Issues: Whether the cost imposed on the accused, payable to the Legal Services Authority pursuant to the settlement based on the earlier decision, was legally sustainable.

Analysis: The appellant had been convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, but the matter was later settled between the parties during the revisional stage and the appellant was acquitted subject to deposit of costs. The challenge before the Court was confined to the direction requiring payment of costs to the Legal Services Authority. The Court held that the earlier decision relied upon could not be treated as a binding precedent in the sense of laying down an inflexible mandate applicable to every case, particularly where the complainant had no objection and the appellant was unable to comply.

Conclusion: The direction imposing costs on the appellant could not be sustained and was set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: A settlement-based cost direction, though referable to Article 142 of the Constitution of India, does not operate as an inflexible binding precedent in every case, and such costs cannot be mechanically sustained where the facts do not justify their continuance.

Outcome: The appeal was disposed of by requesting the High Court to decide the pending revision expeditiously and by directing continuation of the interim order till disposal of the revision petition.

Outcome: The Special Leave Petition was disposed of and the impugned order was not interfered with.

Issues: Whether the challenge to the criminal proceedings on the ground of absence of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 warranted interference at the stage of the special leave petitions, and whether liberty could be given to seek exemption from personal attendance.

Analysis: The sanction question under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was treated as one that may be examined by the trial court at an appropriate stage depending on the evidence led during trial. In the circumstances, no interference was considered necessary with the High Court's order at this stage. The petitioner was left at liberty to seek exemption from personal attendance before the trial court under the provisions corresponding to Sections 205 and 317 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Sections 228 and 355 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Conclusion: The petition was not entertained on merits at this stage, and the petitioner's remedy on sanction was left open before the trial court. Liberty to seek exemption from personal attendance was preserved.

Issues: Whether the foreign arbitral award, granting compensatory damages to the award-holders, could be recognized and enforced in India without any legal impediment and whether prior RBI approval was required before enforcement.

Analysis: The award was for compensatory damages arising from breach of the share purchase arrangements and did not direct transfer of shares or payment of consideration for any equity transfer. The RBI's affidavit clarified that payment of damages of this nature is a current account transaction under the foreign exchange framework and does not require any specific approval or permission. In that view, the Court found no contravention that would bar enforcement under the enforcement provisions of the arbitration law.

Conclusion: The foreign award was held enforceable in India, and RBI approval was not treated as a precondition to enforcement on the facts presented.

Final Conclusion: The award-holder's enforcement rights were upheld and the matter was disposed of with directions for the execution proceedings to continue expeditiously.

Ratio Decidendi: A foreign award granting compensatory damages, where no transfer of shares is ordered and the RBI states that such payment is a current account transaction not requiring specific approval, is not ed from enforcement in India on RBI-approval grounds.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1. Whether the High Court erred in substituting the sentence of six months simple imprisonment under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 with a token compensation of Rs.50,000/-.

2. Whether the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be compounded under Section 147 of the Act and, if so, on what terms and conditions compounding and consequent acquittal may be ordered.

3. Whether a conditional acquittal/compounding order that is made subject to payment within a fixed period may be subject to automatic recall and revival of conviction on non-payment, and whether the victim/appellant may be given liberty to pursue enforcement in the trial court on non-compliance.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1 - Adequacy of Compensation substituted for Imprisonment

Legal framework: Sentencing under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act permits imprisonment; appellate or revisional courts have discretion to modify sentence but must ensure compensation awarded in lieu of imprisonment is just and proportionate to the loss and conduct.

Precedent Treatment: No specific earlier authorities are relied upon or distinguished in the judgment; the Court proceeded on established principles of proportionality and victim compensation rather than on citing prior decisions.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that substituting a six-month sentence with a payment of Rs.50,000/- in respect of a cheque default relating to a principal of Rs.3,62,493/- returned only after a decade was manifestly inadequate. The Court emphasized that compensation must be realistic and commensurate with the deprivation suffered; a token amount that fails to reflect the magnitude and duration of the default is unreasonable. On this basis the Court called for a re-assessment of compensation and elicited the respondent's willingness to pay an amount equal to the principal.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - a token compensation that is disproportionate to the amount due and the delay in payment cannot validly replace an otherwise justified sentence; compensation in lieu of imprisonment must be reasonable and proportionate. This reasoning forms part of the operative decision to reject the Rs.50,000/- token amount.

Conclusion: The Rs.50,000/- sum previously directed by the High Court was inadequate and unreasonable as compensation in lieu of six months imprisonment given the facts (principal Rs.3,62,493/- and decade-long delay).

Issue 2 - Power to Compound under Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and permissible terms

Legal framework: Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act permits compounding of the offence; compounding requires the consent of the complainant/victim and is subject to the court's satisfaction that compounding is appropriate in the circumstances.

Precedent Treatment: The judgment does not advert to or overrule any judicial precedents; it applies the statutory compounding power in light of parties' expressed positions.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court proceeded on the statutory power to compound. Having found the token compensation inadequate, the Court solicited and obtained the respondent's agreement to pay an amount equal to the principal and obtained the appellant's willingness to permit compounding on that basis. The Court treated compounding as permissible where the injured party consents and where the court can frame appropriate conditions (including a monetary payment within a fixed period) to safeguard the victim's legal interests.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - compounding under Section 147 may be ordered by the court with the parties' consent, provided the terms (including quantum and timeline for payment) adequately protect the injured party; where such terms are agreed and reasonable, the court may acquit and compound the offence subject to compliance.

Conclusion: Compounding of the Section 138 offence was permissible and was ordered on terms that the respondent pay an additional amount equal to the principal (i.e., double the principal when added to amounts already paid) within eight weeks, satisfying the requirement of safeguarding the injured party's interests.

Issue 3 - Conditional acquittal, automatic recall on non-payment and enforcement avenues

Legal framework: Courts may grant conditional acquittals/compounding subject to compliance with specified conditions; failure to comply permits revival/recall of the conviction and sentence and allows the injured party to pursue available remedies for enforcement.

Precedent Treatment: No explicit authorities cited; the Court implemented well-established procedural consequences attendant on conditional orders - recall on default and leave to pursue enforcement in trial court.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court directed that on compliance with the payment condition the matter stood compounded and the accused be acquitted; conversely, the Court ordered automatic recall of the order and revival of conviction and sentence if payment was not made within the stipulated eight-week period. Additionally, the Court granted liberty to the injured party to file a petition in the trial court in the event of non-compliance, to enable further appropriate action. These measures were imposed to ensure that compounding is not a mere paper acquittal but is contingent on meaningful satisfaction of the victim's claim and enforceable by revive/recall mechanisms.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - conditional compounding/acquittal can be made subject to a clear timeline for payment; automatic recall and revival of conviction on non-compliance is an appropriate and effective safeguard; granting the injured party liberty to approach the trial court for enforcement is consistent with ensuring practical redress.

Conclusion: The Court's order providing for conditional acquittal on payment within eight weeks, automatic revival of conviction on default, and liberty to seek enforcement in the trial court is legally sound and appropriately balances the accused's interest in compounding with protection of the injured party's rights.

Cross-references and Operative Outcome

The Court's conclusions on the inadequacy of the earlier Rs.50,000/- direction (Issue 1) directly informed its exercise of the compounding power (Issue 2) and the framing of conditional terms with an express recall mechanism (Issue 3). The operative direction - payment of an additional amount equal to the principal within eight weeks, compounding and acquittal on compliance, and automatic recall and revival of conviction on non-compliance - embodies the Court's application of the statutory compounding regime while securing realistic compensation for the injured party.

Issues: Whether the complaint proceedings pending in Calcutta and Jaipur were required to be transferred to one forum, and whether the prayer to shift the Jaipur proceeding to Kolhapur could be granted.

Analysis: The transfer request was considered on the basis that one complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was instituted at Jaipur on the footing of Section 142(2)(a) of that Act, while the other proceeding was stated to arise from a loan transaction at Kolhapur. Without expressing any opinion on jurisdiction, the Court considered it just and convenient that both matters be heard at the same place, since one proceeding was already pending at Jaipur.

Conclusion: The proceeding pending at Calcutta was directed to be transferred to Jaipur, and the request to transfer the Jaipur proceeding to Kolhapur was rejected.

Issues: Whether the transfer petition should be disposed of in terms of the settlement arrived at between the parties during mediation.

Analysis: The parties were referred to mediation and a Memorandum of Settlement was placed on record. The settlement recorded payment of the agreed amount, withdrawal of the connected complaint, and a complete resolution of all claims and counterclaims arising from the dispute. In view of the settlement, no further adjudication on the transfer request was required.

Conclusion: The transfer petition was disposed of in terms of the Memorandum of Settlement.

Final Conclusion: The dispute was brought to an end through a binding settlement recorded by the Court, and the transfer proceedings stood concluded accordingly.

Issues: Whether the complaint arising from dishonour of electronic funds transfer proceedings was liable to be transferred on the ground that the petitioner's head office and the underlying loan transaction were situated at Delhi, or whether jurisdiction lay at Jaipur where the credit account was located.

Analysis: Section 25(5) of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 applies Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 to dishonour of electronic funds transfer. Section 142(2)(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 governs the place where the complaint may be lodged, and the complaint allegations indicated that the mandate for transfer was given for credit to the complainant's account located within the territorial jurisdiction of the Jaipur court. On that basis, no ground was made out for transfer.

Conclusion: The request for transfer was rejected and jurisdiction was found to lie at Jaipur.

Final Conclusion: The proceeding was retained at the forum where the complaint disclosed the relevant territorial nexus, and the transfer request failed.

Ratio Decidendi: For dishonour proceedings relating to electronic funds transfer, jurisdiction is determined by the statutory scheme applying Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and by the complaint's territorial nexus under Section 142(2)(a), not merely by the location of the drawer's head office or the loan transaction.

(i) Whether Investigating Agencies, Prosecuting Agencies, or Police can directly issue summons to question a counsel who is appearing for a party in a case, particularly when the counsel's role is limited to legal representation and advice.

(ii) If such direct summons are permissible, under what circumstances and safeguards, including whether judicial oversight is necessary before such summons can be issued to a lawyer.

(iii) The extent to which communications between an Advocate and client, protected under statutory provisions analogous to legal professional privilege, can be subjected to investigation or inquiry by law enforcement agencies.

(iv) The implications of permitting or restraining direct summons on the autonomy, independence, and effective functioning of the legal profession and the administration of justice.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis

1. Authority of Investigating Agencies to Summon Counsel Directly

The Court examined the statutory framework under which the summons was issued, specifically Section 179 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ("BNSS"). This provision empowers Investigating Agencies to summon individuals for inquiry as part of investigation. However, the petitioner was summoned in his capacity as counsel representing the accused, not as an accused or witness personally connected to the facts beyond his professional role.

The Court noted that the petitioner challenged the summons on the ground that he was neither an accused nor a witness but was discharging professional duties as an Advocate. The Court acknowledged the fundamental rights of legal professionals under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to practice any profession, including law, subject to reasonable restrictions. Further, the Court considered Section 132 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 ("BSA"), which corresponds to Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, protecting privileged communications between an Advocate and client from being disclosed in legal proceedings.

The Court reasoned that permitting Investigating Agencies to directly summon counsel risks undermining the confidentiality and privilege essential to the administration of justice. It emphasized that the autonomy and independence of the legal profession are integral to the justice system, and direct summons to a lawyer could threaten these principles. The Court found merit in the petitioner's contention that such direct summons impinge upon the rights of Advocates and the autonomy of the profession.

2. Scope of Legal Professional Privilege and Confidentiality

The Court highlighted that communications between an Advocate and client are protected under Section 132 of the BSA, which prohibits disclosure of confidential communications made for the purpose of legal advice or representation. This privilege is a cornerstone of the legal system, ensuring clients can freely communicate with their counsel without fear of exposure.

The Court observed that the Investigating Agency's attempt to summon the petitioner potentially threatens this confidentiality, as questioning counsel could lead to disclosure of privileged communications. The Court underscored that such privilege cannot be lightly overridden and must be respected unless exceptional circumstances justify otherwise.

3. Need for Judicial Oversight and Safeguards

The Court raised the question of whether, even if the Investigating Agency suspects that the individual's role is more than that of counsel, direct summons without judicial oversight is appropriate. The Court suggested that judicial scrutiny should be a prerequisite before Investigating Agencies can summon a lawyer, particularly to ensure that the lawyer is not being questioned merely for their professional role or privileged communications.

This approach balances the need for effective investigation with the protection of legal professional independence and client confidentiality. The Court indicated that such safeguards are necessary to prevent misuse of investigative powers and to uphold the integrity of the legal profession.

4. Impact on Administration of Justice and Legal Profession

The Court emphasized that the legal profession is an integral component of the administration of justice. The autonomy and independence of Advocates are essential for them to discharge their duties fearlessly and conscientiously. Subjecting counsel to the "beck and call" of Investigating Agencies without proper safeguards would undermine the administration of justice.

Accordingly, the Court expressed concern that permitting direct summons to counsel without judicial oversight would be "completely untenable" and could have a chilling effect on the legal profession's ability to function effectively.

Treatment of Competing Arguments

The Investigating Agency's position, as reflected in the High Court's dismissal of the quashing petition, was that the summons was issued under statutory authority and that the petitioner was summoned as a witness under Section 179 of BNSS. The High Court held that there was no violation of fundamental rights since the Investigating Agency had the power to investigate and summon witnesses.

The Supreme Court, however, distinguished the petitioner's role as counsel from that of a witness or accused. It found that the High Court did not adequately consider the implications of summoning a lawyer in their professional capacity and the protections afforded to legal professionals under constitutional and statutory provisions. The Court thus rejected the reasoning that mere statutory authority to summon witnesses extends to counsel without limitations or safeguards.

Key Evidence and Findings

The Court relied on the petitioner's role as an Advocate, the nature of the FIR and investigation, the statutory provisions protecting privileged communication, and the fundamental rights guaranteed to legal professionals. The report submitted by the Assistant Commissioner of Police noted the petitioner's non-cooperation but did not establish any role beyond that of counsel. The Court found no justification for the Investigating Agency's direct summons without judicial oversight.

Conclusions

The Court concluded that:

• Direct summons issued by Investigating Agencies to counsel acting in their professional capacity are prima facie impermissible.
• Legal professional privilege and the autonomy of the legal profession must be protected from intrusion by investigative authorities.
• Judicial oversight is necessary before such summons can be issued in exceptional cases where the role of the lawyer may extend beyond legal representation.
• Pending further directions, the State is restrained from summoning the petitioner, and the notice dated 24.03.2025 is stayed.

The Court further directed issuance of notices to the Attorney General, Solicitor General, Bar Council of India, and apex legal professional bodies to assist in addressing the broader questions raised.

Significant Holdings

"The legal profession is an integral component of the process of administration of justice. Counsel, who are engaged in their legal practice apart from their fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, have certain rights and privileges guaranteed because of the fact that they are legal professionals and also due to statutory provisions like Section 132 of BSA."

"Permitting the Investigating Agencies/Prosecuting Agency/Police to directly summon defence counsel or Advocates, who advise parties in a given case would seriously undermine the autonomy of the legal profession and would even constitute a direct threat to the independence of the administration of justice."

"Subjecting the Counsel in a case to the beck and call of the Investigating Agency/Prosecuting Agency/Police prima facie appears to be completely untenable."

"Judicial scrutiny should be a prerequisite before Investigating Agencies can summon a lawyer, particularly to ensure that the lawyer is not being questioned merely for their professional role or privileged communications."

The Court's final determination is that direct summons to counsel by Investigating Agencies without judicial oversight is impermissible in ordinary circumstances, and the autonomy and privilege of legal professionals must be preserved to maintain the integrity of the justice system.

The core legal questions considered by the Court were:

(a) Whether the Hospital (Appellant) and the doctor (Respondent No. 2) could be held vicariously liable for medical negligence resulting in the death of the complainant's son.

(b) Whether the findings of medical negligence by the National Consumers Dispute Redressal Commission (NCDRC) and the Andhra Pradesh State Consumers Disputes Redressal Commission (APSCDRC) were supported by sufficient medical evidence and expert opinion.

(c) Whether the quantum of compensation awarded by the NCDRC-Rs. 20 lakhs in total (Rs. 15 lakhs against the Hospital and Rs. 5 lakhs against the doctor)-was justified and proportionate to the facts and circumstances of the case.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

(a) Liability of the Hospital and Doctor for Medical Negligence

The legal framework governing medical negligence requires proof that the medical professionals failed to exercise the degree of care and skill expected of a reasonably competent practitioner under similar circumstances, resulting in harm to the patient. The principle of vicarious liability holds the hospital responsible for the acts of its doctors and staff if negligence is established.

The Appellant argued that the hospital and its doctors had adhered to the requisite standard of care, supported by medical literature and records, and that no expert evidence substantiated the claim of negligence. It was contended that the procedures followed were in accordance with accepted medical standards and that requisite permissions were duly obtained from the patient's attendants.

The Court examined the medical records and evidence on record, including the pleadings and expert opinions presented before the consumer fora. The Respondent supported the findings of negligence, emphasizing that the hospital and doctor failed to provide the appropriate standard of care, leading to the death of the patient.

The Court found that ample evidence and records indicated medical negligence by the hospital and the doctor. The findings of the APSCDRC and NCDRC were based on a thorough examination of the medical facts and were not arbitrary or unsupported by evidence. The Court affirmed these findings, holding that both the hospital and the doctor were liable for the negligence resulting in the death.

(b) Sufficiency of Medical Evidence and Expert Opinion

The Appellant challenged the findings on the ground that there was no medical literature or expert evidence substantiating the negligence. It was argued that the medical procedures were standard and that the doctors exercised due care and caution.

The Court noted that the medical literature placed on record by the Appellant supported the procedures followed, but the ultimate question was whether the treatment met the standard expected in the circumstances. The Court observed that the consumer fora had considered all medical evidence, including expert opinions, and had found negligence based on the facts.

The Court did not find any infirmity in the approach of the consumer fora in evaluating the medical evidence. It held that the findings were based on a proper appreciation of the evidence and medical records, and therefore, deserved to be upheld.

(c) Quantum of Compensation

The Appellant contended that the compensation awarded by the NCDRC was excessive and not supported by evidence or documents. The Respondent argued that the compensation was justified considering the deceased was a 27-year-old B.Tech graduate employed in a soap factory, supporting his family and having the potential for future earnings.

The Court considered the age, qualifications, and employment status of the deceased. It recognized that at 27 years, the deceased was in the prime of his life with a promising career ahead, and the compensation should reflect the loss of future earnings and support to the family.

While the NCDRC awarded Rs. 5 lakhs against the doctor and Rs. 15 lakhs against the hospital, the Court noted that the doctor had accepted and deposited the Rs. 5 lakhs. Regarding the hospital's liability, the Court referred to its earlier direction requiring the hospital to deposit Rs. 10 lakhs in the Court Registry, which had accrued interest over time.

The Court concluded that the deposited amount of Rs. 10 lakhs with accrued interest would adequately serve the interests of justice as compensation from the hospital. Consequently, the Court modified the quantum of compensation payable by the hospital from Rs. 15 lakhs to Rs. 10 lakhs plus interest, while upholding the total liability.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

The Court held:

"There is ample evidence as well as records to indicate that there was indeed medical negligence at the end of the Appellant and Respondent no.2."

"The findings thus returned by the APSCDRC and NCDRC in this regard cannot be invalidated and are affirmed."

Regarding compensation, the Court stated:

"Considering that the individual was a B.Tech graduate and he was working in a soap factory, albeit drawing a modest salary... the compensation as has been assessed by NCDRC is fully justified calling for no interference by this Court."

On the modification of compensation payable by the hospital, the Court observed:

"The amount of Rs.10 lakhs as stands deposited in this Court by the Appellant along with the accrued interest thereon would serve the interest of justice and the said amount of compensation would suffice as far as the liability of the appellant hospital is concerned."

The Court upheld the decision of the NCDRC on liability but modified the compensation amount payable by the hospital to Rs. 10 lakhs plus interest, directing disbursement to the complainant upon application.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on parity with similarly placed co-accused and in view of the period of incarceration already undergone.

Analysis: The petitioner's role was not found to include the main firing incident attributed in the case. The circumstances were treated as substantially similar to those of co-accused who had already been granted bail, and the petitioner had undergone incarceration of about 41/2 years, which was longer than the period considered for the released co-accused.

Conclusion: Bail was granted to the petitioner.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the NCDRC order and enhancing the rate of interest from 9% p.a. to 15% p.a. and awarding enhanced compensation; and (ii) Whether the compensatory award of Rs. 10,00,000/- should be maintained.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court was justified in enhancing the rate of interest from 9% p.a. (as awarded by NCDRC) to 15% p.a.

Analysis: The question required assessment of whether interference by the High Court under Article 227 was warranted in modifying a fact-sensitive, reasoned determination made by the NCDRC which had considered delay, option for refund by the allottee, and the circumstances of the allotment. Precedent establishes that where possession is not delivered within specified time, the allottee is entitled to refund with reasonable interest; the appropriate rate depends on the facts and equitable balancing. The NCDRC's award of 9% p.a. followed evaluation of evidence and choice of refund by the complainant. The High Court's enhancement to 15% p.a. was not shown to be compelled by the factual matrix or legal standards applicable to such consumer disputes.

Conclusion: The High Court's enhancement of interest to 15% p.a. was not justified; the NCDRC's award of interest at 9% p.a. is restored.

Issue (ii): Whether the compensation awarded of Rs. 10,00,000/- should be sustained.

Analysis: Consideration was given to the nature of the respondent (an instrumentality of the State), the course of conduct, and proportionality of the compensatory sum relative to ends of justice. The Court found that a reduction would adequately meet justice without unduly penalising the public authority, having regard to deposits already made and the factual circumstances.

Conclusion: The compensation is reduced from Rs. 10,00,000/- to Rs. 7,50,000/-.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed by setting aside the High Court's enhancement of interest to 15% p.a., restoring the NCDRC's award of interest at 9% p.a., and reducing the compensation awarded to Rs. 7,50,000/-. The remainder of the NCDRC order as to refund with interest is maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a specialised forum has made a reasoned, fact-based determination of refund and a reasonable rate of interest for delay, supervisory interference is improper unless the rate or compensation is shown to be legally unsupportable or manifestly excessive; courts should restore a fact-based reasonable award and may moderate excessive compensation in the interest of proportionality.

Issues: Whether the appellant's arrest and consequential remand were liable to be set aside for non-furnishing of the grounds of arrest as required by law.

Analysis: The material supplied to the appellant was only an arrest memo in a prescribed format, containing basic particulars such as the name of the appellant, place of arrest, and a reference to the statement of a co-accused. It did not convey the grounds of arrest with any meaningful particulars. Such a memo could not be treated as compliance with the statutory requirement to inform the arrested person of the grounds of arrest. This deficiency amounted to clear non-compliance with the mandate under Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which gives effect to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The arrest and the consequential remand order were set aside, and the appellant was directed to be released unless required in any other case.

Ratio Decidendi: A mere arrest memo without meaningful particulars does not satisfy the legal requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest, and non-compliance vitiates the arrest and consequential remand.

Issues: Whether the commercial suit was liable to be held not maintainable for non-compliance with Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

Analysis: The suit had been registered after the parties had already been referred to mediation by the Civil Court, and the mediation had failed. On these facts, the requirement under Section 12A was treated as having been substantially complied with because the dispute had, in substance, undergone the mediation process before the suit was registered.

Conclusion: The plea of non-compliance with Section 12A was rejected and the commercial suit was not held to be non-maintainable on that ground.

Issues: Whether the petitioner, who had remained in custody for more than six years after extradition while the investigation continued and the trial had not commenced, was entitled to bail.

Analysis: The Court noted the prolonged incarceration, the continuing investigation despite multiple charge-sheets and supplementary charge-sheets, and the absence of commencement of trial. These factors were treated as sufficient to justify release on bail, with conditions to be fixed by the Trial Court and with an expectation of full cooperation during trial.

Conclusion: Bail was granted to the petitioner on terms and conditions to be determined by the Trial Court.