Condonation of delay turns on the credibility of the explanation, not delay length alone, in challenging an ex parte decree.

Condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act depends on whether the explanation is acceptable, not on the length of delay alone. A liberal approach may advance substantial justice, but it cannot excuse gross negligence or a deliberate delay strategy. Here, the appellant had engaged counsel from the outset and its claim of ignorance of the ex parte decree was supported by the record, including the fact that the alleged notice was received by a person who had already ceased to be in service. No negligence or falsity was shown in the explanation, so the delay in seeking to set aside the ex parte decree was satisfactorily explained and ought to have been condoned.

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Issues: Whether the delay of 1,932 days in seeking to set aside the ex parte decree was satisfactorily explained and liable to be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: In considering condonation of delay, the decisive test is the acceptability of the explanation, not the length of delay by itself. A liberal approach is permissible to advance substantial justice, but it does not extend to gross negligence or a dilatory strategy. The appellant had engaged counsel at the outset and asserted that it was unaware of the decree. The alleged notice relied on by the respondent was received by a person shown to have ceased to be in service before the date of receipt, and the record supported that position. In those circumstances, no negligence could be attributed to the appellant, and the explanation did not appear false or frivolous. The Court also noticed the pending BIFR proceedings but did not rest its decision on that aspect.

Conclusion: The delay was satisfactorily explained and ought to have been condoned.

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