Issues: Whether a first-motion application for a merger scheme may be rejected on the basis of an appointed date more than one year before filing, alleged delay in filing, and preliminary document-related concerns before shareholders and creditors consider the scheme.

Analysis: Sections 230 and 232 of the Companies Act, 2013 contemplate a two-stage scheme process. At the first stage, the proposed amalgamation is primarily for consideration by shareholders and creditors, whose interests are directly implicated; threshold intervention is therefore inappropriate merely on matters that can be assessed after their decision and with the benefit of inputs from regulators and tax authorities. Regulation 37 of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 required the listed company to obtain stock-exchange observations based on SEBI observations before approaching the Tribunal. The interval required for that mandatory regulatory process could not be attributed to the applicants where they approached the Tribunal promptly after the observations were received. General Circular No. 09/2019 concerns an appointed date significantly ante-dated beyond one year and requires justification and consistency with public interest; it does not warrant a mechanical threshold rejection. Concerns regarding delay, valuation, and related matters may be evaluated at the second stage.

Conclusion: Rejection of the first-motion application on the stated grounds was premature and unsustainable; the process for convening stakeholder meetings was required to proceed, with fuller scrutiny reserved for the second stage.

Issues: Whether statutory ESI contributions payable by a corporate debtor are trust assets excluded from the liquidation estate under Section 36(4)(a)(i) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, rather than ordinary operational debts subject to distribution under Section 53.

Analysis: Section 40(4) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 governs the employer's statutory obligation to deposit ESI contributions, including amounts recoverable from employees' wages. Amounts so retained for statutory employee-benefit purposes are held in trust and constitute third-party assets. Section 36(4)(a)(i) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 excludes such trust assets from the liquidation estate. Filing the claim in Form B is procedural and does not alter the substantive character of the contributions or estop the claimant from invoking the statutory exclusion. The absence of an express reference to ESI contributions in Section 36(4)(a)(iii) does not affect the independent exclusion available under Section 36(4)(a)(i).

Conclusion: ESI contributions falling within Section 40(4) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 are trust assets excluded from the liquidation estate under Section 36(4)(a)(i) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. They cannot be treated as ordinary Government or operational creditor dues or subjected to the Section 53 waterfall; the qualifying amount must be determined from the statutory records and contribution period.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax under reverse charge was payable on foreign services in respect of which deductions were claimed under Rules 4, 9 and 10 of the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012; (ii) Whether demurrage charges paid for delay in loading or discharge of cargo constituted consideration for a taxable service.

Issue (i): Whether service tax under reverse charge was payable on foreign services in respect of which deductions were claimed under Rules 4, 9 and 10 of the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012.

Analysis: The show-cause notice applied the default Rule 3 without specifying why the assessee's disclosed claims under Rules 4, 9 and 10 were unavailable. As the demand arose from ST-3 returns and audit records already available to Revenue, and the assessee had furnished supporting documents, the extended period could not be invoked. The burden to establish taxability and inapplicability of the claimed place-of-provision rules remained on Revenue. The adjudicating authority had separately considered the fifteen categories of services and correctly accepted the deductions under Rules 4, 9 and 10.

Conclusion: The dropped service-tax demand of Rs. 143,01,41,936 was rightly dropped; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether demurrage charges paid for delay in loading or discharge of cargo constituted consideration for a taxable service.

Analysis: Demurrage was payable as a penal charge for delay and not as consideration for services received. Such charges are in the nature of liquidated damages or penal rent and are outside the service-tax levy.

Conclusion: Demurrage charges were not taxable, and the service-tax demand of Rs. 1,26,16,689 together with penalty was unsustainable; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: No service-tax liability survives under the impugned show-cause notice.

Ratio Decidendi: A reverse-charge demand cannot be sustained where the show-cause notice does not establish the inapplicability of the specific place-of-provision rules invoked by the assessee, and penal demurrage is not consideration for a taxable service.

Issues: (i) Whether the 23% licence and facility charges received from the kitchen operator under a revenue-sharing arrangement were consideration for Business Support Service; and (ii) whether payouts linked to sales of alcoholic beverages constituted consideration for Advertisement Service.

Issue (i): Whether the 23% licence and facility charges received from the kitchen operator under a revenue-sharing arrangement were consideration for Business Support Service.

Analysis: Section 65(104c) of the Finance Act, 1994 covers infrastructural support provided to support the business or commerce of a service recipient. The agreement provided for the appellant to receive 23% of the kitchen operator's net turnover, while both entities jointly operated the restaurant on a principal-to-principal basis. Circular No. 109/3/2009-S.T. recognises that, in a revenue-sharing arrangement between principal-to-principal parties, neither party renders a taxable service to the other merely because a predetermined share of revenue is received.

Conclusion: The licence and facility charges were a revenue share and not consideration for Business Support Service; the service-tax demand on this count was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether payouts linked to sales of alcoholic beverages constituted consideration for Advertisement Service.

Analysis: The payouts comprised stock and cash incentives received from distributors based on the volume of alcoholic beverages sold under specific agreements. The receipts were linked to sales of goods and did not represent consideration for sale of space or time, or for advertising or promoting alcoholic beverages.

Conclusion: The payouts were sales incentives and not consideration for Advertisement Service; the service-tax demand on this count was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: As neither receipt constituted consideration for a taxable service, the associated interest and penalties could not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: A genuine principal-to-principal revenue-sharing arrangement, without provision of support to a service recipient, does not create taxable Business Support Service; sales-linked incentives not paid for advertising activity are not taxable consideration for Advertisement Service.

Issues: (i) Whether compulsory generation and carriage of an e-way bill under Rule 138 applied to inter-State movement on 24 November 2017; (ii) Whether detention, seizure and penalty for non-production of an e-way bill were sustainable on that date.

Issue (i): Whether compulsory generation and carriage of an e-way bill under Rule 138 applied to inter-State movement on 24 November 2017.

Analysis: Rule 138 was substituted by Notification No. 27/2017-Central Tax dated 30.08.2017, but its compulsory operational date for e-way bill compliance was subsequently notified. The nationwide mandatory requirement was brought into force from 1 April 2018, which was after the interception on 24 November 2017.

Conclusion: No; compulsory e-way bill compliance under Rule 138 did not apply on 24 November 2017. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether detention, seizure and penalty for non-production of an e-way bill were sustainable on that date.

Analysis: The goods corresponded with the tax invoice and transport documents, and no discrepancy was found in their quantity, weight or description. The buyer and seller were bona fide dealers, the vehicle was on its designated route, and no material established tax evasion or an intention to evade tax. Since the mandatory e-way bill requirement was not in force on the relevant date, proceedings under Sections 129 and 122 could not rest on its non-production.

Conclusion: No; detention, seizure and penalty for non-production of an e-way bill on that date were unsustainable. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: Non-production of an e-way bill before Rule 138 became compulsory could not constitute a breach supporting detention or penal action where the accompanying transaction documents were genuine and no tax-evasion intent was shown.

Ratio Decidendi: Detention and penalty for failure to carry an e-way bill cannot be sustained where the compulsory requirement under Rule 138 had not come into force on the date of movement and no tax evasion is established.

Issues: Whether penalty for transport of goods with an expired e-way bill containing details of a vehicle wholly different from the vehicle actually carrying the goods was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 68 requires prescribed documents to accompany goods in transit, while Explanation (2) to Rule 138(3) requires Part B of the e-way bill to contain correct vehicle particulars for a valid movement. The limited relaxation under Circular No. 64/38/2018-GST applies to minor errors in one or two digits or characters and does not extend to substitution of an entirely different vehicle. An incomplete or incorrect e-way bill gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of intention to evade tax; such intention may be inferred from surrounding circumstances. Here, the e-way bill had expired, named a different vehicle, and the stated diversion and delay were unsupported by a timely explanation or credible material rebutting that presumption.

Conclusion: The penalty was validly imposed and the concurrent findings were sustained against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the imported surgical tools were classifiable under CTH 9021 as orthopaedic appliances or under CTH 9018 as orthopaedic instruments; (ii) Whether the benefit of basic customs duty exemption under Item E(9) of List 30 was available for the period from 16.07.2018 to 12.12.2019; and (iii) Whether the concessional IGST benefit under Item E(9) of List 3 was available for the relevant period.

Issue (i): Whether the imported surgical tools were classifiable under CTH 9021 as orthopaedic appliances or under CTH 9018 as orthopaedic instruments.

Analysis: Chapter Note 6 to Chapter 90 confines orthopaedic appliances under Heading 9021 to appliances for preventing or correcting bodily deformities or for supporting or holding body parts following illness, operation or injury. The relevant goods were surgical tools used by surgeons and health-care professionals during operative procedures and were neither worn, carried or implanted in a patient. Heading 9018 specifically covers instruments and appliances used in medical and surgical sciences. The previous self-assessment of the same goods under Heading 9018 and the verified functional use of each imported item supported classification as surgical instruments.

Conclusion: The goods are classifiable under CTH 9018 and not under CTH 9021; the issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the benefit of basic customs duty exemption under Item E(9) of List 30 was available for the period from 16.07.2018 to 12.12.2019.

Analysis: For the stated period, Item E(9) of List 30 covered instruments and implants for severely physically handicapped patients, including spinal instruments. The imported goods were surgical tools specifically designed for spinal surgeries and therefore fell within the then applicable entry. The later amendment removing the word "instruments" did not govern the disputed pre-amendment period.

Conclusion: The basic customs duty exemption was available for the period from 16.07.2018 to 12.12.2019; the issue is against the Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether the concessional IGST benefit under Item E(9) of List 3 was available for the relevant period.

Analysis: Item E(9) of List 3 under the IGST notification was identical to the corresponding pre-amendment customs exemption entry. Since the goods qualified under the customs entry for the earlier period, the identical IGST entry also applied. Unlike the customs notification, Item E(9) of List 3 was not amended to remove instruments, and its benefit consequently continued during the relevant period.

Conclusion: The concessional IGST benefit under Item E(9) of List 3 remained available; the issue is against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: Surgical tools used in spinal procedures remain subject to classification as medical or surgical instruments, while the applicable pre-amendment customs exemption and the unamended corresponding IGST entry preserve the stated concessional benefits.

Issues: Whether specially designed disposable microcuvettes used with an analyser are classifiable as parts of analytical instruments under CTI 9027 9090 or as articles of plastic under CTI 3926 9099.

Analysis: Note 2(b) to Chapter 90 classifies parts and accessories suitable for sole or principal use with a particular instrument along with that instrument; permanent physical attachment is not required. The microcuvettes possessed specialised dimensions, configuration, material and optical characteristics necessary for calibration, spectrophotometry and accurate analytical operation of the analyser. Their function in processing samples and reagents, coupled with the absence of any established general or alternative use, demonstrated their sole or principal suitability for the analyser. Disposable character alone does not prevent an article from being a part or accessory, and classification depends on objective characteristics and functional use rather than material of manufacture.

Conclusion: The microcuvettes are parts of the analyser classifiable under CTI 9027 9090, and not articles of plastic under CTI 3926 9099.

Issues: (i) Entitlement to concessional basic customs duty under Notification No. 46/2011-Cus. for the disputed imports; (ii) Whether Notification No. 35/2013-Customs operates retrospectively; (iii) Validity of invoking the extended period of limitation.

Issue (i): Entitlement to concessional basic customs duty under Notification No. 46/2011-Cus. for the disputed imports

Analysis: On the dates of the disputed Bills of Entry, Notification No. 127/2011-Customs governed the exemption and did not cover goods under the relevant tariff heading. The subsequent Notification No. 64/2012-Customs also did not restore the omitted entry. No unequivocal governmental acknowledgment established that the omission was a drafting error. Strict construction of tax exemption notifications precluded extending the benefit beyond their expressed terms.

Conclusion: The concessional basic customs duty benefit was unavailable for the disputed imports; decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Notification No. 35/2013-Customs operates retrospectively

Analysis: Notification No. 35/2013-Customs restored the benefit for the specified goods but did not prescribe retrospective operation. In fiscal matters, a notification operates prospectively unless retrospective intent is expressly stated or necessarily follows from its terms; an alleged omission cannot supply such intent.

Conclusion: Notification No. 35/2013-Customs operates prospectively from its Gazette publication; decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Validity of invoking the extended period of limitation

Analysis: The exemption claimed had ceased to be available before the Bills of Entry were filed. Awareness of the amended notification was attributable to the importer, and the claim of an unavailable benefit supported invocation of the extended period of limitation.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was valid; decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The claimed exemption was unavailable at the time of import, its later restoration did not affect prior imports, and the resulting duty demand was sustainable within the extended limitation period.

Ratio Decidendi: A fiscal exemption notification operates prospectively unless its text clearly provides otherwise, and a subsequent extension of exemption cannot confer benefits for an earlier period merely on an alleged omission.

Issues: (i) Whether penalties could be imposed and appropriated from refundable pre-deposit in refund proceedings after an appellate order had set aside the penalties; (ii) Whether interest on the refundable pre-deposit was governed by the pre-6 August 2014 version of Section 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and the point from which such interest was payable.

Issue (i): Whether penalties could be imposed and appropriated from refundable pre-deposit in refund proceedings after an appellate order had set aside the penalties.

Analysis: The prior appellate order had set aside the penalties. A refund claim for the pre-deposit had to be examined consistently with that binding disposition and could not be used to institute a fresh penalty determination or recover penalties by appropriation. Such reopening of penalty liability in refund proceedings was contrary to judicial discipline.

Conclusion: Penalties could not be imposed or appropriated in the refund proceedings; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest on the refundable pre-deposit was governed by the pre-6 August 2014 version of Section 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and the point from which such interest was payable.

Analysis: As the appeal was pending before 6 August 2014, the saving proviso to amended Section 35F, read with Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994, preserved the pre-amendment Section 35FF regime despite the later date of deposit. Under that regime, statutory interest becomes payable only where the refundable amount remains unpaid beyond three months from receipt or communication of the appellate order by the jurisdictional authority, and not from the date of the pre-deposit. The dates on which the respective refundable components became due and the consequential interest require computation.

Conclusion: The pre-amendment Section 35FF governs; interest is not payable from the date of deposit but only after the stipulated three-month period. The assessee's claim for interest from the date of pre-deposit fails.

Final Conclusion: The refundable pre-deposit must be recalculated without the impermissible penalty appropriation, and statutory interest must be computed under the unamended regime for each amount that became refundable.

Issues: Whether the appellant was entitled to service-tax exemption for rent-a-cab service provided to an SEZ unit under Notification No. 4/2004 dated 31.03.2004.

Analysis: The Special Economic Zones Act exempts taxable services supplied to an SEZ Developer or Unit for authorised operations, and the situs of rendering the service does not defeat the exemption where the service is supplied for such operations. Form A-1 issued by the SEZ Specified Officer identified the appellant's rent-a-cab service as an authorised service. No documentary material rebutted that certification; transportation of SEZ staff by pick-up and drop was connected with the authorised service.

Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to the exemption, and denial of the exemption on the ground that the rent-a-cab service was rendered outside the SEZ area was unsustainable.

Issues: Whether the margin earned from the purchase and resale of airline cargo slots at specifically agreed rates is taxable as Business Auxiliary Service.

Analysis: Business Auxiliary Service requires consideration for services rendered to another. Commission received while acting as a general sales agent had already been subjected to service tax. Cargo slots covered by specific rate arrangements carried no commission entitlement; the assessee purchased and resold the slots independently, bearing the possibility of profit or loss. The unchanged factual and legal position warranted application of the earlier final orders on the same issue.

Conclusion: The resale margin arose from an independent, principal-to-principal trading of cargo space and was not consideration for Business Auxiliary Service; the service-tax demand was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the applicant should be granted regular bail in relation to allegations of cess and excise-duty evasion.

Analysis: A prima facie doubt was recorded regarding computation of suspected evasion solely from the recovery and seizure of machinery under the prescribed formula. The observation was confined to bail and did not determine the validity of the Rule or bind the trial court. In the absence of antecedents, and since the machinery had already been seized, an unsupported apprehension of repetition was insufficient to justify continued custody.

Outcome: Regular bail granted.

Issues: Whether proceedings restricting refund under Rule 96(10) could continue after its omission without a savings or sunset clause.

Analysis: The governing principle on omission of subordinate legislation is that an omitted rule cannot sustain pending proceedings unless it is preserved by a savings clause or sunset clause. Rule 96(10) was omitted without such preservation; the recommendation that its omission operate prospectively was advisory and did not retain the rule for pending proceedings.

Conclusion: The omitted Rule 96(10) could not be kept alive to deny the refund claim.

Issues: Whether the writ petitions challenging the penalty proceedings should be entertained despite the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: The detailed objections concerning alleged denial of natural justice, reasonable time for penalty proceedings, competence of the initiating officer, and the applicable penalty provision require appraisal of the adjudication record and statutory framework in appellate jurisdiction. Exhaustion of the statutory appellate remedy was required, and no exceptional basis for writ intervention was established.

Outcome: The statutory appellate remedy remains available; no final adjudication of the merits of the challenges was undertaken.

Issues: Whether an assessment order imposing tax and penalty can be sustained where no personal hearing was afforded despite an adverse decision being contemplated.

Analysis: Section 75(4) of the Uttarakhand Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 mandates an opportunity of hearing where an adverse decision against the taxable person is contemplated. The statutory obligation applies even where the assessee did not separately opt for or request a personal hearing.

Conclusion: The assessment order passed without affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing is invalid and was quashed, with liberty to the Department to pass a fresh order after granting such opportunity.

Issues: Whether refund proceedings could continue under omitted Rule 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 in the absence of a saving or sunset clause.

Analysis: Rule 96(10) stood omitted without any saving or sunset clause. The binding principle governing omission of subordinate legislation was applied: an omitted rule cannot be kept alive to sustain pending proceedings where the rule-making authority has not preserved its operation.

Conclusion: Proceedings under omitted Rule 96(10) could not continue, and rejection of the refund claim solely by reference to that rule was unsustainable.

Issues: Whether interest expenditure directly attributable to taxable interest income under a back-to-back borrowing-and-lending arrangement could be disallowed in computing expenditure relating to exempt income.

Analysis: Section 14A(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 8D(2)(ii) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 applies to interest expenditure not directly attributable to a particular income or receipt. The borrowed funds were advanced in a back-to-back transaction, and the corresponding interest receipt was taxable and exceeded the interest payment. The interest expenditure was therefore directly connected with taxable interest income and was not expenditure incurred for earning exempt income. The absence of separate accounts or use of mixed funds did not alter the concurrent factual finding of a direct nexus.

Conclusion: The interest disallowance under Section 14A(2) read with Rule 8D(2)(ii) was not sustainable; the deletion was upheld in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether an upper turnover filter of Rs. 200 crore could be applied for selecting comparable companies in determining the arm's length price.

Analysis: The challenge concerned comparability under Section 92C(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Rules 10B(3) and 10D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. The sole question pressed by the Revenue was covered in favour of the assessee by a binding co-ordinate Bench decision.

Conclusion: Application of an upper turnover filter of Rs. 200 crore for selection of comparables was sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the cash-payment disallowances under section 40A(3) were sustainable without verified identification of individual contravening payments; and (ii) Whether the first appellate authority could reject unreliable accounts under section 145(3) and estimate business income at 6% of gross receipts.

Issue (i): Whether the cash-payment disallowances under section 40A(3) were sustainable without verified identification of individual contravening payments.

Analysis: Section 40A(3) embodies a mandatory deeming fiction, but its statutory conditions precedent require verified identification of payments exceeding the prescribed limit to a single person on a single day. The accounts, vouchers and supporting records were not produced, and the disallowances were made without specifically establishing each contravening payment. Potential exceptions under Rule 6DD were also not verified against identified entries.

Conclusion: The cash-payment disallowances were unsustainable for want of verified and specified statutory violations, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the first appellate authority could reject unreliable accounts under section 145(3) and estimate business income at 6% of gross receipts.

Analysis: The first appellate authority possesses co-terminous appellate powers with the Assessing Officer. Since the accounts were unavailable for verification and could not be relied upon, rejection of books of account and estimation through best judgment assessment were within those powers. Although an anticipated high profit rate cannot by itself displace a valid statutory disallowance, estimation was permissible because the prerequisites for applying section 40A(3) had not been established.

Conclusion: Rejection of the books and estimation of business income at 6% of gross receipts were valid, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The estimated assessment based on rejected accounts was sustained in place of the unverified cash-payment disallowances.

Ratio Decidendi: A mandatory cash-payment disallowance cannot be sustained unless its statutory prerequisites are established through identified and verified transactions; where accounts are unreliable, the first appellate authority may exercise co-terminous powers to reject the accounts and estimate income.