Issues: (i) Whether the claimed input tax credit of Rs. 31,115 was admissible; (ii) Whether interest of Rs. 3,80,408 was payable where suppliers were not paid within 180 days; and (iii) Whether the Rs. 20,000 penalty was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the claimed input tax credit of Rs. 31,115 was admissible.

Analysis: Section 16(2) requires satisfaction of the prescribed conditions for input tax credit, while Section 155 places the burden of proving eligibility on the claimant. No invoices, proof of payment to the supplier, transport or goods-receipt evidence, or supplier ledger was produced to establish those conditions. The question whether retrospective cancellation of the supplier's registration alone could justify denial of credit was not decided.

Conclusion: The input tax credit denial is sustained, with consequential interest to be quantified in accordance with Section 50. Against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest of Rs. 3,80,408 was payable where suppliers were not paid within 180 days.

Analysis: The unamended second proviso to Section 16(2) required an amount equal to the credit to be added to output tax liability with interest where the supplier was not paid within 180 days; the third proviso permitted re-availment upon subsequent payment. The later amendments to Rule 37 did not govern the disputed period, but the earlier Rule 37 also prescribed reversal or addition of credit with interest. Non-operation of FORM GSTR-2 affected only the reporting mode and did not extinguish the statutory liability, since reversal through FORM GSTR-3B and voluntary payment under Section 73(5) read with Rule 142(2) remained available. The maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia was inapplicable because compliance was possible but not attempted. A recipient cannot avoid interest by relying on its own failure to add the amount to output tax liability, and a private arrangement for delayed supplier payment could not extend the statutory period.

Conclusion: Interest of Rs. 3,80,408 on credit relating to supplies unpaid within 180 days is payable. Against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the Rs. 20,000 penalty was sustainable.

Analysis: Under Section 73(9), the statutory minimum penalty was Rs. 10,000. The fourth proviso to Section 20 of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act required aggregation of the corresponding Central and State GST penalties for integrated tax, resulting in a penalty of Rs. 20,000. No independent challenge to the penalty was established.

Conclusion: The penalty of Rs. 20,000 is sustained. Against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The denied credit, consequential interest, interest for delayed supplier payment, and statutory penalty remain enforceable, subject to quantification of the interest on the denied credit and adjustment of amounts already deposited or paid.

Issues: (i) Whether 22.04.2018 was the relevant date for computing the limitation period for refund of excess tax paid; (ii) Whether the refund application filed on 04.07.2025 was barred by limitation under Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (iii) Whether authorities under the GST enactments could sanction a refund filed beyond the prescribed limitation period.

Issue (i): Whether 22.04.2018 was the relevant date for computing the limitation period for refund of excess tax paid.

Analysis: For refund claims not falling within the specific categories in the Explanation to Section 54, the relevant date is the date of payment of tax. The excess GST was reported and paid through the return filed on 22.04.2018. Section 54 contains no provision permitting computation of limitation from the subsequent discovery of an error in applying the tax rate.

Conclusion: 22.04.2018 was the relevant date for computing limitation, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the refund application filed on 04.07.2025 was barred by limitation under Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 54(1) requires a refund application within two years from the relevant date. Since the application was made more than two years after 22.04.2018, it did not satisfy the statutory time limit. The fact that tax had been paid at a rate higher than the applicable rate did not displace the limitation governing a refund application before the statutory authorities.

Conclusion: The refund application was time-barred under Section 54(1), against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether authorities under the GST enactments could sanction a refund filed beyond the prescribed limitation period.

Analysis: The two-year period under Section 54 is mandatory, and the statutory authorities have no express power to condone delay or entertain a belated refund claim. Section 54(8), including the requirement that the tax incidence has not been passed on, regulates the manner of disbursal only after a refund is otherwise admissible; it neither creates an independent refund entitlement nor overrides limitation. Relief against retention of tax allegedly collected without authority of law may be sought through writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, not through a belated statutory refund claim.

Conclusion: The statutory authorities could not sanction the belated refund, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory refund mechanism remained unavailable because the claim was lodged after the mandatory limitation period, notwithstanding the asserted excess payment and absence of unjust enrichment.

Ratio Decidendi: A refund claim under Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 must be made within two years from the applicable relevant date, and statutory authorities lack power to condone delay absent an express enabling provision.

Issues: Whether delayed filing of returns justified invoking Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 74 requires tax non-payment or short payment attributable to fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade tax. The statutory scheme also provides for notice to return defaulters and best-judgment assessment. The pending returns were filed and their declared turnover and liability were accepted; the estimated cash liability had reportedly been deposited before inspection, and interest had reportedly been paid before proceedings began. There was no identified misstatement or omission in the returns or failure to furnish information requested in writing.

Conclusion: Section 74 was not invocable against the taxpayer. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Delayed filing of returns alone does not establish the fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade tax required to invoke Section 74.

Issues: (i) Whether an appellate authority may dismiss an appeal ex parte without deciding the appellant's core ground through a reasoned order under Section 107(12) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether CBIC Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST applied to the disputed input tax credit and justified requiring CA or supplier certificates; and (iii) Whether input tax credit of Rs. 1,92,949.93 claimed in FY 2019-20 was validly availed as omitted FY 2018-19 credit within the statutory time limit.

Issue (i): Whether an appellate authority may dismiss an appeal ex parte without deciding the appellant's core ground through a reasoned order under Section 107(12) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Sections 107(11) and 107(12) require the appellate authority to pass a written order stating the points for determination, its decision on those points, and reasons. Although the order recorded non-appearance and noted the portal comparison, it did not address the specific explanation that FY 2018-19 credit had been claimed in FY 2019-20 within the permissible period. Absence of the appellant does not dispense with the requirement of adjudication on the grounds raised.

Conclusion: The ex parte non-speaking appellate order was legally unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether CBIC Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST applied to the disputed input tax credit and justified requiring CA or supplier certificates.

Analysis: The Circular is confined to specified mismatches for FY 2017-18 and FY 2018-19 arising from supplier-side reporting failures. The disputed difference resulted from comparing FY 2019-20 GSTR-3B with FY 2019-20 GSTR-2A while excluding credit already reflected in FY 2018-19 GSTR-2A and claimed later by the recipient. No supplier reporting default was alleged. Further, the aggregate disputed amount was below Rs. 2 lakh, making a CA certificate unwarranted even on the Circular's monetary thresholds.

Conclusion: The Circular was inapplicable, and the certificate requirement could not sustain the input tax credit demand.

Issue (iii): Whether input tax credit of Rs. 1,92,949.93 claimed in FY 2019-20 was validly availed as omitted FY 2018-19 credit within the statutory time limit.

Analysis: The invoice-wise reconciliation, GSTR-2A reports, tax-comparison records, and GSTR-3B returns established that FY 2018-19 credit reflected in GSTR-2A was claimed in April and July 2019. Those returns were filed before the due date for the September 2019 return, satisfying the time limits under Sections 16(4) and 39(9). The condition requiring invoice reflection in the recipient's statement under Section 16(2)(aa) became effective only from 01.01.2022 and did not govern the period in dispute. A GSTR-2A/GSTR-3B mismatch, without verification of the reconciliation, could not by itself justify denial of credit.

Conclusion: The disputed input tax credit was validly availed within the prescribed time, and the related tax, interest, and penalty demand was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The input tax credit component of the impugned demand was removed, while the accepted output-tax liability and its consequential components remained unaffected.

Ratio Decidendi: Input tax credit validly availed within the statutory time limit cannot be denied solely by comparing GSTR-3B of a subsequent year with that year's GSTR-2A where reconciliation establishes that the credit relates to invoices reflected in an earlier year.

Issues: (i) Whether the seized gold could be treated as smuggled goods so as to invoke the statutory presumption and sustain confiscation under the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) Whether the penalty for dealing with allegedly smuggled gold was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the seized gold could be treated as smuggled goods so as to invoke the statutory presumption and sustain confiscation under the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 shifts the burden of proving lawful acquisition only where the seizure is founded on a reasonable belief of smuggling, based on relevant material rationally connected with that belief. Domestic courier transport and absence of accompanying documents could justify suspicion and investigation, but did not by themselves establish illegal importation. The absence of foreign markings, the inconclusive assayer report, the disclosed jewellery business and melting explanation, and the failure to independently verify the identified recipient or melting laboratory were material circumstances not adequately addressed.

Analysis: The requirements of Section 111(i) and Section 111(j) of the Customs Act, 1962 were not met merely because the gold was recovered from an airport cargo complex; no concealment in imported packages or unauthorised removal from a customs area was identified. Liability under Section 111(d) likewise required illegal importation to be established through evidence or a lawfully raised statutory presumption.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the gold could not be treated as smuggled on the available material, and the absolute confiscation was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty for dealing with allegedly smuggled gold was sustainable.

Analysis: Penalty under Section 112(a) and Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 required identification of the appellant's act or omission rendering the goods liable to confiscation and material demonstrating the requisite knowledge or reason to believe. Jewellery business and transportation without accompanying documents, without more, did not establish those statutory ingredients.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the penalty was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The adverse customs determinations concerning confiscation and personal penalty were set aside, with consequential relief to follow in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: The burden under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 arises only upon a reasonable belief of smuggling founded on relevant material; suspicion from domestic transportation and missing documents cannot alone establish illegal importation or sustain confiscation.

Issues: Whether an appeal against confiscation of gold carried by an international passenger is maintainable before the Tribunal when the gold was recovered from the passenger's person.

Analysis: The first proviso to Section 129A(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 excludes the Tribunal's appellate jurisdiction over orders relating to goods imported or exported as baggage. Gold brought into India during international travel retains its character as passenger baggage even when recovered from the passenger's trouser pocket rather than from luggage. Allegations of non-declaration or concealment concern the merits of confiscation and penalty and cannot override the statutory exclusion of jurisdiction. The nature of the goods and transaction, rather than the relief sought, determines maintainability. Section 129DD provides the applicable revisional remedy.

Conclusion: No. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the baggage-related order; the appropriate remedy lies before the competent Revisional Authority.

Issues: (i) Whether commission-based marketing and order-procurement services supplied to foreign principals constituted export of services and were taxable in India; (ii) Whether the extended limitation period could be invoked for recovery of the proposed service tax demand.

Issue (i): Whether commission-based marketing and order-procurement services supplied to foreign principals constituted export of services and were taxable in India.

Analysis: Rule 6A(d) required the place of provision of service to be outside India. Under Rule 3 of the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012, the place of provision is ordinarily the location of the service recipient. The service recipient is the person whose instructions are acted upon, whose business need is satisfied, and who bears the consideration; a third party affected by performance is not thereby the recipient. The foreign principals engaged the assessee to procure orders and promote their products, paid the commission in convertible foreign exchange, and used the services for their business. There was no evidence that Indian customers received any service from the assessee after their order details were passed to the foreign principals. The destination of the service was therefore outside India, determined by its consumption rather than its place of performance.

Conclusion: The commission services constituted export of services and were not liable to service tax; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period could be invoked for recovery of the proposed service tax demand.

Analysis: The assessee regularly filed service-tax returns and disclosed the activity as export of service. Mere non-payment or failure to declare tax liability does not establish wilful suppression; a positive act showing intent to evade payment is required. No evidence established deliberate concealment or intent to evade service tax.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended limitation period was invalid and the demand was time-barred; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned service-tax confirmation was unsustainable both because the services qualified as exports and because the extended period was unavailable.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a foreign principal engages and pays an Indian service provider for order procurement and marketing, the foreign principal is the service recipient, and the service qualifies as export when its place of provision is outside India notwithstanding that prospective customers are located in India.

Issues: (i) Whether waste and scrap arising from manufacture of goods of headings 8601 to 8606 cleared at a concessional rate under Notification No. 1/2011-CE was exempt under Sl. No. 17 of Notification No. 62/95-CE; (ii) Whether the extended period under Section 11A(4) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was validly invoked; (iii) Whether interest and penalty under Sections 11AA and 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether waste and scrap arising from manufacture of goods of headings 8601 to 8606 cleared at a concessional rate under Notification No. 1/2011-CE was exempt under Sl. No. 17 of Notification No. 62/95-CE.

Analysis: Section 5A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 permits exemption from the whole or any part of duty. Notification No. 1/2011-CE exempted the specified coaches from duty in excess of 1%; therefore, the coaches remained exempted goods for purposes of the unqualified expression used in Sl. No. 17 of Notification No. 62/95-CE. Sl. No. 17 does not restrict its benefit to goods wholly exempted or chargeable to nil duty. A restriction found in another notification could not be added by interpretation. Rule 2(d) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 was not transplanted into the notification, but its express inclusion of goods availing Notification No. 1/2011-CE corroborated the statutory character of the concession as an exemption. The proviso to Notification No. 27/2011-CE was attracted because goods of heading 8607 remained excisable despite their exemption; however, an incorrect initial claim under that notification did not defeat the independently applicable exemption under Sl. No. 17.

Conclusion: Waste and scrap arising from goods of headings 8601 to 8606 was exempt under Sl. No. 17 of Notification No. 62/95-CE; the duty paid was not payable and was refundable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period under Section 11A(4) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was validly invoked.

Analysis: Invocation of the extended period requires fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade duty. Departmental audit had already ascertained and quantified the relevant facts, collected the amounts, and those facts were subsequently the subject of refund adjudication before issuance of the notice. The notice contained no particularised allegation of a deliberate act or intent to evade. Mere alleged non-disclosure of exempt clearances could not constitute wilful suppression, particularly where the dispute concerned a tenable construction of exemption notifications and the material facts were within departmental knowledge.

Conclusion: The extended period was not invokable and the demand was barred by limitation in its entirety, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether interest and penalty under Sections 11AA and 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 were sustainable.

Analysis: Interest was consequential to the duty demand, which failed both on merits and limitation. Penalty under Section 11AC required the ingredients of fraud, suppression, or intent to evade, none of which were established.

Conclusion: No interest or penalty was sustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The exemption under Sl. No. 17 governed the entire disputed waste and scrap, rendering the amount paid refundable only once and leaving no legally sustainable duty demand, interest, or penalty.

Issues: Whether the complainant's personal appearance at every hearing should be dispensed with.

Analysis: The application was made under Section 279 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. The complainant had initiated the complaint on behalf of the department, had retired from service and was represented by departmental representatives and counsel. A mechanical direction requiring personal attendance at every hearing would cause prejudice in those circumstances.

Conclusion: The complainant's personal appearance is dispensed with.

Ratio Decidendi: A public servant complainant represented by departmental representatives and counsel should not be mechanically required to attend every hearing.

Issues: Whether bail granted for non-supply of written grounds of arrest should be cancelled where the arrests preceded 3 October 2023.

Analysis: Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 already required an arrested person to be informed of the grounds of arrest. The subsequent judicial direction prescribed written communication as the mode of compliance from 3 October 2023. No misuse of bail was alleged, and no other ground for cancellation was advanced.

Conclusion: The existing bail orders remain in force; cancellation on the ground advanced was rejected.

Issues: Expeditious consideration of the pending stay application and interim protection against recovery.

Outcome: The authority was directed to decide the application when the petitioner was represented on 20 November 2026, in accordance with the applicable instruction and law. Coercive recovery was barred until 21 November 2026. No determination was made on the merits of the stay application or tax demand.

Issues: Whether amounts recovered from the petitioners towards a tax demand against the Mining Department should be returned.

Analysis: The Income Tax Department issued recovery notices to the petitioners for tax collection at source dues on mining royalty. The underlying demand against the Mining Department had been quashed by a Division Bench.

Conclusion: Any amount recovered from a petitioner shall be returned upon that petitioner making an application.

Issues: (i) Whether dismissal for delay without an opportunity to explain it violated natural justice. (ii) Whether the appeal was filed within the statutory period for condonation of delay.

Issue (i): Whether dismissal for delay without an opportunity to explain it violated natural justice.

Analysis: The appeal was dismissed at the threshold without giving the appellant an opportunity to explain the delay.

Conclusion: The dismissal violated natural justice. The issue was decided in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the appeal was filed within the statutory period for condonation of delay.

Analysis: Section 85 of the Finance Act, 1994 prescribes two months for filing an appeal and permits a further month upon sufficient cause. Assuming service on 22 September 2018, the limitation computation took account of the intervening weekend and the expiry of the condonable period on a Sunday; the appeal was filed on the following working day.

Conclusion: The appeal was filed within the condonable period, and the Commissioner had power to consider condonation. The issue was decided in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The appellant is entitled to an opportunity to explain the delay; the existence of sufficient cause and the underlying service tax liability remain to be considered.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an appeal is filed within the statutory condonable period, computed with the relevant holidays, the appellate authority must afford an opportunity to explain the delay before rejecting it on limitation.

Issues: Whether CENVAT credit on imported inputs could be excluded from the assessable value of railway track maintenance machines, entitling the manufacturer to a refund of excess excise duty.

Analysis: Under the excise valuation framework, duty on inputs available as CENVAT credit is excluded from the cost of those inputs. The finding that the credit benefit had been transferred through an endorsement in a letter attached to the bill of entry was unchallenged. The record also contained certificates concerning the non-passing of the duty incidence to the buyer.

Conclusion: The manufacturer was entitled to the refund. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Duty on inputs available as CENVAT credit is excluded from input cost when determining excise assessable value.

Issues: (i) Whether the arrest was lawful without reasons to believe recorded by the Commissioner; (ii) whether the absence of a document identification number invalidated the arrest-related communications.

Issue (i): Whether the arrest was lawful without reasons to believe recorded by the Commissioner.

Analysis: Section 69 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires the Commissioner to record reasons to believe, based on credible material, concerning the specified offence and the need for arrest. This safeguard protects personal liberty. The detailed reasons were recorded by the investigating officer, while the Commissioner's authorisation contained only a bare statement of belief. The Commissioner's order and reasons must also be communicated to the person arrested.

Conclusion: The arrest and consequent custody were illegal; the petitioner was entitled to release.

Issue (ii): Whether the absence of a document identification number invalidated the arrest-related communications.

Analysis: The applicable circular requires a document identification number on specified communications, subject to recorded exceptions and subsequent regularisation. The grounds of arrest and reasons to believe lacked such numbers, and no exigency or regularisation was established.

Conclusion: The arrest-related communications failed judicial scrutiny on this ground also.

Final Conclusion: The prosecution retains liberty to seek custody in accordance with law after supplying written reasons to believe and grounds of arrest.

Ratio Decidendi: A GST arrest requires reasons to believe recorded by the Commissioner on credible material; specified arrest-related communications require a document identification number unless the applicable exception and regularisation requirements are met.

Issues: Whether the general penalty imposed in connection with the return was sustainable.

Analysis: The return had been filed and the late fee paid. The penalty order imposed Rs. 50,000, exceeding the maximum provided under the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Conclusion: The show cause notice and penalty order were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A general penalty under the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act cannot exceed the statutory maximum.

Issues: Whether payments adjusted through accepted Forms GST DRC-03A satisfied the principal tax payment condition for waiver of interest and penalty.

Analysis: Section 128A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires payment of the entire principal tax covered by an eligible demand within the prescribed period. Rule 164 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 requires an application in Form GST DRC-03A before seeking waiver where the tax was previously paid through Form GST DRC-03. Under Rule 142, the adjusted amount is credited against the demand as payment on the date of the original intimation. Circular No. 238/32/2024-GST clarifies the same mechanism. Both adjustment applications were accepted and the electronic liability register reflected nil outstanding principal tax. The explanation that an incorrect financial year had been selected in the original payment form required consideration; receipt of the payment was not disputed.

Conclusion: The principal tax payment condition for waiver was satisfied. The application remained to be processed in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: An accepted adjustment of prior tax payments against a demand must be given effect when determining whether the principal tax payment condition for waiver has been satisfied.

Issues: (i) Whether the departmental appeal was maintainable below the monetary threshold for appeals to the Tribunal; (ii) Whether penalty was sustainable for an alleged undisclosed dispatch location when the goods matched valid transit documents and the allegation rested on an uncorroborated driver's statement.

Issue (i): Whether the departmental appeal was maintainable below the monetary threshold for appeals to the Tribunal.

Analysis: The departmental litigation circular excludes recurring issues from its monetary limits. The question concerning mobile-squad enforcement jurisdiction was treated as recurring in transportation checks.

Conclusion: The appeal was maintainable notwithstanding the monetary threshold, in favour of Revenue on this issue.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty was sustainable for an alleged undisclosed dispatch location when the goods matched valid transit documents and the allegation rested on an uncorroborated driver's statement.

Analysis: Section 129 is an anti-evasion provision, with intent to evade tax treated as foundational to penalty. The goods matched the tax invoice and e-way bill. The driver's statement was the basis of the allegation, but the alleged warehouse was not independently verified and no opportunity for cross-examination was provided. The circular concerning an additional place of business requires independent establishment of an operational undisclosed facility. Penalty discretion must be exercised judicially, and suspicion cannot replace legal proof.

Conclusion: The penalty was not sustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The recurring-issue exception applied to the departmental appeal, but the alleged undisclosed dispatch and tax evasion lacked the evidentiary foundation necessary for penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: An alleged undisclosed loading point supported solely by an uncorroborated driver's statement cannot sustain a detention-related penalty when the goods match valid transit documents and intent to evade tax is not established.