Limitation for challenging a tribunal order starts on communication when the party had no prior knowledge.

Where a statutory remedy is subject to a forty-five-day limitation period, time does not fairly run from the date the Tribunal merely made or dictated the order if the affected party had no actual or constructive knowledge of it. Applying fair play and natural justice, the Court treated communication of the signed and sealed order, or other knowledge of its essential contents, as the starting point for limitation. On that basis, the limitation period commenced only on communication of the decision, and the application challenging refusal of reference was treated as within time.

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Issues: Whether the period of forty-five days for filing the application to challenge the order refusing reference ran from the date the Tribunal made the order or from the date the signed order was communicated to the applicant.

Analysis: The governing regulations required the Tribunal to sign and seal the judgment and communicate a copy under the seal of the court and the signature of the Secretary. The Court held that, where no prior intimation of the date of pronouncement was given and the party had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the order, limitation could not fairly be computed from the mere date on which the order was dictated or made. Relying on the principle of fair play and natural justice, the Court construed the limitation provision as starting only when the aggrieved party received communication of the order or otherwise had knowledge of its essential contents.

Conclusion: The period of limitation commenced from communication of the signed order, not from the date the order was made, and the application was within time.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory remedy is subject to limitation and the affected party has no actual or constructive knowledge of the decision, time runs from communication of the decision or from the point at which the party is deemed to know its essential contents.

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