Issues: (i) Whether goodwill arising on amalgamation is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation under Section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the Revenue could, for the first time before the High Court, invoke the restriction under the fifth proviso to Section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether goodwill arising on amalgamation is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation under Section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Explanation 3(b) to Section 32(1) treats goodwill as an asset for depreciation purposes. The question stood settled by the binding determination that goodwill is an asset within that Explanation and is eligible for depreciation.

Conclusion: Goodwill is a depreciable intangible asset and depreciation thereon is allowable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Revenue could, for the first time before the High Court, invoke the restriction under the fifth proviso to Section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The proposed restriction had neither been specifically raised before nor decided by the appellate authorities. It did not constitute an independent substantial question of law arising from the Tribunal's order.

Conclusion: The Revenue cannot raise the fifth-proviso restriction for the first time before the High Court; no substantial question of law arises on that basis, against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The assessee's entitlement to depreciation on goodwill remains undisturbed, and the unraised statutory restriction cannot be introduced at the appellate stage.

Ratio Decidendi: Goodwill falls within the statutory category of depreciable assets, and a new issue not raised or adjudicated before the lower appellate authorities cannot be made the basis of a substantial question of law.

Issues: Whether the writ challenge to the NCLT's observations could be entertained despite the statutory appellate remedy under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The NCLT's observations proceeded on the settled position that claims relating to the period preceding approval of a resolution plan stand extinguished. Those observations fell within the NCLT's jurisdiction under the insolvency framework. The asserted conflict with State tax legislation did not establish a jurisdictional error, as permitting State tax claims to bypass the corporate insolvency resolution process would undermine the statutory effect of an approved resolution plan.

Conclusion: No jurisdictional infirmity was established to bypass the statutory appellate remedy before the NCLAT.

Issues: (i) Whether the employees' dismissals without an inquiry violated the principles of natural justice and were illegal; (ii) Whether approval of a corporate insolvency resolution plan extinguished the employees' rights under pre-CIRP labour awards and barred withdrawal of the court deposits.

Issue (i): Whether the employees' dismissals without an inquiry violated the principles of natural justice and were illegal.

Analysis: The employees were dismissed through composite charge-sheet-cum-dismissal orders after they had reported at their transferred locations, without a disciplinary inquiry. The employer did not establish any perversity in the labour awards finding that the dismissals had been effected in gross breach of the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The terminations were illegal, and the finding in the labour awards was affirmed in favour of the employees.

Issue (ii): Whether approval of a corporate insolvency resolution plan extinguished the employees' rights under pre-CIRP labour awards and barred withdrawal of the court deposits.

Analysis: The labour awards had adjudicated the employees' claims and granted compensation before commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process. Their entitlement under the awards had therefore crystallised before the moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and approval of the resolution plan. This was distinguishable from an unadjudicated employment claim pending when the resolution plan was approved. The deposits were made to secure compensation awarded to the employees during the challenge proceedings; their continued deposit in court did not, by itself, entitle the new management to recover them. The general question whether court deposits constitute assets of the corporate debtor was not decided.

Conclusion: The resolution plan did not defeat the employees' crystallised entitlement under the labour awards. The employees were entitled to withdraw the deposited amounts with accrued interest as compensation, in full settlement of their service-related claims.

Final Conclusion: The labour awards remain operative, and the court deposits with accrued interest are to satisfy the compensation payable to the employees, with no further service-related benefits remaining payable.

Issues: (i) Whether scrutiny under Section 39(1) could be initiated against a continuously registered dealer without a valid notice under Section 35; (ii) Whether the five-year limitation in Section 57 applied to Section 39 scrutiny; (iii) Whether the Superintendent of Taxes had lawful delegated authority to commence Section 39 proceedings; and (iv) Whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the alternative remedy under Section 65.

Issue (i): Whether scrutiny under Section 39(1) could be initiated against a continuously registered dealer without a valid notice under Section 35.

Analysis: Section 35(2) mandates registered dealers to file returns, whereas Section 35(3) permits notice to dealers other than registered dealers. Section 39(1) confines scrutiny to returns furnished by a registered dealer to whom a notice under Section 35 has been issued. The notice requirement is a condition precedent to the exercise of scrutiny jurisdiction. A harmonious construction did not permit the statutory qualification to be disregarded; a dealer that was always registered and filed returns under Section 35(2) could not be subjected to Section 39 scrutiny without the prescribed notice.

Conclusion: The Section 39(1) scrutiny was without jurisdiction for want of the mandatory Section 35 notice, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the five-year limitation in Section 57 applied to Section 39 scrutiny.

Analysis: The statutory limitation governing completion of assessments could not be circumvented through recourse to the scrutiny mechanism under Section 39. Section 57 was applied to Section 39 proceedings, and scrutiny commenced in 2023 for returns relating to 2007 to 2017 fell beyond the prescribed period.

Conclusion: The impugned Section 39 scrutiny proceedings were barred by statutory limitation, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the Superintendent of Taxes had lawful delegated authority to commence Section 39 proceedings.

Analysis: Section 26 read with Rule 3 requires delegation of the Commissioner's powers through notification in the Official Gazette. No gazette notification delegating Section 39 powers to the Superintendent of Taxes was produced. Internal orders or circulars could not satisfy the mandatory statutory requirement for delegation.

Conclusion: The Superintendent of Taxes lacked lawful delegated authority to initiate the Section 39 proceedings, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the alternative remedy under Section 65.

Analysis: The challenge disclosed a jurisdictional error arising from non-fulfilment of the statutory notice requirement and absence of valid delegation. This brought the matter within the recognised exception to the rule requiring exhaustion of an alternative remedy.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable notwithstanding the alternative remedy, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory scheme did not permit scrutiny against the assessee without fulfilment of the express jurisdictional preconditions, compliance with limitation, and lawful delegation of power.

Ratio Decidendi: A fiscal scrutiny power conditioned by statute may be exercised only upon strict compliance with its express jurisdictional preconditions, prescribed limitation, and lawful delegation.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 16(2)(c), read with Section 155, of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unconstitutional or must be read down to confine ITC reversal to fraudulent, collusive, or non-genuine transactions; (ii) Whether and subject to what safeguards a purchaser's ITC may be denied or reversed when the supplier defaults in depositing tax or its registration is subsequently cancelled.

Issue (i): Whether Section 16(2)(c), read with Section 155, of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unconstitutional or must be read down to confine ITC reversal to fraudulent, collusive, or non-genuine transactions.

Analysis: Input tax credit is a statutory concession, and actual payment of tax to the Government is integral to the credit mechanism. Section 16(2)(c) operates subject to Section 41 and forms part of an integrated statutory framework governing eligibility, reversal, recovery from the supplier, and subsequent re-availment. The earlier matching and reconciliation framework under Sections 42 and 43 was not operationalised, but the resulting difficulty concerns the manner of enforcement rather than the constitutional validity of the condition itself.

Analysis: The possibility of arbitrary or mechanical action in individual cases does not invalidate Section 16(2)(c). The condition cannot be restricted only to fraud, collusion, or fictitious transactions by reading down its text; instead, it must be applied harmoniously with the statutory safeguards and recovery mechanisms available against the defaulting supplier.

Conclusion: Section 16(2)(c), read with Section 155, is constitutionally valid and is not read down to limit its operation exclusively to fraudulent, collusive, or non-genuine transactions.

Issue (ii): Whether and subject to what safeguards a purchaser's ITC may be denied or reversed when the supplier defaults in depositing tax or its registration is subsequently cancelled.

Analysis: The non-operationalisation of the original matching mechanism, the phased substitution of Section 41, and the subsequent introduction of Rule 37A require the statutory regime applicable to the relevant tax period to be applied. For periods before Rule 37A, the absence of a re-availment mechanism is material. The statutory power to recover tax collected but not deposited by the supplier, including under Section 76, remains a relevant part of the scheme and cannot be rendered ineffective.

Analysis: Subsequent or retrospective cancellation of the supplier's registration, a nil or short tax declaration, or an alert concerning the supplier may justify an inquiry but cannot alone justify denial or reversal of ITC. The notice must disclose the relevant supplier, invoices, tax periods, nature of the default, material relied upon, and the status of recovery proceedings against the supplier. The purchaser may discharge the burden of proof through invoices and evidence of actual receipt and movement of goods or services. A notice invoking fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression must itself state the foundational facts connecting the purchaser to such conduct. Personal hearing, reasoned consideration of the purchaser's material, and examination of the grounds for retrospective cancellation are required.

Conclusion: ITC cannot be denied or reversed mechanically merely because the supplier defaulted or its registration was subsequently cancelled. Reversal may follow where the purchaser fails to establish eligibility or where fraud, collusion, non-receipt of goods or services, or other grounds rendering the credit inadmissible are established in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: Pending notices and completed adjudications must be dealt with afresh in conformity with the prescribed safeguards, after adequate opportunity to furnish material and be heard. Amounts already reversed, deposited, or recovered shall be adjusted or refunded as warranted by the fresh determination, and no fresh coercive recovery may be undertaken until that determination.

Ratio Decidendi: Actual payment of tax is a valid statutory condition for input tax credit, but Section 16(2)(c) must be enforced as part of the integrated GST scheme and cannot be used to impose mechanical reversal upon a bona fide purchaser without a fact-based inquiry, procedural fairness, and consideration of recovery from the defaulting supplier.

Issues: Whether the reassessment order under Section 148A(3) and the consequent notice under Section 148 for assessment year 2020-21 warranted writ interference where the materially identical reassessment challenge for the preceding assessment year had already been decided against the assessee.

Analysis: The information and allegations underlying the impugned reassessment action were identical to those involved in the preceding assessment year. The earlier decision had found that determining whether the amount disclosed by the assessee arose from a spurious transaction resulting in escaped income required factual examination by the Assessing Officer. Judicial discipline required adherence to the coordinate bench decision rendered in the assessee's own case.

Conclusion: The reassessment order and consequential notice did not warrant writ interference; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax paid under a mistake of law on exempt goods transport agency services is refundable; (ii) Whether interest is payable on that amount and, if so, at what rate.

Issue (i): Whether service tax paid under a mistake of law on exempt goods transport agency services is refundable.

Analysis: The assessee was eligible for exemption under Clause (21)(d) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST, as amended, but paid service tax under reverse charge despite no liability. Such payment, made under a mistake of law, is a revenue deposit rather than tax or duty. Consequently, Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 does not govern the refund claim, and retention of the amount would be without authority of law under Article 265 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The refund of the amount paid under mistake of law is admissible, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest is payable on that amount and, if so, at what rate.

Analysis: Since the payment retains the character of a revenue deposit and is outside the statutory refund mechanism for duty, the interest regime under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 is inapplicable. The applicable principle supports compensatory interest at 12% per annum for wrongful retention of the deposit.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to interest at 12% per annum from the respective dates of deposit until payment of the refund, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The exemption is given full effect by treating the erroneous payment as a refundable revenue deposit, with compensation for its retention.

Ratio Decidendi: A payment made under a mistake of law where no tax liability exists is a revenue deposit outside Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and its unlawful retention warrants refund with compensatory interest.

Issues: Whether the Commissioner could withhold the refund under Section 54(11) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 when an anti-evasion investigation concerning alleged fraudulent input tax credit was pending.

Analysis: Section 54(11) permits withholding where the refund-generating order is subject to an appeal, further proceedings, or any other pending proceeding under the Act, and the Commissioner, after hearing the taxable person, forms an opinion that release would adversely affect revenue because of fraud or malfeasance. The expression concerning other pending proceedings extends beyond a formally instituted appeal and includes a pending statutory investigation. The anti-evasion investigation had commenced before the refund-withholding order and was supported by contemporaneous material indicating non-existent or cancelled suppliers, absence of established movement of goods, and absence of the claimant from the manufacturer's supply chain. Those circumstances bore directly on actual receipt of goods for input tax credit purposes and supported the requisite opinion of fraud or malfeasance. A subsequently issued show-cause notice merely crystallised the ongoing investigation; the absence of a pending appellate proceeding or separate judicial stay did not invalidate the statutory withholding.

Conclusion: The refund was validly withheld under Section 54(11); the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether extraordinary writ jurisdiction could be exercised to quash an input-tax-credit adjudication order despite an available statutory appeal, on the asserted bar under Section 6(2)(b), variance from the show-cause notice, and denial of an effective hearing.

Analysis: Article 226 jurisdiction does not ordinarily substitute the statutory appellate process where the challenge requires examination of the adjudication record and disputed facts. The bar under Section 6(2)(b) depends upon identity of the precise subject matter, including the relevant tax period, transactions, invoices, ITC liability and allegations; a common supplier or general connection with ITC is insufficient. Whether the State and Central proceedings concerned identical liabilities required examination of their respective notices, orders and transaction-wise material. The impugned order disclosed an independent finding of ITC availment on goods-less invoices with reference to Section 16(2)(b), and therefore did not facially rest on a wholly new basis. The recorded grant of hearing opportunities, notwithstanding an apparent date discrepancy, and objections regarding evidence, limitation, clubbing of periods, replies and invocation of Section 74 required scrutiny of the underlying record in appeal.

Conclusion: An efficacious appellate remedy was required to be pursued because no ex facie lack of jurisdiction or undisputed breach of natural justice was established; all objections, including the applicability of Section 6(2)(b), remained open for appellate determination.

Issues: (i) Whether unfiled GST dues, interest and penalty for the pre-resolution-plan period were extinguished upon approval of the resolution plan, thereby barring later proceedings; and (ii) Whether the statutory appeal barred writ jurisdiction where the demands were initiated without jurisdiction.

Issue (i): Whether unfiled GST dues, interest and penalty for the pre-resolution-plan period were extinguished upon approval of the resolution plan, thereby barring later proceedings.

Analysis: Section 31(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 makes an approved resolution plan binding upon the Central Government and authorities owed statutory dues, while Section 238 gives the Code overriding effect. The GST liabilities concerned the period preceding approval of the resolution plan, and no claim was lodged during the corporate insolvency resolution process. The approved plan extinguished all pre-effective-date governmental claims, whether assessed or unassessed, unless specifically preserved. This accords with the clean-slate principle, under which a successful resolution applicant cannot be burdened with undisclosed or undecided pre-plan claims.

Analysis: The distinction between adjudication and recovery was inapplicable after extinguishment of the underlying claim. A show-cause notice and consequential demand proceedings under Section 73(9), including interest and penalty, amount to proceedings concerning that extinguished claim. Section 88 concerns liquidation and cannot revive a liability extinguished through an approved resolution plan; the general adjudicatory powers under the GST law remain subject to Sections 31(1) and 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the pre-resolution-plan GST dues, interest and penalty stood extinguished, and no subsequent proceedings for their determination or recovery could be initiated or continued.

Issue (ii): Whether the statutory appeal barred writ jurisdiction where the demands were initiated without jurisdiction.

Analysis: Availability of an appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 does not bar writ jurisdiction where the challenged action is without jurisdiction and contrary to binding insolvency law. The relevant facts were undisputed and the challenge raised a pure legal question concerning the authority to initiate proceedings for an extinguished claim.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, writ jurisdiction was available notwithstanding the alternate statutory appeal.

Final Conclusion: An approved resolution plan conclusively extinguishes unfiled statutory claims relating to the pre-approval period and precludes subsequent tax-adjudication proceedings concerning those claims.

Ratio Decidendi: Statutory dues not lodged in the corporate insolvency resolution process and not preserved by an approved resolution plan are extinguished under Section 31(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and cannot thereafter be assessed, adjudicated or recovered notwithstanding general powers under fiscal legislation.

Issues: Whether the Customs authorities have statutory jurisdiction to process the IGST refund claim relating to goods exported under a manual shipping bill.

Analysis: Rule 96(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 assigns processing of refund claims for IGST paid on exported goods to the Customs system or the proper officer of Customs after receipt of information regarding filing of a valid GSTR-3B return. The export had been regularised through a manual shipping bill because of ICEGATE technical failure, and the GST Department confirmed that it lacked statutory jurisdiction to sanction the export refund. The Customs authority could not decline the claim by treating it as falling within the GST Department's jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The Customs authority has jurisdiction to process the IGST refund claim under Rule 96 and must sanction the admissible refund with applicable interest in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether an appellate authority may dismiss an income-tax appeal ex parte for non-compliance without determining the grounds on merits in accordance with Section 250(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 250(6) requires the appellate authority to identify the points for determination and state its decision with reasons. A cryptic ex parte order merely affirming the reassessment because the assessee did not respond to notices neither determines the issues raised nor supplies the reasons necessary for effective appellate scrutiny. The appellate authority has powers co-terminous with those of the Assessing Officer and may undertake enquiry where required. Although the assessee failed to comply with the notices, a fresh opportunity was considered appropriate in the interests of justice.

Conclusion: An ex parte appellate order affirming reassessment without a merits-based and reasoned determination is invalid; the appeal requires fresh adjudication after affording opportunity to both sides.

Issues: (i) Whether diary notings could support additions for unexplained expenditure under Section 69C without proof that the assessee had actually incurred off-book expenditure; (ii) Whether a cash entry arising from reversal of unsubstantiated labour expenditure and recognition of additional income could be characterised as unexplained money under Section 69A; (iii) Whether interest on fixed deposits maintained as margin or security for bank guarantees relating to infrastructure projects qualified for deduction under Section 80IA(4).

Issue (i): Whether diary notings could support additions for unexplained expenditure under Section 69C without proof that the assessee had actually incurred off-book expenditure.

Analysis: Section 69C requires proof of the foundational fact that expenditure was actually incurred before the source of that expenditure can be questioned. The diary entries did not establish that the recorded cash payments represented additional expenditure outside the books. The same diary included cheque payments accepted as accounted, and no independent corroborative material identified any specific unrecorded expenditure. The possibility that the entries represented disbursements from disclosed cash withdrawals or payments connected with sub-contractors was not disproved.

Conclusion: The additions under Section 69C based on the diary entries were unsustainable and are deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a cash entry arising from reversal of unsubstantiated labour expenditure and recognition of additional income could be characterised as unexplained money under Section 69A.

Analysis: Section 69A applies to money not recorded in the books where its nature and source remain unexplained. The cash balance resulted from reversing an earlier booked cash outflow for labour expenditure and crediting corresponding additional income. This accounting reversal did not represent a fresh receipt of cash from an undisclosed source, and the accounting genesis of the amount was identifiable from the books.

Conclusion: The reversal entry could not be treated as unexplained money under Section 69A or subjected to tax under Section 115BBE; the related additions are deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether interest on fixed deposits maintained as margin or security for bank guarantees relating to infrastructure projects qualified for deduction under Section 80IA(4).

Analysis: The character of interest depends on the purpose for which the fixed deposits were maintained. Where deposits are a business necessity for obtaining bank guarantees required to secure or execute eligible infrastructure contracts, they have a direct and proximate nexus with the eligible business and are not independent investments of surplus funds.

Conclusion: Interest on fixed deposits maintained as margin or security for bank guarantees shall be included in eligible profits for deduction under Section 80IA(4), subject to verification that the deposits were not investments of surplus funds, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned additions for unexplained expenditure and unexplained money are vacated, and the exclusion of qualifying bank-guarantee deposit interest from eligible infrastructure profits is reversed subject to the directed verification.

Issues: Whether a common assessment order covering more than one tax period or assessment year is valid.

Analysis: Sections 74(3) and 74(4) of the Andhra Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 were applied consistently with the binding coordinate-bench ruling that a single show-cause notice or composite assessment order cannot cover multiple tax periods or more than one assessment year after the due date for annual return. The assessment combined the periods 2023-24 and 2024-25 up to November 2024; consequently, the original assessment was invalid and the appellate order affirming it could not survive.

Conclusion: The composite assessment order and the consequential appellate order were set aside. Separate notices and assessments for the relevant tax periods may be undertaken in accordance with law after affording opportunity to the assessee.

Issues: Whether proceedings pending under Rule 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 could continue after its omission without a saving clause.

Analysis: Rule 96(10) was omitted with effect from 08.10.2024 without a saving or sunset clause. The governing principle is that proceedings initiated under an omitted rule may continue only where the omission itself preserves them or a statutory legal fiction enables their continuance. The omission was intended to end the complications arising from the rule, and the binding position applied equally to proceedings that had not concluded on the date of omission.

Conclusion: Pending proceedings founded on the omitted Rule 96(10) could not be continued after 08.10.2024.

Issues: Whether the assessment order allowing deduction for contribution to the Core Settlement Guarantee Fund, without examining its character as a present and ascertained liability or a contingent reserve, was validly revised under section 263.

Analysis: Revision under section 263 requires both error in the assessment order and prejudice to the Revenue. Under Explanation 2(a), an order passed without inquiries or verification that should have been made is deemed erroneous and prejudicial. Although the Assessing Officer called for supporting material and examined the genuineness and increase in expenses, the assessment order did not disclose an inquiry into the material question whether the contribution augmented a corpus for possible future clearing-member defaults or discharged an accrued and crystallised liability. The accumulated corpus, interest earned by the assessee on the fund, and the absence of material showing a default giving rise to an identified liability required specific examination. The earlier ruling concerning a contributor exchange did not govern the matter because the assessee, as clearing corporation, continued to earn income from the corpus. The merits of allowability under section 37(1) were not adjudicated and remain for independent examination in the set-aside proceedings.

Conclusion: The conditions for revision under section 263 read with Explanation 2(a) were satisfied, and the limited revision directing fresh examination of the deduction claim was valid.

Issues: Whether tax deducted at source during financial year 2022-23 and reflected in Form 26AS for assessment year 2023-24 could be claimed as credit in assessment year 2024-25.

Analysis: The credit claimed through rectification under Section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 had to relate to the assessment year in which the corresponding tax deduction was reflected. The undisputed deduction was made during financial year 2022-23 and appeared in Form 26AS for assessment year 2023-24. The reliance on Section 155(20) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Rule 134/Form 71 did not appropriately address this assessment-year mismatch.

Conclusion: The tax deducted at source credit was not allowable in assessment year 2024-25.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings could be sustained where approval for issuance of notice was granted under Section 151 in a mechanical manner without application of mind.

Analysis: The approval merely recorded satisfaction with the reasons of the Assessing Officer and that the case was fit for issuance of notice, without disclosing any independent consideration of the material or statutory requirements. Conflicting non-jurisdictional High Court views on the sufficiency of such approval remained independent because summary dismissal of special leave petitions did not attract the doctrine of merger or declare binding law. Applying the interpretation favourable to the assessee, the requirement of sanction was treated as a substantive safeguard requiring meaningful application of mind. Even an administrative approval was required to be reasoned and could not be ritualistic or mechanical.

Conclusion: The approval under Section 151 was invalid for want of application of mind, and the consequential reassessment was quashed.