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Issues: (i) Whether Anti-Dumping Duty (Notification No. 16/2024-Customs (ADD) dated 27.09.2024) imposed after the date of filing into-bond warehousing bills but in force on the date of filing the ex-bond bill of entry is leviable at the time of clearance for home consumption of goods warehoused under the MOOWR scheme.
Analysis: Section 15(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 fixes the date for determination of the rate of duty for goods cleared from a warehouse under Section 68 as the date of presentation of the bill of entry for home consumption. Section 2(25) defines warehoused goods as "imported goods" until cleared for home consumption. Section 9A(8) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 applies the machinery of the Customs Act, including the date-of-determination rule, to anti-dumping duty. Judicial authorities on warehousing confirm that the tentative into-bond assessment does not freeze the duty structure and that intervening lawful changes in duty between warehousing and ex-bond clearance govern leviability. Administrative FAQs and circulars describing MOOWR as a duty-deferment scheme do not override the statutory mandate of Section 15(1)(b) and the deeming operation of Section 9A(8). The MOOWR scheme defers payment but does not convert deferment into an exemption that prevents subsequent prospective duties from applying at ex-bond clearance.
Conclusion: Notification No. 16/2024-Customs (ADD) dated 27.09.2024 is applicable to aluminium frames (CTH 7610 90 10) imported and warehoused under the MOOWR scheme between December 2023 and September 2024 if such goods are cleared for home consumption on or after 27.09.2024; the rate of duty at ex-bond clearance shall be the rate in force on the date of presentation of the bill of entry for home consumption, and this includes anti-dumping duty as well as BCD, SWS and IGST.
Issues: (i) Whether second-hand or used goods may be imported for refurbishment, re-processing, re-conditioning, re-designing, re-manufacturing, re-assembling, re-tooling, repair, software uploading, integration, testing and tooling validation; (ii) whether duty exemption under Notification No. 134/94-Customs dated 22.06.1994 can be claimed under the MOOWR scheme; (iii) what compliance is required for waste generated during the process; (iv) whether goods imported into a DTA unit for repair or refurbishment and not cleared for domestic consumption are exempt from duty; (v) whether import duty is payable on waste generated during the process; and (vi) how wastage or scrap value is to be determined.
Issue (i): Whether second-hand or used goods may be imported for refurbishment, re-processing, re-conditioning, re-designing, re-manufacturing, re-assembling, re-tooling, repair, software uploading, integration, testing and tooling validation.
Analysis: The applicable import policy permits second-hand goods for repair, refurbishing, reconditioning or re-engineering, and the exemption notification covers goods imported for repair, reconditioning, reengineering, testing, calibration or maintenance. The permissible activity must leave the goods as the same identifiable article, and the operations must not convert them into a new product with a different essential character. Manufacturing operations beyond that scope are not covered.
Conclusion: The import is permitted in principle, but only to the extent the goods remain identifiable and are not transformed into a new article; otherwise the claim fails.
Issue (ii): Whether duty exemption under Notification No. 134/94-Customs dated 22.06.1994 can be claimed under the MOOWR scheme.
Analysis: The exemption notification and the MOOWR regime operate in different fields. The notification grants duty exemption for specified repair-type activities subject to Section 65 compliance and re-export, whereas MOOWR is a duty deferment warehouse regime requiring separate warehouse licensing and permissions. The two benefits cannot be availed together for the same transaction.
Conclusion: The assessee may choose either the exemption notification route or the MOOWR route, but not both simultaneously.
Issue (iii): What compliance is required for waste generated during the process.
Analysis: Waste generated during refurbishment or related activities must be handled in accordance with the applicable environmental framework, including rules governing e-waste, battery waste, plastic waste and solid waste, along with any other applicable pollution-control requirements. Authorised disposal and proper record maintenance are required.
Conclusion: The assessee must comply with the applicable waste-management and environmental rules and ensure disposal through authorised channels.
Issue (iv): Whether goods imported into a DTA unit for repair or refurbishment and not cleared for domestic consumption are exempt from duty.
Analysis: Notification No. 134/94-Customs grants exemption to specified goods imported for repair, reconditioning, reengineering, testing, calibration or maintenance, provided the operations are carried out in accordance with Section 65 and the goods are re-exported within the stipulated period and not cleared for home consumption.
Conclusion: The goods are eligible for exemption, subject to the conditions in the notification.
Issue (v): Whether import duty is payable on waste generated during the process.
Analysis: Section 65 governs waste or refuse arising from operations on warehoused goods. If the resultant goods are exported, duty on the waste is remitted subject to destruction or duty payment on the waste itself; if cleared for home consumption, duty is charged on the quantity attributable to such waste.
Conclusion: Import duty is payable on the waste if it is not exported in the manner required.
Issue (vi): How wastage or scrap value is to be determined.
Analysis: The valuation or treatment of wastage and scrap follows the statutory framework under Section 65, which links duty treatment to whether the resultant goods are exported or cleared for home consumption and to the manner in which waste is disposed of.
Conclusion: The wastage or scrap value is to be determined under Section 65 of the Customs Act, 1962.
Final Conclusion: The ruling substantially accepts the import and exemption claims only within the limited repair or refurbishment framework, while rejecting any attempt to treat the activity as manufacturing or to combine the exemption notification with the MOOWR regime.
Ratio Decidendi: Goods imported for repair-related exemption must remain the same identifiable article and the activity must not result in a new product with a different essential character; repair exemption and MOOWR are distinct regimes and cannot be simultaneously invoked for the same import.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether "Temperature / Climatic Test Chambers" used for environmental simulation and durability testing of products are classifiable under Heading 9027, more specifically under Tariff Item 9027 89 90, as "instruments and apparatus for physical analysis - other", or under any other Heading of the Customs Tariff.
1.2 Whether the presence of additional features such as vibration testing in certain models of the Temperature Test Chambers alters their classification under Heading 9027.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Classification of Temperature / Climatic Test Chambers under Heading 9027
Legal framework
2.1 The Court referred to Rule 1 of the General Rules for Interpretation, holding that classification is to be determined according to the terms of the headings and relevant Section or Chapter Notes, and that titles are for ease of reference only.
2.2 Heading 9027 covers: "Instruments and apparatus for physical or chemical analysis (for example, polarimeters, refractometers, spectrometers, gas or smoke analysis apparatus); instruments and apparatus for measuring or checking viscosity, porosity, expansion, surface tension or the like; instruments and apparatus for measuring or checking quantities of heat, sound or light (including exposure meters); microtomes." Within this, Tariff Item 9027 89 90 is the residual sub-heading "Other".
2.3 The Court noted the General Note (I) to Chapter 90 in the HSN Explanatory Notes, which states that Chapter 90 covers a wide variety of high-precision instruments and apparatus, mainly for scientific, specialised technical or industrial purposes, including machines, instruments and appliances for testing materials.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 On the basis of the applicant's technical description, the Court found that Temperature Test Chambers are specialised equipment that artificially create and control environmental conditions (temperature, and in some models also humidity, vibration, pressure, light) in order to test the durability, performance and reliability of products, materials or components.
2.5 The Court observed that "physical analysis" involves examining or testing a substance, material, or product based on its physical properties, which can be observed, measured or tested without changing its chemical composition. Climatic / temperature chambers expose materials to controlled environmental stresses (heat, cold, moisture, etc.) to measure physical responses such as expansion, contraction, warping, cracking or loss of strength, without altering their chemical nature.
2.6 The Court held that the Temperature Test Chambers carry out testing using environmental simulation in a controlled thermal environment and, through data collected by various sensors (including high-precision psychrometric sensors) and processed via SIMPATI® software, generate graphical and statistical data to visualise temperature trends within the chamber and their impact on the specimen. The viewing window allows visual observation and analysis of the specimen's behaviour (e.g. expansion or contraction) at specific thermal levels. These features make the equipment an apparatus for physical analysis of durability, performance and reliability.
2.7 It was emphasised that Heading 9027 is not confined to small analytical instruments but extends to apparatus designed to analyse or measure the physical properties of materials or products, including machines and appliances for testing materials, as indicated by the HSN General Notes.
2.8 The Court attached weight to international interpretative materials relied on by the applicant, including EU Explanatory Notes and earlier Brussels Tariff Nomenclature and classification opinions, which recognise climatic testing cupboards/chambers and cabinets for testing behaviour of materials by reference to temperature and humidity as "instruments and apparatus for physical analysis" within Heading 9027. While treating EU materials as having only reference value, the Court found that they supported classification of climatic testing cupboards under Heading 9027.
2.9 The Court placed reliance on the decision of the Tribunal in "VDO India v. CC", which held that Climatic Test Cabinet Systems used to test the function of products during temperature variations are correctly classifiable under sub-heading 9027.80 as apparatus for physical analysis. It noted that the Tribunal rejected the argument that the goods must necessarily measure a parameter numerically to fall under Heading 9027 and recognised that the heading covers apparatus for physical analysis, including where behaviour is assessed visually.
2.10 Considering the technical functions of the goods, the wording of Heading 9027 and the explanatory materials, the Court concluded that the essential function of the Temperature Test Chambers is that of an instrument/apparatus for physical analysis, specifically testing material behaviour and product performance under controlled environmental conditions.
Conclusions
2.11 Applying GIR 1 and the HSN Explanatory Notes, the Court concluded that the subject goods, namely Temperature / Climatic Test Chambers, are squarely covered by Heading 9027 as "instruments and apparatus for physical or chemical analysis".
2.12 As there is no more specific sub-heading for such climatic / temperature test chambers within Heading 9027, they fall under the residual sub-heading 9027 89 and, more specifically, under Tariff Item 9027 89 90 ("Other") of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
Issue 2 - Effect of additional features (e.g. vibration testing) on classification
Interpretation and reasoning
2.13 The Court noted that all models/series of the Temperature Test Chambers necessarily have temperature control and environmental simulation as their core function, used for physical analysis of specimens. Certain models additionally incorporate features such as vibration testing to ensure more precise environmental simulation for particular applications (e.g. automotive, aerospace components exposed to intense vibrational forces).
2.14 The Court held that, notwithstanding such additional features, the essential character and primary function of the equipment remain that of temperature / climatic testing and physical analysis of products under controlled conditions. The vibration or other ancillary features are only supplementary and do not change the nature of the apparatus as an instrument for physical analysis.
Conclusions
2.15 The Court concluded that the presence of additional features such as vibration testing does not affect or alter the classification of the Temperature Test Chambers; all the models covered by the application, with or without such additional features, are classifiable under Heading 9027, specifically under Tariff Item 9027 89 90 of the Customs Tariff.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(a) Whether unsecured loans and related interest from a common lender, an NBFC, could be treated as unexplained cash credits under section 68 in the hands of various group entities on the basis of statements, search material and a press release alleging shell-company status.
(b) Whether, for the relevant assessment years (prior to AY 2023-24), the Assessing Officer was entitled to invoke a "source of source" requirement in respect of loans under section 68 and to treat upstream credits in the lender's bank accounts as unexplained in the borrowers' hands.
(c) Whether standalone and earlier statements of third parties and employees, without corroborative incriminating material relatable to the years under appeal, could sustain additions under section 68 in search/reassessment proceedings.
(d) Whether the allegation that the lender was a "confirmed shell company" and a "high-risk financial institution" on the basis of a Ministry of Finance / FIU press release, in the absence of any adverse SFIO proceedings or regulatory non-compliance, could by itself justify treating loans as bogus.
(e) Whether the Commissioner (Appeals), acting under section 250(4), was justified in calling for and relying upon clarificatory material from the lender and SFIO, and whether such use of enquiry power violated Rule 46A.
(f) Whether, when the same bank credits have already been brought to tax in the lender's assessments, a further addition of corresponding loans in the hands of the borrowers would amount to impermissible double taxation.
(g) Whether the subsequent repayment of loans through banking channels had evidentiary and legal impact on the sustainability of section 68 additions and the disallowance of interest.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
(a) Characterisation of loans from the NBFC-lender as unexplained cash credits under section 68
Legal framework (as discussed): Section 68 requires (i) a credit in the assessee's books, (ii) an explanation of nature and source by the assessee, and (iii) an objective opinion of the Assessing Officer, based on material, that the explanation is unsatisfactory. The onus is on the assessee to establish identity of the creditor, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transaction.
Interpretation and reasoning:
* The assessee entities received loans from a common lender, a registered NBFC. The Court recorded that, during assessment and appellate proceedings, the assessees produced:
- Confirmed copies of account,
- Bank statements of the lender,
- Audited financial statements and ITR acknowledgements of the lender,
- RBI registration/licence details, and details of substantial shareholder funds, investments (FDRs, mutual funds) and CCD investments from financially strong entities (e.g. Reliance group company).
* The Assessing Officer himself accepted a substantial part of the loans from the same lender as genuine, while treating only certain tranches as unexplained, although the factual matrix and banking pattern were identical. The Court held this "partial" approach created serious doubt about the methodology: once the lender's creditworthiness and genuineness are accepted for a part of the amount, the balance cannot be arbitrarily treated as bogus without distinct adverse material.
* The funds received by the lender, which were used to advance loans to the group, were largely established as:
- Repayments of earlier advances made by the lender to various concerns, and/or
- Monies traceable to CCDs and investments from high-net-worth, scrutinised entities (e.g. Teesta Retails, HFCL, other reputed companies), and
- In some cases, already subjected to addition in the lender's assessments under section 153C/147, with no adverse finding on its net worth.
* The Court noted that there was no evidence of cash deposits immediately preceding loan cheques/RTGS to the assessees, and that all transactions were routed through regular banking channels.
* The lender's status as a regularly assessed NBFC with long-standing high shareholder funds, continuous filing with ROC/RBI, and acceptance of its capital and investments in various completed assessments, was held sufficient to establish creditworthiness and business reality.
Conclusions:
* The assessees discharged their onus under section 68 by proving identity of the lender, its creditworthiness, and genuineness of loan transactions.
* The Assessing Officer's rejection of explanations, based merely on presumptions and selective reliance on material, was not based on proper appreciation of the record and could not be sustained.
* Additions in respect of loans from the lender under section 68 in all connected appeals were rightly deleted by the Commissioner (Appeals); the Court upheld the deletions.
(b) Applicability of "source of source" requirement for loans under section 68 for years prior to AY 2023-24
Legal framework (as discussed):
* The judgment records that Finance Act, 2022 inserted a second proviso to section 68, effective from 1 April 2023 (applicable from AY 2023-24), requiring, in case of loans/borrowings or other liabilities, that the nature and source in the hands of the creditor also be explained; with relaxation for specified regulated entities.
* Earlier jurisprudence (noted by the Court) held that the "source of source" obligation was confined to specified share capital cases from 1 April 2013, and did not extend to non-share-capital loans in the earlier regime.
Interpretation and reasoning:
* The relevant assessment years in these appeals (AYs 2019-20, 2020-21, 2021-22, 2022-23) precede the statutory extension of "source of source" to loans. Hence, in law, the assessees were only required to explain their own credits, not to conclusively establish the origin of funds in the lender's hands.
* Despite this, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the assessees, in fact, traced and tabulated each immediate credit in the lender's bank statements and demonstrated that the advances to the group were chiefly funded by:
- Repayments of earlier loans and advances granted by the lender,
- Redemption of mutual funds / FDRs, and
- Capital/CCD inflows from strong third-party investors.
* The Court held that the Assessing Officer misunderstood these incoming bank credits as fresh unexplained loans to the lender, whereas they were largely realisations of past advancements; therefore, questioning the creditworthiness of those repaying entities in the borrowers' assessments was "totally uncalled for".
Conclusions:
* For the years under appeal, there was no statutory mandate to prove "source of source" for loans under section 68; the Assessing Officer's application of this theory to borrowers' assessments was legally erroneous.
* In any event, the source of immediate credits in the lender's accounts having been satisfactorily explained, the additions could not survive even on a stricter "source of source" scrutiny.
(c) Use of statements and search material; need for incriminating, year-specific corroboration
Legal framework (as discussed):
* The Court referred to Supreme Court decisions (e.g. Singhad Education Society; Abhisar Buildwell) to underline that additions in search-based assessments must rest on incriminating material relatable to the assessment year and seized during the search, and cannot be made "dehors" incriminating material.
* It also cited multiple authorities holding that uncorroborated statements under section 132(4) or otherwise, without independent supporting evidence, are insufficient for additions.
Interpretation and reasoning:
* The additions were substantially based on:
- Statements of alleged entry operator (recorded in 2016-17 in an earlier search, years before the impugned loan transactions),
- Statements of a director of the lender recorded during subsequent search, and
- Statements of an employee of the group about cash components and role of certain persons in arranging entries.
* The Court noted:
- No incriminating documents evidencing bogus loans or cash-exchange against the specific loans under appeal were found or seized from the assessees, their directors or staff.
- The earlier statements (2016-17) pre-dated the loan years and did not refer to the assessees' impugned transactions; they were therefore not directly relatable to the assessment years in question.
- Statements of the group employee and the lender's director were contradicted or rebutted by other directors' statements, which were not fairly dealt with in the assessment order; this selectivity was characterised as impermissible "cherry-picking".
- No corroborative material (cash trails, accommodation entry ledgers, hawala registers, or seized documents tying cash receipts to specific loan cheques) was brought on record.
* The Court endorsed the Commissioner (Appeals)'s detailed finding that standalone statements, particularly when contradicted by other evidence and unsupported by seized documents, lack sufficient evidentiary value to justify additions.
Conclusions:
* In the absence of incriminating documents or corroborative evidence directly linking the impugned loans to cash or accommodation entries in the relevant years, additions could not be sustained merely on statements recorded in earlier or other proceedings.
* The reliance on such statements, without holistic evaluation of all statements and documents, was held contrary to settled law; the additions under section 68 on this basis were invalid.
(d) Allegation of "shell company" / high-risk status of the lender based on press release and FIU classification
Legal framework (as discussed):
* The Assessing Officer relied on a Ministry of Finance press release (08.06.2018) and FIU-IND classification labelling the lender as a "confirmed shell company" / "high-risk financial institution", to doubt its existence and operations.
* The Commissioner (Appeals) invoked section 250(4) to seek independent verification from SFIO, the nodal agency for serious fraud investigation, and from the lender itself.
Interpretation and reasoning:
* The SFIO, in reply to the Commissioner (Appeals), confirmed that no investigation was initiated, pending, or disposed of against the lender.
* The lender furnished details showing:
- Continuous filing of annual returns with ROC and RBI from AY 2018-19 onwards,
- No show-cause notice from ROC post the press release,
- Ongoing regulatory compliance as an NBFC.
* These enquiry findings were forwarded to the Assessing Officer for comments. Despite multiple reminders, no objection or rebuttal was filed.
* The Court accepted the Commissioner (Appeals)'s finding that:
- The generic press release only flagged certain non-compliant entities for regulatory action and did not, by itself, establish that this lender was a sham or barred from banking operations; and
- In the face of positive confirmations from SFIO and evidence of continuing statutory compliance, reliance solely on the press release/FIU label was factually and legally untenable.
Conclusions:
* The mere reference in a press release or FIU categorisation, without any live SFIO or regulatory action and in the face of regular ROC/RBI compliance, could not justify treating the lender as a shell/bogus company.
* Additions premised on this allegation were rightly rejected.
(e) Scope of Commissioner (Appeals)'s enquiry powers under section 250(4) and Rule 46A
Legal framework (as discussed):
* Section 250(4) empowers the Commissioner (Appeals) to make further enquiry or direct the Assessing Officer to make further enquiry as he thinks fit.
* Rule 46A regulates admission of additional evidence produced by the assessee but does not curtail the appellate authority's suo motu enquiry powers.
Interpretation and reasoning:
* The Commissioner (Appeals) called for information from SFIO and directly from the lender (bank accounts, ledgers, loan agreements, ITRs, audit reports, ROC/RBI filings) to verify the Assessing Officer's allegations.
* These materials were:
- Specifically requisitioned by the appellate authority under section 250(4) to clarify and carry to conclusion the factual enquiry commenced at assessment stage; and
- Duly shared with the Assessing Officer on several occasions through emails, inviting objections or comments.
* The Assessing Officer did not respond to any of these communications. The Commissioner (Appeals) thus proceeded to adjudicate on the basis of the available record and uncontroverted enquiry replies.
* The Court, relying on cited High Court and Tribunal precedents, endorsed that:
- Evidence called for and obtained by the appellate authority in exercise of section 250(4) powers is "clarificatory" and not hit by Rule 46A;
- Rule 46A constraints apply only when the assessee, on its own initiative, seeks to adduce additional evidence; they do not diminish the appellate authority's plenary fact-finding jurisdiction, which is co-terminous with that of the Assessing Officer.
Conclusions:
* There was no violation of Rule 46A; the Commissioner (Appeals) validly exercised section 250(4) powers to seek clarificatory material and provided adequate opportunity to the Assessing Officer.
* The Revenue's procedural challenge to the reliance on such enquiry material was rejected.
(f) Risk of double taxation where bank credits already taxed in lender's hands
Interpretation and reasoning:
* The record showed that, pursuant to searches, assessments in the lender's case were reopened and "whole credits" in the lender's bank statements were added under section 68/153C/147 for several years.
* The Commissioner (Appeals) examined fund-flow statements of the lender and concluded that:
- The bank credits used to fund loans to the group entities had already been made subject to addition in the lender's hands; and
- Even insofar as certain credits were notionally excluded by the Assessing Officer while computing additions in the lender's case, corresponding earlier-year credits forming the substratum had been taxed, leaving a net surplus, thus indicating potential multiple and duplicate additions of the same money.
* On this analysis, treating the identical sums once more as unexplained credits in the hands of borrowers would amount to double taxation, which is not permissible.
Conclusions:
* Once the relevant credits have been substantively taxed in the lender's assessments, the same inflows cannot again be brought to tax as unexplained loans in the borrowers' hands on mere suspicion.
* The Commissioner (Appeals)'s view that such duplication is unsustainable was affirmed.
(g) Effect of repayment of loans and consequential disallowance of interest
Interpretation and reasoning:
* It was undisputed that the assessees had repaid the loans in full, in the same or subsequent years, through banking channels. Ledger copies evidencing repayments were filed.
* No adverse findings were recorded in the years of repayment; no part of these repayments was treated as unexplained or sham.
* The Commissioner (Appeals), relying on several High Court and Supreme Court decisions, held that where loans are taken and repaid through regular banking channels, with supporting confirmations and financials, and repayments are accepted, it is inconsistent to simultaneously treat the same loans as non-genuine cash credits.
* For those cases where interest paid on the alleged bogus loans had been disallowed, the Court held that once the underlying loan is accepted as genuine and used for business, interest necessarily qualifies as deductible business expenditure.
Conclusions:
* The fact of full repayment through banking channels, without any contrary finding in repayment years, reinforced the genuineness of the loans and further undermined section 68 additions.
* Consequential disallowances of interest on such loans were unsustainable and were rightly deleted.
(h) Overall disposition of connected appeals
Interpretation and reasoning:
* The appeals of the Revenue across all group entities involved a common core issue: treatment of loans (and related interest) from the same NBFC-lender as unexplained under section 68.
* Both sides admitted that facts, reasoning of the Assessing Officer, and grounds of appeal were materially identical, differing only in quantum per entity and year. The Court, therefore, adopted the detailed reasoning in the lead case and applied it mutatis mutandis to the remaining appeals.
Conclusions:
* In all appeals, additions under section 68 in respect of loans from the NBFC-lender, and related interest disallowances, were held unsustainable and stood deleted.
* All Revenue appeals in the batch were dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether the advance ruling application was maintainable in view of a prior investigation by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence concerning the applicant's imports.
(2) What is the correct tariff classification, under the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, of cathode coated foils used in the manufacture of lithium-ion cells.
(3) What is the correct tariff classification of anode coated foils used in the manufacture of lithium-ion cells.
(4) What is the correct tariff classification of separator (microporous polymer film) used in the manufacture of lithium-ion cells.
(5) What is the correct tariff classification of LC breaker (cell-circuit protection device) used in lithium-ion cell applications.
(6) Whether the above goods, so classified, are eligible for exemption from basic customs duty as "parts, sub-parts, inputs or raw materials for use in manufacture of Lithium-ion cells" under the relevant customs exemption notification, subject to compliance with the prescribed end-use conditions and procedures.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
(1) Maintainability in light of DRI investigation
Legal framework (as discussed)
The Court considered the second proviso to Section 28-I(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, which bars admission of an advance ruling application where the "same question" of law or fact is pending or has been decided in any proceeding in the applicant's own case under the Act.
Interpretation and reasoning
The DRI Hyderabad Zonal Unit had examined the applicant's imports of parts of lithium-ion batteries with reference to the applicable rate of IGST under Notification No. 01/2017-Integrated Tax (Rate), particularly as to the proper serial number and Schedule for levy of IGST under Section 3(7) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
The Court noted that:
(a) The DRI correspondence and clarification from DRI HZU expressly confirmed that the investigation was "not about/against HSN classification of imported goods", but confined to verification of IGST rate and alleged short payment; the goods had already been treated as parts of accumulators under subheading 8507 90.
(b) The term "wrong classification" in the DRI communication was used in the context of misapplication of entries under the IGST rate notification, not as a dispute over tariff heading under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
(c) The applicant had voluntarily deposited the differential IGST and no show cause notice or adjudication on classification under the Customs Tariff Act had been initiated; no proceeding was pending on tariff classification or on customs exemption notification issues.
(d) The advance ruling application sought determination of: (i) tariff classification under the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act; and (ii) eligibility to customs exemption under a customs notification, which are distinct from determination of IGST rate entries under the GST rate notification.
On this basis, the Court distinguished between:
- "Classification" for purposes of selecting the correct HSN-based entry under the IGST rate notification (a rate issue); and
- Tariff classification under the Customs Tariff Act and eligibility to a customs exemption notification (a customs assessment/exemption issue).
As the questions before DRI and before the Authority were not identical in law or fact, the statutory bar in the second proviso to Section 28-I(2) was held inapplicable.
Conclusions
The application was held to be maintainable; no "same question" under Section 28-I(2) was pending or decided in DRI proceedings, and the Authority proceeded to rule on merits.
(2) Classification of cathode coated foil for lithium-ion cells
Legal framework (as discussed)
The Court applied General Rules for Interpretation (GRI), particularly Rule 1, and Section XVI Note 2 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975:
- Heading 8507: "Electric accumulators, including separators therefor..."; subheading 8507 90: "Parts"; 8507 90 90: "Other".
- Section XVI Note 2(b): parts suitable for use solely or principally with a particular kind of machine are to be classified with that machine, where not specifically covered by another heading under Note 2(a).
Interpretation and reasoning
The goods were described as aluminium current-collector foils uniformly coated with cathode active material (with binder and additives), imported in roll/slit form and only slit to the required width before cell assembly. The films already possessed the electrochemical properties of a cathode and were exclusively used as cathodes in lithium-ion accumulators.
The Court found:
(a) No specific tariff heading existed in Chapters 84 or 85 for such "coated electrode films." Hence, Section XVI Note 2(a) (classification in a specific heading) did not apply.
(b) The goods were engineered and dedicated for sole/principal use as cathodes in lithium-ion cells, and thus were parts suitable for use solely or principally with accumulators of heading 8507.
(c) Under Section XVI Note 2(b), such parts must be classified along with the machine, i.e., under heading 8507, and specifically as "parts" under subheading 8507 90.
(d) Within subheading 8507 90, there was no more specific eight-digit entry for cathodes other than the residual category 8507 90 90 "Other".
Conclusions
Cathode coated foils are classifiable as parts of electric accumulators under tariff item 8507 90 90.
(3) Classification of anode coated foil for lithium-ion cells
Legal framework (as discussed)
The Court considered:
- Heading 8545: "Carbon electrodes, carbon brushes, lamp carbons, battery carbons and other articles of graphite or other carbon, with or without metal, of a kind used for electrical purposes"; subheading 8545 19 00 (other electrodes).
- Heading 8507 and Section XVI Note 2 (particularly Note 2(b)).
- HSN Explanatory Notes to headings 8507 and 8545, and the general principles that parts suitable solely/principally for a given machine are to be classified with that machine, where no specific heading under Note 2(a) exists.
Interpretation and reasoning
The goods were copper foils coated with graphite-based anode active material (about 74% graphite, 26% copper), imported in rolls, then only slit to required width and used exclusively as negative electrodes (anodes) in lithium-ion cells.
The applicant argued for classification under heading 8545 19 00 as graphite electrodes based on predominant graphite content and HSN Note descriptions of carbon electrodes.
The Court, considering both the applicant's submissions and the Commissionerate's view, reasoned that:
(a) Heading 8545 covers generic "articles of graphite or other carbon" of a kind used for electrical purposes, such as furnace electrodes, carbon brushes, lamp carbons, and conventional battery carbons, not highly specialised, machine-specific accumulator electrodes integrated on metal current collectors.
(b) The anode coated foil is a sophisticated copper foil carrying active anode material, designed and manufactured exclusively for use as the negative electrode in lithium-ion accumulators. It is not a mere generic carbon article of heading 8545.
(c) There is no dedicated tariff heading in Chapters 84 or 85 specifically covering such lithium-ion anode-coated foils; hence Note 2(a) is inapplicable.
(d) In substance and in use, the goods are parts suitable for use solely or principally with lithium-ion accumulators of heading 8507. Under Section XVI Note 2(b), they must be classified with that machine.
(e) HSN Explanatory Notes to heading 8507 also recognise electrodes as parts of accumulators, supporting classification as accumulator parts rather than generic carbon electrodes.
Conclusions
Anode coated foils are classifiable as parts of electric accumulators under tariff item 8507 90 90, and not under heading 8545.
(4) Classification of separator (microporous polymer film) for lithium-ion cells
Legal framework (as discussed)
The Court considered:
- Heading 8507, subheading 8507 90 10: "Accumulator cases made of hard rubber and separators".
- Possible competing heading 3921 for other plastic films.
- Section XVI Note 2(a) and (b).
- HSN Explanatory Notes to heading 8507, which recognise separators, including those in roll form merely cut into rectangles and meeting precise technical specifications, as accumulator parts.
Interpretation and reasoning
The goods were microporous separator films comprising polyethylene, boehmite and PVDF, imported in jumbo rolls, then slit to required width and used to separate anode and cathode in lithium-ion cells, allowing ion transport while preventing electrical short-circuits. They are purpose-built for accumulator use and critical for cell safety and function.
The Court found:
(a) The product is not a generic plastic film of heading 3921; its essential character lies in its specific electrochemical function as a separator in accumulators.
(b) No specific heading in Chapters 84 or 85, other than those for accumulator parts, covers such specialised separators; thus, Note 2(a) does not divert classification away from parts of accumulators.
(c) The goods are suitable for use solely/principally with lithium-ion accumulators of heading 8507; therefore, under Section XVI Note 2(b), they must be classified with the machine.
(d) The tariff itself provides a specific subheading 8507 90 10 for "Accumulator cases made of hard rubber and separators." The wording is broad; while "cases" are restricted to hard rubber, there is no material limitation for "separators". Hence, separators of other materials, including polymeric films, are covered.
(e) HSN Explanatory Notes and the cited tribunal decisions (Exide Industries Ltd.; Amara Raja Batteries Ltd.) support treating separators in roll form as accumulator parts under heading 8507, provided they meet technical specifications and are ready for use as separators after simple cutting/slitting.
Conclusions
Separator microporous films are classifiable as accumulator separators under tariff item 8507 90 10.
(5) Classification of LC breaker (cell-circuit protection device)
Legal framework (as discussed)
The Court considered:
- Heading 8536: "Electrical apparatus for switching or protecting electrical circuits... for a voltage not exceeding 1,000 volts"; subheading 8536 30 00: "Other apparatus for protecting electrical circuits".
- Heading 8507 (electric accumulators and parts thereof).
- HSN Explanatory Notes to heading 8536, which include circuit-protective apparatus (including thermal and over-current protection devices).
Interpretation and reasoning
The LC breaker was described as a protective electrical device used in secondary-cell circuits to interrupt current under abnormal thermal or over-current conditions. It is an active, independent apparatus operating in low-voltage circuits, providing safety protection.
The Court reasoned that:
(a) The essential function of the LC breaker is protection of electrical circuits, not electrochemical energy storage.
(b) Heading 8507 is confined to accumulators and their inherent electrochemical/mechanical parts (electrodes, separators, cases etc.) and does not extend to separate, active electrical-protection apparatus.
(c) The LC breaker is an electrical apparatus of the kind described in heading 8536: it protects circuits for voltages not exceeding 1,000 V.
(d) It is not specifically described under subheadings for "fuses" or "automatic circuit breakers"; it therefore falls under the residual protective category in 8536 30 00 "Other apparatus for protecting electrical circuits".
(e) By GRI 1 and the text of heading 8536, classification under 8536 30 00 best reflects the product's nature and function.
Conclusions
The LC breaker is classifiable under tariff item 8536 30 00 as "other apparatus for protecting electrical circuits" and not as a part of accumulators under heading 8507.
(6) Eligibility for exemption as parts/inputs for manufacture of lithium-ion cells
Legal framework (as discussed)
The Court examined:
- Earlier Serial No. 523A of Notification No. 50/2017-Cus. and its supersession by Notification No. 45/2025-Customs dated 24.10.2025.
- Serial No. 314 of Notification No. 45/2025-Customs: providing "NIL" BCD to "Parts, sub-parts, inputs or raw materials for use in the manufacture of Lithium-ion cells falling under tariff item 8507 60 00", applicable to goods "of any chapter", subject to:
* Compliance with Condition No. 3 - following the Customs (Import of Goods at Concessional Rate of Duty or for Specified End Use) Rules, 2022 (IGCR, 2022); and
* A sunset clause that the exemption has no effect after 31 March 2026.
- The principle laid down in Commissioner of Customs v. Rupa & Co. Ltd., that while exemption notifications are to be construed strictly, interpretation should not defeat the object and purpose of the exemption.
Interpretation and reasoning
The Court noted that:
(a) All four products-cathode coated foils, anode coated foils, separator films, and LC breakers-are inputs/components directly used in the manufacture of lithium-ion cells classifiable under 8507 60 00.
(b) The first three items are core electrochemical parts of the cell architecture; the LC breaker forms part of the protection circuitry at cell level. All fall within the broad functional description "parts, sub-parts, inputs or raw materials for use in the manufacture of Lithium-ion cells".
(c) The exemption entry is chapter-neutral; tariff classification does not restrict eligibility so long as the goods are used in manufacturing lithium-ion cells of tariff item 8507 60 00 and IGCR procedural conditions are followed.
(d) Having classified the goods as 8507 90 90 (cathode coated foil), 8507 90 90 (anode coated foil), 8507 90 10 (separators), and 8536 30 00 (LC breaker), none is excluded by the wording of Serial No. 314, which explicitly extends to goods "of any chapter".
(e) In line with the principle in Rupa & Co. Ltd., an interpretation that recognises all functionally indispensable inputs in lithium-ion cell manufacture is consistent with the evident objective of incentivising domestic production of such cells.
(f) The exemption remains conditional: the importer must comply with IGCR, 2022 procedures and end-use must be verified to be in manufacture of lithium-ion cells (8507 60 00); further, the benefit is time-bound till 31 March 2026.
Conclusions
(a) Cathode coated foils (8507 90 90), anode coated foils (8507 90 90), separator films (8507 90 10), and LC breakers (8536 30 00) are all "parts, sub-parts, inputs or raw materials for use in manufacture of Lithium-ion cells falling under tariff item 8507 60 00" within the meaning of Serial No. 314 of Notification No. 45/2025-Customs.
(b) These goods are eligible for "NIL" basic customs duty under Serial No. 314, subject to:
* strict compliance with Condition No. 3 (IGCR Rules, 2022);
* verification of actual end-use in manufacture of lithium-ion cells classifiable under 8507 60 00; and
* the exemption being effective only up to 31 March 2026.
Issues: (i) Whether the imported diagnostic kits were classifiable under tariff item 38221990 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975; (ii) whether the kits were entitled to exemption from basic customs duty under the relevant exemption entries for Bovine Albumin / Bovine Serum Albumin.
Issue (i): Whether the imported diagnostic kits were classifiable under tariff item 38221990 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
Analysis: The goods were examined as laboratory reagents put up in kit form. Applying Rule 1 of the General Rules for the Interpretation of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, the heading covering diagnostic or laboratory reagents put up as kits was found to be more specific than the residuary or other reference material heading. The materials on record also showed that the products were not certified reference materials, as the necessary certificate of reference and degree of certainty was absent. The earlier classification under the residuary heading was treated as an error and could be corrected prospectively.
Conclusion: The kits are classifiable under tariff item 38221990, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the kits were entitled to exemption from basic customs duty under the relevant exemption entries for Bovine Albumin / Bovine Serum Albumin.
Analysis: The exemption entries were construed strictly. The relevant notification exempted the specified item of Bovine Albumin as such and did not extend the benefit to composite diagnostic kits merely because they contained Bovine Albumin as one of several constituents. The listing of particular diagnostic kits in the notification showed that only expressly enumerated goods were intended to receive exemption. The precedent relied upon by the applicant was held inapplicable because that case involved goods whose active and principal ingredient was the exempted substance itself.
Conclusion: The kits are not eligible for the exemption, in favour of the Revenue.
Final Conclusion: The ruling grants classification relief to the applicant but rejects the claimed customs duty exemption, so the substantive outcome is mixed.
Ratio Decidendi: For customs classification, the most specific tariff entry that directly describes the goods prevails over a residuary entry, and an exemption notification must be applied strictly to the exact item described, not extended by implication to a composite product that merely contains the named ingredient.
Issues: Whether the show cause notice and consequential demand for recovery of Cenvat credit were barred by limitation, the department having invoked the extended period under Section 11A(4) of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
Analysis: The assessee had informed the jurisdictional officers in November 2016 about completion of the exemption period, availment of Cenvat credit, and the details of credit reflected in returns. The record also contained the contemporaneous correspondence and a Chartered Accountant's certificate supporting the credit availment. In these circumstances, the facts giving rise to the dispute were already within the department's knowledge in November 2016. For invocation of the extended period, the department was required to establish the existence of fraud, wilful misstatement, collusion, or suppression with intent to evade duty. That burden was not discharged. Since issuance of notice within the normal period is the rule and invocation of the extended period is the exception, the demand could not be sustained.
Conclusion: The show cause notice was time-barred and the demand under the extended limitation period was unsustainable; the finding is in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal succeeded on the ground of limitation.
Ratio Decidendi: The extended period of limitation under Section 11A(4) cannot be invoked unless the department proves the requisite elements justifying such invocation, and prior knowledge of the material facts defeats a time-barred demand.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the Tribunal was justified in deleting the addition of a receipt treated as income under section 56 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
1.2 Whether a gift can be validly made by one incorporated company to another, and consequently whether the deleted addition on that footing was justified.
1.3 Whether questions relating to taxability under section 28(iv) and inclusion of the receipt in book profits under section 115JB raised any substantial question of law.
1.4 Whether additional questions of law involving allegations of use of a shell company, lifting the corporate veil, application of the McDowell anti-avoidance principle, and reopening of individual assessments could be framed in an appeal under section 260A when no foundational facts for such questions were laid before the Tribunal.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Deletion of addition under section 56 and validity of gift between incorporated companies
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.1 The Court noted that the Tribunal had deleted the addition of Rs. 87,15,95,326/- following its own earlier decision in the assessee's case for a prior assessment year, where a similar receipt characterized by the Revenue as not being a permissible "gift" between companies had been treated as non-taxable.
2.1.2 The Revenue's proposed substantial questions of law A to D essentially challenged (i) the non-taxability of the receipt as income within section 2(24), and (ii) the Tribunal's acceptance of the transaction as a "gift" between companies, contending that a company cannot, in law, make a gift to another company.
2.1.3 The Court reformulated and admitted only two substantial questions of law: (A) whether the Tribunal was justified in law in deleting the addition of Rs. 87,15,95,326/-, and (B) whether the Tribunal was justified in deleting the addition without appreciating the Revenue's case that a gift cannot be made by an incorporated company, holding that the Revenue's original questions C and D were subsumed within these two.
Conclusions
2.1.4 The Appeal was admitted only on two substantial questions of law concerning (i) the justification of the deletion of the addition, and (ii) the legal possibility of a gift between incorporated companies. Questions C and D as framed by the Revenue were not separately entertained as they were covered by these two admitted questions.
2.2 Taxability under section 28(iv) and inclusion in book profit under section 115JB
Legal framework
2.2.1 The Court referred to section 28(iv) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, concerning taxation of benefits arising from business, and section 115JB regarding computation of book profit for minimum alternate tax.
2.2.2 The Court also referred to the Supreme Court decisions in CIT v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. (404 ITR 1) and Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. CIT (255 ITR 273).
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2.3 With respect to the question whether the receipt was taxable under section 28(iv) (Revenue's question E), the Court observed that, in an earlier appeal involving the same assessee and similar issues, counsel for the Revenue had conceded that the issue stood concluded against the Revenue by the decision of the Supreme Court in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd.; consequently, that question had not been entertained in the earlier appeal.
2.2.4 Applying the same reasoning, the Court held in the present matter that the issue raised in question E was squarely covered by Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd., did not give rise to any substantial question of law, and therefore could not be entertained.
2.2.5 As to the inclusion of the receipt in book profit under section 115JB (Revenue's question F), the Court noted that the same issue had been raised in the earlier appeal and that the Revenue had then fairly stated that it was concluded against the Revenue by the Supreme Court in Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. CIT. On that basis, the Court had refused to entertain the question in the earlier appeal.
2.2.6 The Court held that, in the present appeal as well, question F stood answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee by Apollo Tyres Ltd., and therefore did not give rise to any substantial question of law.
Conclusions
2.2.7 Questions relating to taxability of the receipt under section 28(iv) and to its inclusion in book profits under section 115JB did not give rise to any substantial question of law in view of binding Supreme Court precedents in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. and Apollo Tyres Ltd., and were therefore not entertained.
2.3 Competence to raise additional questions of law based on new factual foundations in an appeal under section 260A
Legal framework
2.3.1 The Court proceeded on the settled principle, as laid down in earlier decisions including CIT v. Tata Chemicals Ltd. (256 ITR 395) and CIT v. Smt. Lata Shantilal Shah (323 ITR 297), that a question which does not arise from the order of the Tribunal cannot be made the subject matter of an appeal under section 260A of the Income Tax Act.
2.3.2 The Court reiterated that the Tribunal is the last fact-finding authority and that substantial questions of law before the High Court must arise from the facts as found or placed before the Tribunal. If findings are contrary to the record, perversity may itself raise a substantial question of law, but new factual foundations cannot be introduced for the first time in a section 260A appeal.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3.3 The Revenue sought to frame additional questions of law alleging, inter alia, that the assessee was a shell company and a mere vehicle for transferring money to its shareholders; that the so-called gifts were actually monies received by those shareholders; that the anti-avoidance principles in McDowell & Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer (154 ITR 148) should apply; that the corporate veil should be lifted and the sums taxed in the hands of the individuals under section 56(2); and that individual assessments should be reopened under section 150.
2.3.4 The Court examined the orders of the Assessing Officer, the Commissioner (Appeals), and the Tribunal, and found that at no stage had the Revenue contended that the assessee was a shell company, that the amounts from Kardam Commercial Pvt. Ltd. were actually for the benefit of the shareholders, or that the arrangements constituted a device to evade tax.
2.3.5 On the contrary, the Court observed that the consistent stand of the Revenue throughout was that the money received by the assessee from Kardam Commercial Pvt. Ltd. was taxable in the hands of the assessee company itself on the ground that one company cannot give a gift to another, and therefore the receipts were income under section 56 in the hands of the assessee.
2.3.6 The Court held that permitting the additional questions would require bringing in new facts and laying a fresh factual foundation at the High Court stage, which is "wholly impermissible" in an appeal under section 260A, as such questions do not arise from the Tribunal's order and are not based on findings or material considered by the Tribunal.
Conclusions
2.3.7 The additional questions of law proposed by the Revenue, based on allegations of shell company, routing of funds to shareholders, application of McDowell, lifting the corporate veil, taxing shareholders under section 56(2), and reopening of individual assessments under section 150, were held not to arise from the Tribunal's order, lacked foundational facts before the Tribunal, and therefore could not be framed or entertained in the present appeal under section 260A.
2.3.8 The appeal was confined to the two substantial questions of law earlier formulated and admitted by the Court, and directions were issued to the Registry to communicate the order to the Tribunal to keep the records available.
Issues: (i) whether the bail granted to the accused should be cancelled; (ii) whether the condition restricting the accused to the city of Kolkata after release on bail should be modified; (iii) whether delay in presenting the modification application should be condoned.
Issue (i): whether the bail granted to the accused should be cancelled.
Analysis: Cancellation of bail requires a demonstrated breach of bail conditions or circumstances showing that continued liberty would imperil the trial. The application was founded mainly on apprehensions of influence over witnesses and alleged hostility in the prosecution evidence, but no conclusive material established that the accused had breached the terms of bail or that cancellation had become necessary at the then stage of trial. The Court also noted the progress already made in the trial.
Conclusion: The prayer for cancellation of bail was rejected.
Issue (ii): whether the condition restricting the accused to the city of Kolkata after release on bail should be modified.
Analysis: A condition imposed while granting bail can be altered only on a substantial change in circumstances or where the restraint is shown to be unjustified. The Court held that the restrictive condition was part of the careful balance struck while enlarging the accused on bail, and no significant fresh circumstance had been shown to justify relaxation. The Court also accepted that the condition continued to serve the concern of witness protection and the integrity of the trial.
Conclusion: The prayer for modification of the bail condition was rejected.
Issue (iii): whether delay in presenting the modification application should be condoned.
Analysis: The delay related only to the presentation of the modification application and no prejudice was shown from condoning it.
Conclusion: The delay was condoned.
Final Conclusion: The criminal applications were finally disposed of by declining cancellation of bail and refusal to relax the bail restraint, while granting condonation of delay in the modification matter and leaving the trial court free to proceed in accordance with law.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether 18% GST is applicable on the services forming the subject-matter of the tender and, if so, how that affects bid evaluation.
1.2 Whether the tendering authority violated the tender conditions, particularly Annexure 9, Clause 6 and the "Method of Tender Evaluation and Price Comparison", by treating the successful bidder's quoted price as inclusive of GST and accepting an indemnity bond.
1.3 Whether the tender process and award decision were arbitrary, unfair, mala fide or otherwise vitiated, warranting interference in judicial review despite the limited scope of intervention in tender matters.
1.4 Whether, assuming infirmities in the tender process, the Court ought to set aside the award considering the stage of contract performance and public interest.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Applicability of 18% GST on the tendered services and its relevance
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Court noted that the tendering authority sought a specific clarification from the GST Department by letter dated 21.03.2025 on applicability of GST to the services in question.
2.2 The GST Department, by letter dated 25.03.2025, clarified that under Notification No. 11/2017 (Central Tax Rate) dated 28.06.2017, 18% GST is chargeable on "Human Health & Social Care Services".
2.3 The Court held that the services under the tender, being NAT testing and related services, fall within "Human Health and Social Care Services" and therefore attract GST at 18%.
2.4 The contrary position urged on the basis of Notification No. 12/2017 - Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 was not examined substantively, as the Court relied on the contemporaneous departmental clarification from the GST authority and was not called upon to adjudicate upon the correctness of that notification or the clarification itself.
Conclusions
2.5 The Court concluded that 18% GST is applicable to the services forming the subject of the tender, and answered the issue of chargeability of GST in the affirmative.
Issue 2 - Whether the tendering authority violated tender conditions by treating the successful bidder's price as inclusive of GST and accepting an indemnity bond
Legal framework discussed
2.6 Annexure 9 (Price Bid) required bidders to indicate: (a) "Rate per reportable test (without GST)" (Column D), (b) "% GST" (Column E), (c) "Final reportable test (including GST) in Rs." (Column F), and (d) "Total amount during contract (including GST)" (Column G = C × F). The note specified that L1 would be selected on the basis of the grand total of Column G.
2.7 Clause II (Taxes & Duties) of the tender provided that prices "shall be inclusive of all taxes & duties leviable including GST and Entry tax etc. and the Purchaser shall not be liable for the same" [sub-clause (ii)], and that if tax rates change during performance, an equitable adjustment to the contract price would be made [sub-clause (iv)].
2.8 Clause IV(xvi) (Price Negotiation) of the General Terms and Conditions permitted negotiations with the lowest quoted technically qualified bidder (L1) in exceptional circumstances, with prior approval of the competent authority.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 The Court accepted that Annexure 9 is an integral and relevant part of the tender, and that all fields (including indication of GST) are material for price comparison.
2.10 It was undisputed that the successful bidder did not specify, in Annexure 9, whether Rs. 945/- CPRT was with or without GST, and indicated 0% GST, whereas the other bidder quoted CPRT, GST at 18% and the corresponding total.
2.11 The Court observed that at the time of tender issuance, the tendering authority itself was evidently uncertain about the GST position, which led to divergent stands by the two bidders on applicability of GST and to the subsequent reference to the GST Department.
2.12 On harmonising Annexure 9 with Clause II, the Court held that while Annexure 9 requires separate disclosure of CPRT without and with GST, Clause II(ii) clearly mandates that quoted prices are to be "inclusive of all taxes & duties including GST" and that the purchaser has no liability for such taxes.
2.13 The Court reasoned that Clause II(ii) must be given its plain and natural meaning; otherwise, it would be rendered otiose. Reading the tender conditions harmoniously, the Court held that the tendering authority was entitled to treat quoted prices as inclusive of GST and to evaluate bids on that basis.
2.14 In this light, the tendering authority's decision to treat the successful bidder's quoted CPRT of Rs. 945/- as inclusive of GST at 18% and to protect itself by obtaining an indemnity bond was considered to be within the contractual framework and commercial discretion of the authority.
2.15 The Court recognised that the indemnity bond was likely sought to safeguard the purchaser in view of Clause II and the GST clarification, and held that calling for such a bond did not, by itself, render the process arbitrary or perverse.
Conclusions
2.16 The Court held that, although Annexure 9 required explicit indication of GST, the overriding stipulation in Clause II(ii) permitting consideration of prices inclusive of GST justified the tendering authority's approach.
2.17 The award of the contract to the successful bidder on the footing that its quoted price was inclusive of 18% GST, coupled with an indemnity bond, was not found to be in violation of the tender conditions so as to warrant judicial interference.
Issue 3 - Alleged arbitrariness/unfairness in the tender process and scope of judicial review
Legal framework discussed
2.18 The Court referred to principles laid down in decisions on judicial review of tenders, including that: (a) tender processes are primarily commercial decisions of the State; (b) interference is limited to cases of arbitrariness, irrationality, mala fides, bias or violation of mandatory norms; and (c) there is no absolute obligation to accept the lowest bid, provided the decision is fair and reasonable.
2.19 The Court reiterated the tests from prior judgments that judicial review is confined to examining whether the process adopted or decision made is mala fide, intended to favour someone, or so arbitrary and irrational that no responsible authority could have reached it, and whether public interest is adversely affected.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.20 The Court noted the existence of multiple committees (pre-bid clarification, prequalification, technical evaluation, and price bid evaluation) as indicative of an institutional process, but did not treat this alone as conclusively negating arbitrariness.
2.21 The Court accepted that once the GST Department clarified that 18% GST was applicable, the tendering authority knew that both bidders would be subject to GST at the same rate. In such circumstances, fairness required that both bidders be treated even-handedly, including in any further clarification or price negotiation.
2.22 The Court held that the tendering authority, after receiving the GST clarification, ought to have called both bidders for further clarification or negotiations, especially in view of Clause IV(xvi) providing for negotiations with the L1 bidder in exceptional circumstances. Restricting the indemnity arrangement to only one bidder without extending a comparable opportunity to the other was viewed as falling short of ideal fairness and transparency.
2.23 The Court regarded Annexure 9 as materially relevant, and noted as a "disturbing feature" that the successful bidder had not clearly stated whether its quote was inclusive of GST, yet its bid was regularised through the indemnity mechanism without parallel engagement with the other bidder.
2.24 The Court also took serious note of the incorrect instructions furnished to the Court earlier, where it was represented that services at both hospitals had commenced on 30.03.2025, while the record showed that installation and commencement at one hospital occurred only at the end of April 2025. The Court characterised this as falling within the doctrine of "suppressio veri suggestio falsi" and expressly deprecated such conduct, though it stopped short of initiating contempt proceedings.
2.25 At the same time, the Court found no conclusive material to hold that the process was tainted by mala fides or that the decision to award the contract to the successful bidder was so irrational or arbitrary as to be unsustainable in law.
Conclusions
2.26 The Court held that while the tendering authority's conduct displayed procedural lapses and lack of ideal fairness (particularly in not engaging both bidders equally post-GST clarification and in furnishing incorrect instructions to the Court), these did not cumulatively establish mala fides, bias, or such arbitrariness as would vitiate the entire tender process under the limited scope of judicial review.
2.27 Consequently, the tender award was not set aside on grounds of arbitrariness or unfairness, though the Court admonished the authority's conduct and emphasised the binding necessity of fairness and transparency in public tenders.
Issue 4 - Whether the contract should be quashed despite identified infirmities, in light of public interest and stage of performance
Interpretation and reasoning
2.28 The Court was informed that the contract period was one year, that services under the tender had been performed by the successful bidder since April 2025, and that the contract was due to end around March-April 2026.
2.29 The Court recognised that setting aside the award at that stage would cause significant disruption to ongoing NAT testing services in public hospitals and adversely affect public interest, which is of paramount importance in matters involving essential health services.
2.30 The Court also considered that the price difference between the two bidders was marginal in overall terms and that there was no challenge to the technical capability or performance standards of the successful bidder.
Conclusions
2.31 Weighing the identified procedural shortcomings against the advanced stage of contract performance and the potential disruption to public health services, the Court declined to interdict the contract.
2.32 The writ petition was dismissed, without costs, and the contract in favour of the successful bidder was allowed to continue until its natural expiry, with the Court's admonition to the tendering authority to adhere strictly to fairness, transparency and accuracy in future tender processes.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, for Assessment Year 2006-07, disallowance under section 14A could be validly computed by applying Rule 8D of the Income Tax Rules, 1962.
1.2 Whether the Tribunal was justified in setting aside the order of the first appellate authority and remanding the matter to the Assessing Officer with a direction that the disallowance under section 14A, if any, should not exceed 5% of the exempt income.
1.3 Whether the questions proposed by the Revenue raised any substantial question of law warranting interference by the Court in second appeal.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Applicability of Rule 8D for Assessment Year 2006-07 in making disallowance under section 14A
Legal framework
2.1.1 The Court noted that the Assessing Officer had applied Rule 8D for computing disallowance under section 14A for Assessment Year 2006-07.
2.1.2 The Court referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax 5, Mumbai v. Essar Teleholdings Ltd., wherein it was held that Rule 8D is prospective in operation and cannot be applied to assessment years prior to Assessment Year 2008-09.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.3 The Court observed that Assessment Year 2006-07 precedes Assessment Year 2008-09 and, therefore, the Assessing Officer could not have invoked Rule 8D for this year.
2.1.4 Since the disallowance sustained by the first appellate authority proceeded on the basis of the disallowance originally computed by the Assessing Officer under Rule 8D, the foundation of the Revenue's computation was itself contrary to the legal position clarified by the Supreme Court.
Conclusions
2.1.5 Rule 8D is not applicable to Assessment Year 2006-07, and the Assessing Officer's action in applying Rule 8D for that year was impermissible in law.
2.2 Justification for Tribunal's direction to remand and cap disallowance at 5% of exempt income
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2.1 The Tribunal noted that in Assessment Year 2004-05, in the assessee's own case and under similar circumstances, the first appellate authority had restricted the disallowance of expenditure relating to exempt income to 5%, and that order had been accepted by the Assessing Officer without further appeal.
2.2.2 The Tribunal, relying on that earlier year and other decisions of the Court holding 5% to be a reasonable basis for disallowance, set aside the order of the first appellate authority and remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer to freshly evaluate the assessee's plea, with a direction that the disallowance, if any, should not exceed 5% of the exempt income.
2.2.3 The Court endorsed this approach, noting that in the absence of applicability of Rule 8D, and considering prior acceptance of a 5% disallowance in the assessee's own case as well as several judgments treating 5% as reasonable, the Tribunal's direction was justified.
Conclusions
2.2.4 The Tribunal was justified in remanding the matter to the Assessing Officer to re-evaluate the assessee's claim under section 14A, with a ceiling that any disallowance should not exceed 5% of the exempt income.
2.3 Existence of substantial question of law in Revenue's appeal
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3.1 The Revenue's questions challenged the Tribunal's direction to limit the disallowance to 5% of exempt income and relied on a CBDT Circular and the Supreme Court's decision in Maxopp Investment Ltd. to support a broader application of the principle of apportionment.
2.3.2 The Court held that once it is accepted, in light of Essar Teleholdings Ltd., that Rule 8D could not be applied to the relevant assessment year, the basis of the Revenue's challenge falls away.
2.3.3 In that view, the Tribunal's order, being consistent with binding precedent on the prospective operation of Rule 8D and with prior decisions treating 5% as a reasonable disallowance, did not give rise to any substantial question of law.
2.3.4 The Court observed that, having found no substantial question of law arising from the first proposed question, the second proposed question, which was dependent on the first, also did not survive for consideration.
Conclusions
2.3.5 No substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's order, and the appeal by the Revenue was liable to be dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether continued detention of the seized gold chain is permissible in the absence of issuance of a show cause notice within the time prescribed under Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, or any valid extension thereof.
1.2 Consequential directions and conditions, if any, for release of the seized gold chain upon holding the continued detention to be impermissible.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Legality of continued detention of the seized gold chain in absence of show cause notice within the statutory period
Legal framework
2.1 The Court considered Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, which prescribes a six-month period from the date of seizure for issuance of notice under clause (a) of Section 124, extendable by the Principal Commissioner/Commissioner for a further period not exceeding six months, with reasons recorded in writing and intimation to the person from whom goods were seized.
2.2 The Court relied on the dictum of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3489/2024, which held that: (i) the only power to extend the time period is as per the first proviso to Section 110(2); (ii) release under Section 110A is merely interim and does not affect the mandatory consequence flowing from non-issuance of notice within the period under Section 110(2); and (iii) if no notice is issued within the original or validly extended period, the consequence is that the goods shall be returned to the person from whose possession they were seized.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court noted that the gold chain was detained on 17 January 2024 and that no show cause notice had been issued till the date of decision.
2.4 It was observed that there was also no material before the Court to show that the period under Section 110(2) had been validly extended by the competent authority in the manner prescribed, i.e., by recording reasons in writing and informing the person concerned before expiry of the initial six-month period.
2.5 The Court held that in view of the Supreme Court's interpretation, the time period to issue notice under clause (a) of Section 124 is governed by Section 110(2), and that this time prescription is mandatory in relation to the consequence of seizure and continued detention, irrespective of the distinct field in which Section 124 operates.
2.6 The Court found that more than one year had elapsed from the date of seizure; consequently, even the maximum extendable period under the first proviso to Section 110(2) stood exhausted, and no show cause notice could be issued at that stage for purposes of sustaining the seizure.
2.7 Applying the binding precedent, the Court held that continued detention of the seized gold chain in such circumstances is impermissible and that the goods are liable to be released to the person from whose possession they were seized.
Conclusions
2.8 The Court concluded that, as no show cause notice was issued within six months of seizure nor any valid extension granted within the statutory framework of Section 110(2), and the one-year outer limit had elapsed, the seized gold chain must be released to the petitioner.
Issue 2: Conditions and modalities for release of the seized gold chain
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 Having held that the continued detention was illegal and that the gold chain must be released, the Court proceeded to structure the terms on which such release should occur, ensuring compliance with applicable revenue requirements.
2.10 The Court directed that release would be subject to payment of applicable customs duty and warehousing charges calculated as on the date of detention, thereby balancing the petitioner's right to release of goods with the statutory dues of the Customs Department.
2.11 The Court also prescribed the procedural modality for implementation by directing the petitioner to appear before the Customs Department on a specified date, personally or through an authorised representative, with verification of authorisation through appropriate communication.
Conclusions
2.12 The Court directed the Customs Department to release the seized gold chain to the petitioner upon:
(a) Payment of applicable customs duty; and
(b) Payment of warehousing charges based on the rates applicable on the date of detention.
2.13 The Court further directed that, upon such payments being made and appearance being facilitated through the designated nodal officer, the gold items shall be released and the petition stood disposed of on these terms.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether continued detention of seized gold items is lawful when no show cause notice has been issued within the time limits prescribed under Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962.
1.2 Whether, in the facts of the case, the seized gold items are liable to be released to the petitioners and, if so, on what terms and conditions.
1.3 Whether costs are liable to be imposed on the petitioners for having misrepresented the nature of the seized jewellery as "old jewellery".
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Legality of continued detention in absence of show cause notice under Section 110(2)
Legal framework
2.1 The Court referred to Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, which prescribes that if no notice under clause (a) of Section 124 is given within six months of seizure, the seized goods shall be returned, with a further possible extension of up to six months by the Principal Commissioner/Commissioner for reasons recorded in writing and communicated before expiry of the initial period.
2.2 The Court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India & Anr. v. Jatin Ahuja, which held that: (i) the only power to extend time for issuance of notice is under the first proviso to Section 110(2); (ii) Section 110A, being an interim power to release goods, does not affect or dilute the mandatory operation of Section 110(2); and (iii) failure to issue notice under Section 124(a) within the prescribed/extended period results in an obligation to return the seized goods.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 It was undisputed before the Court that no show cause notice had been issued in respect of the seized gold items.
2.4 The Court noted, following the Supreme Court, that the time period to issue notice under clause (a) of Section 124 is governed solely by Section 110(2), and that this time prescription is mandatory and distinct from the general power to issue a show cause notice under Section 124.
2.5 The Court observed that the statutory period of six months from seizure, even if extended by a further maximum period of six months under the proviso to Section 110(2), had in any event expired; hence, the outer limit of one year had elapsed without issuance of any show cause notice.
2.6 On these facts, the Court held that continuation of detention of the gold items after expiry of the maximum permissible period, in the absence of a show cause notice or a valid extension under Section 110(2), is impermissible in law and attracts the statutory consequence of release.
Conclusions
2.7 The seized gold items could not be lawfully detained beyond the statutory period in Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, as no show cause notice had been issued within that period or its permissible extension.
2.8 The gold items were, therefore, liable to be released to the petitioners.
Issue 2 - Direction for release and conditions imposed
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 The Court recorded, upon physical inspection, that the seized items were "absolutely brand new jewellery" and not used or old jewellery as claimed by the petitioners.
2.10 Nonetheless, applying the binding ratio of the Supreme Court decision, the Court held that the character of the jewellery (old vs new) did not alter the statutory consequence under Section 110(2) once no show cause notice was issued within the prescribed time.
2.11 Considering the statutory position and the factual matrix, the Court directed that the release of the seized gold items would be subject to compliance by the petitioners with fiscal and procedural requirements.
Conclusions
2.12 The Customs Department was directed to release the seized gold items to the petitioners, subject to:
* Payment of the entire applicable customs duty by the petitioners; and
* Payment of full warehousing charges as applicable on the date of detention.
2.13 The petitioners were directed to appear (personally or through an authorised representative, with due verification of authorisation) before the Customs Department on the specified date to complete the formalities, whereupon the goods would be released on proof of compliance with the Court's conditions.
Issue 3 - Imposition of costs for misrepresentation regarding the nature of jewellery
Interpretation and reasoning
2.14 The petitioners had stated that the detained gold items were their "old jewellery" being worn by them; however, upon production and perusal of the jewellery in Court, it was found that the items were not old jewellery but clearly brand new pieces purchased in Dubai.
2.15 The Court held that the petitioners had given an incorrect impression to the Court as to the nature of the seized jewellery, warranting imposition of costs.
Conclusions
2.16 Costs of Rs. 10,000/- in each petition were imposed on the petitioners, directed to be deposited with the Delhi High Court Bar Clerk Association by a specified date.
2.17 Production of proof of such deposit before the Customs Authority on the date fixed for appearance was made a condition precedent to effecting release of the gold items.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether a demand of Safeguard Duty under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 is legally sustainable when earlier re-assessed Bills of Entry, allowing exemption, were not challenged by the Revenue under the statutory appeal/review mechanism and had attained finality.
1.2 Whether a demand of Safeguard Duty is maintainable in respect of subsequent self-assessed Bills of Entry, when the Revenue did not file appeals against such self-assessment despite the law requiring appeal even against self-assessment.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Validity of invoking Section 28 where reassessment orders granting exemption attained finality
Legal framework (as discussed in the judgment)
2.1 The Tribunal relied on its own earlier decision which had, in turn, examined the scheme of Sections 11A, 11B and 35E of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the judgment of the High Court in "Eveready Industries India Ltd. v. CESTAT, Chennai". That judgment held, inter alia:
(a) Orders granting refund under Section 11B are orders of adjudication and are appealable. (b) Section 11B is a complete code for refund, involving adjudication by the Assistant/Deputy Commissioner. (c) Once an order under Section 11B attains finality (no appeal/review under Section 35E), the Department cannot subsequently invoke Section 11A to treat the refund as "erroneous refund" and recover it. (d) Sections 11A and 35E operate in different fields and must be read harmoniously; what cannot be done directly by appeal/review cannot be done indirectly by invoking the demand provision. (e) One authority cannot, in collateral proceedings, declare erroneous what another adjudicating authority has already decided, when that earlier order has not been appealed against.
2.2 The Tribunal applied the above ratio, mutatis mutandis, to the Customs context, in relation to reassessment of Bills of Entry and subsequent attempts to raise demand under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 without first challenging the reassessment orders by appeal.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Tribunal found that the case did not involve mere self-assessment. In the first four Bills of Entry:
(a) The Customs electronic system itself had flagged non-eligibility to Safeguard Duty exemption on the ground that imports were from "Taiwan". (b) The appellant and CHA appeared before the reassessing authority, submitted documents and arguments on eligibility to exemption. (c) The competent Customs authorities, after considering the material, formally re-assessed the Bills of Entry and allowed clearance without payment of Safeguard Duty.
2.4 The Tribunal treated this re-assessment as a conscious adjudicatory decision of the proper officer on the very issue now sought to be reopened. The Revenue did not challenge these reassessment orders before the Commissioner (Appeals). Thus, the reassessments attained finality.
2.5 The Tribunal noted that, after such reassessment and removal of the relevant "flag" in the electronic system, subsequent imports passed through without objection on Safeguard Duty, evidencing that the Department itself treated the exemption position as settled.
2.6 Applying the ratio of the earlier relied-upon judgment (following "Eveready Industries India Ltd.") the Tribunal held that, once an adjudicatory order has been passed and has not been appealed or reviewed under the statutory mechanism, the Department cannot subsequently invoke the demand provision (here, Section 28 of the Customs Act) to indirectly undo or overturn that final order.
2.7 It was held that, as in the excise context where an unchallenged refund order under Section 11B cannot later be treated as "erroneous refund" under Section 11A, an unchallenged reassessment order under the Customs law cannot be collaterally attacked by a demand under Section 28.
Conclusions
2.8 The Tribunal concluded that, in the absence of any appeal against the reassessed Bills of Entry, the issue of Safeguard Duty exemption for the relevant imports had reached finality and the Department could not lawfully invoke Section 28 to raise a demand contrary to such final reassessments.
2.9 On this ground, the proceedings initiated through the Show Cause Notice and the consequent demand pertaining to the reassessed Bills of Entry were held to be legally unsustainable.
Issue 2 - Maintainability of demand on subsequently self-assessed Bills of Entry without Revenue appeal against self-assessment
Legal framework (as discussed in the judgment)
2.10 The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court decision in "ITC Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata-IV", which held that even in the case of self-assessed Bills of Entry, if any issue arises regarding value, rate of duty, etc., such self-assessed Bills of Entry must be challenged by way of appeal; they cannot be collaterally questioned without recourse to the appellate mechanism.
2.11 The Tribunal applied the principle that what is applicable to the assessee, in terms of the requirement to challenge self-assessment by appeal, is equally applicable to the Revenue.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.12 For the subsequent 30 consignments, the Tribunal found:
(a) The Bills of Entry were self-assessed by the appellant. (b) The Customs electronic system did not raise any query or objection regarding Safeguard Duty. (c) The Revenue, if aggrieved by such self-assessment or by the system's non-flagging of Safeguard Duty, was required to file appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals) to challenge these self-assessments.
2.13 The Tribunal held that, following the principle laid down in "ITC Ltd.", self-assessed Bills of Entry, once accepted and not appealed, also attain finality. The Revenue cannot bypass the appellate remedy and instead initiate proceedings under Section 28 to dispute aspects of the self-assessment that could and should have been agitated in appeal.
Conclusions
2.14 Since the Revenue did not file any appeal against the 30 self-assessed Bills of Entry, the Tribunal held that the confirmed demand of Safeguard Duty in respect of those consignments is not legally sustainable.
2.15 The Tribunal explicitly declined to examine or decide the substantive question whether "Taiwan" is a part of "China" for the purpose of the Safeguard Duty exemption notification, holding that the appeal could be allowed on the ground of finality of reassessment/self-assessment and failure of the Revenue to pursue the prescribed appellate remedies.
2.16 On the combined reasoning that (i) the reassessment orders and (ii) the accepted self-assessments had attained finality without appeal, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and allowed the appeal, granting consequential relief as per law.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, in the absence of a show cause notice under Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 within the prescribed period, the seized gold coins are liable to be released under Section 110(2) of the Act.
1.2 Whether an alleged "oral" show cause notice or waiver of notice can satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Consequence of non-issuance of show cause notice under Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court referred to Section 124(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 requiring a show cause notice before confiscation, and Section 110(2) mandating return of seized goods if such notice is not issued within the prescribed period. The Court also noted the Supreme Court's interpretation in Union of India & Anr. v. Jatin Ahuja that non-issuance of notice under Section 124(a) within the statutory period attracts the mandatory consequence under Section 110(2) that the goods "shall be returned" to the person from whose possession they were seized, absent a valid extension by the competent authority under the first proviso to Section 110(2).
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Court noted that no show cause notice, written or oral, had been issued in respect of the seized gold coins, and that the coins continued to remain with the Customs Authority.
2.3 Relying on an earlier coordinate bench decision in a connected matter and on the Supreme Court's judgment in Union of India & Anr. v. Jatin Ahuja, the Court held that, in the absence of a show cause notice under Section 124(a) within the period contemplated by Section 110(2) and without any recorded extension by the competent authority under the first proviso, the statutory consequence is that the seized goods must be returned.
2.4 The Court accepted the principle, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, that Section 110A (provisional release) is merely an interim mechanism and cannot dilute or negate the mandatory operation of Section 110(2), and that the time limit for issuing notice under Section 124(a) is governed solely by Section 110(2).
Conclusions
2.5 The seized gold coins are liable to be released to the petitioner as no show cause notice under Section 124 has been issued within the statutory framework and no valid extension of time has been shown.
Issue 2: Validity of "oral" show cause notice and waiver of statutory notice under Section 124
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.6 The Court adopted and relied upon the reasoning of the coordinate bench in the connected matter which examined the contention of the Customs Authorities that a show cause notice under Section 124 could be issued orally and/or that the notice requirement could be waived by the passenger.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.7 The Court noted that in the earlier connected matter it had been specifically held that: (a) there was no averment in the counter affidavit that any oral show cause notice had been issued; (b) there is no statutory provision permitting waiver of the notice mandated under Section 124; and (c) in the absence of any such notice, written or oral, the requirements of Section 124(a) are not satisfied.
2.8 Applying the same reasoning, the Court rejected the Department's stand in the present case that an "oral show cause notice" existed, in circumstances where there was neither pleading nor material establishing such oral notice, and where the statute does not contemplate waiver of the prescribed notice.
Conclusions
2.9 Alleged oral show cause notice and any purported waiver of the statutory notice do not satisfy Section 124; in the absence of a valid statutory notice, the seizure cannot be sustained and the goods are to be returned in accordance with Section 110(2).
Issue 3: Conditions and modalities for release of the seized gold coins
Interpretation and reasoning
2.10 Having held that the seized gold coins must be released to the petitioner, the Court directed that the release be subject to payment of applicable customs duty and warehousing charges.
2.11 The Court further directed that warehousing charges be computed on the basis of the charges applicable on the date of detention and facilitated the petitioner's appearance before the Customs Authority (personally, through Power of Attorney Holder, or virtually), designating a nodal officer and fixing a specific date and time for appearance.
Conclusions
2.12 The Department is required to release the seized gold coins to the petitioner upon: (i) payment of applicable customs duty; and (ii) payment of warehousing charges calculated as on the date of detention, with the release process to be coordinated through the designated nodal officer on the specified date and time.
Issues: Whether the impugned appellate order was liable to be set aside for want of a proper opportunity of personal hearing, and whether the delay in filing the appeal could be condoned.
Analysis: The petition challenged the order-in-original and the order-in-appeal in GST proceedings. The Court found that the petitioner was not afforded a sufficient opportunity of hearing at either stage, and also noted the unusual nature of the hearing notice which stated that no personal hearing was required and that the notice was only for uploading of the order. In these circumstances, the appellate process was held to have suffered from procedural unfairness. The Court also condoned the delay in filing the appeal and directed that a fresh personal hearing be given before the appellate authority.
Conclusion: The impugned order-in-appeal was set aside, the delay in filing the appeal was condoned, and the matter was remitted for decision afresh on merits after granting the petitioner a personal hearing.
Final Conclusion: The petitioner obtained restoration of appellate consideration with a direction for a fresh merits decision after hearing, while the substantive tax dispute was left open for determination by the appellate authority.
Ratio Decidendi: An appellate order passed without affording a meaningful opportunity of personal hearing cannot be sustained, and the appellate remedy must be decided afresh after complying with natural justice.
Issues: (i) Whether the appellate authority was bound to consider the assessee's annual return in Form GSTR-9, the unavailed input tax credit on inward supplies, and the resulting claim of revenue neutrality while re-examining the tax demand; (ii) Whether the amended restriction in Section 44(2) of the Goods and Services Tax law could be applied to the assessee's annual return filed before the amendment took effect.
Issue (i): Whether the appellate authority was bound to consider the assessee's annual return in Form GSTR-9, the unavailed input tax credit on inward supplies, and the resulting claim of revenue neutrality while re-examining the tax demand.
Analysis: The annual return filed in Form GSTR-9 was material to the controversy because it reflected the assessee's corrected disclosure. The Court held that where the assessee asserts that it did not avail input tax credit on inward CESS and that the demand on outward supplies should be neutralised by the available but unutilised credit, the tax authorities cannot ignore that aspect altogether. Reference was made to Article 265 of the Constitution of India, which requires that tax be levied and collected only by authority of law. On that reasoning, the appellate authority was required to give due regard to the annual return and the pleaded revenue-neutral position.
Conclusion: The assessee's annual return and the claimed input tax credit position had to be considered by the appellate authority; the omission to do so was not sustained.
Issue (ii): Whether the amended restriction in Section 44(2) of the Goods and Services Tax law could be applied to the assessee's annual return filed before the amendment took effect.
Analysis: The Court held that the pre-amendment position under Section 44(2) did not impose a fatal prohibition against filing the annual return beyond the stated date. The amendment introducing a mandatory prohibition was stated to take effect from 1 October 2023 and could not govern a return filed earlier. The presence of a late-fee mechanism also indicated that late filing was not intended to be totally barred under the earlier regime.
Conclusion: The amended restriction in Section 44(2) did not apply to the assessee's return filed before the amendment came into force.
Final Conclusion: The impugned appellate order was set aside and the matter was sent back for fresh consideration in accordance with law, with the assessee obtaining substantive relief on the issues of GSTR-9 and revenue neutrality.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a tax assessee's corrected annual return and unavailed input tax credit are relevant to the ultimate liability, the appellate authority must consider them, and a later statutory prohibition on late filing cannot be applied to invalidate an earlier return filed before the amendment's commencement.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, in view of Section 35(2AB) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the applicable judicial precedents, there is any legal impediment to considering the assessee's applications for recognition and approval of its R&D facility, and issuance of Forms 3CM and 3CL, for FY 2015-16 and FY 2016-17.
1.2 Whether the respondents acted lawfully in declining or omitting to consider the assessee's claim for recognition/approval and issuance of requisite certificates for FY 2015-16 and FY 2016-17, despite subsequent recognition of the R&D facility and grant of approval with effect from 01.04.2017.
1.3 Whether the respondents are required to reconsider the assessee's applications for FY 2015-16 and FY 2016-17 in light of the binding interpretation of Section 35(2AB) laid down in the cited Division Bench judgment.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Legal impediment to considering recognition/approval and issuance of Forms 3CM/3CL for FY 2015-16 and FY 2016-17
(a) Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court noted the legal position as declared in the Division Bench decision interpreting Section 35(2AB) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and approving the reasoning in earlier decisions which held:
(i) Section 35(2AB) is intended to encourage innovation, research and development in India.
(ii) For availing weighted deduction, the essential elements are: (a) development of the R&D facility; (b) incurring of expenditure on such facility; (c) approval of the facility by the prescribed authority (DSIR); and (d) allowance of weighted deduction on the expenditure so incurred.
(iii) The provisions do not stipulate that weighted deduction is confined only to expenditure incurred from the date of recognition/approval or any "cut-off" date mentioned in the DSIR certificate.
(iv) A plain and harmonious reading of Section 35(2AB), Rule 6(5A) and Form 3CM indicates that once the facility is approved, the entire expenditure incurred on development of the approved R&D facility is eligible for weighted deduction, except expenditure on land and building.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 Relying on the Division Bench judgment, the Court recorded the settled position that, for claiming benefit under Section 35(2AB):
- What is relevant is the existence of recognition/approval of the R&D facility, and
- It is not permissible to restrict the benefit only from the date of recognition or from any cut-off date mentioned in Form 3CM, as such restriction would amount to "reading more in the law which is not expressly provided".
2.3 The Court noted the petitioner's contention that there was no "in principle" impediment to granting approval under Section 35(2AB) for FY 2015-16 and FY 2016-17, particularly as:
- The petitioner's R&D unit had been granted recognition on 26.10.2016; and
- Approval under Section 35(2AB) had been granted with effect from 01.04.2017 and Form 3CM had been issued for FY 2017-18.
2.4 The Court observed that neither the communication dated 02.08.2021 nor the subsequent communication dated 30.01.2021 (received during the pendency of the petition) reflected a consideration of the petitioner's eligibility for Forms 3CM and 3CL for FY 2015-16 and FY 2016-17 in the light of the above legal position.
(c) Conclusions
2.5 The Court concluded that there is, in principle, no legal bar under Section 35(2AB), as interpreted by the Division Bench, against considering the petitioner's applications for recognition/approval and issuance of requisite certificates for FY 2015-16 and FY 2016-17 merely because recognition/approval came later.
Issue 2: Validity of the respondents' omission/refusal and necessity of reconsideration
(a) Interpretation and reasoning
2.6 The Court found that the respondents' prior communications had not addressed the petitioner's entitlement to approval and issuance of Forms 3CM and 3CL for FY 2015-16 and FY 2016-17 in accordance with the binding legal position laid down in the Division Bench judgment.
2.7 The Court emphasised that the legislative intent behind Section 35(2AB) is to incentivise research and development and that non-grant of benefit on a restrictive reading of dates of recognition or approval would defeat that intent, as recognised in the cited precedents.
(b) Conclusions
2.8 The Court did not itself grant the certificates or approve the expenditure, but held that the matter required fresh examination by the respondents in accordance with law.
2.9 The petition was disposed of with the following operative directions:
(i) The respondents shall examine the matter afresh and consider grant of the requisite certificate/issuance of Forms (including Forms 3CM and 3CL) for FY 2015-16 and FY 2016-17.
(ii) This exercise shall be completed as expeditiously as possible and preferably within four weeks.
(iii) If the petitioner's request/application is to be rejected, the respondents shall pass a reasoned order under intimation to the petitioner.
(iv) While undertaking this exercise, the concerned authorities shall consider and apply the Division Bench judgment interpreting Section 35(2AB).
Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to implementation of the Order-in-Original permitting redemption and re-export of the seized gold jewellery despite delay in payment of the redemption fine.
Analysis: The Order-in-Original had already permitted redemption and re-export of the gold jewellery on payment of redemption fine and penalty. The delay in approaching the Customs Department was viewed in the backdrop of the COVID-19 period and the extension of limitation recognised by the Supreme Court. The Court also noted the petitioner's medical purpose for visiting India and the finding that he was not a habitual offender. In these special circumstances, the order of confiscation was directed to be given effect to, with the petitioner being required to pay costs and comply with the prescribed formalities.
Conclusion: The petitioner was held entitled to implementation of the Order-in-Original and release of the seized gold jewellery for re-export, subject to payment of costs and compliance with formalities.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether CENVAT credit on capital goods is deniable where, on the date of receipt of such capital goods, the intended final product was exempted, but at the time the capital goods were put to use, the final product had become dutiable.
1.2 Whether capital goods in such circumstances can be regarded as "used exclusively in the manufacture of exempted goods" within the meaning of Rule 6(4) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
1.3 Whether the Tribunal's earlier decision and its affirmation by the High Court in relation to the same assessee, product, and period conclude the controversy and render the present dispute covered by precedent.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Timing of eligibility for CENVAT credit on capital goods and meaning of "used exclusively in the manufacture of exempted goods" under Rule 6(4)
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 Rule 6(4) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 was considered, which restricts CENVAT credit on capital goods used "exclusively" in the manufacture of exempted goods. The focus of interpretation was on:
2.1.1 The relevant point of time for determining credit eligibility on capital goods - whether it is the date of receipt/installation of capital goods or the date when such capital goods are put to use for manufacture.
2.1.2 The condition that capital goods must be "used exclusively" for exempted goods to attract the bar under Rule 6(4).
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Tribunal adopted and relied upon the reasoning of the coordinate Bench (Ahmedabad) in the assessee's own case, which held that:
2.2.1 For purposes of Rule 6(4), the relevant date to determine whether capital goods are hit by the exclusion is the date of commencement of production on such capital goods, not the date of their receipt or installation.
2.2.2 The statutory language links the restriction to whether the capital goods are used "exclusively" for exempted goods; hence, the factual position when the capital goods are actually put to use for manufacture is decisive.
2.3 It was noted that in the earlier decision, the Tribunal had examined the factual matrix and held that:
2.3.1 Although the capital goods were received when the finished product "Maaza" was exempt, they were not used for manufacture of exempted goods during that period.
2.3.2 Production on the capital goods in question (meant for "Maaza" in PET bottles) commenced only from 29.03.2011, by which date the finished product had become dutiable and the exemption had been withdrawn.
2.3.3 Consequently, the capital goods were never "used exclusively" for manufacture of exempted goods, and the bar under Rule 6(4) did not apply.
2.4 The Tribunal distinguished the decision relied upon by Revenue (Surya Roshni Ltd.) on two principal grounds highlighted in the earlier Ahmedabad decision:
2.4.1 The decision had not attained finality before the higher courts; therefore, its binding value was limited as against the clear ratio already laid down in the assessee's own case.
2.4.2 On facts, in Surya Roshni, the same capital goods were actually used for a substantial period for manufacturing exempted goods before the product became dutiable, justifying the denial of credit. In contrast, in the present facts, the capital goods started production only after the product became dutiable, and were never used for exempted production.
2.5 The Tribunal emphasized that the adjudicating authority, in earlier remand proceedings, was required only to verify the factual aspects-namely, the date of commencement of production on the capital goods and whether the finished goods were exempted or dutiable on that date. Revisiting the legal issue at that stage was characterized as beyond the scope of remand.
Conclusions
2.6 The Tribunal reaffirmed that, for Rule 6(4) purposes, the eligibility of CENVAT credit on capital goods is to be determined with reference to the date the capital goods are put to use for production.
2.7 Since, on the date of commencement of production on the capital goods in question, the finished goods were dutiable and the capital goods were never used exclusively for exempted goods, the bar under Rule 6(4) did not apply and CENVAT credit was legally admissible.
2.8 The Tribunal therefore upheld the dropping of proceedings by the adjudicating authority and rejected Revenue's argument that mere receipt of capital goods during an exemption period disentitled the assessee to credit.
Issue 3: Effect of prior Tribunal and High Court decisions in the same assessee's case
Interpretation and reasoning
3.1 The Tribunal observed that the precise question - whether the date of receipt or the date of commencement of production governs credit eligibility on capital goods where the status of the finished goods changes from exempted to dutiable - had already been decided by the coordinate Bench (Ahmedabad) in the assessee's own case.
3.2 That decision held that the date of production is determinative and that the assessee was entitled to credit as the capital goods were first used when the final product was dutiable.
3.3 The Tribunal recorded that the said decision was subsequently carried by Revenue before the jurisdictional High Court, which, after examining the Tribunal's factual findings (including the commencement of production on 29.03.2011 and the dutiable status of the product on that date), declined to interfere and held that no substantial question of law arose.
3.4 In light of this affirmation, the Tribunal held that the controversy is no longer "res integra" and stands squarely covered in favour of the assessee, leaving no scope to re-agitate the same issue in the present appeal.
Conclusions
3.5 The Tribunal concluded that the matter is fully covered by the earlier Tribunal decision and the High Court's order, and therefore Revenue's appeal could not be sustained.
3.6 The appeal filed by Revenue was dismissed, confirming the assessee's entitlement to CENVAT credit on the capital goods in question.
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Issues: Whether penalty under section 10-A of the Central Sales Tax Act was leviable where a diesel generating set, mentioned in the registration certificate as an item for use in manufacture, was purchased against form 'C' at a concessional rate and used to generate electricity for running the plant and machinery used in production.
Analysis: Penalty under section 10-A read with section 10(d) is attracted only when goods purchased for the purposes specified in section 8(3)(b), (c) or (d) are not used for the very purpose for which they were acquired without reasonable excuse. The generating set was expressly included in the registration certificate, and the only use made of it was generation of electricity for running the manufacturing plant. That use was within the contemplation of both the dealer and the assessing authority when the certificate was granted. There was no allegation of any different or unauthorised use, nor any misstatement by the dealer. The earlier decision relied upon was distinguishable because it concerned refusal to include the item in the registration certificate, not misuse after such inclusion.
Conclusion: Penalty was not leviable, and the dealer was entitled to the benefit of purchase at the concessional rate for the said generating set.
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