Issues: Whether, on approval of a rehabilitation scheme by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, an unsecured creditor can refuse to accept the scaled down value of its dues and wait to recover the full debt after the scheme has worked itself out.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 is remedial and intended to revive sick industrial companies through a binding rehabilitation scheme. Section 18 empowers preparation and sanction of a scheme providing for financial reconstruction and other preventive, ameliorative and remedial measures, while Section 18(8) makes the sanctioned scheme binding on the sick company, its transferee, shareholders, creditors, guarantors and employees. The scheme cannot be treated as optional for unsecured creditors, because that would defeat the collective restructuring process and permit minority creditors to frustrate revival. Section 32 gives overriding effect to the scheme, and the contention based on Article 300A was rejected because the reduction of dues occurs by authority of law under the statutory rehabilitation framework.

Conclusion: An unsecured creditor has no option to stay outside the sanctioned rehabilitation scheme and must accept the scaled down value of its dues.

Ratio Decidendi: A rehabilitation scheme sanctioned under Section 18 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 binds all creditors, including unsecured creditors, and they cannot opt out to claim their full dues after revival.

Issues: (i) whether the contractor's security deposits were liable to be forfeited on termination of the contract under the contractual clauses governing default and rescission; (ii) whether interest could be awarded on the advance granted against hypothecation of equipment and, if so, at what rate.

Issue (i): whether the contractor's security deposits were liable to be forfeited on termination of the contract under the contractual clauses governing default and rescission.

Analysis: The contractual clauses empowered the employer to rescind the contract and appropriate the security deposit where the contractor failed to complete the work within the stipulated or extended time, abandoned the work, or otherwise committed default. The finding of the arbitral tribunal that the contractor had failed to complete the work and had abandoned the contract was not set aside and had attained finality. On that footing, the rescission and forfeiture of the security deposits were justified, and interference under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was unwarranted.

Conclusion: The rejection of the claims for return of the security deposits was valid and ought to have been upheld; the contrary view was wrong.

Issue (ii): whether interest could be awarded on the advance granted against hypothecation of equipment and, if so, at what rate.

Analysis: Section 31(7)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 permits an arbitral tribunal to award interest unless the parties have expressly barred it. In the absence of a clear contractual prohibition, the award of pendente lite interest on the advance could not be interfered with. However, the rate awarded was considered excessive on the facts, and a reduced reasonable rate was substituted.

Conclusion: The tribunal's award of interest on the advance was sustainable, but the rate was modified to 12% pendente lite.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded to the extent that the setting aside of the award on both the security-deposit claims and the interest claim was reversed, with only a modification of the interest rate.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a contractor defaults and the contract authorises rescission and forfeiture upon failure to complete the work, the security deposit may be appropriated; and unless there is a clear contractual bar, an arbitral tribunal may award pendente lite interest under Section 31(7)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues: (i) Whether pending proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against the company and its signatory/director abate or stand terminated upon approval of a resolution plan under Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. (ii) Whether the resolution plan or the extinguishment of the corporate debtor's liability under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 discharges the personal penal liability of the signatory/director under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Issue (i): Whether pending proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against the company and its signatory/director abate or stand terminated upon approval of a resolution plan under Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: Proceedings under Section 138 are criminal in character and are not recovery proceedings. The moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 operates only during the CIRP and, after approval of a resolution plan, Section 31 gives the plan binding effect, but it does not convert or extinguish the penal proceedings. Section 32A was understood as protecting the corporate debtor after a change in management and a clean break with the past, not as wiping out the prosecution under Section 138 against natural persons who were in charge of the company. The legislative scheme, read harmoniously, permits the criminal prosecution to continue against those persons notwithstanding the resolution of the corporate debtor.

Conclusion: The Section 138 proceedings do not abate merely because a resolution plan has been approved under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issue (ii): Whether the resolution plan or the extinguishment of the corporate debtor's liability under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 discharges the personal penal liability of the signatory/director under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: The liability of persons in charge of the company under Section 141 is co-extensive with the company's offence, but it is a distinct personal penal liability. The Court held that the resolution plan may bind the corporate debtor and may affect the amount recoverable from the claim, yet it cannot operate as a statutory compounding or as a discharge of the natural persons. The second proviso to Section 32A preserves the liability of persons who were in charge of, responsible to, or associated with the corporate debtor and involved in the offence. A director or signatory cannot take advantage of the corporate debtor's discharge by operation of law to avoid criminal prosecution.

Conclusion: The signatory/director remains liable to be prosecuted and punished under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Final Conclusion: Approval of the resolution plan may extinguish the corporate debtor's criminal exposure in the manner contemplated by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, but it does not terminate the pending cheque-dishonour prosecution against the natural persons responsible for the offence.

Ratio Decidendi: A resolution plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 does not amount to compounding or discharge of Section 138 liability for the company's signatory or other persons vicariously liable under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, even though the corporate debtor may obtain statutory protection upon resolution.

Issues: (i) whether a registered medical practitioner, found with small quantities of medicines in her consultation premises, could be prosecuted for stocking drugs for sale without a licence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940; (ii) whether the exemption for drugs supplied by a registered medical practitioner under Rule 123 and Schedule K of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 applied; and (iii) whether the criminal proceedings were liable to be quashed for want of application of mind in the sanction order.

Issue (i): whether a registered medical practitioner, found with small quantities of medicines in her consultation premises, could be prosecuted for stocking drugs for sale without a licence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.

Analysis: The alleged contravention rested on stocking medicines for sale under Section 18(c), punishable under Section 27(b)(ii). The materials showed only small quantities of lotions and ointments in the premises of a registered dermatologist, not the operation of an open shop or sale across the counter. Possession of medicines in such circumstances did not, by itself, establish stocking for sale, and the essential ingredient of the offence was not made out on the facts.

Conclusion: The prosecution on this footing was not sustainable and was against the Appellant.

Issue (ii): whether the exemption for drugs supplied by a registered medical practitioner under Rule 123 and Schedule K of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 applied.

Analysis: Rule 123 exempts the drugs specified in Schedule K from the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act, subject to the conditions stated in that Schedule. Entry 5 of Schedule K covers drugs supplied by a registered medical practitioner to her own patient, so long as she is not keeping an open shop, selling across the counter, or otherwise engaged in commercial drug distribution to a degree attracting Chapter IV. On the record, the Appellant was a registered medical practitioner and the prosecution did not show any prohibited open-shop sale; the seized medicines were consistent with the limited professional use contemplated by the exemption.

Conclusion: The Appellant was entitled to the protection of Rule 123 and Schedule K, and the exemption applied in her favour.

Issue (iii): whether the criminal proceedings were liable to be quashed for want of application of mind in the sanction order.

Analysis: The sanction for prosecution was granted after considerable delay and disclosed no reference to the relevant materials, no discussion of the doctor-specific exemption, and no explanation for the delay. The sanctioning authority was required to apply an independent mind to the facts and materials before authorising prosecution. The absence of such consideration rendered the sanction mechanical and infirm.

Conclusion: The sanction suffered from non-application of mind and the criminal proceedings were liable to be quashed.

Final Conclusion: The prosecution was unwarranted on the facts, the statutory exemption protected the Appellant, and the impugned criminal case was quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: Mere possession of small quantities of medicines by a registered medical practitioner does not constitute stocking for sale where the statutory exemption under Rule 123 and Schedule K applies, and prosecution cannot be sustained on a mechanical sanction lacking independent application of mind.

Issues: Whether the order compulsorily retiring a government servant under FR 56(j) was sustainable in law, and whether it was punitive in nature rather than a bona fide order passed in public interest.

Analysis: FR 56(j) confers an absolute right to retire a government servant in public interest, but the power must be exercised on valid material and after considering the entire service record. An order of compulsory retirement is ordinarily not punitive and does not attract Article 311(2) unless it casts stigma or is shown to be a disguise for punishment. The service record here showed consistently outstanding performance and unimpeachable integrity for years, while several complaints relied upon by the employer were either closed, unsubstantiated, or unrelated to any proved misconduct. The proximity between the pending disciplinary proceedings and the premature retirement, together with the unexplained departure from the officer's consistently clean record, showed that the stated public-interest basis was not credible. The Court lifted the veil and found that the order was intended to short-circuit the disciplinary process and secure immediate removal.

Conclusion: The compulsory retirement order was held to be punitive and unsustainable, and the challenge succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: An order of compulsory retirement can be struck down where, despite innocuous form, it is shown on the basis of the entire record and surrounding circumstances to be a colourable exercise of power made not in public interest but as a punitive substitute for disciplinary action.

Issues: (i) whether the suit, though framed as one for declaratory and injunctive reliefs, was in substance one concerning rights in immovable property so as to fall under Section 16(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and require return of the plaint; (ii) whether the High Court's common order allowing both the applications under Order VII Rule 10 and Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 required modification.

Issue (i): whether the suit, though framed as one for declaratory and injunctive reliefs, was in substance one concerning rights in immovable property so as to fall under Section 16(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and require return of the plaint.

Analysis: The plaint itself treated the disputed properties as the subject matter of the suit and challenged the defendants' right, title and interest in those properties. The reliefs included declarations against deeds of confirmation, injunctions restraining alienation and third-party dealings, and a prayer restraining handing over of possession. A decree on such reliefs would necessarily affect rights in immovable property and, in relation to possession, would not be fully covered by the proviso to Section 16. The invocation of Section 20(c) could not override the statutory command of Section 16(d) where the suit was substantially about immovable property.

Conclusion: The suit was held to fall within Section 16(d), and the order returning the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 was sustained.

Issue (ii): whether the High Court's common order allowing both the applications under Order VII Rule 10 and Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 required modification.

Analysis: Allowing both applications was internally inconsistent because return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10 and rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 operate differently. Once a plaint is rejected, the question of presenting the same plaint before another court does not arise, whereas return of plaint permits presentation to the proper court. The High Court's operative direction therefore needed correction to align with its actual reasoning and intended relief.

Conclusion: The portion of the order allowing the application under Order VII Rule 11 was set aside, while the return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10 was maintained.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded only to the limited extent of deleting the inadvertent rejection of plaint, while the direction returning the plaint for presentation before the competent court at Bengaluru remained undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a suit substantially seeks declarations and injunctions affecting title, interest, and possession in immovable property, it falls within Section 16(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and cannot be sustained on the basis of the proviso or a contrary forum-selection clause when possession-related relief is also involved.

Issues: (i) Whether the mode of appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners under Article 324(2) required replacement by a broad-based committee until Parliament enacts a law. (ii) Whether the protection against removal available to the Chief Election Commissioner should be extended to other Election Commissioners, and whether their service conditions should be insulated from disadvantageous variation. (iii) Whether the Election Commission should be provided with an independent secretariat and its expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund of India.

Issue (i): Whether the mode of appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners under Article 324(2) required replacement by a broad-based committee until Parliament enacts a law.

Analysis: The constitutional text was read with the Constituent Assembly debates, which showed a clear concern that appointment of the Election Commission should not remain exclusively with the Executive. The Court found that the phrase making appointment "subject to the provisions of any law made in that behalf by Parliament" reflected an intended legislative intervention that never came. It held that the existing practice left a constitutional vacuum affecting the independence of the institution and the integrity of free and fair elections. The Court further held that judicial intervention was justified to the limited extent of filling the gap until Parliament acts.

Conclusion: The appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners is to be made by the President on the basis of the advice of a committee consisting of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, and, where there is no recognised Leader of Opposition, the leader of the largest opposition party in the Lok Sabha, together with the Chief Justice of India, until Parliament enacts a law.

Issue (ii): Whether the protection against removal available to the Chief Election Commissioner should be extended to other Election Commissioners, and whether their service conditions should be insulated from disadvantageous variation.

Analysis: The Court held that Article 324(5) gives the Chief Election Commissioner a distinct constitutional protection: removal only in the manner applicable to a Judge of the Supreme Court, and no variation of service conditions to his disadvantage. It distinguished the position of other Election Commissioners, holding that the second proviso operates as a separate and limited safeguard tied to the Chief Election Commissioner's recommendation. While the Court declined to rewrite the proviso by judicial fiat, it acknowledged the force of the argument that the independence of the Election Commission would be better secured if Parliament extended similar protection to all members.

Conclusion: The request for identical constitutional protection to all Election Commissioners was not accepted as a matter of direct adjudicatory substitution, but the Court indicated that Parliament should consider extending such protection and keeping service conditions insulated from adverse variation.

Issue (iii): Whether the Election Commission should be provided with an independent secretariat and its expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund of India.

Analysis: The Court accepted that financial and administrative dependence can undermine institutional independence. It noted the Election Commission's own repeated recommendations for an insulated secretariat and charged expenditure, and recognised that such structural support would strengthen neutrality and effective functioning. The Court refrained from prescribing details of budgetary design, treating the matter as one of urgent institutional reform best addressed by the political branches.

Conclusion: The Court made a strong appeal that Parliament and the Union should consider creating a permanent independent secretariat for the Election Commission and charging its expenditure on the Consolidated Fund of India.

Final Conclusion: The petitions succeeded in part: the Court supplied an interim appointment mechanism for the Election Commission, preserved the existing constitutional safeguard for the Chief Election Commissioner, and urged structural reforms to secure the Commission's independence until Parliament legislates.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the Constitution contemplates a law to govern the appointment of a constitutional authority but Parliament has left the field unoccupied, and the existing executive arrangement threatens institutional independence central to free and fair elections, the Court may lay down interim norms to fill the constitutional vacuum until legislation is enacted.

Issues: Whether the FIR alleging cheating, criminal conspiracy, and criminal intimidation arising out of an agreement to sell was liable to be quashed on the ground that the dispute was civil in nature and no dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction was shown.

Analysis: The agreement to sell, the repeated complaints, and the absence of any civil proceedings for specific performance or refund showed that the dispute essentially concerned non-execution of the sale deed and recovery of money. The allegations against the appellant were introduced only in later complaints, while the first complaint was directed against other persons and sought refund of the amount paid. The material did not show fraudulent or dishonest intention from the beginning of the transaction, which is essential for cheating. A mere breach of contract or failure to complete the sale deed does not by itself constitute a criminal offence, and criminal process cannot be used to pressurise a party in a civil dispute.

Conclusion: The FIR and all consequential proceedings were liable to be quashed, and the appeal succeeded.

Issues: (i) whether the High Court was justified in quashing the FIR at the investigation stage in a disproportionate assets case; (ii) whether the FIR was liable to be quashed on the ground of mala fides.

Issue (i): whether the High Court was justified in quashing the FIR at the investigation stage in a disproportionate assets case.

Analysis: The power to quash an FIR is to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection, and the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry into the reliability, genuineness, or probable truth of the allegations at the threshold. In a corruption case involving alleged illicit enrichment, the FIR need only disclose a basis for reasonable suspicion of a cognizable offence; exactitude of figures is a matter for investigation and not a precondition for registration. The materials in the FIR, read with the preliminary inquiry, disclosed a prima facie case warranting investigation, and the High Court erred by assessing the allegations on a probability-based and mini-trial approach.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in quashing the FIR on this ground.

Issue (ii): whether the FIR was liable to be quashed on the ground of mala fides.

Analysis: Allegations of mala fides must be specifically pleaded and supported by proper foundation. The pleadings were found to be vague and general, and the person against whom mala fides were alleged was not impleaded eo nomine. In corruption matters, the decisive factor is the material ultimately collected in investigation, and the mere presence of political overtones does not by itself justify quashing where the FIR otherwise discloses a cognizable offence. Exceptional interference is reserved for cases where there is no material at all and mala fides alone is the basis for investigation, which was not the position here.

Conclusion: The FIR was not liable to be quashed on the ground of mala fides.

Final Conclusion: The impugned judgment quashing the FIR could not be sustained, and the writ petitions were liable to be dismissed so that investigation could proceed in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: In a disproportionate assets corruption case, an FIR may be quashed only in exceptional circumstances where it discloses no material giving rise to even a reasonable suspicion of cognizable offence, and the court must not test the allegations for probability, reliability, or genuineness at the stage of investigation.

Issues: Whether complaints could be dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant when the complainant's evidence had already been recorded and the case had reached the stage of defence evidence and consideration of an application under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 256(1) of the Code permits the Magistrate to dispense with the complainant's attendance and proceed with the case where personal attendance is unnecessary. That situation may arise where the complainant's evidence has already been recorded and the matter can be decided on the existing record. Where the prosecution evidence is closed and the case is at the stage of defence evidence, the complainant's absence by itself does not compel dismissal. The Court found that the courts below did not consider whether the matter could proceed on merits on the basis of the evidence already on record and whether the application under Section 311 could be dealt with notwithstanding the complainant's absence.

Conclusion: Dismissal of the complaints merely for non-appearance of the complainant was unjustified, and the proceedings were required to continue on the existing record.

Ratio Decidendi: When the complainant's evidence has already been recorded and the case can proceed on the existing record, the Magistrate may dispense with the complainant's attendance under the proviso to Section 256(1) and should not dismiss the complaint solely for non-appearance.

Issues: Whether the extraordinary power to direct a CBI investigation should be exercised on the basis of the allegations of illegal abduction, foisted criminal case, and alleged partisan investigation, and whether the pending criminal trial warranted quashing or discharge at this stage.

Analysis: The jurisdiction to transfer an investigation to the CBI is extraordinary and must be exercised sparingly, only in exceptional situations where the facts disclose a real need to secure a fair and credible investigation. Mere allegations against the local police, without material showing that the normal investigative process has failed or that justice would otherwise be defeated, do not justify such a direction. The disputes raised by the appellants were found to be seriously contested questions of fact that belonged to the criminal trial, where evidence could be led, witnesses could be examined and cross-examined, and the accused could place his defence under the procedural safeguards available in the trial court. The materials on record did not disclose any public importance or exceptional circumstance requiring CBI intervention, and the pending trial had progressed.

Conclusion: The request for transfer of investigation to the CBI was declined, and the challenges seeking interference with the ongoing criminal process were not accepted.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were upheld and the appeals were dismissed, leaving the parties to pursue their remedies in the pending criminal proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: A direction for CBI investigation can be issued only in exceptional cases where the Court is satisfied that such intervention is necessary to secure a fair and credible investigation and the discovery of truth.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court was justified in allowing review under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on the ground that the earlier writ order was erroneous. (ii) Whether the orders dismissing the connected writ petitions and contempt petition were liable to be set aside and remitted after restoration of the writ order.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court was justified in allowing review under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on the ground that the earlier writ order was erroneous.

Analysis: Review jurisdiction is confined to correction of an error apparent on the face of the record or other grounds recognised by the provision. It cannot be used to sit in appeal over the earlier decision, to reappreciate material already considered, or to substitute one view for another. An order said to be erroneous on merits is not, by that reason alone, reviewable. The High Court, while allowing review, reconsidered material already dealt with in the writ proceedings and treated the review as though it were an appeal.

Conclusion: The High Court exceeded the limits of review jurisdiction and its order allowing review was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the orders dismissing the connected writ petitions and contempt petition were liable to be set aside and remitted after restoration of the writ order.

Analysis: The dismissal of the connected proceedings was a consequence of the order passed in review. Once that review order was found unsustainable and the original writ order restored, the consequential dismissals could not stand. Those matters required fresh consideration by the High Court on their own merits.

Conclusion: The connected writ petitions and contempt petition were set aside and remitted for fresh decision in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded, the review order was quashed, the earlier writ order was restored, and the connected matters were sent back for fresh adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: Review under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 cannot be invoked to correct an allegedly erroneous decision on merits or to reargue matters already considered; it lies only for an error apparent on the face of the record or other legally recognised grounds.

Issues: (i) Whether the investigation should be transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation. (ii) Whether further investigation or re-investigation could be directed after filing of the charge sheet and framing of charges.

Issue (i): Whether the investigation should be transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation.

Analysis: Transfer of investigation to an independent agency is an extraordinary power to be exercised sparingly and only in rare and exceptional cases. Mere allegations against the local police or the existence of a serious accusation do not by themselves justify such transfer. The material on record did not warrant displacement of the State investigating agency in the present case.

Conclusion: The prayer for transfer of investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether further investigation or re-investigation could be directed after filing of the charge sheet and framing of charges.

Analysis: The governing principle is that the constitutional courts retain power to ensure a fair investigation and fair trial, and that this power is not barred merely because a charge sheet has been filed or charges have been framed. Where the investigation appears perfunctory or incomplete, and where fairness of the process demands it, further investigation may be ordered to secure complete justice. On the facts, the investigation was found to have been inadequate in material respects, and the State itself acknowledged the need for further investigation.

Conclusion: Further investigation was directed and permitted.

Final Conclusion: The refusal to transfer the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation was upheld, but the refusal to permit further investigation was set aside, resulting in a partial success for the appellant and continuation of the criminal process with additional investigation.

Ratio Decidendi: Constitutional courts may direct further investigation, re-investigation, or de novo investigation to secure a fair and just criminal process even after the charge sheet is filed and charges are framed, but transfer of investigation to another agency is warranted only in rare and exceptional cases.

Issues: (i) Whether the Supreme Court's power to transfer criminal cases under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is excluded by the non obstante clause in Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; (ii) Whether transfer of the complaint cases was warranted as they arose out of the same transaction and were pending in different courts.

Issue (i): Whether the Supreme Court's power to transfer criminal cases under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is excluded by the non obstante clause in Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 governs cognizance and territorial jurisdiction for offences under Section 138, while Sections 142(2) and 142-A were inserted to align jurisdictional rules with the later understanding of place of trial. The non obstante clause in Section 142(1) operates in relation to the manner of taking cognizance and the special procedure under the Act. It does not, by its language or purpose, abrogate the Supreme Court's independent transfer power under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which can still be exercised where expedient for the ends of justice.

Conclusion: The Supreme Court's power under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 remains intact and is not excluded by Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Issue (ii): Whether transfer of the complaint cases was warranted as they arose out of the same transaction and were pending in different courts.

Analysis: All the complaint cases arose from the same commercial transaction and the dishonour of cheques issued under the same arrangement. Trying them separately in different fora could result in inconsistent or contradictory findings. Since more cases were already pending at Dwarka and transfer there would also be convenient to the parties and witnesses, common adjudication would better serve judicial economy and the interests of justice.

Conclusion: Transfer of the Nagpur cases to the Dwarka courts was justified.

Final Conclusion: The transfer petitions were allowed and the pending cases were directed to be tried together in the designated court at Dwarka.

Ratio Decidendi: The Supreme Court may transfer complaint cases under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 notwithstanding the non obstante clause in Section 142(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, where a common trial is necessary to secure the ends of justice and avoid contradictory findings.

Issues: (i) whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 filed by the company through its authorised representative was maintainable when the power of attorney contained a specific clause permitting appointment of special attorneys; and (ii) whether the power of attorney holder was competent to depose on behalf of the company on the basis of personal knowledge of the transaction.

Issue (i): whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 filed by the company through its authorised representative was maintainable when the power of attorney contained a specific clause permitting appointment of special attorneys.

Analysis: The complaint was filed by the company in its own name through an authorised representative. The power of attorney, approved by the board, authorised the director to appoint counsels or special attorneys. On a combined reading of the relevant clauses, the authority to appoint special attorneys included the authority to engage an authorised representative for prosecution of the complaint. Since the power of attorney expressly permitted such sub-delegation, the filing of the complaint through the authorised representative was not illegal.

Conclusion: The complaint was maintainable and the objection to its institution failed.

Issue (ii): whether the power of attorney holder was competent to depose on behalf of the company on the basis of personal knowledge of the transaction.

Analysis: A power of attorney holder may depose and verify the complaint if he has knowledge of the transaction. The affidavit placed on record stated that the deponent was a director, was the general power of attorney holder, and was fully conversant with the facts. The High Court ignored this affidavit and proceeded only on the absence of such averment in the complaint. That approach was erroneous because the record disclosed due knowledge and competence to support the prosecution.

Conclusion: The power of attorney holder was competent to depose on behalf of the company.

Final Conclusion: The interference under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was unwarranted, and the orders of the trial court and revisional court restoring the complaint proceedings were sustained in law.

Ratio Decidendi: A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 may be instituted through an authorised representative where the power of attorney expressly permits such delegation, and a power of attorney holder with due knowledge of the transaction is competent to depose in support of the complaint.

Issues: (i) Whether the landowners waived their right to seek revised compensation by signing the agreement under the compensation scheme; (ii) whether the differential treatment between Pushtaini and Gair-pushtaini landowners for payment of compensation and ex gratia was violative of Article 14; (iii) whether the classification upheld by the Full Bench was inconsistent with the law laid down in Nagpur Improvement Trust.

Issue (i): Whether the landowners waived their right to seek revised compensation by signing the agreement under the compensation scheme?

Analysis: The right to challenge the later grant of additional compensation arose only after the agreement had been entered into, when the impugned classification and ex gratia structure came into existence. A constitutional challenge based on equality could not be defeated merely because an agreement had earlier been signed, especially when the grievance was not against the agreed base compensation alone but against a subsequent discriminatory enhancement in favour of one class.

Conclusion: The signing of the agreement did not amount to waiver of the right to seek revised compensation. This issue was answered in favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the differential treatment between Pushtaini and Gair-pushtaini landowners for payment of compensation and ex gratia was violative of Article 14?

Analysis: The classification was tested on the touchstone of reasonable classification, requiring intelligible differentia and a rational nexus with a lawful object. The stated object of rehabilitation of original residents could not sustain a cut-off based distinction in the absence of empirical support, because the acquisition and the need for rehabilitation could affect non-Pushtaini landowners in the same manner. The classification also failed the proportionality standard, since the statutory framework already addressed compensation factors under the land acquisition law and the executive distinction introduced an arbitrary and under-inclusive burden without adequate safeguards.

Conclusion: The classification was held to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14. This issue was answered in favour of the appellants.

Issue (iii): Whether the classification upheld by the Full Bench was inconsistent with the law laid down in Nagpur Improvement Trust?

Analysis: The governing principle is that land acquired for a public purpose cannot attract differential compensation based on the nature or status of the owner when the public purpose is equally served irrespective of ownership attributes. The impugned distinction between landowners was therefore contrary to the settled rule that compensation norms cannot rest on irrelevant personal classifications where the statute itself does not sanction such differentiation.

Conclusion: The Full Bench approach was found to be inconsistent with the binding law and could not be sustained. This issue was answered in favour of the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The impugned classification and the consequent denial of equal compensation were set aside, the writ petition before the High Court stood allowed, and the appellants were held entitled to the reliefs claimed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute does not authorize differential compensation based on personal status or residence-linked labels, an executive classification governing land acquisition compensation must satisfy Article 14 by a real and substantiated intelligible differentia, a rational nexus with a lawful object, and proportional safeguards; otherwise it is invalid.

Issues: (i) Whether a DNA test of a minor child born during the subsistence of a valid marriage could be directed in the absence of a pleaded case of non-access so as to displace the conclusive presumption under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. (ii) Whether refusal by the mother to subject the child to DNA testing could justify an adverse inference of adultery against her under Illustration (h) of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Issue (i): Whether a DNA test of a minor child born during the subsistence of a valid marriage could be directed in the absence of a pleaded case of non-access so as to displace the conclusive presumption under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Analysis: Section 112 creates a conclusive presumption of legitimacy for a child born during a valid marriage, and that presumption can be displaced only by proof of non-access at the relevant time. A DNA test is not to be ordered as a matter of course, nor as an exploratory measure to enable a spouse to prove adultery. Such a direction is permissible only in exceptional cases where there is strong prima facie material, a plea of non-access, and a compelling necessity that no other evidence can resolve the controversy. The material on record did not show non-access; the husband also asserted that he had other evidence available to prove adultery. The child's privacy, identity, and best interests weighed against subjecting him to genetic testing for a collateral purpose.

Conclusion: The direction to subject the child to DNA testing was unjustified and unsustainable; this issue is decided in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether refusal by the mother to subject the child to DNA testing could justify an adverse inference of adultery against her under Illustration (h) of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Analysis: Illustration (h) of Section 114 concerns refusal by a person to answer a question that he or she is not compelled by law to answer, and the presumption thereunder is discretionary. It cannot be used to bypass the mandatory force of Section 112 or to convert refusal to expose a child to a DNA test into proof of the mother's adultery. The inference sought was not truly about paternity but about marital infidelity, and that could not be drawn from the mother's protective refusal acting in the child's best interests. The Court held that the husband must prove adultery by independent evidence de hors the child's paternity.

Conclusion: No adverse inference of adultery could be drawn against the appellant on her refusal to subject the child to DNA testing; this issue is decided in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside, and the request for DNA testing was rejected, leaving the respondent free to prove the matrimonial s by other admissible evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: In matrimonial disputes, a minor child born during a valid marriage cannot be directed to undergo DNA testing merely to support allegations of adultery unless the applicant first pleads and shows non-access with strong prima facie material; refusal by the mother to expose the child to such testing cannot, by itself, found an adverse inference of adultery.

Issues: Whether the review order could be sustained when it re-examined the merits of the special appeal instead of correcting only an error apparent on the face of the record.

Analysis: Review jurisdiction is confined to correcting an obvious error visible on the face of the record and does not permit a fresh appraisal of the merits or the adoption of a new substantive basis for decision. The impugned review order dealt with the matter as though it were hearing the special appeal afresh and in substance reversed the earlier appellate order by taking a new stand on payment of salary to teachers subject-wise. Such an exercise amounted to rehearing and rewriting the judgment in appeal, which lay beyond the limited scope of review.

Conclusion: The review order was beyond jurisdiction and could not stand. The challenge to the order allowing review succeeded.