Issues: Whether capital expenditure incurred on construction of a research and development building used for scientific research related to the assessee's business is deductible under Section 35(1)(iv) read with Section 35(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 35(1)(iv) read with Section 35(2)(ia) allows the whole of capital expenditure incurred on scientific research related to the assessee's business in the year of incurrence; the relevant exclusion is confined to expenditure attributable to acquisition of land. Expenditure on construction of a building used for such research is not excluded. The restriction concerning the cost of land or building, DSIR approval, and Form No. 3CL applies to weighted deduction under Section 35(2AB), and cannot be imported into a claim for actual deduction under Section 35(1)(iv). The capital nature, genuineness, scientific-research use, and business nexus of the expenditure were undisputed.

Conclusion: The capital expenditure incurred on construction of the R&D building was allowable as deduction under Section 35(1)(iv) read with Section 35(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether second-hand restricted goods could be absolutely confiscated instead of being released on payment of redemption fine; (ii) Whether the penalty imposed under Section 112(a) could be enhanced under Section 114AA.

Issue (i): Whether second-hand restricted goods could be absolutely confiscated instead of being released on payment of redemption fine.

Analysis: The Foreign Trade Policy 2015-2020 restricts import of second-hand goods other than capital goods unless authorised. The examination report and the Chartered Engineer's report established that the imported goods were second-hand goods; the contrary plea could not be raised after foregoing notice and personal hearing. However, restricted character alone did not justify absolute confiscation. The discretion under Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962 required specific reasons for denying redemption, and no such reasons were recorded. The precedent concerning imports adversely affecting the national economy was factually inapplicable.

Conclusion: The goods were liable to confiscation but were entitled to redemption on payment of fine; absolute confiscation was unsustainable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty imposed under Section 112(a) could be enhanced under Section 114AA.

Analysis: Penalty under Section 112(a) and penalty under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 rest on distinct legal premises. The appellate enhancement under Section 114AA of a penalty originally imposed under Section 112(a) was therefore misplaced.

Conclusion: The enhanced penalty under Section 114AA was set aside, and the original penalty under Section 112(a) was restored. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The original adjudication permitting redemption of the restricted second-hand goods on fine and imposing penalty under Section 112(a) was restored.

Ratio Decidendi: Absolute confiscation of restricted imported goods requires a reasoned and judicious exercise of discretion under Section 125; restriction alone does not displace the option of redemption, and penalties resting on distinct statutory bases cannot be substituted without the requisite legal basis.

Issues: Whether interest for deferment of advance tax was correctly chargeable under section 234C after allowing foreign-tax relief and tax deducted at source credit.

Analysis: Interest under section 234C is to be computed instalment-wise on the net tax due on returned income. The tax chargeable on the returned income had to be reduced by relief under section 90 and tax deducted at source credit. On the resulting net liability, there was no shortfall in the first two instalments; the shortfalls in the third and fourth instalments yielded aggregate interest of Rs.56,047. The higher interest computation of Rs.700,499 was unsupported, and the departmental representative did not dispute the assessee's calculation.

Conclusion: Interest under section 234C is payable only at Rs.56,047, and the Assessing Officer must recompute the interest and grant consequential relief in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether an arbitration clause bars an operational creditor from invoking the statutory remedy under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code; (ii) Whether a claim arising from a settlement of disputes concerning supply of goods constitutes operational debt and confers operational-creditor status; (iii) Whether the respondent's alleged contractual damages claim constituted a pre-existing dispute barring admission under Section 9.

Issue (i): Whether an arbitration clause bars an operational creditor from invoking the statutory remedy under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Analysis: An arbitration clause embodies a consensual private dispute-resolution mechanism and does not displace a statutory insolvency remedy. The availability, or even invocation, of arbitration cannot prevent proceedings under the Code where the statutory requirements for debt and default are met.

Conclusion: The arbitration clause did not bar invocation of Section 9 proceedings, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether a claim arising from a settlement of disputes concerning supply of goods constitutes operational debt and confers operational-creditor status.

Analysis: The settlement amount arose from transactions for supply of raw cotton and disputes concerning the supplied goods. A claim in respect of such supply falls within operational debt; the person to whom that debt is owed qualifies as an operational creditor. The definition cannot be confined to a person who directly supplied goods or services to the corporate debtor.

Conclusion: The settlement claim was operational debt and the appellant was an operational creditor entitled to invoke Section 9, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the respondent's alleged contractual damages claim constituted a pre-existing dispute barring admission under Section 9.

Analysis: A dispute must be genuine and supported by material, rather than a patently feeble assertion. The alleged breach and damages claim was raised only in reply to the demand notice, apart from an isolated communication, and had not been pursued before any adjudicatory or arbitral forum. It therefore did not establish a dispute existing before the demand notice.

Conclusion: No pre-existing dispute was established to bar the Section 9 application, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The statutory conditions for pursuing insolvency resolution on the settled operational debt remained available, and the rejection founded on arbitration and an alleged pre-existing dispute could not stand.

Ratio Decidendi: A consensual arbitration clause does not exclude the statutory insolvency remedy, and a belated, unsupported damages assertion does not constitute a pre-existing dispute where the claim arises from an operational debt connected with supply of goods.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for failure to respond to the show-cause notice should be sustained where the non-response was attributed to bona fide and unavoidable circumstances.

Analysis: The cancellation followed the petitioner's failure to reply to a notice that had been sent by email. In view of the stated bona fide reasons and sufficient cause for the omission, a justice-oriented approach warranted a further opportunity to comply with GST obligations.

Conclusion: The cancellation of GST registration was set aside and restoration of registration was directed, conditional upon filing pending returns and payment of outstanding tax, interest and penalty. The conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether an ITC mismatch caused by reporting or allocation of eligible IGST credit under the CGST and SGST heads, without excess aggregate ITC availment, can sustain a demand under Section 73.

Analysis: The aggregate ITC balance in the electronic credit ledger across IGST, CGST and SGST heads is material where the alleged discrepancy is attributable only to allocation between tax heads. The underlying eligibility of the credit was not substantively disputed and no revenue loss was established. A demand cannot rest solely on an incorrect tax-head classification when the assessee has not exceeded its aggregate eligible entitlement. The authorities had not verified the assessee's claim that sufficient eligible IGST credit remained available and unclaimed. Since the principal alleged excess ITC demand was unsustainable on these facts, interest and penalty could not independently survive.

Conclusion: A cross-head ITC reporting discrepancy does not by itself constitute excess ITC availment; the demand, interest and penalty must be dropped if verification establishes that sufficient eligible IGST credit remained unclaimed.

Issues: Whether the penalty imposed on the assessee as majority shareholder of the holding company of Yogesh Associates was required to be separately remanded for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The penalty imposed in the assessee's capacity as partner of Balaji Flexipack had attained finality. The distinct penalty of Rs. 20 crore related to the assessee's position as majority shareholder of the holding company of Yogesh Associates, whose matters had already been directed for de novo consideration. Both sides accepted that this distinct penalty issue had not been appropriately included in the remand direction.

Conclusion: The penalty issue of Rs. 20 crore is remitted to the adjudicating authority for de novo consideration along with the remanded matters of Yogesh Associates and the connected entities, in favour of the Revenue.

Issues: Whether a show-cause notice and consequential tax determination issued in the name of a deceased proprietor, without notice to the legal representatives, are legally sustainable.

Analysis: Section 93(1)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 creates liability of legal representatives, limited to the estate inherited from the deceased, but does not provide machinery to assess a deceased person. The machinery for determination under Section 74 requires notice to the person liable. A notice issued to a deceased person is a nullity; the legal representatives must instead be independently served with a notice and afforded an opportunity to respond and be heard before liability is determined.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice, consequential order of determination and recovery notice issued in the deceased proprietor's name were invalid. Fresh proceedings may be initiated by issuing and manually serving a show-cause notice upon the legal representatives, followed by adjudication after hearing them.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition remained maintainable despite the appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Order in Original was liable to be quashed for non-application of mind, breach of principles of natural justice, and invalid invocation of Section 74 for Financial Year 2018-19.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition remained maintainable despite the appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The availability of an appellate remedy did not bar writ jurisdiction where the original adjudication was alleged to be non-speaking, to have disregarded the reply and supporting documents, and to suffer from jurisdictional infirmity. These circumstances brought the matter within the recognised exceptions to the alternative-remedy rule.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable notwithstanding the statutory appellate remedy.

Issue (ii): Whether the Order in Original was liable to be quashed for non-application of mind, breach of principles of natural justice, and invalid invocation of Section 74 for Financial Year 2018-19.

Analysis: The notice did not dispute possession of suppliers' tax invoices or receipt of goods and services. The material placed on record also showed proceedings against the defaulting supplier. Mere non-reflection of invoices in GSTR-2A could not, by itself, result in automatic denial of input tax credit to a bona fide purchaser, particularly absent an allegation of collusion; the issue required reconsideration in light of the binding precedent identified in the order.

Analysis: For Financial Year 2018-19, the notice was ex facie beyond the ordinary limitation under Section 73(10). Section 74 was invoked through unparticularised references to fraud, wilful misstatement and suppression, without material disclosing how those ingredients were attracted. The adjudication also failed to deal with the reply and documents, contrary to the requirement of a reasoned order and fair hearing.

Conclusion: The Order in Original and consequential recovery notice were invalidated; the adjudicating authority was required to conduct fresh, reasoned adjudication after considering the reply, relevant documents and binding precedents, with an opportunity of personal hearing.

Final Conclusion: The statutory demand could not stand on an unreasoned adjudication founded, for Financial Year 2018-19, on a mechanically invoked extended-limitation provision; the substantive input-tax-credit claim remains for fresh determination in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Extended limitation under Section 74 cannot be invoked through bare allegations of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression without material particulars establishing those statutory ingredients.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax was chargeable on study materials/books, hostel and mess charges, 'other fee', and other ancillary collections. (ii) Whether differential service tax could be demanded on tuition-fee accounting entries, additional income declared for income-tax purposes, and rental income. (iii) Whether the appellant was entitled to Notification No. 12/2003-ST and whether the extended period and penalties were invocable.

Issue (i): Whether service tax was chargeable on study materials/books, hostel and mess charges, 'other fee', and other ancillary collections.

Analysis: Books and study materials separately reflected in invoices and accounts constituted sale of goods liable to VAT, even where VAT was exempt, and could not be treated as consideration for coaching. The allegation that their supply formed an integral or bundled part of coaching was beyond the show-cause notices. Hostel accommodation and mess facilities were independent of coaching and lacked the requisite nexus with Commercial Training and Coaching Service. Affidavit and certificate evidence supported the claim that 'other fee' represented hostel-related collections. The Department did not establish that the listed ancillary receipts arose from taxable coaching services.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, demands on study materials, hostel fee, mess fee and the identified ancillary collections were unsustainable. 'Other fee' was excluded to the extent attributable to non-coaching activities or lacking nexus with coaching, with its residual quantification requiring re-determination.

Issue (ii): Whether differential service tax could be demanded on tuition-fee accounting entries, additional income declared for income-tax purposes, and rental income.

Analysis: Income-receivable journal entries for later tuition instalments did not establish taxable receipt, completed service, advance payment or invoicing; tax on the relevant amounts had also been paid in the following month. A voluntary income-tax disclosure, without proof that it represented consideration for a taxable service, could not sustain service-tax demand. Rental income from premises leased to an educational institution fell within the applicable negative-list and exemption framework. Actual tuition charges remained consideration for Commercial Training and Coaching Service.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, differential demands based on accounting entries, the additional income disclosure and rental income were unsustainable; demand on actual tuition-fee consideration was sustained.

Issue (iii): Whether the appellant was entitled to Notification No. 12/2003-ST and whether the extended period and penalties were invocable.

Analysis: The certificate based on the financial records established that no inadmissible input credit had been availed on the study materials, satisfying the notification condition. The disputed components had been the subject of prior proceedings, disclosures were made in records, and the Department failed to show deliberate suppression or intent to evade tax. The dispute involved a bona fide interpretative understanding of the taxability of separate receipts.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, benefit of Notification No. 12/2003-ST was available up to 30.06.2012; the extended period and penalty under Section 78 were not invocable, and penalties under Sections 76 and 77 were waived under Section 80 for the applicable period. Cum-tax benefit was admissible where not already granted.

Final Conclusion: Service tax is confined to consideration demonstrably attributable to coaching, while independently supplied goods, accommodation, mess facilities and unrelated receipts cannot be included in the taxable value; the limited residual 'other fee' component must be quantified consistently with these findings.

Ratio Decidendi: Receipts may be included in the taxable value of a service only where the Department establishes their nexus with the taxable service; separate sale of goods and independent non-coaching facilities cannot be taxed as coaching consideration merely because they are collected from students.

Issues: Whether the one-year limitation under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 bars refund of Education Cess and Secondary and Higher Education Cess mistakenly paid on Oil Industry Development Cess.

Analysis: Section 11B applies to refund claims for duty of excise and interest paid on such duty. Education Cess and Secondary and Higher Education Cess paid on Oil Industry Development Cess, when not legally payable, constitute amounts paid under a mistake of law rather than duty of excise. Article 265 of the Constitution of India prohibits collection or retention of tax without authority of law. The general limitation governing relief from a mistake applies rather than the limitation prescribed by Section 11B.

Conclusion: Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 does not bar refund of the mistakenly paid Education Cess and Secondary and Higher Education Cess; the amounts must be refunded.

Issues: Whether, following a search, an assessment for the preceding assessment year could validly be framed under the regular scrutiny procedure without invoking reassessment jurisdiction and issuing the mandatory notice.

Analysis: For searches initiated during the post-1 April 2021 and pre-1 September 2024 regime, Explanation 2 to Section 148 deems the Assessing Officer to possess information suggesting escapement of income. The search-related assessment mechanism is consequently governed by Sections 147 and 148. Although the preliminary procedure under Section 148A is inapplicable to an assessee's own search case, that exclusion does not dispense with the jurisdictional notice required under Section 148. Section 143(2) operates within the ordinary scrutiny machinery and cannot substitute the special statutory route where the additions arise from cash and jewellery found in the search. The subsisting period for issuing a scrutiny notice does not confer an option to bypass the special reassessment procedure.

Conclusion: The assessment framed under Section 143(3) without notice under Section 148 was without jurisdiction and invalid; the consequential cash addition could not survive.

Issues: Whether the FIR alleging cheating, criminal breach of trust, conspiracy, forgery and fraudulent GST transactions should be quashed under the inherent jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute arose from contractual supply agreements and was purely civil in nature.

Analysis: The contractual indemnity and remedial clauses preserved remedies available in law and did not exclude criminal proceedings where cognizable offences were prima facie disclosed. The material indicated that the agent introduced allegedly bogus and non-existent suppliers, furnished documents to establish their purported genuineness, and facilitated transactions supported by allegedly fabricated GST invoices, e-way bills, KYC documents and registrations. These allegations indicated dishonest intention at inception, inducement to release substantial payments, and a prima facie conspiracy; they were not confined to subsequent non-performance of contractual obligations. Civil and criminal liability may coexist where the alleged conduct involves deception, forgery and financial fraud. Questions concerning proof of criminal breach of trust and connivance require determination at trial.

Conclusion: The FIR prima facie disclosed cognizable criminal offences and did not warrant quashing under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked where the assessee had previously disclosed material facts regarding availment of Cenvat credit to the Department.

Analysis: The Tribunal's finding rested on the assessee's prior disclosures concerning common inputs and input services. The subsequent letters relied upon by the Department neither supplied fresh information capable of justifying extended limitation nor were placed on the Tribunal's record. Limitation being a mixed question of law and fact, the factual appreciation by the Tribunal did not warrant interference in the limited appellate jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the settlement agreement, agreement to sell and addendum novated or discharged the operational debt, thereby barring an application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) Whether a pre-existing dispute barred admission of the insolvency application.

Issue (i): Whether the settlement agreement, agreement to sell and addendum novated or discharged the operational debt, thereby barring an application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: Novation under Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act requires a complete substitution, rescission or extinguishment of the original obligation. The agreements expressly preserved the original liability by providing that payment of the outstanding dues would cancel the agreement to sell. Neither payment nor transfer of the property occurred; instead, cheques for the admitted outstanding operational debt were subsequently issued and dishonoured. The property arrangement was therefore a conditional mechanism to secure or facilitate payment, not a substitution of the underlying operational debt. The suit for specific performance was instituted after the Section 9 application and did not preclude it.

Conclusion: The operational debt was neither novated nor discharged and remained enforceable under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issue (ii): Whether a pre-existing dispute barred admission of the insolvency application.

Analysis: A pre-existing dispute must concern a genuine and substantiated dispute relating to the operational claim. The admitted liability was not accompanied by any contemporaneous objection concerning the quality or quantity of the goods, the amount due, or the liability to pay. The controversy concerning the proposed property transfer and specific performance did not dispute the operational debt. In the absence of documentary support for a dispute over the supplied goods or the admitted dues, the asserted dispute was a moonshine defence.

Conclusion: No pre-existing dispute existed that could bar admission of the insolvency application.

Final Conclusion: The admitted unpaid operational claim remained amenable to insolvency resolution notwithstanding the conditional property-related arrangements between the parties.

Ratio Decidendi: A conditional arrangement for transfer of property to secure payment does not novate an operational debt unless it completely extinguishes the original obligation, and a collateral property dispute does not amount to a pre-existing dispute where the underlying operational liability remains admitted and undisputed.

Issues: Whether assessment of long-term capital gain in the hands of a person claiming to act solely as a constituted attorney required reconsideration on the newly produced sale deed and power of attorney.

Analysis: The sale deed and power of attorney produced before the Tribunal indicated that the land was owned by another person and that the assessee may have acted only as that owner's agent. As these documents had not been produced before the lower authorities and required factual verification, the ownership and consequent taxability questions were not finally adjudicated.

Outcome: The first appellate order was set aside and the matter was sent back for fresh consideration of the documents and the parties' submissions.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing Form No. 10AB for regularisation of provisional registration was liable to be condoned under the proviso to section 12A(1)(ac) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The proviso to section 12A(1)(ac), operative from 01.10.2024, empowers the Commissioner to condone delay in applications under the specified sub-clauses upon reasonable cause being shown, with the application then deemed to have been filed in time. The application was filed after the proviso became effective. The earlier application had been filed under an incorrect statutory clause and was followed promptly by the corrected application. The affidavit explaining the omission, together with the chronology and absence of deliberate default, established reasonable cause. The general relaxation under CBDT Circular No. 07/2024 did not displace this independent statutory power. As the application had been rejected only on limitation without examining the objects, genuineness of activities, or other conditions for registration, merits required fresh consideration.

Conclusion: The delay in filing Form No. 10AB is condoned, and the application shall be treated as filed within time and decided afresh on merits under section 12AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961, without reopening the issue of delay.

Issues: Whether GST could be deducted from compensation awarded for compulsory acquisition of land and the building standing on it.

Analysis: Land and buildings attached to or embedded in land are immovable property under the applicable legal framework. GST is leviable on a supply of goods or services, whereas compulsory acquisition is a statutory expropriation under the power of eminent domain, not a voluntary supply by the owner. The landowners neither sold goods nor rendered services by surrendering the acquired property. No statutory basis was identified for treating compensation for the acquired land and structure as consideration for a taxable supply.

Conclusion: Deduction of GST from the compensation was beyond authority of law; the GST-deduction portion of the award notice was quashed and refund of the deducted amount with interest was directed.

Issues: Whether the final assessment order was barred by limitation under Section 144C(13) after issuance of the Dispute Resolution Panel's directions.

Analysis: Section 144C(13) requires the assessment to be completed within one month from the end of the month in which directions under Section 144C(5) are received. The directions issued on 18 December 2025 were uploaded on the ITBA portal on 19 December 2025, constituting receipt by the Assessing Officer. Accordingly, the assessment had to be completed by 31 January 2026. The statutory timeline is mandatory, and the final assessment order dated 11 March 2026 was issued beyond that period.

Conclusion: The final assessment order was time-barred and was quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether an approved resolution plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, expressly waiving arrears and transfer charges, precludes a State industrial-development authority from raising a subsequent demand and withholding mutation and transfer of leasehold rights.

Analysis: Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 makes an approved resolution plan binding upon the corporate debtor, creditors, governmental authorities and other stakeholders. The approved plan expressly waived earlier arrears, transfer charges, interest, penalties and lease-related liabilities, and required unconditional permission for change in control. A subsequent demand founded on liabilities extinguished or waived under the plan would defeat the clean slate principle and revive pre-resolution claims after approval.

Conclusion: The authority was barred from recovering the demanded pre-effective-date arrears and transfer charges, and was required to effect mutation and transfer of the leasehold rights in accordance with the approved resolution plan.