearing.

Final Conclusion: The estimated treatment of unproved purchases was rejected for the years contested by the Revenue, while the other search-based additions require fresh fact-specific assessment and cannot be deleted solely by extending Settlement Commission findings from different years.

Issues: Whether Foreign Tax Credit under section 90 can be denied solely because Form No. 67 was furnished belatedly under Rule 128(9).

Analysis: Section 90 confers substantive relief against double taxation, while Form No. 67 supplies particulars for implementation of that relief. Rule 128(9), as applicable, prescribed a time for furnishing the form but did not prescribe forfeiture of an otherwise admissible Foreign Tax Credit for delay. The subsequent extension of time for furnishing Form No. 67 reinforced the procedural character of the requirement. The condonation mechanism under section 119(2)(b) is administrative and does not curtail appellate relief where substantive eligibility is otherwise established.

Conclusion: Belated furnishing of Form No. 67 does not by itself disentitle the assessee to Foreign Tax Credit; the Assessing Officer must verify the foreign-tax payment and allow the admissible credit in accordance with law without insisting on separate condonation.

Issues: (i) Whether recovery proceedings and auction sale were barred by limitation under Rule 68B for the relevant assessment years; (ii) Whether individual partners must receive notices under the Second Schedule before recovery action against partnership-firm assets or a partner's personal assets; (iii) Whether the notices in the present recovery and sale proceedings were validly served and complied with natural justice; (iv) Whether the auction sales were vitiated by improper valuation or sale below fair market value; (v) Whether payments through demand drafts funded from the successful bidder's father's bank account invalidated the auction sale.

Issue (i): Whether recovery proceedings and auction sale were barred by limitation under Rule 68B for the relevant assessment years.

Analysis: The earlier determination on Rule 68B was applied: recovery relating to assessment years 2007-08 and 2008-09 was time-barred, whereas recovery for assessment years 2009-10 to 2011-12 remained within limitation. The amendment to Rule 68B applies where the original limitation period was subsisting when the amendment came into force, but not where that period had already expired.

Conclusion: The recovery and sale proceedings for assessment years 2009-10 to 2011-12 were not barred by limitation, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether individual partners must receive notices under the Second Schedule before recovery action against partnership-firm assets or a partner's personal assets.

Analysis: Sections 222 and 188A, read with Rule 2 and the definition of defaulter in the Second Schedule, require notice to the assessee named in the recovery certificate. A partnership firm is the defaulter where the certificate is issued in its name. The contextual qualification in the definition provisions requires an individual partner to be treated as a defaulter when recovery is pursued against that partner's personal assets because that partner is directly affected by the sale.

Conclusion: Notice to individual partners is unnecessary for sale of the defaulting firm's assets, but is necessary where recovery measures are directed against an individual partner's assets.

Issue (iii): Whether the notices in the present recovery and sale proceedings were validly served and complied with natural justice.

Analysis: Rule 2 notices and attachment orders were served on the partnership firm. The notice for settlement of sale proclamation and the sale proclamation were also copied to the partners; the relevant partner raised objections upon receipt of the former notice and refused receipt of the latter. The sale concerned assets of the partnership firm, and the factual record did not establish non-compliance with the applicable recovery rules or denial of a meaningful opportunity.

Conclusion: The recovery and sale notices were validly served and did not violate the Second Schedule or principles of natural justice, against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the auction sales were vitiated by improper valuation or sale below fair market value.

Analysis: The realised auction prices substantially exceeded both the guideline value and the market value recorded in the affidavit executed by all partners. No evidence established that either property was sold below fair market value. Differences in reserve prices between sale notices, without such evidence, did not demonstrate an infirm valuation or sale process.

Conclusion: The valuation challenge did not vitiate the auction sales, against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether payments through demand drafts funded from the successful bidder's father's bank account invalidated the auction sale.

Analysis: The earnest money and sale payments were made through bank demand drafts in accordance with the auction conditions. The source account of the successful bidder's father did not affect the validity of payments made for and on behalf of the successful bidder.

Conclusion: The demand drafts funded by the successful bidder's father did not invalidate the auction sale, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The objections to the recovery auction were untenable; the auction sale was confirmed and the purchaser became entitled to a sale certificate, while the objecting partner was afforded a signed copy of the order on his objection petition for any further remedy.

Ratio Decidendi: In recovery proceedings against a defaulting partnership firm, notice to the firm suffices for sale of firm assets, whereas a partner must be notified only when recovery is pursued against that partner's personal assets; an auction is not invalid absent material proof of defective service, material irregularity, or inadequate sale value.

Issues: (i) Whether the liquidation order under Section 33(1) was sustainable when the resolution professional's application was not founded on an independent and objective assessment and liquidation had not been considered by the Committee of Creditors; (ii) Whether the CIRP could be restored to enable consideration of withdrawal under Section 12A where settlement of financial debts was being pursued.

Issue (i): Whether the liquidation order under Section 33(1) was sustainable when the resolution professional's application was not founded on an independent and objective assessment and liquidation had not been considered by the Committee of Creditors.

Analysis: Section 33(1) permits liquidation upon failure of the resolution process, but the resolution professional must act independently, objectively, and consistently with the statutory scheme. The application was filed after the resolution professional abandoned the proposed request for general directions under Section 60(5), allegedly on the Registry's insistence, and acted upon an informal communication from one financial creditor outside a Committee of Creditors meeting. Neither financial creditor had voted for liquidation. These circumstances showed that the decision to invoke liquidation was not an independent, objective decision and was taken without placing the matter before the Committee of Creditors for deliberation.

Conclusion: The liquidation order under Section 33(1) was legally unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the CIRP could be restored to enable consideration of withdrawal under Section 12A where settlement of financial debts was being pursued.

Analysis: Withdrawal under Section 12A is an integral route for resolving an insolvency condition through settlement, alongside resolution through a plan and liquidation. The CIRP timeline is directory where a viable resolution remains in sight. The extension mechanism under Section 12(3), including the period up to the outer limit of 330 days, can be used to facilitate a probable Section 12A exit route as well as a resolution plan. Since repayment under the one-time settlement was continuing and the financial debts had been substantially addressed, fairness and the objective of preserving the corporate debtor as a going concern required an opportunity to pursue withdrawal rather than liquidation.

Conclusion: The CIRP was restored and the resolution professional was required to explore withdrawal under Section 12A, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: Insolvency resolution must favour a fair and purposive choice among available mechanisms, and liquidation cannot be pursued where a viable settlement-based exit may preserve the corporate debtor as a going concern.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a resolution professional invokes liquidation without an independent and objective assessment, despite a viable settlement process capable of supporting withdrawal under Section 12A, the liquidation order may be reversed and the CIRP restored to pursue that statutory exit route.

Issues: (i) Whether development of custom-made/customised software under the agreements constituted a sale of goods liable to VAT; (ii) Whether issuance of Digital Signature Certificates constituted a sale of goods liable to VAT.

Issue (i): Whether development of custom-made/customised software under the agreements constituted a sale of goods liable to VAT.

Analysis: Entry 2 of Schedule IV of the Telangana Value Added Tax Act, 2005 applies to a sale of software as goods. The agreements established end-to-end IT outsourcing, software development, maintenance, implementation and support services. The customer retained ownership and effective control over its existing hardware and software; software developed for a customer was tailor-made, customer-specific and incapable of being marketed to another person. Intellectual property either vested in the customer from inception or was licensed for use in connection with the services, without a transfer of property in goods for consideration. The activities were consequently service contracts, falling within support services of business or commerce under Section 65(104c) of the Finance Act, 1994, rather than sales of software.

Conclusion: Development of the custom-made/customised software did not constitute a sale of goods and was not liable to VAT, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether issuance of Digital Signature Certificates constituted a sale of goods liable to VAT.

Analysis: Issuance of Digital Signature Certificates by a licensed certifying authority involved rendering certification services and did not entail a transfer of goods.

Conclusion: Issuance of Digital Signature Certificates did not constitute a sale of goods and was not liable to VAT, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service turnover could not be recharacterised as turnover from sale of software or other goods; the VAT assessments and consequential demand lacked legal and factual basis.

Ratio Decidendi: Customer-specific software development and related certification activities are not sales of goods where the arrangement does not effect a transfer of property in marketable software for consideration.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner's refund claim founded on asserted transitional credit required a merits determination by the Central Tax Authorities; (ii) Whether interest for reversal of input tax credit could be sustained before determination of entitlement to refund based on transitional credit.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioner's refund claim founded on asserted transitional credit required a merits determination by the Central Tax Authorities.

Analysis: The communication on the refund application merely indicated that the TRAN-1 portal had been open for a specified period and that jurisdiction lay with the State GST Authorities. It did not decide the claimed refund. The appellate authority also treated the appeal as invalid because no appealable decision on refund existed. The asserted circumstances concerning import of the equipment, the claimed transitional credit and reversal of input tax credit require determination under the applicable law.

Conclusion: The refund claim must be adjudicated on its merits by the Central Tax Authorities after considering the petitioner's detailed representation and the asserted entitlement to transitional credit.

Issue (ii): Whether interest for reversal of input tax credit could be sustained before determination of entitlement to refund based on transitional credit.

Analysis: The claimed input tax credit was stated to have been availed in Form GSTR-3B on the advice of the Central Authorities and later reversed after it was not accepted. Verification of these circumstances forms part of the unresolved refund and transitional-credit determination.

Conclusion: Interest founded on the reversal of input tax credit cannot be sustained until the entitlement to refund based on transitional credit is determined; the impugned State appellate order, summary and endorsement were quashed.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner's transitional-credit-based refund entitlement remains open for a fresh merits decision, while the consequential interest action cannot continue unless and until that entitlement is determined.

Issues: Whether an assessee who filed a return in response to a reassessment notice while an advance-ruling application on the transaction's taxability was pending could be denied credit and refund of tax deducted at source and prepaid taxes.

Analysis: The pending advance-ruling application furnished a bona fide explanation for not filing the return by the ordinary due date. The reassessment return was accordingly required to be treated akin to a regular return under Section 139. Credit of verified TDS and prepaid taxes could not be confined to adjustment against the outstanding demand, since any excess remaining after discharge of the ultimately determined tax liability could not be retained as tax revenue. The cited precedent concerning concluded substantive computation items in reassessment did not govern credit for prepaid taxes.

Conclusion: The reassessment return must be treated as a return under Section 139, and verified TDS and prepaid-tax credit, including refund of any excess with applicable statutory interest, cannot be denied.

Issues: Whether the assessment and transfer-pricing order passed pursuant to a limited remand by the appellate authority were barred by limitation.

Analysis: The earlier appellate order did not set aside or cancel the assessment for making a fresh assessment; it directed exclusion of certain comparables and fresh examination of specified comparable-company issues. Accordingly, the matter fell under Section 153(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for giving effect to an appellate order otherwise than through a fresh assessment. Since verification and an opportunity of hearing were required, the second proviso to Section 153(5) attracted the time limit under Section 153(3). The order having been received on 17 October 2022, the applicable limitation expired on 31 March 2024. The additional extension under Section 153(4) was unavailable because remand of an issue to the Transfer Pricing Officer was distinct from a reference by the Assessing Officer under Section 92CA(1).

Conclusion: The assessment order and the transfer-pricing order were time-barred and were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be granted against rejection of the delayed statutory appeal.

Analysis: The medical material relied upon to explain the delay included an undated certificate whose neat copy contained an insertion not found in the original. This was treated as an attempt to mislead the Court. A litigant seeking writ relief must approach the Court with clean hands, and the discretionary jurisdiction was therefore not invoked.

Conclusion: Discretionary writ relief was declined against the petitioner.

Issues: Whether reassessment under Sections 147 and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be initiated on information and a statement already available and considered in the earlier search assessment and revision proceedings.

Analysis: The information relied upon for reassessment, including the statement concerning the alleged entry provider, was available during the assessment under Section 153A and subsequent proceedings under Section 263. The Assessing Officer had also obtained confirmations from the concerned entities before issuing the notice under Section 148 but did not deal with them. The later investigation-wing communication merely repackaged the same material; it did not constitute fresh tangible material. Approval under Section 151 was likewise founded on the old statement and was mechanical. Reopening on that basis amounted to a change of opinion.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were beyond jurisdiction and the additions made therein were deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether assessments for AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12 could validly be initiated under Section 153C by computing the applicable assessment block from the date of the search rather than the date of receipt or handover of seized material by the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over the non-searched person.

Analysis: Under the first proviso to Section 153C(1), the reference date for a non-searched person is deemed to be the date on which the jurisdictional Assessing Officer receives the seized books, documents or assets, and not the date of the original search. This deeming fiction governs computation of the six-year and relevant ten-year assessment blocks. The satisfaction and initiation of proceedings in 2022 placed the assessment years in question outside the permissible statutory block. The contrary contention that the proviso operates only for abatement was rejected as inconsistent with the governing interpretation of Section 153C.

Conclusion: The assessments for AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12 were beyond the permissible period under Section 153C and the Assessing Officer lacked jurisdiction to initiate them; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether interim protection from arrest should be granted pending interrogation in connection with the GST investigation.

Analysis: The petitioner relied on resignation before the alleged transactions, absence of a notice naming him as an accused, documentary nature of the material, and willingness to cooperate. The respondent sought time to reply and stated that arrest could not be made under the notices issued to the petitioner.

Outcome: The petitioner was permitted to appear before the Investigating Officer for interrogation and was protected from arrest in the specified proceedings. Time was granted for filing a reply and the matter was listed after one week.

Issues: Whether the supply of cement and max fault to contractors, with their value deducted from final payments, constituted a sale liable to tax.

Analysis: The supply of cement and max fault to the contractors and deduction of their value from the final bills were admitted. The transaction was governed by the principle applied in the cited Supreme Court precedent, under which such supply and recovery from the contractor constitute a sale.

Conclusion: The supply constituted a taxable sale; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether delay in filing the statutory appeal against the order-in-original should be condoned and the appeal entertained on merits.

Analysis: Although the appellate authority is bound by the limitation prescribed under Section 107, the delay was attributable to circumstances beyond the assessee's control. Refusal to permit adjudication on merits would cause grave prejudice. The consistent approach permitting delayed GST appeals to be entertained in such circumstances was applied, including the accepted principle that portal-only service may not justify denial of an effective appellate remedy.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned, and the appellate authority was directed to entertain and decide the appeal on merits if filed within 30 days from upload of the order.

Issues: Whether the earlier order required correction to record counsel's appearance and reference to the cited decision.

Analysis: The requested correction was confined to insertion of the appearance of counsel for Respondent No. 2. The cited decision concerning reliance on photocopies was found irrelevant because the earlier dismissal proceeded on the undisputed default and the record of default filed with the Information Utility under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Outcome: The appearance entry was directed to be corrected, and the praecipe for speaking to the minutes was disposed of without costs.

Outcome: Delay condoned, exemption application allowed, and Special Leave Petition dismissed.

Issues: Whether a two-day delay in filing Form No. 10B for claiming exemption should be condoned under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 119(2)(b) permits condonation where refusal would cause genuine hardship. The delay was only two days and was attributable to portal-related technical difficulty and/or inadvertent error. Refusal of condonation would deny the trust its claimed exemption under Section 11 and result in substantial tax demand. A justice-oriented exercise of the condonation power requires reasonable cause and genuine hardship to be assessed liberally, with substantive justice preferred over technical limitation.

Conclusion: The two-day delay in filing Form No. 10B was condoned, and the rejection of the condonation application was set aside. The return must be processed on the basis that Form No. 10B was filed within time.