Issues: Whether, after disclosure of electoral bond data, the Court should direct a court-monitored investigation by an SIT and grant other consequential reliefs such as recovery of alleged proceeds of crime and reopening of assessments in exercise of Article 32 jurisdiction.

Analysis: The reliefs sought rested on assumptions of quid pro quo and alleged involvement of officials, which would require a roving enquiry into the purchase of electoral bonds, the donations made, and the surrounding arrangements. Individual grievances of this nature are to be pursued through the remedies available in law, including the criminal procedure framework and, where appropriate, Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court held that resort to Article 32 at this stage would be premature and inappropriate because the ordinary remedies had not been invoked and their inefficacy had not been established. It further held that directions for recovery and reopening of assessments would intrude into statutory functions entrusted to competent authorities under the relevant enactments.

Conclusion: The request for an SIT and the allied reliefs were declined, and the writ petitions were dismissed.

Issues: Whether the appellant, in a case involving serious allegations and a voluminous charge-sheet, was entitled to bail having regard to prolonged custody, the stage of the trial, and the release of co-accused on bail.

Analysis: The appellant had remained in custody for about two years, the trial was still at the stage of supply and translation of charge-sheet documents, and the record was exceptionally voluminous. The Court also took note that a co-accused had already been granted bail. In these circumstances, the pendency and likely duration of the trial, coupled with continued custody, justified release on bail. The grant of bail was made subject to conditions requiring cooperation with the trial, avoidance of unnecessary adjournments, surrender of passport, restriction on foreign without permission, and non-interference with witnesses or proceedings.

Conclusion: Bail was granted to the appellant subject to conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: Prolonged pre-trial custody, coupled with delayed commencement of trial and parity with similarly placed co-accused, can justify grant of bail subject to protective conditions even where serious allegations are made.

Issues: (i) Whether an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be compounded under Section 147 of that Act by invoking Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 without the complainant's consent. (ii) Whether, in the facts of the case, the complaint and further proceedings could be quashed despite the complainant's consent after deposit of the cheque amount and additional sums.

Issue (i): Whether an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be compounded under Section 147 of that Act by invoking Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 without the complainant's consent.

Analysis: Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 preserves the High Court's inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice, whereas Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 specifically declares offences under that Act compoundable. The decision distinguishes the two powers and holds that compounding under Section 147 is not an exercise that can be undertaken in disregard of the complainant's consent. The Court relied on the settled position that compounding is different from quashing and reiterated that the consent of the complainant remains essential for compounding an offence under Section 138.

Conclusion: The offence could not be compounded under Sections 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 without the complainant's consent.

Issue (ii): Whether, in the facts of the case, the complaint and further proceedings could be quashed despite the complainant's consent after deposit of the cheque amount and additional sums.

Analysis: Although the compounding order was unsustainable for want of consent, the Court noted that the accused had already deposited the cheque amount with interest and the additional amount ordered by the High Court, and that the matter was otherwise fit for closure. Since restoring the proceedings would serve no useful purpose, the Court invoked Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do complete justice between the parties and brought the criminal proceedings to an end while permitting withdrawal of the deposited amount by the complainant.

Conclusion: The complaint and all further proceedings were quashed in exercise of Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

Final Conclusion: The High Court's compounding order was set aside for want of complainant consent, but the criminal complaint itself was ultimately terminated by the Supreme Court in exercise of its plenary power to do complete justice.

Ratio Decidendi: Compounding of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 requires the complainant's consent, and the High Court cannot use its inherent power to bypass that requirement, though the Supreme Court may still quash proceedings under Article 142 in an appropriate case.

Issues: (i) Whether bail could be sustained in a prosecution involving commercial quantity of narcotic drugs without recording satisfaction of the twin conditions under the NDPS Act. (ii) Whether the trial should be expedited on priority in view of the accused being HIV positive.

Issue (i): Whether bail could be sustained in a prosecution involving commercial quantity of narcotic drugs without recording satisfaction of the twin conditions under the NDPS Act.

Analysis: The statutory scheme governing bail in cases involving commercial quantity of narcotic drugs requires the court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and that the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. These conditions are cumulative and mandatory. A liberal approach that ignores this mandate is impermissible, and the requirement of recording the statutory satisfaction cannot be bypassed merely because bail was earlier granted on a different consideration. On the facts, the impugned bail order was passed on the ground of HIV positivity without addressing the statutory rigour applicable to the alleged offences involving heroin in commercial quantity.

Conclusion: The bail order could not be sustained and was liable to be set aside; the finding is against the accused and in favour of the State.

Issue (ii): Whether the trial should be expedited on priority in view of the accused being HIV positive.

Analysis: The HIV legislation mandates that legal proceedings concerning an HIV-positive person be taken up and disposed of on a priority basis. That statutory protection does not dilute the bail restrictions under the NDPS Act, but it does require the criminal trial to proceed expeditiously once the accused is before the trial court.

Conclusion: The trial court was directed to expedite the proceedings on a priority basis.

Final Conclusion: The impugned bail order was set aside, custody was directed to be restored in accordance with law, and the trial court was required to proceed with the case on priority.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions involving commercial quantity under the NDPS Act, bail can be granted only upon satisfaction of the mandatory twin conditions under Section 37, and such statutory rigour cannot be overridden by a humanitarian ground unless the Act itself permits it.

Issues: Whether bail could be granted to an accused in custody for more than two years in an NDPS prosecution after the panch witnesses turned hostile, notwithstanding the statutory restriction under Section 37(1)(b) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

Analysis: The panch witnesses examined in the trial did not support the prosecution case. The Court declined to treat the Investigating Officer as a panch witness for the purpose of sustaining continued denial of bail. It held that prolonged incarceration and failure to conclude the trial within a reasonable time implicate the protection of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In such circumstances, conditional liberty may override the statutory embargo under Section 37(1)(b) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

Conclusion: Bail was held to be justified and the petitioner was entitled to be enlarged on bail on terms to be fixed by the trial court.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to bail despite being in custody since April 2021 for offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and having involvement in another NDPS case.

Analysis: The petitioner was facing serious NDPS and the Court noted that he was also an accused in another case under the same Act. On that basis, the Court found no reason to exercise discretion in favour of grant of bail.

Conclusion: Bail was declined and the special leave petition was dismissed.

Issues: Whether the interim protection from arrest granted to the petitioner should be made absolute and what consequential directions should be issued regarding appearance and bail.

Analysis: A charge-sheet has been filed and no offence is alleged against the petitioner under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 because he is a private individual; additionally, the investigative agency appears to have abandoned the corruption-related case. The remaining offences are triable by a Magistrate. The petitioner had been earlier granted protection from arrest by an interim order dated 3 January 2024. Taking these aspects into account and exercising discretion in favour of the petitioner, continued protective relief is warranted subject to participation in the trial process.

Conclusion: The interim order of protection is made absolute; the petitioner is directed to appear before the Trial Court and furnish bail to the satisfaction of the Trial Court. The special leave petition is disposed of in favour of the petitioner.

Issues: Whether the complaint and supporting evidence could be amended to correct the year of the cheque from 2010 to 2012 in proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: The date of the cheque had been consistently reflected as 22.07.2010 in the statutory notice, the complaint, and the complainant's evidence. The proposed correction was sought at a late stage and would not merely cure a clerical error, because the cheque date was material to the statutory requirements governing notice and the cause of action in cheque dishonour proceedings. Permitting the correction would also leave the supporting evidence inconsistent with the amended pleading.

Conclusion: The amendment was not justified and ought not to have been allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: A correction that alters a materially significant cheque date in Section 138 proceedings cannot be permitted where the date has been consistently reflected in the statutory notice, complaint, and evidence, and where the change would affect the statutory foundation of the prosecution.

Issues: Whether the criminal proceedings against the appellant were liable to be quashed on the ground that the allegations and factual position were on par with those against a co-accused whose proceedings had already been quashed.

Analysis: The appellant was accused no.2 in the case arising from offences under the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act. The proceedings against accused no.5 had already been quashed by the High Court, and that order had not been challenged by the State. The material recorded showed that the appellant stood on the same footing as accused no.5, with no material factual distinction between them. In those circumstances, the earlier quashing order governed the appellant's case as well.

Conclusion: The proceedings against the appellant were rightly quashed.

Issues: Whether, while directing an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Magistrate applies his mind and takes cognizance at that stage; whether, in view of the earlier reference on the same question, the present matters should be tagged with the pending larger Bench proceedings.

Analysis: The order records that the same question had already been referred to a larger Bench. It notes, prima facie, that a combined reading of Sections 156(3), 173(2), 190, 200, 202, 203 and 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 indicates that directing investigation and forwarding the complaint does not amount to taking cognizance. However, as the issue was already referred, judicial discipline and propriety led the Court to refrain from deciding the question in the present matter and to direct that the case be placed with the already referred matters.

Outcome: The matter was directed to be tagged with the cases already referred to the larger Bench, and the Registry was directed to place it before the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.

Outcome: Further proceedings before the Trial Court were stayed till the next date, counter affidavit was directed to be filed within two weeks, rejoinder within one week thereafter, and the matter was listed for further hearing.

Issues: Whether the challenge to the nominated arbitrator survived after the arbitrator withdrew from the arbitral proceedings.

Analysis: The objection had been raised to the arbitrator on the ground of his earlier role in a matter arising between the same parties in connection with the same arbitration. During the pendency of the proceedings, the arbitrator withdrew from the arbitral proceedings. Once that withdrawal occurred, the cause sought to be pursued in the proceeding no longer survived for adjudication.

Conclusion: The challenge did not survive and the impugned order was set aside.

Issues: (i) whether the orders passed in income tax proceedings and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal's findings could by themselves justify quashing of the criminal proceedings or discharge of the accused in a prosecution for disproportionate assets and abetment; (ii) whether the fact that one accused was a minor for a substantial part of the check period negated the charge or warranted interference at the stage of framing of charge.

Issue (i): Whether the income tax orders and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal's findings could justify quashing of the criminal proceedings or discharge of the accused in a disproportionate assets prosecution.

Analysis: The materials in the income tax proceedings were held not to be conclusive proof of the lawfulness of the sources of income for the purpose of a charge under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The orders under the tax regime were treated only as pieces of evidence whose probative value could be assessed at trial. The reasoning relied on the settled principle that assessment or appellate findings under the Income-tax Act do not bind the criminal court on the issue whether the income was from lawful sources, and that a prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act stands on a different footing from adjudication under the tax laws.

Conclusion: The income tax proceedings did not warrant quashing of the prosecution or discharge of the accused.

Issue (ii): Whether the minority of one accused for a substantial part of the check period negated the charge or warranted interference at the stage of framing of charge.

Analysis: The charge had to be tested on the material showing participation during the relevant period, and the fact that the accused was a minor for part of the check period did not by itself negate the prosecution case where he was admittedly major for the remaining years. The Court also reiterated that at the stage of charge the court does not conduct a mini-trial and only examines whether there is ground for presuming commission of the offence.

Conclusion: The plea based on minority for part of the period did not justify interference with the charge.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the order on charge and the framed charges failed, and the criminal trial was permitted to proceed to conclusion.

Ratio Decidendi: Findings in income tax proceedings do not conclusively establish the lawfulness of the source of income for a disproportionate assets prosecution, and at the stage of charge the court need only ascertain whether the material raises a ground for presuming the offence.

Issues: Whether a miscellaneous application filed after final disposal of the appeals was maintainable to seek directions for late payment surcharge and related reliefs, and whether the Court retained jurisdiction to entertain such post-disposal prayer.

Analysis: The application sought substantive relief in aid of a concluded judgment, not correction of any clerical or arithmetical mistake or extension of time. The Court held that its post-disposal jurisdiction cannot be invoked to reopen or expand the scope of a final judgment through a miscellaneous application or a disguised review. The limited scope of post-judgment interference under the Supreme Court Rules, together with the principle that the Court becomes functus officio after final disposal, barred entertainment of the application. The earlier contempt orders leaving the LPS question open did not create a right to pursue that claim in the present procedural vehicle.

Conclusion: The miscellaneous application was not maintainable and was dismissed.

Final Conclusion: A final judgment cannot be substantively modified or supplemented through a post-disposal miscellaneous application, save in narrowly recognised situations such as clerical correction, extension of time, or other exceptional cases within jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: After final disposal, the Court is functus officio and cannot entertain a miscellaneous application seeking substantive modification, clarification, or fresh relief beyond the limited powers expressly preserved by the rules or law.

Issues: Whether the secured creditor was entitled to proceed under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, including by issuance of notice under Section 13(4), and whether the guarantor could resist such measures on the footing that liability was not enforceable against him.

Analysis: The challenge arose from proceedings initiated by the secured creditor for recovery of dues against mortgaged property. The Court held that where a mortgage exists and loan amounts remain recoverable, the secured creditor is entitled to proceed under the SARFAESI framework. It further affirmed that the liability of the guarantor is joint and several with that of the principal debtor, and therefore the measures taken under the Act could not be interdicted on the grounds urged against the demand notice.

Conclusion: The challenge to the SARFAESI measures failed and the secured creditor was held entitled to proceed, including under Section 13(4) of the Act.

Final Conclusion: The impugned judgment was set aside and the appeal succeeded, leaving the secured creditor free to continue recovery action under the SARFAESI Act.

Ratio Decidendi: A secured creditor may enforce a mortgage under the SARFAESI Act when the debt remains recoverable, and the guarantor remains jointly and severally liable with the principal debtor.

Issues: (i) Whether ghee is a product of livestock within the meaning of the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966. (ii) Whether the 1994 notification required compliance with the procedure contemplated under Section 3 of the Act. (iii) Whether market fee could be levied on ghee and collected for the relevant period.

Issue (i): Whether ghee is a product of livestock within the meaning of the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966.

Analysis: The statutory definition of livestock covers animals such as cows and buffaloes, and products of livestock are those declared by notification. Ghee is derived from milk, which itself is a product of livestock, and the expression is wide enough to include derivative items where the legislative object is to regulate animal husbandry products. The meaning adopted by the High Court, treating ghee as a product of livestock, was supported by the scheme of the Act and by analogous reasoning on processed animal products.

Conclusion: Ghee was rightly held to be a product of livestock.

Issue (ii): Whether the 1994 notification required compliance with the procedure contemplated under Section 3 of the Act.

Analysis: Section 3 governs the initial declaration of a notified area and requires draft publication and consideration of objections. Section 4 operates differently and concerns constitution of market committees, establishment of markets, and declaration of notified market areas in respect of already notified products. The impugned notification was issued under Section 4, not under Section 3, and therefore the draft-notification procedure was not attracted.

Conclusion: Compliance with the procedure under Section 3 was not required for the 1994 notification.

Issue (iii): Whether market fee could be levied on ghee and collected for the relevant period.

Analysis: Once ghee stood notified as a regulated product, the market committees were empowered under the Act to levy market fee on its sale and purchase. The appellants had availed the market mechanism and facilities, and the levy could not be defeated merely because interim protection had earlier prevented collection. The direction permitting payment in instalments balanced the financial burden while affirming the liability.

Conclusion: The appellants were liable to pay market fee for the relevant period.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the 1994 notification failed, the levy on ghee was upheld, and the appeals were dismissed with consequential directions regarding payment.

Ratio Decidendi: A derivative product of a notified livestock product can itself fall within the expression