Outcome: Notice issued on the interim order as well as on the appeal. Dasti service was permitted.

Issues: Whether a notice returned with the endorsement "unclaimed" is to be treated as deemed service on the addressee.

Analysis: A notice sent to the correct address and returned unclaimed attracts the statutory presumption of service. The presumption arising from postal delivery under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and the evidentiary presumption under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 operate unless the contrary is proved. The distinction drawn in the office report between "refusal" and "unclaimed" was held to be incorrect, since both indicate service at the proper address for the purpose of deeming service.

Conclusion: Notice returned as unclaimed was held to be deemed served and treated as proper service.

Ratio Decidendi: A notice sent to the correct address and returned unclaimed gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of due service, unless the contrary is proved.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is mandatory and a suit seeking urgent interim relief is excluded from the requirement of pre-institution mediation; (ii) Whether the commercial court may examine the plaint and reliefs to determine whether a prayer for urgent interim relief is a camouflage to bypass Section 12A and reject the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Issue (i): Whether Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is mandatory and a suit seeking urgent interim relief is excluded from the requirement of pre-institution mediation.

Analysis: The statutory scheme makes pre-institution mediation mandatory for a commercial suit that does not contemplate urgent interim relief. The expression used in Section 12A qualifies the suit and the determination is to be made from the plaint, the reliefs claimed, and the surrounding pleadings. The requirement is not a formal one dependent upon a separate application for exemption. Where the plaint itself seeks urgent interim relief, the suit falls outside the mediation mandate.

Conclusion: The provision is mandatory, but a suit that genuinely contemplates urgent interim relief is not hit by the pre-institution mediation requirement.

Issue (ii): Whether the commercial court may examine the plaint and reliefs to determine whether a prayer for urgent interim relief is a camouflage to bypass Section 12A and reject the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The court is not bound to accept a mere label of urgent interim relief if the pleadings and surrounding facts show that the relief is illusory or designed to evade the statutory bar. A limited judicial scrutiny is permissible to see whether the plaint, viewed holistically, truly contemplates urgent interim relief. At the same time, refusal of ad interim relief or eventual denial of interim relief on merits does not by itself justify rejection of the plaint. On the facts, the plaint did seek urgent interim relief and the challenge to rejection of the plaint was therefore unsustainable.

Conclusion: The commercial court can make a limited scrutiny for camouflage, and the rejection of the plaint was upheld as lawful.

Final Conclusion: The special leave petition failed, and the dismissal of the application under Order VII, Rule 11 was affirmed because the suit was found to contemplate urgent interim relief within the meaning of Section 12A.

Ratio Decidendi: In a commercial suit, the applicability of Section 12A depends on whether the plaint, read as a whole, truly contemplates urgent interim relief, and the court may reject a colourable invocation of such relief to bypass mandatory pre-institution mediation.

Issues: Whether, in a challenge arising from a discharge application, the aspect of validity of sanction required consideration, and whether the matter disclosed a case of failure of justice.

Outcome: Notice issued. Counter affidavit and rejoinder directed to be filed. List after eight weeks.

Issues: Whether the petitioners were entitled to bail in a prosecution under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 despite the statutory restrictions applicable to commercial quantity cases.

Analysis: The petitioners had remained in custody for almost two years, and the trial was not likely to commence in the immediate future. The Court took this factor into account while considering bail, notwithstanding the State's reliance on the restrictions under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and the allegation of commercial quantity. The length of incarceration and the delay in commencement of trial were treated as decisive for grant of bail.

Conclusion: Bail was granted to the petitioners on terms and conditions to be fixed by the Trial Court.

Issues: Whether bail should be granted to the petitioners in view of the prolonged custody, the fact that trial had not yet commenced, and the nature of the contraband involved.

Analysis: The petitioners had remained in custody for about 2 years and 4 months, the charge had already been framed but the trial was still to begin, and the State did not indicate any known criminal antecedents. These circumstances, along with the nature of the contraband, justified release on bail, leaving the trial court to impose appropriate conditions.

Conclusion: Bail was granted to the petitioners.

Issues: Whether the interim protection earlier granted to the petitioner should be made absolute and the petitioner be permitted to remain on bail during the pendency of the trial.

Analysis: The petitioner had complied with the earlier direction to appear before the Trial Court, had been admitted to interim bail, had furnished bail bonds to the satisfaction of the Trial Court, and was stated to be regularly appearing and cooperating with the trial. In these circumstances, the interim arrangement warranted continuation on the same terms, with the petitioner remaining bound to appear before the Trial Court on each hearing date unless exempted and to comply with the conditions imposed by the Trial Court.

Conclusion: The interim order was made absolute and the petitioner was directed to remain on regular bail during the pendency of the trial subject to compliance with the stipulated conditions.

Issues: Whether non-compliance with Section 202(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in a complaint where some accused reside beyond the Magistrate's territorial jurisdiction, vitiated the order issuing summons and justified remand.

Analysis: The requirement under Section 202(1) is mandatory when the accused resides outside the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, as the provision uses the word "shall" and was inserted to ensure due scrutiny before process is issued. Earlier examination of the complainant under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, does not by itself amount to compliance unless the inquiry contemplated by Section 202(1) is actually undertaken. On the facts, even substantial compliance was not established, and the belated objection did not cure the jurisdictional defect. Since the complaint had proceeded without the mandatory inquiry, the error was treated as causing failure of justice.

Conclusion: The order quashing the summons and remanding the complaint to the Magistrate from the stage of Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, was upheld; the challenge was rejected.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the first appeal should be condoned and the appeal restored for decision on merits.

Analysis: The delay was only 52 days and was explained on the basis that the appellants were not aware of the earlier judgment and had not effectively participated in the suit except by filing a written statement. In matters concerning immovable property, the Court emphasised that substantial rights should ordinarily be decided on merits and that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 calls for a justice-oriented and liberal approach where sufficient cause is shown. The rejection of condonation by the lower appellate court, and the High Court's refusal to interfere, were found inconsistent with that approach.

Conclusion: The delay in filing the appeal was required to be condoned, the orders of the lower appellate court and the High Court were set aside, and the first appeal was restored to the lower appellate court for decision on merits.

Outcome: The matters were dismissed as withdrawn, dismissed as infructuous, and dismissed for non-prosecution, with pending applications disposed of and time granted to cure defects in the remaining matters.

Issues: Whether bail could be granted in an offence under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 despite the restrictions under Section 37, in view of prolonged custody and the stage of trial, and whether additional safeguards were necessary.

Analysis: The petitioner had remained in custody for more than three and a half years, the trial had commenced but only one of the nineteen witnesses had been examined, and the trial was likely to take further time. The Court considered the twin conditions under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, and noted that while the State had been heard on those conditions, the second condition could not be conclusively addressed at that stage. It held that prolonged incarceration militates against the protection of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and that conditional liberty may override the statutory embargo in the circumstances.

Conclusion: Bail was granted, subject to furnishing bail bonds to the satisfaction of the Trial Court, producing two local sureties, and appearing before the Trial Court on each date of hearing.

Issues: Whether bail could be declined solely on the ground that a co-accused who had been granted bail had not surrendered.

Analysis: The accused was facing prosecution under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and his second bail application had been rejected by the High Court essentially because a co-accused released on bail had not surrendered. The Court held that this circumstance, by itself, was not a relevant or germane consideration for refusing bail to the appellant. Since the impugned order rested on that sole factor, the matter required fresh consideration by the High Court.

Conclusion: The refusal of bail on that ground was unsustainable and the matter was remitted to the High Court for reconsideration of the bail application.

Final Conclusion: The order refusing bail was set aside and the bail application was sent back to the High Court for a fresh decision on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: A co-accused's failure to surrender after being released on bail is not, by itself, a germane ground to deny bail to another accused.

Outcome: The miscellaneous application was disposed of, and the pending applications also stood disposed of.

Issues: Whether the petitioners, accused under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, were entitled to bail pending trial in the facts of the case, having regard to the requirements of Section 37.

Analysis: The investigation was complete and the chargesheet had been filed, but charges were yet to be framed and the trial would take time. The petitioners had remained in custody for more than one year and four months and had no criminal antecedents. In these circumstances, the Court found substantial compliance with Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and considered release on bail appropriate, while imposing conditions to secure regular appearance and to treat any involvement in another offence as misuse of the concession.

Conclusion: Bail was granted to the petitioners on terms to be imposed by the Trial Court.