Issues: Whether an order imposing penalty under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be passed while the assessee's appeal against the relevant assessment order was pending before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 253 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 275(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires penalty proceedings to remain in abeyance where the relevant assessment order is the subject of a pending appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. The appeal had been filed and remained pending when the penalty order was made; whether the Assessing Officer had been intimated of the appeal was immaterial.

Conclusion: The penalty order passed during the pendency of the Tribunal appeal contravened Section 275(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and could not stand, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether an adjudicating authority may confirm GST tax and penalty exceeding the amounts proposed in the show-cause notice, contrary to Section 75(7).

Analysis: Section 75(7) was treated as mandatory and as restricting the adjudicating authority from confirming a demand greater than that proposed in the show-cause notice. The notice proposed tax and penalty of Rs. 16,20,000 each, whereas the adjudication order confirmed tax and penalty of Rs. 25,28,400 each.

Conclusion: No; confirmation of tax and penalty exceeding the amounts proposed in the show-cause notice was without jurisdiction and invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether an ex parte GST adjudication order could stand when the taxpayer's request for relied-upon documents and for cross-examination had not been addressed.

Analysis: The Revenue could not dispute the asserted procedural error. The ex parte order was therefore set aside, and the adjudicating authority was directed to furnish the available relied-upon documents, exclude from reliance any documents not furnished, consider any cross-examination request through a reasoned order, and thereafter undertake fresh adjudication.

Conclusion: The ex parte adjudication was set aside for fresh proceedings after disclosure of relied-upon documents and determination of the cross-examination request, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the amended pre-deposit requirement under Section 107(6) applies to a statutory appeal against a penalty-only order where the show-cause notice was issued before 1 October 2025.

Analysis: Section 107(6) governs the pre-deposit required for maintaining a statutory appeal. The liability imposed was solely penalty, and the show-cause notice initiating the proceedings preceded the amendment effective from 1 October 2025. These facts attracted the applicable principles governing pre-deposit in penalty-only proceedings initiated before that amendment.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to the benefit of the applicable pre-deposit principles for the penalty-only proceedings, and the requirement under Section 107(6) shall be determined accordingly.

Issues: Whether deduction under the first proviso to section 36(1)(viia)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is an alternative to deduction under the main clause and is unavailable once the main-clause deduction has been allowed.

Analysis: Section 36(1)(viia)(a) permits deduction for provisions for bad and doubtful debts within the prescribed ceiling, while the first proviso addresses provisions for assets classified under RBI guidelines as doubtful or loss assets. The expression "at its option" vests the choice of claiming the special statutory benefit in the assessee and cannot be treated as surplusage. Reading the proviso as an alternative mechanism controlled by the Assessing Officer would deprive that expression of operative effect. The proviso, enacted to address banking-sector provisioning for specified assets, must receive effect within its express factual requirements and statutory limits.

Conclusion: The first-proviso deduction is not automatically exhausted or barred merely because deduction under section 36(1)(viia)(a) has been allowed. The issue is answered in favour of the assessee, subject to satisfaction of the prescribed conditions, RBI classification requirement and statutory ceiling.

Issues: (i) Whether the bond and bank-guarantee requirements for provisional release of the seized consignment required modification; (ii) Whether demurrage and other charges on the detained consignment were liable to be waived.

Issue (i): Whether the bond and bank-guarantee requirements for provisional release of the seized consignment required modification.

Analysis: The tariff value justified securing the assessable value through a bond. However, fine and penalty would become recoverable only if the investigation established the Revenue's case and after the consequential litigation; their quantification at the provisional-release stage was premature. The previous final clearance of a consignment from the same exporter on the basis of a certificate of origin also supported recalibration of the security conditions.

Conclusion: The issue was determined partly in favour of the assessee. Provisional release was made subject to a bond of Rs.9,05,73,295 and a bank guarantee of Rs.1,00,00,000.

Issue (ii): Whether demurrage and other charges on the detained consignment were liable to be waived.

Analysis: Regulation 6(1)(l) prohibits a Customs Cargo Service Provider from charging rent or demurrage on goods that are seized, detained or confiscated, subject to any other applicable law.

Conclusion: The issue was determined in favour of the assessee. Complete waiver of demurrage and other charges for the detained consignment was directed.

Final Conclusion: The provisional-release safeguards were recalibrated to protect revenue without requiring security for unascertained penal liabilities, and the detained consignment was entitled to waiver of demurrage and related charges.

Ratio Decidendi: Security for provisional release must adequately protect revenue, but cannot be fixed by prematurely quantifying fine and penalty before investigation establishes the underlying liability.

Issues: (i) Whether the show-cause notice was invalid because it was issued by an Assistant Commissioner and later corrected by corrigendum, and for want of pre-notice consultation; (ii) Whether differential customs duty could be demanded under Section 28 without first challenging self-assessment; (iii) Whether the imported CKD e-bike components were classifiable as complete electrically operated motorcycles under CTH 87116020; (iv) Whether the goods qualified for concessional duty under Serial No. 531A(1), or alternatively Serial No. 531A(2), of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017; (v) Whether confiscation and penalty were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the show-cause notice was invalid because it was issued by an Assistant Commissioner and later corrected by corrigendum, and for want of pre-notice consultation.

Analysis: An officer designated as an officer of customs under Section 2(34) of the Customs Act, 1962 is a proper officer for the assigned function. A corrigendum issued before adjudication that merely corrected the clause making the notice answerable to the Principal Commissioner caused no prejudice and related back to the notice. The record also showed receipt of the pre-consultative letter.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice and adjudication proceedings were valid, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether differential customs duty could be demanded under Section 28 without first challenging self-assessment.

Analysis: Recovery proceedings for duty not levied or not paid under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 are distinct from refund proceedings. The existence of self-assessment did not bar issuance of a notice for recovery of differential duty.

Conclusion: Differential duty could be demanded under Section 28 without prior challenge to self-assessment, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the imported CKD e-bike components were classifiable as complete electrically operated motorcycles under CTH 87116020.

Analysis: Rule 2(a) of the General Rules for the Interpretation of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 requires classification by the identity and essential character of goods as presented for assessment. An incomplete vehicle may retain the essential character of a complete vehicle despite absence of items such as a battery or charger. The imported goods were declared as e-bikes in CKD condition with pre-assembled essential parts and components.

Conclusion: The goods possessed the essential character of complete electrically operated motorcycles and were correctly classified under CTH 87116020, against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the goods qualified for concessional duty under Serial No. 531A(1), or alternatively Serial No. 531A(2), of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017.

Analysis: The exemption under Serial No. 531A(1) required a knocked-down kit containing all necessary components for assembly of the complete vehicle. Battery packs, chargers and electric compressors were admittedly not imported. The alternative exemption had not been claimed in the Bills of Entry and could not be claimed subsequently.

Conclusion: The claimed concessional and alternative exemption benefits were unavailable, against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether confiscation and penalty were sustainable.

Analysis: Confiscation under Section 111(m) of the Customs Act, 1962 and imposition of redemption fine are legally distinct. The absence of redemption fine did not invalidate confiscation or the penalty under Section 112(a)(ii) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Conclusion: The confiscation and penalty were sustainable, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The denial of the claimed exemption and the consequential customs liability were maintained.

Issues: Whether the impugned orders, being consequential implementation of prior binding appellate directions, warranted appellate interference.

Analysis: The order under challenge merely reiterated earlier appellate directions, already affirmed by the Supreme Court, and supplied no independent factual or legal finding affecting the merits of the company petition. The connected directions were consequential compliance measures. Entertaining the challenge would indirectly reopen the affirmed appellate directions.

Conclusion: The consequential orders did not warrant appellate interference and remain governed by the finality of the prior affirmed directions.

Issues: Whether cancellation, refund and no-show charges recovered by an airline from passengers constitute consideration for a distinct declared service of agreeing to tolerate an act.

Analysis: Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994 applies where an agreement is intended to tolerate an act for consideration. The passenger-airline contract is intended for carriage of the passenger in return for fare; cancellation charges operate only upon the passenger's failure to perform that contract. Such charges are liquidated damages compensating the airline for breach and do not arise from a separate agreement to tolerate cancellation or default. The absence of a service charge makes the question of abatement immaterial.

Conclusion: Cancellation, refund and no-show charges are compensation for breach of contract and are not taxable as consideration for tolerating an act under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Issues: Whether tender fee collected for supplying tender documents is consideration for a taxable service liable to service tax.

Analysis: Service tax under Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 requires an identifiable service provided for consideration. The prescribed tender fee was the cost of supplying tender documents and constituted sale or supply of documents, rather than a service rendered to bidders. A tender is merely an invitation to offer and does not create a contractual service arrangement between the tendering authority and every purchaser of tender documents.

Conclusion: Tender fee collected towards supply of tender documents is not consideration for a taxable service and is not liable to service tax; decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of service tax from a subcontractor where conflicting decisions had created uncertainty about the subcontractor's tax liability after payment of tax by the main contractor.

Analysis: The substantive tax liability of a subcontractor stood settled by the Larger Bench decision. However, prior conflicting Tribunal decisions had generated genuine uncertainty on whether a subcontractor was independently liable where the main contractor had paid service tax. This acknowledged confusion supported the appellant's bona fide belief and precluded invocation of the extended limitation period under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994. The normal limitation period remained unaffected.

Conclusion: The extended-period demand and the penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994, were set aside; the demand for the normal period and the penalty under Section 72 of the Finance Act, 1994, were sustained. The issue was decided partly in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the relevant date for limitation of refund of accumulated CENVAT credit attributable to export of services is the date of the export invoice or the last day of the quarter in which foreign exchange is received; and (ii) Whether refund of CENVAT credit can be denied solely because the invoices relate to unregistered premises.

Issue (i): Whether the relevant date for limitation of refund of accumulated CENVAT credit attributable to export of services is the date of the export invoice or the last day of the quarter in which foreign exchange is received.

Analysis: Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, read with Notification No. 27/2012-C.E. (N.T.) dated 18.06.2012, governed the refund. Although Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 applied to such refund claims, it did not prescribe a specific relevant date for export of services. The applicable principle fixed the relevant date as the last day of the quarter in which the export proceeds were received in foreign exchange. The date of the export invoice could not invariably be adopted, and the prospective character of the subsequent notification did not displace that principle.

Conclusion: The one-year limitation is to be reckoned from the last day of the quarter in which foreign exchange is received, and not from the date of the export invoice. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether refund of CENVAT credit can be denied solely because the invoices relate to unregistered premises.

Analysis: Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, did not make registration of the premises a prerequisite for refund of unutilised CENVAT credit attributable to exported services. The requirement concerning the jurisdictional authority for filing the refund application could not operate as a prohibition on refund merely because the premises from which services were exported were unregistered. The jurisdictional High Court ruling on this point was binding.

Conclusion: Refund cannot be denied merely because the invoices pertain to unregistered premises. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The limitation objection based on the export-invoice date and the objection based solely on non-registration of premises cannot defeat the refund claim.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax on construction of the residential complex was sustainable under Construction of Residential Complex Service; (ii) Whether receipts accounted for as sub-contract and petty job receipts were liable to service tax under the same category; and (iii) Whether the demand under Renting of Immovable Property Service was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether service tax on construction of the residential complex was sustainable under Construction of Residential Complex Service.

Analysis: The statutory definition of a residential complex required proof that the prescribed conditions, including the number of dwelling units, were satisfied. The material did not establish that the additional units were constructed by, or attributable to, the appellant. Further, the Explanation inserted in Section 65(105)(zzzh) with effect from 01.07.2010 could not be retrospectively applied to construction undertaken before that date. The contracts were composite contracts involving goods and services; such contracts could not be taxed under the construction-service categories, which applied to services simpliciter.

Conclusion: The construction-service demand was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether receipts accounted for as sub-contract and petty job receipts were liable to service tax under the same category.

Analysis: The receipts were treated as consideration for construction services without establishing their precise nature or that they represented independently taxable services simpliciter. The absence of documents from the appellant did not displace the Department's obligation to prove the taxable service and its legal basis. The reasoning applicable to composite works contracts also precluded their taxation under the construction-service category.

Conclusion: The demand on sub-contract and petty job receipts was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the demand under Renting of Immovable Property Service was sustainable.

Analysis: Commercial letting alone did not establish the amount of tax payable. The eligibility for small service provider exemption, year-wise rental receipts, and the asserted tax payment on later receipts required verification. The allegations were not supported by sufficient evidence or cogent rebuttal of these matters; consequently, the evidentiary benefit enured to the appellant.

Conclusion: The demand under Renting of Immovable Property Service was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The construction-related and rental demands lacked a sustainable legal and evidentiary basis, and the associated penalties could not survive.

Issues: (i) Whether sewage and drainage pumps were eligible for the concessional duty rate under Entry No. 235 of Notification No. 12/2012-C.E. dated 17.03.2012; (ii) Whether the earlier audit objection or the principle of res judicata precluded Revenue from denying the concessional rate; (iii) Whether the penalty imposed for availing the concessional rate was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether sewage and drainage pumps were eligible for the concessional duty rate under Entry No. 235 of Notification No. 12/2012-C.E. dated 17.03.2012.

Analysis: Entry No. 235 grants the concessional rate only to power-driven pumps primarily designed for handling water. As the expression "water" is undefined, it was construed in its common and commercial sense as clean water, and not as sewage or drainage water. A claimant for a concessional notification must establish clear compliance with its conditions. The material showed that sewage and drainage pumps had a different design and manufacturing process from pumps for handling water; the engineer's certificate only stated that the pumps could also handle clean water and did not establish design similarity.

Conclusion: Sewage and drainage pumps were not eligible for the concessional rate under Entry No. 235; the differential duty and applicable interest were rightly sustained, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the earlier audit objection or the principle of res judicata precluded Revenue from denying the concessional rate.

Analysis: The audit objection was neither implemented through adjudication nor accepted by the assessee, which continued to pay duty at the full rate until March 2016. It therefore did not constitute a concluded determination capable of binding Revenue. Further, res judicata does not apply to distinct tax periods in the manner asserted, and a different position may be adopted where the prior view is not a binding final decision.

Conclusion: The earlier audit objection did not bar Revenue from denying the concessional rate, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the penalty imposed for availing the concessional rate was sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee had initially paid duty at the full rate and began claiming the concession after the audit objection. Revenue subsequently reversed its position and demanded differential duty. These circumstances did not disclose evidence warranting the penalty retained by the appellate authority.

Conclusion: The penalty was unsustainable and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The differential duty together with interest remains enforceable, while no penalty is exigible.

Ratio Decidendi: A claimant for a concessional excise notification must establish strict satisfaction of its conditions, and an undefined product expression is to be understood in its common-parlance meaning.

Issues: (i) Whether the claimed transitional input tax credit attributable to input services, exceeding the closing balance reflected in the ER-1 and ST-3 returns, required verification. (ii) Whether the notice under section 74(1) could be sustained on the alleged wilful misstatement or suppression of facts.

Issue (i): Whether the claimed transitional input tax credit attributable to input services, exceeding the closing balance reflected in the ER-1 and ST-3 returns, required verification.

Analysis: Section 140(1) permits carry-forward of eligible credit under the existing law. The difference between the credit declared in TRAN-1 and the balance reported in the pre-GST returns required verification against the relevant records before entitlement could be determined.

Conclusion: The transitional credit claim is to be verified by the Proper Officer/Adjudicating Authority through a reasoned order.

Issue (ii): Whether the notice under section 74(1) could be sustained on the alleged wilful misstatement or suppression of facts.

Analysis: Invocation of section 74(1) requires material establishing fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with a deliberate intent to evade tax. Mere incorrect information or an ordinary non-declaration does not by itself establish those elements. No investigation or evidence establishing such deliberate intent was on record.

Conclusion: The notice issued under section 74(1) was not sustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The transitional-credit claim remains subject to factual verification, but the fraud-based notice cannot be maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: An incorrect declaration, without material evidence of a deliberate intent to evade tax, does not establish wilful misstatement or suppression of facts for invoking section 74(1).

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked on an allegation of suppression of facts.

Analysis: The differential demand arose from an audit-based verification of the assessee's books of account and invoices, with a prior departmental communication quantifying the liability. The record disclosed no material establishing deliberate suppression of facts or an intent to evade tax. Mere delayed payment and detection upon scrutiny of accounts were insufficient to invoke the extended period of limitation. A show-cause notice issued beyond the normal limitation period raises a jurisdictional challenge and cannot sustain the demand.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable; the show-cause notice and consequential demand were time-barred, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether reassessment of an assessee, based exclusively on incriminating material found during a search of third parties, could be initiated under Sections 147 and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 instead of Section 153C of that Act.

Analysis: The statutory scheme for search assessments treats Section 153C as the special mechanism where material relating to an other person is found during a search. Its invocation requires the prescribed satisfaction to be recorded by the Assessing Officer of the searched person and communicated to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer. The general reassessment provisions under Sections 147 and 148 are unavailable where the sole basis is such transmitted search material; they may apply only where independent material from another source indicates escaped income. The reassessment here rested solely on search material, without a satisfaction note or independent material.

Conclusion: The reopening under Section 148 was without jurisdiction. Assessment or reassessment founded solely on the search material could proceed, if at all, under Section 153C upon compliance with its satisfaction requirement, while Sections 147 and 148 could be invoked only on independent material.

Ratio Decidendi: Where search material concerning an other person is the exclusive basis for reassessment, the special procedure under Section 153C, subject to recorded satisfaction, excludes recourse to Sections 147 and 148 unless independent material supports such reassessment.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the GST Act could be imposed for transporting goods with an expired e-way bill without proof of intent to evade tax.

Analysis: Section 129(1) authorises detention and penalty where goods are transported in contravention of the Act or the rules. The provision does not make proof of intent to evade tax a condition for imposition of penalty; the penalty concerns breach of a civil statutory obligation. Rule 138(10) permitted extension of the e-way bill validity within the stipulated period, but no extension was obtained. Although the accompanying invoice, bilty, and particulars of the goods were undisputed, the vehicle was found in transit nearly three days after expiry of the e-way bill. The GPS report concerned a different vehicle number and was generated after interception. The repair documents were estimates, unsigned credit memoranda, or otherwise unreliable documents and did not credibly establish the alleged breakdown. The subsequent disclosure of breakdown also lacked contemporaneous support. Circular No. 64 dated 14.09.2018 did not exempt transportation under an expired e-way bill from proceedings under Section 129.

Conclusion: Proof of intent to evade tax is not necessary for penalty under Section 129(1)(a), and transportation after expiry of the e-way bill without credible justification attracted the provision. The issue was answered against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Validity of the reassessment notices and resulting reassessments based on erroneous investigation information and previously examined share transactions; (ii) Legality of the addition under Sections 69 and 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 concerning recorded purchases of equity shares; (iii) Legality of the addition under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 of equity-share sale proceeds already recorded and offered to tax.

Issue (i): Validity of the reassessment notices and resulting reassessments based on erroneous investigation information and previously examined share transactions.

Analysis: Sections 147 and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 require a reason to believe founded on tangible material, and do not permit review of a completed scrutiny assessment under Section 143(3) on a mere change of opinion. The recorded reasons misstated the quantum and nature of the share transactions, relied mechanically on investigation information and a subsequently retracted statement, and overlooked that the transactions, supporting documents and source of funds had already been specifically examined in the original scrutiny assessment. The reopening therefore rested on borrowed satisfaction, non-application of mind and material already considered.

Conclusion: The reassessment notices and consequent reassessments were invalid and were quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Legality of the addition under Sections 69 and 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 concerning recorded purchases of equity shares.

Analysis: The equity-share purchases were made through recognised stock exchanges and a registered broker, and were supported by contract notes, broker ledgers, bank records and evidence of source of funds. The investments were recorded in the books and had also been examined in the original assessment. The addition was based principally on a retracted third-party statement that was neither supplied to the assessee nor subjected to cross-examination. On the reasoning adopted, Section 69A could not be invoked for recorded investments whose source had been explained.

Conclusion: The addition for alleged unexplained investment was unsustainable and was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Legality of the addition under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 of equity-share sale proceeds already recorded and offered to tax.

Analysis: The disputed amount represented sale proceeds of equity shares, rather than an investment, and the sales were executed through recognised stock exchanges and a registered broker. Contract notes, bank statements, broker records and sale details were available, while the corresponding income had been accounted for in the books and offered to tax. Treating the gross sale proceeds as unexplained investment under Section 69A was factually and legally untenable and resulted in double taxation.

Conclusion: The addition of the recorded sale proceeds was unsustainable and was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment jurisdiction was unavailable on the recorded reasons, and neither the recorded share purchases nor the accounted sale proceeds could be brought to tax as unexplained amounts.

Issues: Whether GST registration could be cancelled for non-production of a rent agreement for an additional place of business despite proof of the principal place of business.

Analysis: Section 29(2)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, read with Rule 21 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, permits cancellation where the prescribed contraventions are established, including where no business is conducted from a declared place of business. Rule 25 contemplates physical verification of business premises in specified cases. Rule 8 and Form REG-01 require documentary proof concerning the principal place of business; they do not prescribe submission of a rent agreement for an additional place of business as a condition for continuation of registration. The petitioner had furnished proof for the undisputed principal place of business, while the cancellation notice and order rested solely on absence of a rent agreement for the additional place.

Conclusion: Cancellation of registration on that ground was contrary to the statutory scheme; the show-cause notice and cancellation order were quashed and the GST registration was restored from the date of suspension.