Issues: (i) Whether a complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for dishonour of a cheque issued on behalf of a trust is maintainable against the Chairman or trustee without impleading the trust as an accused; (ii) Whether a trust is a juristic person or legal entity capable of suing or being sued in its own name for the purposes of such prosecution.

Issue (i): Whether a complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for dishonour of a cheque issued on behalf of a trust is maintainable against the Chairman or trustee without impleading the trust as an accused.

Analysis: The liability under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was examined on the footing that the cheque had been signed and issued by the respondent as authorised signatory. The established principle that a cheque signatory can be proceeded against where the offence is otherwise made out was applied. The Court also considered that the question was not merely one of vicarious liability in the abstract, but whether the trust itself had to be arraigned as a principal accused before the trustee could be prosecuted.

Conclusion: The complaint was held to be maintainable against the trustee who signed the cheque, even though the trust was not impleaded as an accused.

Issue (ii): Whether a trust is a juristic person or legal entity capable of suing or being sued in its own name for the purposes of such prosecution.

Analysis: Referring to the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, the Court held that a trust is an obligation attached to property and that the duty to maintain and defend suits lies on the trustee. On that basis, and for the purpose of prosecution under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the trust was treated as lacking independent legal personality. The Court rejected contrary views that equated a trust with a company or treated it as a juristic person for this purpose.

Conclusion: A trust was held not to be a separate juristic person or legal entity required to be arraigned as an accused in the present context.

Final Conclusion: The impugned quashing order was set aside and the complaint proceedings were restored for continuation in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 based on a cheque issued on behalf of a trust, the trustee or authorised signatory may be proceeded against without impleading the trust as an accused because the trust is not treated as a separate legal entity for this purpose.

Issues: Whether the instrument styled as a "Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed" or "Security Bond or Mortgage Deed" was chargeable to stamp duty under Article 40 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, or under Article 57 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.

Analysis: The decisive test for stamp duty classification is the substance of the instrument and not its nomenclature. The operative recitals showed that the appellant/company transferred specified immovable property and created a charge over it to secure performance of obligations and repayment liability. That answer satisfied the statutory definition of a mortgage-deed under Section 2(17) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. Article 57 applies to a security bond or mortgage-deed executed for due execution of office, accounting for money or property received by virtue of office, or executed by a surety to secure due performance of a contract. The concept of surety has to be understood in the sense of a contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which requires a tripartite arrangement involving a surety, principal debtor and creditor. Here, no distinct surety existed apart from the principal debtor, and the instrument was executed by the company itself through its director. In such circumstances, Article 57 did not apply.

Conclusion: The instrument was correctly treated as a mortgage deed chargeable under Article 40 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and not as a security bond under Article 57. The challenge to the demand for deficit stamp duty failed.

Issues: Whether the appellate court validly granted an unconditional stay of execution of a money decree pending appeal without requiring deposit of the decretal amount.

Analysis: Order XLI Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 requires a specific and reasoned stay order founded on sufficient cause. The appellate court must consider substantial loss, absence of unreasonable delay, and security for due performance. Although deposit of the disputed amount is the ordinary and prudent course in money-decree cases, Order XLI Rules 1(3) and 5(5) do not make cash deposit an inflexible condition for stay; security may take the form of property, bond, or an appropriate undertaking. An unconditional stay is permissible only sparingly where an exceptional case is established, including where the decree is egregiously perverse, patently illegal, or facially untenable. Prima facie absence of valid service of summons, the ex parte proceedings, lack of sustainable pleadings or findings connecting the judgment-debtor to infringement, and enhancement and award of damages without corresponding pleadings or notice were relevant exceptional circumstances. The analogy based on Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was inapplicable to the exercise of appellate power under the Code.

Conclusion: The unconditional stay of the money decree was validly granted in the exceptional circumstances, and no interference was warranted.

Issues: (i) Whether an independent arbitrator may be appointed where the named arbitral appointment mechanism has become legally inoperative owing to statutory disqualification; (ii) Whether the application for appointment of an arbitrator was within limitation.

Issue (i): Whether an independent arbitrator may be appointed where the named arbitral appointment mechanism has become legally inoperative owing to statutory disqualification.

Analysis: Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule disqualifies the respondent's Managing Director and any officer nominated by that Managing Director from acting as arbitrator. That disqualification extends to the power of nomination. The invalidity of the contractual procedure does not extinguish the parties' substantive agreement to refer disputes to arbitration. A purposive construction preserves that agreement and enables appointment of an impartial arbitrator under Section 11(6).

Conclusion: An independent arbitrator may be appointed despite the inoperability of the named appointment procedure, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the application for appointment of an arbitrator was within limitation.

Analysis: The limitation period commenced when the final bill became due, namely 21.04.2018, and would ordinarily have expired after three years. However, the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 stood excluded under the COVID-19 limitation directions. On that exclusion, the Section 11(6) application filed on 15.03.2022 was timely.

Conclusion: The application was within limitation, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The arbitration agreement remains enforceable through an independent appointment mechanism, and the dispute is to proceed to institutional arbitration.

Ratio Decidendi: Statutory disqualification of a named arbitrator or appointing authority invalidates only the incompatible appointment procedure, not the underlying agreement to arbitrate; courts may preserve that agreement by appointing an independent arbitrator, and mandatory COVID-19 exclusion applies to limitation for such appointment proceedings.

Issues: Whether the tender condition requiring bidders to have supplied sports goods worth at least Rs. 6 crores to State Government agencies of Chhattisgarh in the preceding three financial years was arbitrary, discriminatory and unreasonable, and thus violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The tender was for supply of Sports Kits to students in government schools, and the eligibility condition had to bear a rational nexus with the object of securing quality supplies at the best price through fair competition. The Court reiterated that while the State has latitude to prescribe tender conditions, such conditions may be struck down if arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or lacking rational connection with the public purpose. The impugned condition confined eligibility to past supplies made only to Chhattisgarh State agencies and thereby excluded otherwise competent and financially sound suppliers who had executed comparable contracts elsewhere. This created an artificial barrier to participation, narrowed competition, and did not stand justified by the explanation that the State was Maoist-affected or that local familiarity was necessary, especially when the contract concerned sports kits and not security-sensitive goods.

Conclusion: The impugned eligibility condition was held to be arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory, and to offend Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

Final Conclusion: The tender restriction could not be sustained as a lawful procurement condition and the challenge to it succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: A tender eligibility condition that creates an artificial local barrier unrelated to the object of procurement, and excludes otherwise qualified bidders without rational justification, is liable to be invalidated as arbitrary and violative of equality and freedom of trade guarantees.

Issues: (i) Whether the Division Bench was justified under Sections 34 and 37 in setting aside the award for treating contractual notice requirements as waived or overridden by estoppel; (ii) Whether the award was vitiated by unequal treatment of the parties and denial of a full opportunity to present the case; (iii) Whether the award impermissibly rewrote the contractual prerequisites for the Performance Guarantee Test.

Issue (i): Whether the Division Bench was justified under Sections 34 and 37 in setting aside the award for treating contractual notice requirements as waived or overridden by estoppel.

Analysis: The agreement required any waiver, variation or modification to be in writing and signed by both parties. The award rejected the contractor's pleaded case of waiver based on 2010 events, but nevertheless relied on 2012 communications and the Jinan Agreement to find a waiver of contractual notices, although no such case was pleaded and the employer had no opportunity to adduce evidence on it. No unequivocal representation or conduct establishing a valid departure from the written-modification requirement was shown. An arbitral tribunal must decide in accordance with the contract and cannot alter its terms through an unsubstantiated waiver or estoppel.

Conclusion: The award's finding of waiver or estoppel regarding contractual notices was contrary to the contract and exceeded arbitral authority; the Division Bench rightly interfered in favour of the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the award was vitiated by unequal treatment of the parties and denial of a full opportunity to present the case.

Analysis: The assumed waiver of notice was applied to sustain the contractor's claims despite non-compliance with notice requirements, while the employer's counterclaims were rejected for absence of equivalent notices. The tribunal also adopted an unpleaded basis for waiver without giving the employer an effective opportunity to address it. Such differential treatment violated the statutory requirement of equality and full opportunity, offended natural justice, and conflicted with the basic notions of justice and public policy.

Conclusion: The award was vitiated by discriminatory treatment and denial of natural justice, warranting its setting aside in favour of the respondent.

Issue (iii): Whether the award impermissibly rewrote the contractual prerequisites for the Performance Guarantee Test.

Analysis: The agreement made successful completion of the Reliability Run and Unit Characteristics Tests prerequisites for the Performance Guarantee Test. Having found that the Unit Characteristics Test for Unit 1 failed, the tribunal could not consistently treat the Performance Guarantee Test as successfully completed and grant the related contractual payment. That approach altered express milestone conditions rather than construing the agreement.

Conclusion: The finding that the Performance Guarantee Test was successfully completed impermissibly rewrote the contract and was liable to be set aside in favour of the respondent.

Final Conclusion: The defects went to the root of the award, rendered it incompatible with the contractual mandate, natural justice and public policy, and could not be severed.

Ratio Decidendi: An arbitral award may be annulled notwithstanding the narrow scope of review where the tribunal rewrites express contractual terms, determines an unpleaded waiver without affording a party an opportunity to meet it, and applies contractual requirements unequally between the parties.

Issues: (i) Whether, on admitted execution of the cheque, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arose and were rebutted by the accused; (ii) whether the High Court, in revisional jurisdiction, could upset concurrent findings of conviction in the absence of perversity; (iii) whether the complainant's financial capacity and the alleged cash-transaction violation under Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 destroyed the existence of a legally enforceable debt; and (iv) whether the accused's defence of issuance of a signed blank cheque and the non-reply to statutory notice displaced liability.

Issue (i): Whether, on admitted execution of the cheque, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arose and were rebutted by the accused.

Analysis: Once the cheque and signature were admitted, the statutory presumptions that the cheque was issued for consideration and in discharge of a legally enforceable debt arose. The presumption under Section 139 is rebuttable, but the initial burden lies on the accused to raise a probable defence. The accused did not adduce independent evidence or documents to show that the cheque was not issued towards liability, and the material brought on record did not establish rebuttal of the statutory presumptions.

Conclusion: The presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 operated in favour of the complainant and were not rebutted.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court, in revisional jurisdiction, could upset concurrent findings of conviction in the absence of perversity.

Analysis: Revisional jurisdiction is limited and does not authorise reappreciation of evidence to disturb concurrent factual findings unless those findings are perverse or suffer from jurisdictional error. The Trial Court and the Sessions Court had both accepted the complainant's case and found the accused guilty. No perversity was shown so as to justify revisional interference.

Conclusion: The High Court ought not to have interfered with the concurrent findings of fact.

Issue (iii): Whether the complainant's financial capacity and the alleged cash-transaction violation under Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 destroyed the existence of a legally enforceable debt.

Analysis: The complainant's evidence, read as a whole, did not show incapacity to advance the loan. The accused failed to produce convincing material to establish that the complainant lacked means. A breach of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 attracts penalty under Section 271D of that Act, but the statute does not declare the transaction void or unenforceable. Therefore, such a breach does not by itself defeat a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 or negate the statutory presumptions.

Conclusion: The complainant's financial capacity was not disproved, and a Section 269SS violation did not render the debt legally unenforceable.

Issue (iv): Whether the accused's defence of issuance of a signed blank cheque and the non-reply to statutory notice displaced liability.

Analysis: The defence that a signed blank cheque had been issued merely to facilitate a bank loan was found improbable on the facts. The accused also failed to reply to the statutory notice and took no prompt legal action after receiving notice, which supported the complainant's version. The absence of a reply and the lack of any supporting action or material weakened the defence and reinforced liability.

Conclusion: The defence was not accepted, and non-reply to the notice supported the complainant's case.

Final Conclusion: The impugned acquittal was set aside, the conviction and concurrent findings were restored, and the complainant succeeded with the monetary directions and broader procedural guidelines issued for cheque dishonour cases.

Ratio Decidendi: On admitted execution of a cheque, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arise and can be displaced only by a probable defence supported by material on record; revisional interference with concurrent findings is impermissible absent perversity, and a violation of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 does not by itself render the underlying debt unenforceable for the purposes of Section 138.

Issues: Whether the orders granting bail to the accused were liable to be set aside for ignoring the accused's prior conduct, undertakings before the High Court, and the material emerging from the charge-sheet, and whether the appellate courts erred in treating the challenge as a mere cancellation of bail matter.

Analysis: The bail order of the ACMM, the affirming order of the Sessions Judge, and the High Court's impugned order were found unsustainable because they failed to account for the accused's conduct in the earlier round of anticipatory bail proceedings, including the undertakings recorded before the High Court and the manner in which interim protection had been obtained and enjoyed. The reasoning that filing of the charge-sheet and absence of custodial interrogation by themselves justified bail was held to be inadequate, as the courts below did not meaningfully assess the material collected during investigation or the relevance of the accused's conduct. The appellate court also held that post-bail considerations could not retrospectively validate an otherwise unsustainable bail order, and that the matter could not be treated as a simple cancellation case divorced from the underlying factual background.

Conclusion: The bail orders were quashed and set aside, and the accused were directed to surrender before the ACMM within two weeks.

Issues: Whether, in view of the MoU and the arbitral award, the decree holder was entitled to claim compound interest or additional post-award interest under Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Analysis: Section 31(7)(a) permits the arbitral tribunal to include pre-award interest in the sum awarded, but that discretion is controlled by the parties' agreement. The MoU expressly provided for refund of the advance with interest at 21% per annum from the respective dates of disbursement till actual repayment. The arbitral tribunal adopted that contractual regime and awarded 21% interest till repayment. Since the award itself covered interest up to the date of repayment, there was no scope to add further post-award interest or compound interest at the execution stage. The award did not provide for compounding, and execution proceedings could not be used to enlarge the award.

Conclusion: The claim for compound interest and additional post-award interest was not maintainable, and the order of the executing court restoring full satisfaction of the award was correct.

Issues: Whether the FIR and charge sheet alleging cheating and forgery arising from a loan and contractual transaction warranted quashing under the inherent jurisdiction.

Analysis: The allegations, even if accepted in their entirety, arose from a loan transaction, repayment, an agreement to sell, and dishonoured cheques, and did not prima facie disclose the essential ingredients of cheating or forgery. The complainant's FIR followed criminal proceedings initiated by the appellant, including proceedings for dishonour of cheques in which the complainant was subsequently convicted. The registration of several FIRs within a short period and the retaliatory background established that the prosecution was malicious and gave criminal colour to a substantially civil dispute. The case consequently fell within the principles permitting quashing where no offence is disclosed and where proceedings are instituted mala fide to wreak vengeance.

Conclusion: The FIR and consequential charge sheet were liable to be quashed as an abuse of process; this was in favour of the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: Criminal proceedings arising from a civil or contractual transaction may be quashed where the allegations do not disclose the essential ingredients of the alleged offences and the prosecution is demonstrably mala fide or retaliatory.

Issues: Whether a second special leave petition or appeal was maintainable after the earlier special leave petition challenging the same order had been unconditionally withdrawn, and whether an appeal could lie from the dismissal of the review petition.

Analysis: The earlier challenge to the same order had been withdrawn without any liberty to file a fresh special leave petition or to revive the challenge if review failed. The principle underlying Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applies to special leave petitions as a rule of public policy, barring a second attempt to assail the same order after unconditional withdrawal. The dismissal of the review petition did not alter the original order, and Order XLVII Rule 7(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 bars an appeal from an order refusing review. The Court distinguished authorities dealing with non-speaking dismissal of special leave petitions and doctrine of merger, holding that those decisions did not assist where the earlier challenge was withdrawn without liberty.

Conclusion: The second challenge to the same order was not maintainable, and the objection to maintainability succeeded.

Issues: (i) whether the High Court was justified in entertaining the writ petition despite the availability of the statutory remedy under the SARFAESI Act; (ii) whether, on a proper construction of amended Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act read with Rules 8 and 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, the borrowers could redeem the secured asset after publication of the auction notice and whether separate sale notices were required; and (iii) whether the amended Section 13(8) applied to the case notwithstanding that the loan transaction pre-dated the amendment.

Issue (i): whether the High Court was justified in entertaining the writ petition despite the availability of the statutory remedy under the SARFAESI Act.

Analysis: The dispute had already been carried through the statutory framework under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, and the High Court nevertheless entertained the writ petition to unsettle a concluded auction and sale certificate. The governing principle is that writ jurisdiction is not ordinarily to be invoked when an efficacious statutory remedy exists, particularly in a self-contained recovery statute designed for expeditious enforcement. Equitable considerations cannot be used to override the statutory auction process once the prescribed remedies were available and had been pursued earlier.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition; the impugned interference on that footing was unsustainable and was against the appellants.

Issue (ii): whether, on a proper construction of amended Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act read with Rules 8 and 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, the borrowers could redeem the secured asset after publication of the auction notice and whether separate sale notices were required.

Analysis: The amended Section 13(8) was construed as curtailing the borrower's right of redemption up to the point of valid publication of the notice for sale. The provision was held to operate uniformly across the recognised modes of transfer under Rule 8(5), and the expression "before the date of publication of notice" was read in conjunction with the rules governing service, publication, affixation and upload of the single composite notice of sale. The Court rejected the view that the rules contemplate distinct sale notices with independent thirty-day gaps. The right of redemption was held not to survive after the statutory notice process had been completed in the manner prescribed by the Rules and the sale process had progressed to confirmation and issuance of sale certificate.

Conclusion: The borrowers had no surviving right to redeem after publication of the valid notice of sale in the manner contemplated by the Act and Rules; the contrary view of the High Court was against the appellants.

Issue (iii): whether the amended Section 13(8) applied to the case notwithstanding that the loan transaction pre-dated the amendment.

Analysis: The Court held that the relevant event for application of the amended provision was the enforcement step and publication of the auction notice, not the date of the loan sanction. Since the auction notice was published after the amendment came into force, the amended Section 13(8) governed the controversy. The amendment was treated as applying to live enforcement proceedings and not as being excluded merely because the underlying loan originated earlier.

Conclusion: The amended Section 13(8) applied to the case, and the borrowers could not rely on the pre-amendment position; this point was against the respondents and in favour of the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The statutory auction and sale certificate were upheld, the High Court's interference was reversed, and the secured creditor's enforcement action in favour of the auction purchasers was restored.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the amended Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, the borrower's right of redemption continues only until a valid notice of sale is published in the manner prescribed by the SARFAESI Rules, the sale-notice framework under Rules 8 and 9 is a single composite process, and post-amendment enforcement is governed by the amended regime even where the underlying loan transaction is earlier.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1. Whether a notice under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is valid when the amount demanded in the notice differs from the amount stated on the dishonoured cheque.

2. Whether a plea that the discrepancy in the amount stated in the statutory notice is a typographical or inadvertent error can cure the non-compliance and render the notice valid.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1 - Validity of notice when amount demanded differs from cheque amount

Legal framework: Section 138 creates a penal offence for dishonour of cheque and makes the proviso conditions (a), (b) and (c) mandatory preconditions for prosecuting the offence; proviso (b) requires that the payee "makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money" within the prescribed period.

Precedent treatment: The Court relied on established jurisprudence holding that the phrase "said amount" in proviso (b) refers to the cheque amount and that a statutory notice must specifically demand the sum covered by the dishonoured cheque. Prior decisions have consistently required strict and literal compliance with the proviso, while allowing that separately stated additional claims (interest, costs) may be severable only if the cheque amount is expressly demanded.

Interpretation and reasoning: Reading Section 138 as a whole, the words "said amount" link to "any amount of money" in the substantive portion; thus the proviso's demand must be for the exact cheque amount. The provision being penal and technical mandates strict construction; the statutory scheme shows the legislature intended the demand in the notice to be identical to the cheque amount so as to give the drawer a clear, specific opportunity to remedy the exact liability covered by the cheque.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - A valid notice under proviso (b) must demand the very amount of the dishonoured cheque; divergence in amount is fatal. Obiter - Clarification that separately claimed incidental charges may be severable only when the cheque amount itself is correctly and expressly demanded.

Conclusions: If the amount stated in the demand notice is different from the cheque amount, the notice does not satisfy proviso (b) and is invalid; non-compliance with this mandatory ingredient renders proceedings under Section 138 unsustainable.

Issue 2 - Role of typographical/inadvertent error plea in curing discrepancy

Legal framework: Penal statutes are to be construed strictly; conditions in provisos to Section 138 are mandatory and not susceptible to implied compliance. The integrity of the notice requirement is essential to the statutory scheme; thus, errors affecting the demanded amount engage strict technical scrutiny.

Precedent treatment: Prior authorities have repeatedly refused to permit typographical mistakes or asserted inadvertence to validate notices where the demanded amount did not correspond to the cheque amount. Courts have distinguished cases where the cheque amount is correctly specified and incidental demands are separately itemised from those where the primary demanded amount is incorrect or ambiguous.

Interpretation and reasoning: The strictness of penal construction means courts cannot rewrite the notice or supply missing or corrected figures on the basis of an asserted slip. Even where cheque particulars are otherwise described, an incorrect stated amount creates ambiguity as to the "said amount" and therefore defeats the statutory requirement. Repetition of the same erroneous amount in multiple notices strengthens the conclusion that the discrepancy is not a one-off slip but a defect in the notice.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - A claim of typographical or inadvertent error cannot validate a notice where the demanded amount differs from the cheque amount; such error is fatal to proviso (b) compliance. Obiter - Emphasis that errors limited to non-material particulars (e.g., peripheral typographical errors not affecting the cheque amount) are distinct but must not be conflated with errors in the demanded sum.

Conclusions: A plea of typographical or inadvertent error cannot cure a notice that demands an amount different from the cheque amount; the notice remains invalid and proceedings under Section 138 cannot be sustained on that basis.

Ancillary points and applied principles

1. The requirement to make demand for the "said amount" is an essential ingredient of the offence and not a mere formality; compliance must be literal and precise.

2. The doctrine of reading a notice "as a whole" does not permit relaxation of the mandatory requirement that the cheque amount be specifically demanded; general references to cheque particulars do not substitute for an explicit demand of the cheque sum.

3. The strict construction canon for penal statutes governs interpretation here: courts must ensure that the offence charged falls within the plain and literal meaning of the statutory language and cannot expand the provision to cover mistakes or omissions inconsistent with the text.

Cross-reference: Issues 1 and 2 operate conjunctively - invalidity of a notice for wrong amount (Issue 1) is not remedied by an asserted typographical error (Issue 2); both lead to the inescapable consequence that prosecution under Section 138 must fail when the statutory demand is defective.

Final conclusion

Given the mandatory and technical nature of proviso (b) to Section 138 and the requirement that the demand be for the exact cheque amount, a notice demanding an amount different from the cheque amount is invalid; a contention that the discrepancy arose from typographical inadvertence does not cure the defect. Consequently, proceedings predicated on such defective notice cannot be maintained.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the petition for substitution of the sole arbitrator under Section 15(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 deserved condonation.

Analysis: The communication of the sole arbitrator's recusal was through email, and the parties had received it. The explanation that counsel could access the email account only later because of technical issues was found to be ambiguous. The High Court had considered the grounds for delay and concluded that no sufficient cause was shown. The delay was also viewed against the background of a long-pending arbitral dispute, and the refusal to exercise discretion was not found to be perverse or to cause manifest injustice warranting interference.

Conclusion: The refusal to condone the delay was upheld.

Issues: Whether the High Court could discharge an accused in the predicate corruption case by determining the validity of prosecution sanction at that stage, and consequently quash the connected money-laundering proceedings.

Analysis: Section 19(3)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 prohibits such examination of the validity of sanction at the relevant stage. The discharge was inconsistent with the settled position governing challenges to prosecution sanction. The quashing of the connected proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 rested consequentially on that discharge.

Conclusion: The discharge in the predicate corruption case and the consequential quashing of the money-laundering proceedings cannot stand. The issue of sanction and all other issues remain open for determination at trial.

Issues: (i) Whether the borrower's application under the One Time Settlement scheme could be entertained without the prescribed upfront payment. (ii) Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the bank's rejection of the application and directing reconsideration.

Issue (i): Whether the borrower's application under the One Time Settlement scheme could be entertained without the prescribed upfront payment.

Analysis: The scheme required a borrower seeking consideration of an OTS proposal to accompany the application with an upfront payment of 5% of the OTS amount, and 15% in the case of wilful defaulters. An application not accompanied by the stipulated upfront payment was not even required to be processed. The borrower had not deposited any upfront amount with the application, so the application did not satisfy the basic scheme condition.

Conclusion: The application was not maintainable for consideration under the scheme and could not be claimed as a matter of right.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the bank's rejection of the application and directing reconsideration.

Analysis: The rejection order did not mention non-payment of the upfront amount, but that omission did not prevent the Court from considering a decisive ground evident from the record and the scheme itself. The borrower's failure to comply with the mandatory condition went to the root of eligibility and justified rejection. Since the borrower had disabled itself from fair consideration, the High Court's interference on the premise of eligibility under the scheme was unwarranted.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in interfering with the rejection order, and the bank's decision was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the judgments of the High Court and the Single Judge were set aside, and the bank was left free to proceed in accordance with law while the borrower was permitted to make a fresh proposal outside the earlier scheme.

Ratio Decidendi: A court may sustain an administrative rejection on a decisive ground arising from the scheme and the record, even if that ground was not expressly stated in the rejection order, provided the affected party had an opportunity to meet it; further, compliance with mandatory scheme conditions is a prerequisite to consideration of an OTS application.

Issues: Whether the allegations in the FIR and charge-sheet disclosed the ingredients of cheating or criminal conspiracy so as to justify continuation of the criminal proceedings, and whether the proceedings were liable to be quashed as an abuse of process.

Analysis: To attract cheating, the allegations must show fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of the alleged promise or representation; a mere subsequent failure to perform a contract does not suffice. The materials on record did not disclose any intentional deception at the inception, nor any cogent facts showing dishonest inducement to part with property or valuable security. The delay in lodging the FIR, coupled with vague allegations, reinforced the conclusion that the prosecution lacked bona fides. Applying the settled principles governing quashing, including the categories where allegations do not prima facie constitute an offence and where criminal proceedings are instituted with mala fide intent, the continuation of the prosecution was found unwarranted.

Conclusion: The allegations did not make out an offence under Section 420 or Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and the criminal proceedings were liable to be quashed in favour of the appellants.

Issues: Whether the inspection, search and seizure conducted under Section 15 of the Legal Metrology Act, 2009, without a prior warrant and without recording reasons to believe, was lawful and whether the consequential notices and orders could be sustained.

Analysis: Section 15 of the Legal Metrology Act, 2009 authorises entry, search, inspection and seizure only where the officer has reason to believe, based on information or personal knowledge, that an offence has been or is likely to be committed. The provision also requires compliance with the search-and-seizure safeguards contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The expression "premises" under Section 2(n) is wide enough to include warehouses and other business locations, and the fact that a place may be open during business hours does not dispense with statutory safeguards. The Court held that the general provisions relating to searches, including Sections 100(4) and 100(5) and the requirement of independent respectable witnesses, applied to the case. It further held that the officer must record reasons to believe before undertaking the search and before seizing goods, and that a warrant is ordinarily required unless a valid statutory exception is shown. On the facts, no warrant was obtained, no reasons were recorded, and the witness requirement was not satisfied. The simultaneous seizure and compounding notices, issued without the required foundation, also reflected non-application of mind. The alleged defect in packaging declarations was treated as, at most, technical and did not cure the illegality in the search and seizure process.

Conclusion: The search, seizure and consequential proceedings were illegal and unsustainable, and the relief granted to the appellant was justified.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute incorporates Cr.P.C. safeguards for search and seizure, strict compliance with the requirement of reasons to believe, warrant procedure and independent witnesses is mandatory, and non-compliance vitiates the action and its consequences.

Issues: (i) whether the appellant had the authority to notify the Interim Coal Policy; (ii) whether the 20% increase in the notified price for linked consumers of the non-core sector violated Article 14; (iii) whether the respondents were entitled to refund of the 20% additional amount.

Issue (i): whether the appellant had the authority to notify the Interim Coal Policy.

Analysis: Price regulation of coal had been deregulated under the applicable control order, and the earlier decision striking down the e-auction mechanism did not divest the coal company of its statutory competence to notify interim prices. The direction to constitute an expert committee was directed to evolve a viable distribution policy, not to disable the coal company from fixing prices in the interregnum. Reading that judgment as imposing such a restriction would impermissibly override the statutory scheme and trench upon the separation of powers.

Conclusion: The appellant had the authority to notify the Interim Coal Policy.

Issue (ii): whether the 20% increase in the notified price for linked consumers of the non-core sector violated Article 14.

Analysis: The linked consumers of the core sector and the non-core sector were not similarly situated for the purpose of coal pricing. The linkage system was an administrative arrangement for supply logistics and did not create a constitutional entitlement to identical pricing. The classification between core and non-core linked consumers bore a rational nexus to the objective of sustaining coal supply and maintaining the financial capacity of the public sector undertaking to operate, maintain and develop coal mines. Reasonable profit, when directed to the common good and continued supply, was not forbidden; the policy was not shown to be a mere profiteering measure.

Conclusion: The 20% increase did not violate Article 14 and was valid.

Issue (iii): whether the respondents were entitled to refund of the 20% additional amount.

Analysis: The claim for refund could not succeed where the policy itself was upheld. In any event, the respondents failed to establish with complete and reliable material that they had not passed on the burden of the additional cost to end consumers. Refund of public money cannot be ordered on an incomplete evidentiary foundation, and the doctrine of unjust enrichment was applicable in principle to such a claim.

Conclusion: The respondents were not entitled to refund of the 20% additional amount.

Final Conclusion: The Interim Coal Policy was held valid, the challenge to the 20% price increase failed, and the refund claim was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: Where coal pricing is deregulated by statute, the coal company may notify interim prices in the interregnum, and a differential price between core and non-core linked consumers is constitutionally valid if it rests on a rational nexus with the legitimate objective of maintaining supply and the common good rather than on arbitrary profiteering.

Issues: (i) the meaning and import of the expression "within such period" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963; (ii) the circumstances in which an appellate court may interfere with an order condoning delay; and (iii) whether the High Court was justified in condoning the delay of 3966 days in filing the second appeal.

Issue (i): the meaning and import of the expression "within such period" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963

Analysis: Section 5 permits admission of an appeal or application after the prescribed period only if sufficient cause is shown for not preferring it within such period. The expression "within such period" was interpreted in the setting of the provision as referring to the entire period commencing from the time limitation begins to run and continuing until the actual filing, not merely to the delay after expiry of limitation. The provision was held to require an explanation for the whole continuum of delay, while still leaving room for a justice-oriented and context-sensitive evaluation of sufficiency of cause.

Conclusion: "Within such period" covers the entire period of default up to the date of filing, and sufficient cause must be shown for that full period.

Issue (ii): the circumstances in which an appellate court may interfere with an order condoning delay

Analysis: An order condoning delay is discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on relevant material and in accordance with law. Appellate interference is warranted where the order is vitiated by absence of sufficient cause, non-consideration of relevant facts, reliance on extraneous considerations, or a view that is plainly unreasonable, arbitrary, or perverse. The appellate court does not sit to prefer one plausible view over another merely because it would have reached a different conclusion.

Conclusion: Appellate interference is justified where the discretion to condone delay is exercised on untenable grounds or contrary to law.

Issue (iii): whether the High Court was justified in condoning the delay of 3966 days in filing the second appeal

Analysis: The explanation furnished by the respondent was found to disclose gross administrative lethargy rather than a bona fide and sufficient cause. The Court held that bureaucratic delay, inaction of officials, and reliance on the supposed merits of the underlying dispute do not by themselves justify condonation, especially where the delay is inordinate. The High Court was held to have erred in treating the merits of the case and the respondent's internal lapses as a sufficient basis to extend limitation.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in condoning the delay.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order condoning delay was set aside, the appeal was allowed, and execution of the decree was directed to proceed.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, condonation of delay requires a bona fide and sufficient explanation for the entire period of delay, and appellate interference is warranted where the discretion to condone is exercised on irrelevant, arbitrary, or legally untenable grounds.