Limitation for orders without notice runs from actual or constructive knowledge, and a broad challenge can cover the earlier forest order.

An appeal under the Indian Forest Act was construed broadly enough to cover the earlier Forest Settlement Officer order admitting the claim, even though the memorandum referred to a later recording order, because the challenge was to the substance of the adjudication. For limitation, where an order affecting rights is made without notice, time runs from actual or constructive communication or knowledge, not merely the date written on the order. Applying that principle, limitation was counted from the date the Forest Department became aware of the order, so the appeal was within time and not barred.

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Issues: (i) Whether the appeal under Section 17 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 covered the earlier order of the Forest Settlement Officer dated 9 May 1955 though the memorandum of appeal referred to the later order dated 24 April 1956. (ii) Whether limitation for filing the appeal under Section 17 began from the date of the recorded order or from the date on which the affected party had actual or constructive knowledge of the order.

Issue (i): Whether the appeal under Section 17 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 covered the earlier order of the Forest Settlement Officer dated 9 May 1955 though the memorandum of appeal referred to the later order dated 24 April 1956.

Analysis: The prayer in the appeal sought setting aside of the orders admitting the claim, and the description of the challenge was wide enough to include the order by which the claim had in fact been allowed on 9 May 1955. The later recording on 24 April 1956 merely reflected that the claim had been admitted and did not alter the substantive nature of the earlier adjudication.

Conclusion: The appeal was held to be directed against the earlier order as well.

Issue (ii): Whether limitation for filing the appeal under Section 17 began from the date of the recorded order or from the date on which the affected party had actual or constructive knowledge of the order.

Analysis: Where an order affecting rights is made without notice to the affected party and in its absence, the principle of fair play requires that limitation should not run mechanically from the date written on the order. The relevant date is when the order is communicated or otherwise becomes known actually or constructively, because a remedy cannot be defeated for want of notice. This principle was applied to the appellate remedy under the Forest Act.

Conclusion: Limitation was held to run from 24 April 1956, when the Forest Department became aware of the order, and the appeal was not time-barred.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the appellate order failed, since the appeal under the Forest Act was maintainable against the earlier order and was within time on the basis of knowledge of the order, leaving no ground to interfere with the dismissal of the writ petition.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an order affecting rights is passed without notice to the affected party, the expression denoting the date of the order for limitation purposes means the date of actual or constructive communication or knowledge, not merely the date written on the order.

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