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Issues: Whether a penalty can be sustained where the cyclostyled show cause notice does not strike off irrelevant particulars and is consequently vague.
Analysis: A notice that does not specify the applicable charge by striking off irrelevant particulars is vague and incapable of an effective response. Such a defective notice cannot form the foundation for penalty proceedings. The issue was governed by the Full Bench ruling relied upon by the Tribunal.
Conclusion: The penalty was invalid because it was founded on a vague show cause notice; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Issues: Whether the notice issued for reopening the assessment for assessment year 2015-16 was barred by limitation and, consequently, whether the reassessment order could be sustained.
Analysis: The assessment was reopened under the amended reassessment regime by notice issued on 29-04-2022. The relevant six-year period for issuing notice had expired on 31-03-2022. The extended time limit under the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation) Act, 2020 was held to be inapplicable to the assessment year in question. The decision in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal was relied upon for the proposition that notices issued after the permissible cut-off for assessment year 2015-16 could not survive. On that basis, the notice under Section 148 and the consequential reassessment were held to be without jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The reassessment notice was time-barred and invalid, and the reassessment order was quashed in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The reopening of assessment failed at the threshold for want of a valid notice, so the additions made in the reassessment did not survive.
Ratio Decidendi: For assessment years governed by the pre-existing six-year limitation, a notice for reassessment issued after expiry of that period is without jurisdiction and cannot be saved by the relaxation granted under TOLA where the extended time limit does not apply.
Issues: (i) Whether export incentives received under the Merchandise Exports from India Scheme form part of operating revenue for transfer pricing purposes; (ii) whether miscellaneous expenses are to be treated as operating expenses for the assessee and the comparable companies; and (iii) whether a separate transfer pricing adjustment on account of interest on outstanding receivables is sustainable when the primary transaction has been benchmarked under TNMM.
Issue (i): Whether export incentives received under the Merchandise Exports from India Scheme form part of operating revenue for transfer pricing purposes.
Analysis: The incentive was linked to exports made in the ordinary course of business and was intended to offset operating costs and improve export competitiveness. Its character was intrinsically connected with the assessee's normal business operations. Excluding such receipts would distort the operating profit computation and the comparability analysis under TNMM. The fact that some comparables may not have earned similar incentives did not justify treating the assessee's export-linked incentive as non-operating.
Conclusion: The export incentive was held to be operating revenue and was to be included in the assessee's operating margin.
Issue (ii): Whether miscellaneous expenses are to be treated as operating expenses for the assessee and the comparable companies.
Analysis: Miscellaneous expenses generally consist of routine, low-value business outgoings incurred in the normal course of operations. Their nature, rather than the nomenclature, determines whether they are operating in character. In the absence of any specific segregation showing that the expenses were non-operational, parity required that the same treatment be applied to the assessee and the comparables. Such expenses were therefore regarded as part of regular business expenditure for transfer pricing computation.
Conclusion: The miscellaneous expenses were held to be operating expenses for both the assessee and the comparable companies.
Issue (iii): Whether a separate transfer pricing adjustment on account of interest on outstanding receivables is sustainable when the primary transaction has been benchmarked under TNMM.
Analysis: Once the entity-level international transactions were benchmarked under TNMM and the revised operating margin fell within the arm's length range, the receivables issue stood subsumed in the primary transfer pricing analysis. Separate notional interest adjustment was not warranted, particularly where no interest was charged uniformly from both associated enterprises and non-associated enterprises. The receivables were also treated as part of the overall commercial arrangement rather than as a stand-alone source of income warranting independent benchmarking on the facts of the case.
Conclusion: The separate adjustment on outstanding receivables was deleted.
Final Conclusion: The transfer pricing additions were unsustainable on the issues decided, and the assessee's appeal succeeded in full.
Ratio Decidendi: For transfer pricing under TNMM, export-linked incentives intrinsically connected with normal business operations and routine miscellaneous expenses are operating items, and where the primary transaction is at arm's length with uniform non-charging of interest, no separate notional interest adjustment on receivables is warranted.
Issues: Whether deduction under section 80-IB could be denied only because Form 10CCB was uploaded after the due date, despite the return being filed within time and the audit report having been issued before the specified date.
Analysis: The assessee had claimed the deduction in the return filed within the extended due date, and the auditor had issued Form 10CCB before the specified date. The only default was delayed uploading of the audit report. The delay was treated as a procedural lapse and not a defect affecting the substantive entitlement to deduction. The Tribunal followed its earlier view and the settled approach that a genuine deduction cannot be denied merely for late filing of supporting evidence when the statutory claim is otherwise available.
Conclusion: Deduction under section 80-IB could not be denied merely for delayed filing of Form 10CCB, and the assessee was entitled to the claim.
Final Conclusion: The deduction was directed to be allowed, with a cost imposed for the lapse in filing, and the appeal succeeded on statistical terms.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the statutory conditions for deduction are otherwise satisfied and the supporting audit report was obtained within time, delayed uploading of Form 10CCB is a curable procedural lapse that cannot by itself defeat the deduction claim.
Issues: Whether the costs of Rs. 50,000 imposed on the GST Department in the earlier order should be waived or reduced.
Analysis: The Department sought modification of the earlier order only to the extent of the costs. The Court declined to waive the costs in view of the repeated litigation the petitioner had been compelled to undertake to secure the refund. However, considering the facts placed by the Department in the application, the quantum of costs was reduced.
Conclusion: The request for waiver of costs was rejected, and the costs were reduced to Rs. 20,000.
Issues: (i) Whether the expression "previous Financial Year" in Rule 27(4)(iv) of the Odisha Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2016 required production of the income tax return for the immediately preceding completed financial year or the financial year whose return-filing period had not yet expired; (ii) whether the rejection of the highest bid and the relief granted by the High Court in favour of the successful bidder could be sustained in judicial review of a public tender for extraction of sand.
Issue (i): Whether the expression "previous Financial Year" in Rule 27(4)(iv) of the Odisha Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2016 required production of the income tax return for the immediately preceding completed financial year or the financial year whose return-filing period had not yet expired.
Analysis: Rule 27(4)(iv) required an income tax return of the "previous Financial Year" or an equivalent bank guarantee. The auction notice was issued and bids were called in July 2022, while the statutory time for filing the income tax return for financial year 2021-2022 had not yet expired. Reading the Rule harmoniously with Section 139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the phrase "previous Financial Year" could not mean a year for which the return was not yet due. It had to mean the immediately preceding completed financial year, namely 2020-2021, for which the bidder had filed its return.
Conclusion: The bidder had complied with Rule 27(4)(iv), and the rejection of its bid on the ground of non-filing of the return for financial year 2021-2022 was and unsustainable.
Issue (ii): Whether the rejection of the highest bid and the relief granted by the High Court in favour of the successful bidder could be sustained in judicial review of a public tender for extraction of sand.
Analysis: In contractual and tender matters, interference is limited, but the Court will intervene where the decision-making process is vitiated by a misconstruction of tender conditions, arbitrariness, or a result contrary to public interest. The Tender Committee adopted a narrow construction that excluded the highest bidder and diminished public revenue in a tender concerning natural resources. The High Court also erred in sustaining that rejection while issuing directions that were inconsistent with the correct interpretation of the tender condition. As the impugned judgment could not stand, relief had to be moulded by setting aside the auction process and directing a fresh auction with restitution to the successful bidder for the amount deposited.
Conclusion: The impugned judgment was unsustainable, the directions requiring the successful bidder to match the higher bid were not maintained, and a fresh auction with refund and interest to the successful bidder was warranted.
Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded, the impugned judgment was set aside, the tender process was reopened through a fresh auction, and restitutionary relief was directed in favour of the successful bidder.
Ratio Decidendi: A tender condition requiring an income tax return of the "previous Financial Year" must be construed to mean the last completed financial year whose return was due, and a misconstruction that excludes the highest bidder and reduces public revenue is liable to correction in judicial review.
Issues: Whether regular bail should be granted to the petitioner-accused facing allegations of large-scale GST fraud involving bogus firms and bogus Input Tax Credit.
Analysis: The petition challenges the denial of bail where the prosecution alleges the petitioner set up multiple non-existent/proxy firms and facilitated goods-less invoices generating bogus ITC to the tune of crores. The Court examined the nature and gravity of the allegations, the amount involved as disclosed by investigation, the existence of investigative material (including recorded statement and corroborative electronic traces), and the principle that offences of large-scale economic fraud attract a stricter approach on grant of bail. The Court applied the settled legal framework that economic offences involving deep-rooted conspiracies and substantial loss to the public exchequer warrant a more stringent view while considering bail applications, drawing on the ratio that such offences constitute a class apart for bail purposes.
Conclusion: Bail is refused and the petition is dismissed; the decision is against the petitioner and in favour of the Revenue.
Issues: Whether proceedings in the impugned show cause notice should be stayed pending consideration of the question whether the Delhi Jal Board is a local authority for GST purposes.
Analysis: The question whether the Delhi Jal Board is a local authority was treated as a legal issue warranting consideration in writ proceedings, so that the dispute could be decided without prolonging the controversy. Pending such consideration, the Court directed that the proceedings under the impugned show cause notice should not continue.
Conclusion: Interim stay of the proceedings in the impugned show cause notice was granted.
Issues: (i) Whether time for filing an appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 can be enlarged/condoned where the appeal was filed long after the statutory and extended period and the order was uploaded on the portal without separate electronic alert to the assessee.
Analysis: The statutory scheme provides a three month period for filing an appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, with the appellate authority empowered to condone delay only for a further period of one month upon sufficient reasons. The order challenged was uploaded on the web portal and there is no statutory provision requiring separate e-mail or SMS alert as a substitute for service; service by upload is within the statutory mechanism under Section 169 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Prior to passing the impugned order, notices in Form ASMT-10 and Form DRC-01A were issued to the petitioner and were not answered. The appeal was filed after a period of approximately three years, far beyond both the primary period and the one-month condonation window, and no justifiable reason or sufficient cause was shown to warrant extraordinary enlargement of time.
Conclusion: The petition seeking enlargement of time to file the appeal is rejected; the delay is not condoned and the writ petition is dismissed.
Issues: Whether the importer was entitled to the benefit of Notification No. 46/2011 dated 01.06.2011 in respect of the imported tin ingots, and whether the denial of exemption on the ground of violation of the Rules of Origin under Notification No. 189/2009 dated 31.12.2009 was justified.
Analysis: The dispute turned on the applicability of the origin criteria under Rule 3 and Rule 5 of the Rules of Origin, which require that non-wholly produced goods satisfy the prescribed regional value content and change in tariff sub-heading conditions, and that the claim be supported by a Certificate of Origin issued by the designated authority under Rule 13. The materials on record did not establish that the Certificate of Origin was fake or that the regional value content was below the prescribed threshold. The goods were shown to have been imported from Malaysia with partial manufacture there, and the record did not contain reliable calculation evidence to dislodge the claimed origin status. On the facts, the conditions for preferential treatment were not shown to have been breached.
Conclusion: The importer was held eligible for the exemption under Notification No. 46/2011, and the differential customs duty was held to have been wrongly demanded.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether refund of unutilized input tax credit on export of services under Section 54 of the CGST Act read with Rule 89 of the CGST Rules can be denied solely for non-furnishing of Foreign Inward Remittance Certificates (FIRCs) where other documentary evidence, including a Chartered Accountant's certificate and Foreign Inward Remittance Advices (FIRAs), establishes receipt of convertible foreign exchange.
1.2 Whether the respondent authorities were bound to follow the earlier decision of the same High Court in the petitioner's own case on an identical issue and periodically similar refund claims, and consequently to process refund without insisting on FIRCs.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Denial of refund for non-furnishing FIRCs despite Chartered Accountant's certificate and FIRAs
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court noted that the petitioner's services supplied to customers outside India qualify as "export of services" under Section 2(6) of the IGST Act, resulting in accumulation of unutilized input tax credit when exports are made without payment of GST.
2.2 Refund of unutilized input tax credit is governed by Section 54 of the CGST Act read with Rule 89 of the CGST Rules. The authorities had relied on a CBIC circular requiring FIRCs for refund processing.
2.3 The Court referred to a prior Supreme Court decision holding that a certificate issued by a Chartered Accountant is to be treated as an authentic document and is required to be considered by the authority in determining receipt of foreign exchange.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 The adjudicating and appellate authorities had rejected the refund claims for the periods July 2021-September 2021 and October 2021-December 2021 mainly on two grounds: (i) FIRCs were not produced, only FIRAs; and (ii) the Chartered Accountant's certificate mentioned amounts in Euros whereas FIRAs reflected amounts in US Dollars, leading the authorities to discard the certificate.
2.5 The Court relied on its own earlier order in an identical matter concerning the same petitioner, where it had examined a similar Chartered Accountant's certificate certifying receipt of convertible foreign exchange under RBI approvals and verifying receivables/payables with reference to transport documents and related records.
2.6 In that earlier decision, the Court had held that the certificate clearly established receipt of convertible foreign exchange for export of services, and that the authorities were not justified in rejecting the refund solely because FIRCs, as required by the relevant CBIC circular, were not filed, once a Chartered Accountant's certificate of receipt of foreign exchange was produced.
2.7 The Court reiterated that in light of the Supreme Court's view, the certificate issued by the Chartered Accountant is required to be considered as authentic, and the respondent authorities are bound to take it into account while deciding refund claims relating to export of services.
2.8 Consequently, the insistence on FIRCs as the only acceptable proof, to the exclusion of the Chartered Accountant's certificate and other supporting documents evidencing receipt of foreign exchange under RBI approvals, was held to be unjustified.
Conclusions
2.9 Refund of unutilized input tax credit on export of services cannot be rejected solely for non-production of FIRCs where a Chartered Accountant's certificate and other documents establish receipt of convertible foreign exchange.
2.10 The respondent authorities are required to accept and act upon the Chartered Accountant's certificate as valid evidence of receipt of foreign exchange and cannot deny refund merely on the basis of procedural insistence under a circular for FIRCs.
Issue 2: Effect of earlier High Court decision in petitioner's own case
Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 The Court recorded that the respondent's counsel conceded that the issue was squarely covered by the earlier order of the same Court in a writ petition filed by the petitioner concerning a similar refund rejection on identical grounds.
2.12 In that earlier matter, the Court had quashed the order rejecting refund and directed the authorities to process the refund without insisting on FIRCs and by accepting the Chartered Accountant's certificate showing net foreign exchange receipt as per RBI's approval.
2.13 The Court observed that the facts and controversy in the present petition were indistinguishable from those in the earlier case, involving the same assessee, the same nature of export-of-services transactions, and the same ground of rejection based on non-furnishing of FIRCs.
2.14 In view of the binding nature of its prior decision on identical facts, and the admitted position of the respondents, the Court followed the earlier ruling.
Conclusions
2.15 The issue having been already decided by the Court in the petitioner's favour in an earlier writ petition on identical facts, the respondent authorities are bound by that decision and cannot sustain the present refund rejections on the same grounds.
2.16 The impugned orders rejecting refund were effectively rendered unsustainable, and the Court directed the respondent authorities to process the petitioner's refund claims for the periods July 2021-September 2021 and October 2021-December 2021 in accordance with law, without insisting on FIRCs and by considering the Chartered Accountant's certificate, within twelve weeks from receipt of the order.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the cash deposits in the assessee's bank account during the relevant previous year, determined on the basis of peak credit at Rs. 21,83,900/-, were satisfactorily explained so as to preclude addition as unexplained cash credit under section 68.
1.2 Whether the assessee's claim of substantial opening cash-in-hand of Rs. 26,04,762/- and other alleged cash sources (including IDS declaration, cash income of earlier years, and surplus withdrawals in earlier financial year) could be accepted as credible explanation for the cash deposits.
1.3 Consequentially, whether the addition of Rs. 20,81,900/- under section 68, subjected to tax under section 115BBE, as sustained by the first appellate authority, was liable to be interfered with.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Unexplained cash deposits - section 68; rejection of opening cash-in-hand and other explanations
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The assessment was framed treating the peak cash deposits in the assessee's bank account as unexplained cash credits under section 68, after allowing only a reasonable opening cash-in-hand of Rs. 1,00,000/-. The addition so made was subjected to tax under section 115BBE. The first appellate authority endorsed the approach, noting that under section 68, all credits require satisfactory explanation and that unsupported statements of affairs and cash flow assertions cannot discharge the assessee's onus.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Assessing Officer worked out a peak cash credit of Rs. 21,83,900/- as on 01.07.2015 from the assessee's bank statement, observing that:
* There were huge cash deposits not commensurate with the assessee's income and limited cash withdrawals.
* Many withdrawals were either cheque transfers or bearer cheque withdrawals by someone else, and thus could not explain the cash deposits.
* The assessee produced a balance sheet showing opening cash-in-hand of Rs. 26,04,762/-, but this was unsupported by any authentic books, earlier records, or audited financials.
* The assessee's declared income and savings were modest (returned income of Rs. 4,24,260/-; income from other sources of Rs. 5,45,342/-), with inevitable household expenses, rendering accumulation of over Rs. 26 lakhs in cash over prior years implausible.
* It was illogical that a person allegedly holding such large cash would simultaneously have unsecured loans of Rs. 1,26,00,000/-; this was viewed as "beyond human probability".
2.3 Based on age, income profile and prior returns, the Assessing Officer estimated a reasonable opening cash-in-hand at Rs. 1,00,000/-, treating the balance of Rs. 20,81,900/- (Rs. 21,83,900 - Rs. 1,00,000) as unexplained cash credit under section 68.
2.4 The first appellate authority affirmed this, reasoning inter alia that:
* The alleged accumulation of over Rs. 26 lakhs in cash over earlier years was unsupported by contemporaneous evidence such as audited financials, cash flow, or details of actual utilization of income or investments.
* The reliance on cumulative income and depreciation over years, without demonstrating a nexus with actual cash holdings, was speculative.
* The opening cash balance of Rs. 26,04,762/- was disclosed for the first time in the statement of affairs during assessment, unsupported by prior cash flow statements, books or audited records, and thus did not have sufficient reliability.
* The assessee, being of modest means and engaged in money lending, could not logically be shown to have held such large cash; the asserted withdrawals in FY 2014-15, not redeposited in that year but staggered as deposits in FY 2015-16, were not convincingly explained.
* The observation of minimal cash withdrawals and predominantly cheque/bearer cheque transactions, as recorded by the Assessing Officer, remained uncontroverted.
* The expression "any sum found credited in the books" necessitates satisfactory explanation of both credit and corresponding debit entries; this burden was not discharged.
* The declaration under IDS 2016 for undisclosed income for several years indicated that the assessee had persistently not declared income truthfully, undermining the credibility of his present explanations.
* No concrete details of expenses, investments in property dealing, money lending, or car renting were produced to substantiate the claimed cash flow and opening cash-in-hand.
2.5 Before the Tribunal, the assessee sought to justify availability of cash of Rs. 30,16,188/- through four components: (i) IDS declaration of Rs. 10,00,000/-; (ii) alleged cash income of Rs. 8,66,171/- for FY 2015-16; (iii) alleged cash income of Rs. 5,70,517/- for FY 2014-15; and (iv) alleged surplus withdrawals of Rs. 5,79,500/- in FY 2014-15.
2.6 The Tribunal rejected each of these claims as follows:
* IDS declaration: The IDS declaration of Rs. 10,00,000/- pertained to assessment year 2015-16, whereas the year under appeal was assessment year 2016-17. Since no funds emanating from the IDS declaration related to the relevant year, it could not serve as a source for the impugned cash deposits; the explanation was held to be "misplaced and incorrect".
* Alleged cash income for FY 2015-16: The claimed income of Rs. 8,66,171/- was not demonstrated before the Department or the Tribunal with any sustainable evidence. Mere oral submissions and explanations, without documentary support, were treated as an afterthought and a device "to cover up"; the claim was held to be incorrect and devoid of evidence.
* Alleged cash income for FY 2014-15: The claimed Rs. 5,70,517/- related to AY 2015-16 and not the relevant AY 2016-17, and was also unsupported by evidence; it remained unsubstantiated and could not explain cash deposits in the year under appeal.
* Alleged surplus withdrawals in FY 2014-15: The tabulated statement claiming surplus withdrawals of Rs. 5,79,500/- was not shown to have been filed before the Department; there was no acknowledgment, seal, stamp, or portal record evidencing its submission. No bank confirmation was produced. It related to FY 2014-15 (AY 2015-16), not the relevant year. The assessee also failed to explain why a money lender would withdraw large sums in FY 2014-15, keep them idle in cash, and redeposit them only in FY 2015-16. Accordingly, the Tribunal treated the statement as unauthenticated, misplaced and incorrect.
2.7 The Tribunal emphasized that the assessee had failed to demonstrate availability of cash of Rs. 30,16,188/-, that the opening balance of Rs. 26,04,762/- was first disclosed only during assessment without supporting records, and that no credible evidence or cogent explanation was furnished either before the subordinate authorities or before the Tribunal to reconcile the peak cash deposits with any explained sources.
Conclusions
2.8 The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to discharge the onus under section 68 to explain the nature and source of the cash deposits computed on peak credit basis.
2.9 The rejection by the Assessing Officer and the first appellate authority of the large opening cash-in-hand and other explanations (IDS declaration, alleged prior years' incomes, and earlier-year surplus withdrawals) was upheld as justified and supported by the factual record.
2.10 The addition of Rs. 20,81,900/- as unexplained cash credit under section 68, liable to tax under section 115BBE, was confirmed, and no infirmity was found in the order of the first appellate authority. The appeal was dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether uploading the show cause notice under the "Additional notices and orders" tab instead of the "Normal" tab constituted effective communication to the assessee.
1.2 Whether, in the absence of effective communication of the show cause notice and consequent lack of opportunity of hearing, the adjudication order under Section 73(9) of the WBGST Act, 2017 and the appellate order rejecting the appeal as time-barred could be sustained.
1.3 Whether, in the facts, the assessee was entitled to be relegated to the stage of filing reply to the show cause notice, and the applicability of the precedent in Sankar Agarwala.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Effective communication of show cause notice via "Additional notices and orders" tab
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court noted the settled principle that there must be an "effective communication" of a show cause notice to enable the noticee, against whom an adverse decision is contemplated, to submit a reply.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 It was undisputed that the show cause notice was uploaded under the "Additional notices and orders" tab and not under the "Normal" tab.
2.3 The Court treated such mode of uploading, in the circumstances, as insufficient to constitute effective communication, given that it prevented the assessee from becoming aware of the notice at the relevant time.
Conclusions
2.4 The Court held that there was no effective communication of the show cause notice to the petitioner, as it was uploaded under the "Additional" tab instead of the "Normal" tab.
Issue 2: Sustainability of adjudication and appellate orders in absence of effective communication and opportunity of hearing under Section 75(4) WBGST Act
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.5 Section 75(4) of the WBGST Act, 2017 provides that an opportunity of hearing shall be granted where a request is received in writing from the person chargeable with tax or penalty or where any adverse decision is contemplated against such person.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.6 On examining the show cause notice, the Court found that an adverse decision was clearly contemplated against the petitioner.
2.7 Given that there was no effective communication of the show cause notice, the petitioner was prevented by sufficient cause from filing a reply and from attending the hearing before the adjudicating authority.
2.8 The appellate authority had dismissed the appeal as time-barred on the ground that it was filed beyond the condonable period, without addressing the foundational issue that the assessee had not effectively received the show cause notice and thus had been denied a real opportunity of hearing.
Conclusions
2.9 The adjudication order under Section 73(9) and the appellate order rejecting the appeal as time-barred were held unsustainable and were set aside.
Issue 3: Relief of restoring proceedings to the stage of reply to show cause notice and applicability of precedent
Interpretation and reasoning
2.10 The Court noted that immediately after becoming aware of the adjudication order, the petitioner preferred an appeal and applied for condonation of delay, indicating bona fides and linking the delay to lack of knowledge of the show cause notice.
2.11 The Court relied on its earlier decision in Sankar Agarwala, where, in an almost identical fact situation, the orders of the original authority and appellate authority were set aside and the assessee was permitted to file a reply to the show cause notice despite the appeal having been dismissed as time-barred.
2.12 Holding that the precedent squarely applied, the Court considered it appropriate to grant a "last opportunity" to the petitioner to contest the proceedings from the stage of filing reply to the show cause notice, subject to strict conditions and timelines.
Conclusions
2.13 The writ petition was allowed.
2.14 The adjudication order dated 30 July 2024 and the appellate order dated 31 July 2025 were set aside.
2.15 The petitioner was permitted, as a last opportunity, to file a reply to the show cause notice dated 2 May 2024 within three weeks from receipt of a server copy of the Court's order, whereafter the adjudicating authority must fix a date of hearing and serve notice of hearing.
2.16 It was made explicit that if the petitioner failed to submit the reply within the stipulated period, the benefit of the Court's order would not enure to the petitioner and the writ petition would stand automatically dismissed without further reference to the Court.
2.17 No order as to costs was made.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the objections filed by the assessee to the Draft Assessment Order under Section 144C(1) of the Income Tax Act were within the prescribed period of limitation.
1.2 Whether the Dispute Resolution Panel was justified in rejecting the objections as time-barred and, consequentially, whether the Assessing Officer could validly pass the final assessment order and penalty order without awaiting or acting upon DRP directions.
1.3 Whether, in light of the statutory scheme under Section 144C and the precedents cited, the impugned assessment order, DRP order, and penalty order are liable to be quashed with consequential directions to the DRP and Assessing Officer.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Whether the objections filed by the assessee to the Draft Assessment Order under Section 144C(1) were within the prescribed period of limitation.
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The judgment proceeds on the basis of the statutory scheme under Section 144C of the Income Tax Act, as discussed and applied in earlier decisions, namely LG Soft India (P) Ltd., Open Silicon Research (P) Ltd., and INFRRD Private Limited. Under this scheme, upon receipt of a draft assessment order, an "eligible assessee" has 30 days from the date of receipt to file objections before the Dispute Resolution Panel.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Draft Assessment Order was passed on 16.03.2024 and was communicated to the assessee on 18.03.2024 as per the communication/letter dated 18.03.2024 issued by the Assessing Officer.
2.3 The assessee filed objections in Form No. 35A on 16.04.2024, which were received by the respondents through courier on the same date. The Court treats the date of communication (18.03.2024) as the starting point for computing the 30-day limitation period under Section 144C.
2.4 On these undisputed dates, the Court holds that filing on 16.04.2024 falls within the prescribed 30-day period from the date of communication of the draft order.
2.5 The Dispute Resolution Panel proceeded on the premise that the objections had not been filed within 30 days and therefore rejected them as time-barred. The Court finds this premise to be contrary to the material on record, since the objections were demonstrably filed and received within the statutory period.
Conclusion on Issue 1
2.6 The objections filed by the assessee to the Draft Assessment Order were within the prescribed 30-day limitation period, and the DRP committed an error in rejecting them as being filed beyond time.
Issue 2: Whether the DRP was justified in rejecting the objections as time-barred and, consequentially, whether the Assessing Officer could validly pass the final assessment order and penalty order without awaiting or acting upon DRP directions.
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.7 The Court refers to and applies the principles laid down in prior decisions, particularly LG Soft India (P) Ltd., Open Silicon Research (P) Ltd., and INFRRD Private Limited, which interpret Section 144C of the Income Tax Act.
2.8 From these precedents, the following statutory principles are reiterated and applied:
(a) After issuance of a Draft Assessment Order to an eligible assessee, the assessee has two alternatives: either to accept the variations or to file objections before the DRP within the stipulated time.
(b) Once objections are filed before the DRP within time, the Assessing Officer is obliged to await directions from the DRP and proceed to complete the assessment strictly in conformity with those directions, in terms of Section 144C(5)-(13).
(c) Passing of a final assessment order without awaiting DRP directions, when valid objections have been filed, is arbitrary, illegal, and without jurisdiction.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 The Court notes that the assessee's objections were filed within limitation and were in fact transferred to the concerned DRP-1, Bengaluru on 08.05.2024. Despite this, the DRP rejected the objections as time-barred, leading the Assessing Officer to treat the case as if no valid objections existed and to pass the impugned final assessment order and consequential demand and penalty.
2.10 Relying on INFRRD Private Limited, LG Soft India (P) Ltd., and Open Silicon Research (P) Ltd., the Court reiterates that once an eligible assessee files objections before the DRP within time, the Assessing Officer cannot proceed to pass a final assessment order until the DRP concludes the proceedings and issues directions. Any such final order passed in the interregnum is in violation of the mandatory procedure under Section 144C.
2.11 The rejection of the assessee's objections by the DRP on the erroneous assumption that they were time-barred vitiates the subsequent steps taken by the Assessing Officer, because those steps are premised on a legally incorrect and factually unsustainable foundation.
2.12 The Court follows the ratio of the cited precedents to hold that the Assessing Officer ought to have awaited the conclusion of DRP proceedings and could not have proceeded to pass the impugned assessment order and penalty order when timely objections had been filed.
Conclusion on Issue 2
2.13 The DRP was not justified in rejecting the assessee's objections as time-barred. Consequently, the final assessment order, demand notice, and penalty order passed without awaiting and giving effect to valid DRP proceedings are arbitrary, illegal, and without jurisdiction and are liable to be quashed.
Issue 3: Whether, in light of the statutory scheme under Section 144C and the binding precedents, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed with consequential directions to the DRP and Assessing Officer.
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.14 The Court expressly relies on and applies the principles from:
- LG Soft India (P) Ltd.: holding that once objections are filed before the DRP within the prescribed period, the Assessing Officer cannot proceed to complete the assessment without awaiting DRP directions; any such assessment is arbitrary, illegal, and without jurisdiction.
- Open Silicon Research (P) Ltd.: holding that even where there is lapse in intimation to the Assessing Officer, once objections are filed before the DRP and directions are issued, the Assessing Officer must proceed only in conformity with such directions, and failure to await or follow DRP directions vitiates the assessment.
- INFRRD Private Limited: applying the above principles to quash a final assessment order passed without awaiting DRP outcome despite timely objections, and directing the authorities to proceed only after DRP concludes the matter.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.15 Applying these principles to the facts, the Court finds that:
(a) The assessee is an eligible assessee who was served with a Draft Assessment Order under Section 144C(1).
(b) The assessee filed objections within the statutory period, thus triggering the mandatory DRP procedure under Section 144C.
(c) The DRP's rejection of these objections as time-barred is contrary to undisputed dates on record and thus erroneous.
(d) The Assessing Officer's passing of the impugned final assessment order and penalty order, without awaiting proper DRP adjudication on validly filed objections, contravenes the mandatory scheme of Section 144C as interpreted in the binding precedents.
2.16 In view of the above, and consistent with the approach adopted in INFRRD Private Limited, LG Soft India (P) Ltd., and Open Silicon Research (P) Ltd., the Court considers it just and appropriate to quash the DRP order rejecting the objections, the final assessment order, and the penalty order, and to restore the matter to the DRP stage for fresh consideration of the objections.
Conclusions on Issue 3
2.17 The impugned DRP order rejecting objections (Annexure H), the assessment order and demand notice (Annexure J), and the penalty order dated 25.08.2025 are quashed.
2.18 The jurisdictional Dispute Resolution Panel is directed to consider afresh the objections filed by the assessee to the Draft Assessment Order and to conclude the proceedings in accordance with law, after providing sufficient and reasonable opportunity and personal hearing.
2.19 Upon receipt of the DRP's directions, the Assessing Officer is directed to provide adequate opportunity and personal hearing to the assessee and to pass appropriate orders strictly in accordance with law and in conformity with the DRP's directions, as mandated by Section 144C.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether the ex-parte adjudication order passed under Section 73(9) of the CGST/KGST Act, 2017, without the petitioner's participation, warranted interference and remand to provide an additional opportunity of hearing.
(2) Whether the initiation and continuation of proceedings pursuant to the show-cause notice dated 22.05.2024 were barred by limitation under Section 73(10) of the CGST/KGST Act, in light of Government notifications extending limitation.
(3) Whether the availability of an alternative remedy of appeal under Section 107 of the CGST/KGST Act precluded the exercise of writ jurisdiction in the facts of the case.
(4) Whether, in view of the pendency of a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court concerning the validity of notifications extending limitation, the adjudication order should be set aside and the matter remitted subject to the outcome of the said proceedings, with appropriate directions on computation of limitation.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Ex-parte adjudication order and opportunity of hearing
Interpretation and reasoning
The Court noted that a show-cause notice under Section 73(1) of the CGST/KGST Act, 2017 was issued following an intimation in Form GST DRC-01A, and that the adjudication order dated 14.08.2024 under Section 73(9) read with Rule 142(5) confirmed demand, interest and penalty on an ex-parte basis as the petitioner had not replied. The petitioner contended that the notices were not received and therefore no reply/documents could be filed. The Court considered that, in these circumstances, and given subsequent developments affecting the legal foundation of the proceedings (i.e., notifications on limitation under challenge), one more opportunity ought to be afforded to the petitioner. The Court viewed that setting aside the ex-parte adjudication order and remitting the matter would enable the petitioner to file replies/documents and secure a fresh decision in accordance with law.
Conclusions
The ex-parte adjudication order was set aside and the matter remitted to the adjudicating authority to pass a fresh order after granting the petitioner an opportunity to file reply/documents and after reconsideration in accordance with law.
Issue (2): Limitation under Section 73(10) and effect of notifications extending time
Legal framework as discussed
The petitioner invoked Section 73(10) of the CGST/KGST Act to contend that the impugned proceedings initiated pursuant to the show-cause notice dated 22.05.2024 were barred by limitation. The revenue relied on Notification No. 13/2022 dated 05.07.2022 and Notification Nos. 9 and 56 of 2023 dated 31.03.2023 and 08.12.2023, respectively, to submit that the limitation period had been extended and therefore the proceedings were within time.
Interpretation and reasoning
The Court recorded the rival contentions on limitation and the reliance placed by the revenue on the aforesaid notifications extending the limitation period, and by the petitioner on Section 73(10) to contend that the proceedings were time-barred. The Court did not undertake a definitive adjudication on the correctness of either position. Instead, it noted that the validity and effect of the said notifications were the subject matter of proceedings before the Supreme Court and that the outcome of those proceedings would have a direct bearing on the issue of limitation and the impugned adjudication.
Conclusions
The Court refrained from deciding the limitation issue on merits. It held that, in view of the pendency of proceedings before the Supreme Court on the validity of the notifications extending limitation, the adjudication order should be set aside and the matter reconsidered afresh after the Supreme Court's decision, with appropriate exclusion of time for limitation purposes.
Issue (3): Maintainability of writ petition despite alternative remedy of appeal
Interpretation and reasoning
The revenue contended that an efficacious alternative remedy of appeal under Section 107 of the CGST/KGST Act was available. The petitioner argued that, since the proceedings were allegedly barred by limitation under Section 73(10) and involved questions linked to the validity and effect of limitation-extension notifications, the availability of an alternative remedy should not bar the writ petition. The Court, having regard to the nature of the challenge (including the limitation issue and the pendency of related proceedings before the Supreme Court) and the fact that the impugned order had been passed ex parte, considered it appropriate to exercise writ jurisdiction to set aside the adjudication order and remit the matter.
Conclusions
The existence of an alternative remedy under Section 107 did not preclude the Court from entertaining the writ petition in the given factual and legal context. The writ petition was allowed, and the impugned adjudication order was set aside notwithstanding the availability of an appellate remedy.
Issue (4): Effect of pendency of Supreme Court proceedings on validity of limitation-extension notifications; remand and exclusion of time
Legal framework as discussed
The Court noted that the petitioner relied upon the pendency of a Special Leave Petition (C) No. 4240/2025 before the Supreme Court, wherein the validity of the notifications extending limitation (including those referred to by the revenue) was under consideration. The Court observed that the validity of these notifications, and the Supreme Court's decision thereon, would have an impact or bearing on the impugned proceedings under Section 73.
Interpretation and reasoning
Taking note that the question of validity/effect of the notifications extending limitation was seized by the Supreme Court, the Court considered that deciding the matter finally at this stage could lead to conflicting decisions and multiplicity of proceedings. To avoid such an eventuality and to ensure consistency with the Supreme Court's ultimate pronouncement, the Court deemed it appropriate: (a) to set aside the impugned adjudication order; (b) to remit the matter to the adjudicating authority to pass a fresh order only after disposal of the said Special Leave Petition; and (c) to provide that the period between the date of the impugned order and the date of disposal of the SLP would stand excluded for the purpose of limitation.
Conclusions
(a) The impugned adjudication orders dated 14.08.2024 were set aside.
(b) The matter was remitted to the adjudicating authority to reconsider the case afresh and pass a fresh adjudication order in accordance with law after disposal of SLP (C) No. 4240/2025 by the Supreme Court.
(c) The period between 14.08.2024 and the date on which the Supreme Court disposes of SLP (C) No. 4240/2025 was directed to be excluded for the purpose of computing limitation.
Issues: (i) whether transportation of coal within or around mining areas was classifiable as mining service or as goods transport activity, (ii) whether CENVAT credit could be denied for invoice-related procedural deficiencies where receipt and use of capital goods were not disputed, and (iii) whether the demand was barred by limitation.
Issue (i): whether transportation of coal within or around mining areas was classifiable as mining service or as goods transport activity.
Analysis: The work orders and documentary material showed that the consideration was received for transportation of coal. The activity was limited to carriage of coal from the mine area to another location and did not answer the description of service in relation to mining so as to sustain classification under mining service. The cited precedent on transport of coal within mining areas supported classification under goods transport by road rather than mining service.
Conclusion: The demand confirmed under mining service was not sustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): whether CENVAT credit could be denied for invoice-related procedural deficiencies where receipt and use of capital goods were not disputed.
Analysis: The credit dispute turned on deficiencies in the invoices, but the record did not show that the capital goods were not received or were not used in the appellant's output service operations. CENVAT credit is intended to avoid cascading, and substantive entitlement cannot be denied merely for technical or procedural lapses when the underlying receipt and utilisation are established. On the facts, the denial of credit was not justified.
Conclusion: The disallowance of CENVAT credit was set aside in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): whether the demand was barred by limitation.
Analysis: The notice covered an earlier period, but the demand was substantially based on the appellant's own records and accounts, and most of the proposed demand had already been dropped at the adjudication stage. The record did not establish suppression of material facts with intent to evade tax, and the invocation of the extended period was therefore unsustainable.
Conclusion: The demand could not be sustained on limitation and was set aside in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The entire appeal succeeded, the confirmed demands were set aside, and the appellant was held entitled to consequential relief according to law.
Ratio Decidendi: Transportation of coal within a mining area is not automatically mining service if the substance of the activity is road transport, and CENVAT credit cannot be denied for mere procedural defects when receipt and use of the goods are established and no suppression justifying the extended period is proved.
Issues: (i) Whether excise duty was payable on paper taken out of RG-1 for re-packing within the factory and thereafter re-entered in RG-1 before clearance on payment of duty; (ii) whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked in the absence of suppression.
Issue (i): Whether excise duty was payable on paper taken out of RG-1 for re-packing within the factory and thereafter re-entered in RG-1 before clearance on payment of duty.
Analysis: The factual position showed that the goods remained within the factory, were duly accounted for in RG-1/DSA records, were taken out only for re-packing to meet customer requirements, were again brought back into RG-1, and were finally cleared on payment of duty. The same reasoning applied to re-packing as to re-processing, as both involved goods already treated as manufactured and properly accounted for. The Board's Circular No. 22/71-CX.6 dated 30.10.1971 recognized that defective or damaged excisable goods may be transferred within the factory for re-processing or re-conditioning without payment of duty after necessary accounting entries.
Conclusion: Excise duty was not payable on the re-packed goods merely because they were taken out of RG-1 for in-factory re-packing and later restored to RG-1 before clearance.
Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked in the absence of suppression.
Analysis: The records showed monthly intimation to the Range office and disclosure of the transactions in the monthly returns. In the absence of any material showing clandestine removal, non-accountal, or intent to evade duty, the foundation for alleging suppression was not made out. Accordingly, the conditions for invocation of the extended limitation period were not satisfied.
Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable.
Final Conclusion: The demand was unsustainable both on merits and on limitation, and the appellant was entitled to consequential relief in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: Excisable goods removed within the factory for re-packing or re-processing, when duly accounted for in statutory records and cleared after restoration to RG-1, do not attract duty in the absence of revenue loss or clandestine removal, and the extended period cannot be invoked without proof of suppression or intent to evade duty.
Issues: Whether the addition made on account of difference between purchases shown in VAT returns and purchases recorded in the books of account was justified.
Analysis: The difference arose from the different treatment of purchase returns under the Gujarat VAT regime and in the books of account. Under Rule 15 of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Rules, input tax credit had to be reversed on returned goods even where no commercial credit note was issued by the supplier, whereas the books recognised only those returns supported by actual credit notes. A supplier-wise reconciliation was furnished, and no material was brought on record to show that the purchases were bogus, non-existent, or unverifiable. The sales figures as per VAT returns and the books were accepted as matching, and the variation was negligible in relation to total purchases. In the absence of evidence of suppression of income or fictitious transactions, the mere discrepancy could not justify the addition.
Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 9,99,393/- was unsustainable and was rightly deleted, in favour of the assessee.
Ratio Decidendi: A discrepancy between statutory VAT returns and books of account, where explained by mandated input tax credit reversal and supported by reconciliation, cannot by itself sustain an addition unless the Revenue proves bogus purchases or suppression of income.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1. Whether an order in FORM GST DRC-07 increasing the interest component by suo motu rectification, following a Show Cause Notice in FORM GST DRC-01, is sustainable without affording the affected person an opportunity to file a substantive reply to the confirmed demand.
2. Whether payment of an amount earlier demanded in a prior notice (DRC-01A) and filing of intimation in FORM DRC-06 affects the validity of a subsequently issued demand (DRC-01) and the corrective order (DRC-07) where the affected person did not file a response to the subsequent notice.
3. Whether remand to the Revenue for fresh adjudication (treating the impugned order as an addendum to the Show Cause Notice) with an opportunity to file reply and documents is an appropriate remedy, and what interim consequences (including vacation of bank attachment) should follow upon compliance.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of suo motu rectification increasing interest without fresh opportunity
Legal framework: The statutory scheme governing demand and adjudication under GST contemplates issuance of a show cause notice (DRC-01), opportunity to respond, and adjudication by issuance of a demand order (DRC-07). Suo motu rectification of an earlier order which alters monetary components (such as interest) must be consistent with principles of adjudicatory fairness and the procedural safeguards provided under the GST scheme.
Precedent Treatment: No precedents were cited or applied in the judgment.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated the impugned DRC-07 (which increased interest by suo motu rectification) as requiring reassessment in the light of the absence of a substantive reply to the specific demand in DRC-01. The reasoning emphasizes that where a different demand was earlier intimated (DRC-01A) and the affected person has paid that amount, any subsequent order that confirms a different demand and increases components by rectification cannot be allowed to stand without giving the affected person an opportunity to contest or explain the variation.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - An order rectifying an earlier demand to increase interest cannot be sustained without treating the rectified order as part of the show cause proceedings and giving the taxpayer a proper opportunity to file a reply and produce documents. Obiter - Characterization of the rectification as a "typographical error" by the Revenue was noted but not accepted as determinative of the need for fresh adjudication.
Conclusion: The DRC-07 order increasing interest by suo motu rectification is not immune from review; the appropriate course is remand to permit the affected person to file a reply and for the authority to pass a fresh order on merits.
Issue 2: Effect of prior payment under DRC-01A and filing of DRC-06 when no reply was filed to later DRC-01
Legal framework: Payment made under protest or under pressure, and subsequent intimation (DRC-06) of such payment, does not necessarily preclude adjudication of a separate confirmed demand unless the payment fully covers and is intended to discharge the confirmed liability. Administrative action must still adhere to procedural fairness where differing demands exist.
Precedent Treatment: None cited.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court accepted the petitioner's factual assertion that the higher earlier payment was made under coercion/pressure and that the petitioner had relied on the earlier intimation. Given that the later DRC-01 confirmed a different (lower) demand and the petitioner did not file a reply to that notice, the Court found it equitable and legally proper to remit the matter for fresh consideration rather than sustaining the corrected order which increased interest without giving a chance to contest the confirmed demand or explain the earlier payment.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Prior payment and intimation do not obviate the requirement to afford opportunity to contest a subsequently confirmed demand; such matters warrant fresh adjudication where procedural lapses exist. Obiter - The factual finding that payment was made due to pressure is accepted for the purpose of remand; the order does not adjudicate on coercion as a general principle beyond the present facts.
Conclusion: The payment and DRC-06 intimation do not validate the later rectified demand in the absence of opportunity to reply; remand for fresh adjudication is appropriate.
Issue 3: Appropriateness of remand, treatment of rectified order as addendum, time-bound disposal, and interim relief
Legal framework: Judicial supervisory power permits remand where procedural fairness necessitates fresh consideration. Authorities must act expeditiously and in accordance with law when given an opportunity to revisit the question on receipt of a proper reply and supporting documents. Interim measures (e.g., vacating attachments) may be conditioned on compliance by the affected person.
Precedent Treatment: None cited.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court directed that the impugned order be treated as an addendum to the show cause notice, requiring the affected person to file a proper reply with documents and permitting the authority to pass a final order on merits within a specified period (preferably three months after reply/pre-deposit). The Court conditioned automatic vacation of bank attachment on compliance with the stipulations and reserved to the authority the right to proceed if the stipulations were not met, including treating non-compliance as if the writ had been dismissed in limine.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Remand with directions to treat the rectified order as part of the show cause process, to afford opportunity to reply, and to decide within a fixed time constitutes the remedy where procedural opportunity was lacking; interim relief (vacating attachment) may be granted subject to compliance. Obiter - The specified three-month period is a guideline framed for expeditious disposal and may be adjusted by the authority as necessary but should generally be adhered to.
Conclusion: Remand for fresh adjudication subject to the filing of a reply and documents is the appropriate and proportionate remedy; upon compliance, the attachment shall be vacated, and if the petitioner fails to comply, the authority may proceed to recover the demand as if the petition were dismissed.
General Observations and Directions (Ratio)
1. Procedural fairness requires that any correction or rectification that alters a monetary demand must be reflected in the show cause proceedings and the concerned party afforded an opportunity to respond.
2. Payment of amounts under earlier notices does not foreclose the need for fresh adjudication in respect of a subsequent demand that differs in amount or composition where the taxpayer was not given an opportunity to contest.
3. Where procedural infirmity is established, remand with time-bound directions to the adjudicating authority, coupled with conditional interim relief, is an appropriate judicial response to balance the rights of the Revenue and the affected person.
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Issues: Whether penalty under section 10-A of the Central Sales Tax Act was leviable where a diesel generating set, mentioned in the registration certificate as an item for use in manufacture, was purchased against form 'C' at a concessional rate and used to generate electricity for running the plant and machinery used in production.
Analysis: Penalty under section 10-A read with section 10(d) is attracted only when goods purchased for the purposes specified in section 8(3)(b), (c) or (d) are not used for the very purpose for which they were acquired without reasonable excuse. The generating set was expressly included in the registration certificate, and the only use made of it was generation of electricity for running the manufacturing plant. That use was within the contemplation of both the dealer and the assessing authority when the certificate was granted. There was no allegation of any different or unauthorised use, nor any misstatement by the dealer. The earlier decision relied upon was distinguishable because it concerned refusal to include the item in the registration certificate, not misuse after such inclusion.
Conclusion: Penalty was not leviable, and the dealer was entitled to the benefit of purchase at the concessional rate for the said generating set.
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