Exclusive DRT jurisdiction governs bank recovery claims, making Companies Act leave unnecessary and recall of leave order untenable.

The article explains that once revival efforts for the company were abandoned, the later statutory scheme under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 governed recovery proceedings. Sections 17 and 18 vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Debts Recovery Tribunal for bank and financial institution claims, while sections 31 and 34 provide for transfer of pending matters and overriding effect. In that framework, leave under section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 was not required for secured creditors to pursue pending recovery suits, and the earlier leave order was not inconsistent with the special Act. The recall application was therefore held not maintainable on merits.

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Issues: Whether the order granting leave under section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 to secured creditors to prosecute pending recovery suits before the Debts Recovery Tribunal could be recalled in view of the Supreme Court's earlier directions and the exclusive jurisdiction conferred by the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.

Analysis: The earlier direction of the Supreme Court to consider the report of the Claims Committee was issued in the context of the revival proceedings of the company. Once the effort to revive the company was abandoned, the matter had to proceed under the Companies Act, but the later enactment establishing the Debts Recovery Tribunal altered the legal position. Sections 17 and 18 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Tribunal in respect of recovery claims by banks and financial institutions and bar the jurisdiction of other courts, while sections 31 and 34 provide for transfer of pending matters and overriding effect. In that statutory setting, leave under section 446 was not required, and the earlier order granting such leave did not conflict with the mandatory scheme of the special Act.

Conclusion: The recall application was not maintainable on merits and the order granting leave was not liable to be recalled; the decision was against the applicant.

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