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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court could review or recall its concluded order appointing an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; (ii) Whether Clause 25 constituted a valid and subsisting arbitration agreement despite its unilateral and exclusionary appointment mechanism; (iii) Whether joint applications for extension of the arbitral mandate constituted waiver under Sections 4 and 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Issue (i): Whether the High Court could review or recall its concluded order appointing an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Analysis: The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a self-contained code founded on minimal judicial intervention. The referral court's role under Section 11 is facilitative and limited to a prima facie examination of the arbitration agreement; questions of substantive validity and jurisdiction ordinarily fall to the arbitral tribunal under Section 16. Review in arbitration matters is confined to patent procedural errors or material facts overlooked, and cannot reopen an interpretation of law or an appointment order that has attained finality. The respondents neither challenged the appointment order nor raised a timely jurisdictional objection before the tribunal, but participated in the arbitration and sought extensions of mandate.
Conclusion: The High Court lacked jurisdiction to reopen and review its Section 11(6) appointment order on merits; its review of the concluded appointment was invalid.
Issue (ii): Whether Clause 25 constituted a valid and subsisting arbitration agreement despite its unilateral and exclusionary appointment mechanism.
Analysis: Clause 25 embodied an unequivocal agreement to refer contractual disputes to arbitration, and the parties' prior and continued conduct, including arbitral participation and pleadings, independently established their intention to arbitrate under Section 7. The unilateral appointment mechanism and the stipulation foreclosing arbitration if that mechanism failed offended neutrality, equality and the prohibition against unilateral arbitral appointments in public-private contracts. Those offending procedural terms were severable from the substantive promise to arbitrate. Their invalidity did not extinguish the arbitration agreement or prevent an independent appointment under Section 11(6).
Conclusion: A valid and subsisting arbitration agreement existed; the unilateral and exclusionary portions of Clause 25 were void and severable, while the substantive agreement to arbitrate survived.
Issue (iii): Whether joint applications for extension of the arbitral mandate constituted waiver under Sections 4 and 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Analysis: Section 12(5) creates a mandatory ineligibility that can be waived only by an express written post-dispute agreement, whereas Section 4 governs waiver by informed conduct concerning other procedural non-compliance. A joint application under Section 29A signifies consent to continuation of the tribunal and amounts to waiver under Section 4, but cannot by itself cure a Seventh Schedule ineligibility under Section 12(5). No such statutory ineligibility attached to the appointed arbitrator in this case.
Conclusion: The joint applications constituted waiver by conduct under Section 4; they did not amount to an express written waiver under Section 12(5), which was not attracted on the facts.
Final Conclusion: The concluded arbitral process must be preserved through appointment of a substitute arbitrator, who is to continue from the stage at which the proceedings were interrupted rather than recommence them afresh.
Ratio Decidendi: Invalidity of a unilateral appointment procedure does not nullify a separable substantive agreement to arbitrate; courts must preserve that agreement through a neutral appointment while avoiding impermissible midstream review of a concluded Section 11 appointment.
Severable arbitration clauses preserve neutral dispute resolution despite invalid unilateral appointment mechanisms and bar merit review of concluded appointments.
A concluded arbitrator appointment under Section 11(6) cannot be reopened on merits through review, as the referral court performs only a limited prima facie examination and substantive jurisdictional issues ordinarily lie with the tribunal. A unilateral and exclusionary appointment procedure may violate neutrality and equality, but its invalid terms are severable where the clause otherwise contains a clear agreement to arbitrate; the substantive arbitration agreement survives for neutral appointment. Joint mandate-extension applications constitute waiver by conduct for procedural non-compliance under Section 4, but cannot waive mandatory arbitrator ineligibility under Section 12(5) without an express written post-dispute agreement. A substitute arbitrator should continue from the interrupted stage.
Review of order appointing arbitrator - Severability of unilateral arbitral appointment clause - Waiver of objections in arbitral proceedings - Competence-Competence - Doctrine of Severability - Express Written Waiver - Functus Officio Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to review its earlier order passed under Section 11(6) of the A&C Act, and whether such exercise of power was valid in law ? - HELD THAT: - In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited [2021 (3) TMI 447 - SUPREME COURT], this Court reiterated that “the legislative policy of the 1996 Act is to minimize the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process and to ensure that arbitration proceedings are conducted expeditiously without unnecessary interference”. The insertion of Section 11(6-A) through the 2015 Amendment reaffirmed the limited nature of judicial scrutiny at the appointment stage, restoring the position that courts must confine themselves to a prima facie determination of the existence of an arbitration agreement, curtailing the wider inquiry recognized in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd.[2005 (10) TMI 495 - SUPREME COURT]. In the seven-Judge Bench decision in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, In [2023 (12) TMI 897 - SUPREME COURT (LB)], this Court reaffirmed that the role of the referral court under Section 11 is confined to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. All other questions including validity, enforceability, and jurisdiction are matters for the arbitral tribunal under Section 16. The Court further emphasized that the Arbitration Act is a self-contained code governed by the principle that what is not expressly permitted under the Act is deemed prohibited. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act is a self-contained code which permits only limited judicial intervention. Although a High Court has a narrowly circumscribed procedural review power to correct a patent error or overlooked material fact, it cannot undertake a review on merits or reopen its interpretation of an arbitration agreement. The review was founded on a subsequent decision, was belated, and did not disclose an error apparent or suppression of a material fact. The respondents, having not challenged the appointment order or raised a timely jurisdictional objection before the tribunal and having participated in the proceedings and sought extensions of its mandate, could not reopen the concluded appointment through review. Where the appointed arbitrator became unable to continue, the proper course was substitution under Section 15(2), preserving the earlier proceedings. [Paras 11, 15, 16, 17] The High Court lacked jurisdiction to review and nullify its earlier appointment order; a substitute arbitrator was required to be appointed to continue the arbitration from the stage already reached. Existence of arbitration agreement - Severability of unilateral arbitral appointment clause - Neutrality in public-contract arbitration - HELD THAT: - Section 7 of the A&C Act defines an “arbitration agreement” and stipulates the manner in which it may be proved. While sub-section (3) mandates that such an agreement must be in writing, Section 7(4)(c) significantly widens the evidentiary scope by recognizing a valid arbitration agreement even where it is evidenced through an exchange of statements of claim and defence, provided that one party asserts the existence of such an agreement and the other does not deny it. In State of West Bengal v. Sarkar & Sarkar [2017 (4) TMI 1673 - SUPREME COURT], this Court reiterated that active participation in arbitral proceedings without objection may itself constitute sufficient evidence of a valid and subsisting arbitration agreement. Similarly, in Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited [2019 (8) TMI 576 - SUPREME COURT], it was held that even without a formally executed arbitration clause, a valid arbitration agreement can be inferred from the conduct of parties, including participation in arbitration and exchange of pleadings without denial. In Offshore Infrastructures Ltd. v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. [2025 (10) TMI 1443 - SUPREME COURT], this Court held that even where a clause contains an otherwise defective unilateral appointment mechanism, the Court may sever the offending portion and exercise its power under Section 11(6) to appoint an independent arbitrator, thereby giving effect to the parties’ genuine intention to arbitrate. The parties' conduct, including their earlier resort to arbitration under the same contractual framework, active participation in the pending proceedings and exchange of pleadings, established their intention to arbitrate and satisfied the statutory requirement of an arbitration agreement. Clause 25 contained a substantive and unequivocal agreement to refer disputes to arbitration, distinct from its unilateral and exclusionary appointment procedure. A unilateral appointment mechanism in a public-private contract is contrary to equality, impartiality and neutrality; however, invalidity of that procedure does not extinguish the substantive arbitration agreement. The offending appointment and exclusionary parts were severable, enabling appointment of an independent arbitrator under Section 11(6). [Paras 12] Clause 25 constituted a valid and subsisting arbitration agreement, with its unilateral and exclusionary appointment mechanism severed as void and unenforceable. Waiver of objections in arbitral proceedings - Statutory ineligibility of arbitrator - Extension of arbitral mandate - HELD THAT: - Waiver is a foundational principle of arbitration, rooted in party autonomy and fairness in conduct. Arbitration, being adversarial in nature, inevitably results in a winning and a losing side. The legislative rationale in codifying waiver is to ensure that parties do not secure a second bite at the cherry after an unfavourable outcome. Parties are not permitted to sleep over their rights. This statutory policy is in harmony with the scheme of minimal judicial intervention, where the grounds for interference with an arbitral award are narrow, and waiver operates as a significant bar to belated objections. Though waiver, acquiescence, and estoppel are often discussed together in arbitral jurisprudence, they occupy distinct conceptual spaces. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right; acquiescence arises from passive acceptance or delay; and estoppel precludes a party from resiling from a representation on which the other has relied. In Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. [2019 (4) TMI 983 - SUPREME COURT], this Court held that once a person falls within the disqualifications of the Seventh Schedule, he becomes de jure ineligible to act as an arbitrator. The appointment is void ab initio and the mandate terminates automatically under Section 14(1) (a). The Court emphasized that such disqualification is absolute and capable of being waived only through an express post-dispute written agreement. This position was reiterated in Ellora Paper Mills Ltd [2022 (1) TMI 1513 - SUPREME COURT], where the Court held that mere participation in arbitration proceedings does not amount to waiver of statutory ineligibility. While these decisions do not directly address Section 29A, the legislative intent behind the phrase “express agreement in writing” remains unambiguous: implied waiver, acquiescence, or estoppel cannot cure Section 12(5) ineligibility. Section 12(5) creates a mandatory regime for Seventh Schedule ineligibility which can be waived only by an express written post-dispute agreement; participation, acquiescence or a joint application for extension cannot cure such ineligibility. Section 4, however, governs waiver by conduct in respect of procedural and other non-jurisdictional objections. A joint application for extension under Section 29A manifests consent to continuation of the tribunal and amounts to waiver under Section 4 where no Seventh Schedule disqualification is attracted. Since no such statutory disqualification was involved, the High Court wrongly invoked the rigours of Section 12(5). [Paras 13] The respondents' participation and joint applications for extension constituted waiver under Section 4, and did not justify reopening the arbitration. Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed and the impugned judgment was set aside. The High Court was directed to appoint a substitute arbitrator, who would continue the proceedings from the stage at which they had been interrupted.