Issues: Whether the appellant's selection to the post of Clerk could be set aside on the ground that one member of the Selection Committee was related to the appellant, and whether such relationship attracted the prohibition in Rule 31(1) of the Orissa Education (Establishment, Recognition & Management of Private High Schools) Rules, 1991.

Analysis: Rule 31(1) prohibits participation in selection by a near relation of a candidate. The relationship between the appellant and the member of the Selection Committee was found to be remote, being six degrees apart. On that basis, the relation did not amount to a near relation within the meaning of the rule. Since the High Court had proceeded only on this ground, the setting aside of the selection could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The relationship did not fall within the prohibition under Rule 31(1), and the High Court's order setting aside the selection was liable to be set aside.

Issues: Whether the respondent was entitled to invoke writ jurisdiction without first availing the statutory revisional remedy under section 18 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.

Analysis: The respondent had an effective statutory remedy of revision, yet approached the High Court directly by way of writ petition. The High Court re-examined the facts despite the availability of that alternate remedy. In these circumstances, interference under writ jurisdiction was not justified.

Conclusion: The writ petition ought not to have been entertained in the first instance. The High Court's order was set aside and the respondent was left at liberty to pursue the revisional remedy if so advised.

Issues: Whether the deduction of 40% towards development charges from the enhanced compensation was justified in land acquisition proceedings.

Analysis: The land was acquired pursuant to notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer was enhanced by the District Judge, and the High Court sustained the enhancement after deducting 40% towards development charges. The Court noted that in comparable cases deductions between 30% and 40% had been approved depending on location and development requirements, and found the High Court's application of that principle to be proper.

Conclusion: The deduction of 40% towards development charges was upheld and no interference was called for.

Final Conclusion: The enhanced compensation as affirmed by the High Court remained undisturbed and the appeal failed.

Ratio Decidendi: In land acquisition valuation, deduction towards development charges is permissible where the percentage adopted is reasonable in light of the location and comparable precedents.

Issues: Whether the High Court could decide the appeal on merits in the absence of the appellants' counsel under Order XLI Rule 17(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and whether the impugned judgment required to be set aside and the matter remitted.

Analysis: The Explanation to Order XLI Rule 17(1) makes it clear that the appellate court is not empowered to dismiss an appeal on the merits when the appellant does not appear. Where the appeal is liable to be dismissed in default, the court cannot convert the absence of counsel into an adjudication affirming or rejecting the trial court's decision on merits. Since the High Court had gone into the relevant aspects of the case and recorded findings on interference despite the absence of the appellants' counsel, it had exceeded the permissible scope of Order XLI Rule 17(1).

Conclusion: The High Court's disposal on merits was not permissible, and the appeal was allowed with the matter sent back for fresh disposal in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The appellate court cannot adjudicate the merits of an appeal when dismissing it for non-appearance under Order XLI Rule 17(1), and an order passed in breach of that limitation is liable to be set aside and remitted.

Ratio Decidendi: An appeal cannot be dismissed or decided on merits under Order XLI Rule 17(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the absence of the appellant, and any such merits-based disposal is invalid.

Issues: Whether the personal observations made against the appellant in specified paragraphs of the High Court judgment were warranted and should be deleted.

Analysis: The challenged observations were of a personal nature and were found to be unnecessary for disposal of the writ petition. The Court noted that the appellant's counsel had been somewhat emphatic in argument, but that did not justify the adverse remarks recorded against him personally.

Conclusion: The impugned personal observations were set aside and directed to be treated as deleted.

Issues: Whether statutory rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution can be treated as overridden or rendered inoperative merely because the Government had expressed an intention to amend them and acted on that basis.

Analysis: The rules in question were statutory rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Such rules continue to operate until they are formally amended and cannot be displaced by executive orders or executive practice. A mere decision to amend does not obliterate the existing rule, and any amendment, when made, would ordinarily operate prospectively unless retrospective operation is expressly provided or necessarily implied. The Tribunal erred in ignoring the existing rule and upholding the consequential orders on the assumption of an unmade amendment.

Conclusion: The Tribunal's view was ; the appeals succeeded, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for fresh disposal in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the respondents were entitled to the benefit of the amended provisions governing land acquisition compensation, including the rate of solatium and interest payable on enhanced compensation.

Analysis: The controversy was treated as covered by an earlier decision of the Court. On that footing, the respondents were held not entitled to the benefit of the amended provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court applied the governing precedent and accepted only the relief already settled thereunder.

Conclusion: The respondents were not entitled to the benefit of the amended provisions, and were entitled only to solatium at 15% and interest at 6% on the enhanced compensation from the date of taking possession till the date of deposit.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, and the compensation payable to the respondents was confined to the rates and entitlement stated by the Court.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the controversy is covered by binding precedent, the claim to enhanced statutory benefits must be confined to the relief already determined by that precedent.

Issues: Whether the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission was justified in directing handover of possession of the car when the claim for garage charges was already pending before the civil court.

Analysis: The claim for garage charges was the subject of a pending civil suit and was therefore sub judice before the competent civil court. The Consumer Protection Act does not operate in derogation of other laws, and the existence of the pending civil proceedings made the consumer forum's direction on that aspect unsustainable.

Conclusion: The direction to hand over possession of the car in relation to the garage charges was not justified and was set aside in favour of the appellant.

Issues: Whether the blacklisting order passed against the petitioner called for interference in writ jurisdiction and whether any ground was made out for special leave under Article 136.

Analysis: The petitioner had negotiated to supply steel, received acceptance, but failed to execute the contract or commence supply. Even after notice to show cause, no reply was given. The respondents, therefore, took action to secure the required supply and blacklisted the petitioner for two years. The order was held to be consistent with natural justice and not arbitrary, unwarranted, or irrelevant. The High Court's refusal to interfere in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 was approved, and no ground was found for interference under Article 136.

Conclusion: The blacklisting order was upheld and interference was declined.