Issues: (i) Whether the accused could be granted the remaining period of police custody remand after the original remand order had not been fully executed because of hospitalisation and interim bail. (ii) Whether the pendency of proceedings involving co-accused barred grant of police custody in the present case.

Issue (i): Whether the accused could be granted the remaining period of police custody remand after the original remand order had not been fully executed because of hospitalisation and interim bail.

Analysis: The original order granting seven days' police custody had attained finality. The accused, however, could not be interrogated for the full period because he was hospitalised during the custody period and thereafter obtained interim bail, during which police custody could not operate. The cancellation of interim bail was founded on non-cooperation and misuse of liberty. On these facts, the investigating agency's right to custodial interrogation had been frustrated by the accused's conduct, and denying the remainder of custody would reward such frustration of the judicial process.

Conclusion: The accused was not entitled to resist grant of the remaining police custody remand, and the request for custody was allowed.

Issue (ii): Whether the pendency of proceedings involving co-accused barred grant of police custody in the present case.

Analysis: The proceedings concerning co-accused were distinct and did not control the present dispute. The interim protection granted in those matters did not affect the independent question of custody arising from the accused's own conduct and the unexecuted remand order in this case.

Conclusion: The pendency of proceedings involving co-accused did not bar grant of police custody in the present case.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, and the investigating agency was permitted to exercise the remaining police custody remand for the limited period directed by the Court.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a valid police custody remand order has attained finality but its full execution is thwarted by the accused's conduct, the court may permit the remaining custody to preserve the efficacy of investigation and prevent frustration of judicial process.

Issues: (i) whether the increase in cost of the water intake system could be treated as a change in law under the power purchase agreement; (ii) whether the office memorandum dated 17.06.2011 amounted to a change in law so as to justify compensation for customs duty on mining equipment.

Issue (i): whether the increase in cost of the water intake system could be treated as a change in law under the power purchase agreement.

Analysis: The agreement contemplated a specific change in law mechanism, and the bidders were required to conduct their own inquiry and satisfy themselves about site conditions and project inputs. The pre-bid documents contained express disclaimers that the procurers and their representative made no warranty or representation regarding the accuracy or reliability of the water intake report. The contractual framework also provided consequences for delay or failure in furnishing the required land and related facilities, and the claim was not founded on any actual change in the agreed water source or on any contemporaneous notice under the change in law clause. The later study commissioned by the successful bidder could not, by itself, convert an erroneous or inadequate pre-bid report into a change in law, and the Tribunal could not rewrite the bargain by invoking general regulatory power or equity outside the express contractual mechanism.

Conclusion: The water intake cost escalation did not amount to a change in law, and the relief granted on that basis was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): whether the office memorandum dated 17.06.2011 amounted to a change in law so as to justify compensation for customs duty on mining equipment.

Analysis: The customs exemption regime in force on the cut-off date did not establish, on the material produced, that goods imported for captive coal mines were treated as exempt. The notification structure distinguished between power projects and mining projects, and there was no reliable pre-cut-off authority or consistent practice showing exemption for such equipment. The office memorandum did not demonstrate a change from an earlier legal position favourable to the seller, nor did it show that the Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Power was the final authority for interpreting the customs exemption. In the absence of clear pre-existing exemption and a proved change in interpretation, the memorandum could not be treated as a change in law under the agreement.

Conclusion: The office memorandum dated 17.06.2011 did not constitute a change in law, and no compensation was payable on that basis.

Final Conclusion: The contractual change-in-law claims failed on both grounds, and the appellate interference was justified. The Tribunal's direction granting relief on the water intake issue could not stand, and the consequential proceedings based on that remand also fell.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a power procurement contract sets out an express change-in-law formula and allocates the risk of site and input verification to the bidder, neither a flawed pre-bid report nor a later administrative clarification can be used to rewrite the bargain or create a compensable change in law without proof of an actual post-cut-off legal change within the contract.

Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in cancelling the bail granted by the Trial Court and directing arrest of the appellant, and in calling for an explanation from the Trial Judge.

Analysis: After the earlier rejection of bail, liberty had been granted to move a fresh application after a reasonable time. The charge-sheet had since been filed under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the Trial Court granted bail considering the nature of the offence, the filing of the charge-sheet, and the fact that the other accused had been granted bail. The High Court's interference, together with the direction to arrest the appellant immediately and seek an explanation from the Trial Judge, was found to be wholly disproportionate and unwarranted. The order of the Trial Court did not disclose any application of wrong legal principles, and the exercise of discretion was held to be proper.

Conclusion: The cancellation of bail by the High Court was unjustified, and the appellant was entitled to have the bail order restored and confirmed.

Final Conclusion: The High Court's order cancelling bail was set aside, the cancellation application was dismissed, and the appellant's bail stood confirmed on the terms imposed by the Trial Court.

Ratio Decidendi: Interference with a bail order is not warranted where the Trial Court has exercised its discretion on relevant considerations and no legal error or improper principle is shown; punitive directions against the trial judge are impermissible absent justification.

Issues: (i) Whether security clearance is a condition for renewal of permission under the uplinking and downlinking guidelines; (ii) Whether denial of renewal and the High Court's sealed-cover procedure violated the appellants' procedural guarantees; (iii) Whether the denial of renewal was an arbitrary restriction on the freedom of speech and expression.

Issue (i): Whether security clearance is a condition for renewal of permission under the uplinking and downlinking guidelines.

Analysis: The renewal clauses required compliance with the terms and conditions applicable to grant of permission as modified by the permission letter. Security clearance was part of the substantive conditions governing permission, and the permission letter itself preserved revocation on grounds of public order and national security. Renewal was therefore not confined to programme-code compliance alone.

Conclusion: Security clearance was a condition for renewal, and this issue was decided against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether denial of renewal and the High Court's sealed-cover procedure violated the appellants' procedural guarantees.

Analysis: The core of procedural fairness requires a reasoned order, disclosure of the material relied upon, and an opportunity to meet the case. National security may justify departure from ordinary fairness only if the State demonstrates a factual basis and shows that the restriction is reasonable under proportionality. A blanket refusal to disclose reasons, together with reliance on sealed-cover material by the deciding court, defeats the core of the right to a fair hearing. Public interest immunity, with structured judicial scrutiny and less restrictive alternatives such as redaction or summary disclosure, is preferable to sealed-cover adjudication.

Conclusion: The procedural guarantees were violated, and the issue was decided in favour of the appellants.

Issue (iii): Whether the denial of renewal was an arbitrary restriction on the freedom of speech and expression.

Analysis: A restriction on media operation directly burdens press freedom and must fall within Article 19(2). Criticism of governmental policy cannot, by itself, be treated as anti-establishment conduct justifying denial of security clearance. The asserted linkage with a disfavoured organisation was unsupported by reliable material, and the stated grounds did not establish a legitimate constitutional purpose or a rational nexus with the security parameters invoked.

Conclusion: The denial of renewal was not a constitutionally justified restriction under Article 19(2), and this issue was decided in favour of the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The impugned administrative action and the affirming High Court judgment could not stand, because the process was unfair and the substantive grounds for refusal were not constitutionally sustainable. Renewal permissions were directed to follow in accordance with the judgment.

Ratio Decidendi: Where denial of security clearance affects press freedom, the State must justify both non-disclosure and the restriction itself by a structured proportionality analysis, and it must adopt less restrictive procedural means than sealed-cover adjudication when fair hearing can be preserved without compromising legitimate security interests.

Issues: (i) Whether a plea of res judicata could be the basis for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; (ii) Whether the dismissal of the earlier eviction petition for failure to lead evidence amounted to a decision on merits so as to bar the second petition on res judicata.

Issue (i): Whether a plea of res judicata could be the basis for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Analysis: An application under Order VII Rule 11(d) must be decided only on the basis of the averments in the plaint. The defence taken in the written statement, and material outside the plaint, cannot be examined at that stage. A plea of res judicata generally requires consideration of the pleadings, issues and decision in the former proceeding, and therefore involves facts and materials beyond the plaint.

Conclusion: The plea of res judicata could not be decided under Order VII Rule 11(d) on the plaint alone and the rejection of the plaint on that ground was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the dismissal of the earlier eviction petition for failure to lead evidence amounted to a decision on merits so as to bar the second petition on res judicata

Analysis: For res judicata to apply, the earlier matter must have been directly and substantially in issue, between the same parties or their privies, and finally decided on merits by a competent court. A dismissal that is merely for default or for failure to adduce evidence, without the case being decided on the merits on the material before the court, does not necessarily satisfy that requirement. The order passed in the earlier eviction petition showed closure of evidence and dismissal for failure to establish the case, but it was not a merits determination under Order XVII Rule 3.

Conclusion: The earlier eviction petition was not dismissed on merits in a manner that attracted res judicata against the second petition.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order rejecting the eviction petition was set aside and the matter was restored for consideration in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A plea of res judicata cannot ordinarily be the basis for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) because it depends on material beyond the plaint, and a prior dismissal for failure to adduce evidence is not, by itself, a decision on merits for res judicata purposes unless the record shows an adjudication on the substantive issue.

Issues: (i) Whether the amended electronic filing regime making e-filing mandatory in proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunals and Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunals was liable to be struck down or modified; (ii) whether the grievance concerning lack of facilities warranted directions for institutional support, including help desks and e-sewa kendras, rather than a blanket exception for specified classes of litigants.

Issue (i): Whether the amended electronic filing regime making e-filing mandatory in proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunals and Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunals was liable to be struck down or modified.

Analysis: The mandatory e-filing regime was introduced in stages, beginning with optional filing and then extending to compulsory filing for high-value matters before being made universal. The Court noted that the transition was gradual, preceded by training and consultations, and that e-filing promotes transparency, efficiency, and round-the-clock access to justice. At the same time, the Court recognised the reality of the digital divide and the need to ensure that technology does not exclude users from access to justice.

Conclusion: The mandatory e-filing regime was not struck down, and the challenge was rejected insofar as it sought to undo the shift to compulsory e-filing.

Issue (ii): Whether the grievance concerning lack of facilities warranted directions for institutional support, including help desks and e-sewa kendras, rather than a blanket exception for specified classes of litigants.

Analysis: The Court held that concrete difficulties in e-filing should be addressed through representations, monthly reporting by tribunal heads, monitoring by the National Informatics Centre, and the establishment of e-sewa kendras with adequate infrastructure and standard operating procedures. The Court also accepted that gendered digital exclusion is a real social fact, but declined to create a general exemption for female practitioners and litigants, preferring targeted institutional support and grievance redressal mechanisms.

Conclusion: The Court directed remedial and facilitative measures, but refused to create a blanket class-based exception.

Final Conclusion: The petition was disposed of with directions sustaining mandatory e-filing while requiring supporting infrastructure, monitoring, and grievance redressal to secure meaningful access to justice.

Ratio Decidendi: A mandatory e-filing regime may be upheld where its implementation is gradual and supported by institutional assistance, because access to justice in a digital setting must be secured through facilitative measures rather than by negating technological adoption itself.

Issues: (i) whether the eye-witness account, including the evidence of the injured witness and the immediate statement made after the , was reliable and could be acted upon; (ii) whether the case fell within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code so as to reduce the offence from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Issue (i): whether the eye-witness account, including the evidence of the injured witness and the immediate statement made after the , was reliable and could be acted upon

Analysis: The testimony of the principal eye-witnesses was found consistent on the core occurrence. The presence of the injured witness at the scene was supported by the circumstances and by the defence suggestions in cross-examination. The immediate statement made to another witness formed part of the same transaction and was admissible as res gestae. The Court also treated the discovery of weapons and the surrounding circumstances as corroborative of the prosecution version.

Conclusion: The eye-witness account was reliable and was correctly accepted against the appellants.

Issue (ii): whether the case fell within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code so as to reduce the offence from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder

Analysis: Exception 4 requires a sudden fight, absence of premeditation, heat of passion, and absence of undue advantage or cruel or unusual conduct. The deceased was assaulted with dangerous weapons on vital parts and sustained multiple injuries. The nature and number of blows showed that the assailants acted in a cruel manner and took undue advantage, so the ingredients of the exception were not satisfied.

Conclusion: Exception 4 to Section 300 was not attracted and the conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was sustained.

Final Conclusion: The conviction and sentence for murder were upheld, and the appeal failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where reliable eye-witness evidence and admissible res gestae evidence establish a deliberate assault with dangerous weapons on vital parts causing death, Exception 4 to Section 300 is unavailable if the assailants took undue advantage or acted cruelly.

Issues: (i) Whether amendment of the written statement and permission to raise additional grounds could be allowed at the appellate stage; (ii) Whether the suit based on prior possession was maintainable and whether the objections of non-joinder of necessary parties and abatement could succeed; (iii) Whether the concurrent findings granting possession and injunction required interference.

Issue (i): Whether amendment of the written statement and permission to raise additional grounds could be allowed at the appellate stage.

Analysis: The requested amendment was sought after inordinate delay and without a satisfactory explanation for not raising it before the trial court. Allowing it at the appellate stage would have expanded the controversy, required fresh issues, and in effect led to a de novo trial. The proceedings on remand were confined to recording additional evidence and transmitting it to the High Court, and the scope of the remand could not be enlarged by a fresh amendment of the written statement.

Conclusion: The refusal to permit amendment of the written statement and to permit the new grounds was justified and is affirmed against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the suit based on prior possession was maintainable and whether the objections of non-joinder of necessary parties and abatement could succeed.

Analysis: A suit founded on prior possession and alleged dispossession was maintainable, and the defence that title or better right lay with third parties was merely a plea of jus tertii. The record showed that the appellants had not adequately pleaded possession or title in their written statement, and evidence could not cure the absence of pleadings. The death of one defendant did not abate the proceedings where the estate was substantially represented by the surviving defendants and their successors, and the non-joinder objection also failed on the same footing.

Conclusion: The suit was maintainable, and the objections of non-joinder and abatement were rightly rejected against the appellants.

Issue (iii): Whether the concurrent findings granting possession and injunction required interference.

Analysis: The courts below had concurrently found that the plaintiff was in prior possession and had been forcibly dispossessed, while the appellants failed to establish any better right to possession. The later transfer relied upon by the appellants was ineffective against the plaintiff's possessory claim in the context of the pending litigation, and the principle of lis pendens applied. No perversity or patent illegality was shown to warrant interference under Article 136.

Conclusion: The concurrent findings and the decree for possession and injunction were left undisturbed against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed in full, and the judgment and decree of the High Court affirming the trial court's reliefs were maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: An appellate court will not permit a belated amendment of the written statement at the appellate stage where it would enlarge the scope of the remand or require a fresh trial, and a suit based on prior possession cannot be defeated by an unpleaded plea of third-party title or by objections of abatement where the estate is substantially represented.

Issues: Whether prolonged incarceration and inordinate delay in trial can justify grant of bail in a case governed by the stringent conditions of Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

Analysis: The Court reiterated that the right to speedy trial is an essential facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and that special bail restrictions cannot be read in a manner that results in punitive detention. It held that the satisfaction under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, must be assessed on a prima facie view of the material at the bail stage and that prolonged custody, coupled with slow progress of trial, remains a relevant constitutional consideration. The Court also treated the principle reflected in Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as applicable in assessing continued detention where trial is not concluded within a reasonable time.

Conclusion: The bar under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, did not preclude grant of bail on the facts, and the appellant was entitled to be enlarged on bail.

Final Conclusion: Stringent bail provisions must yield to constitutional demands where custody has become unduly prolonged and trial has not progressed with reasonable expedition.

Ratio Decidendi: In cases under special statutes imposing stringent bail conditions, continued pre-trial detention may be curtailed on constitutional grounds where the court, on a prima facie assessment, finds prolonged incarceration and undue delay in trial inconsistent with the right to personal liberty and speedy trial.

Issues: Whether the rule of audi alteram partem must be read into the Master Directions on Frauds before a borrower's account is classified as fraud, and whether such classification can stand without notice, an opportunity to respond to the forensic audit findings, and a reasoned order.

Analysis: The directions operate in the regulatory sphere, but classification of an account as fraud carries serious civil consequences, including debarment from institutional finance, denial of restructuring, stigma, and consequences affecting business reputation and credit access. Administrative action with such consequences must conform to natural justice unless expressly or by necessary implication excluded. The directions do not expressly exclude a prior hearing, and the time-frame they prescribe leaves room for a pre-decisional opportunity. Mere participation during forensic audit is not enough, because fairness requires notice of the material relied upon, an opportunity to explain the adverse findings, and a chance to make representations before the final fraud classification. The obligation to record reasons also follows, because a reasoned order guards against arbitrariness and enables effective challenge.

Conclusion: The rule of audi alteram partem is implied into Clauses 8.9.4 and 8.9.5 of the Master Directions on Frauds, borrowers must be given notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond before fraud classification, and the decision must be supported by reasons. The impugned classifications made without such hearing are invalid.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an administrative classification entails grave civil consequences and the governing instrument is silent on hearing, the principles of natural justice, including prior notice, opportunity to represent, and a reasoned decision, must be read into the instrument unless expressly or by necessary implication excluded.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal was justified in setting aside the IRDA's rejection of the complaint and directing a fresh inquiry on allegations of illegal gratification in obtaining the brokerage contract.

Analysis: The dispute centred on whether the materials placed before the regulator were sufficient to warrant reopening the complaint. The Court noted that jurisdictional objections to the IRDA's power to act were not examined further, but accepted that the regulator's authority was wide. On the merits, however, the available material did not disclose cogent evidence of bribery or illegal payment. The complaint rested largely on suspicion and unsupported allegations, and the fact-finding authority had already concluded that no proof had been produced. In those circumstances, there was no basis for the Tribunal to interfere with the regulator's order or to require another round of inquiry.

Conclusion: The Tribunal's remand was unjustified and the challenge to the IRDA's order failed.

Final Conclusion: The regulatory order rejecting the complaint was restored, and no further inquiry was warranted on the materials placed before the Court.

Ratio Decidendi: A remand for further inquiry cannot be sustained where the complaint is unsupported by cogent material and the fact-finding authority has already recorded a lack of evidence.

Issues: (i) Whether the decisions holding that mere membership of a banned unlawful association is not enough to attract penal liability under Section 10(a)(i) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and similar provisions, were correctly decided. (ii) Whether American free speech precedents could be relied upon to read down the statutory provision in the Indian constitutional setting, and whether such reading down was permissible without a challenge to the provision's constitutional validity and without hearing the Union of India.

Issue (i): Whether the decisions holding that mere membership of a banned unlawful association is not enough to attract penal liability under Section 10(a)(i) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and similar provisions, were correctly decided.

Analysis: The statutory scheme declares an association unlawful only after a notification under Section 3, public notice, and scrutiny by the Tribunal under Section 4. The object of the Act is the more effective prevention of unlawful activities affecting sovereignty and integrity of India. Section 10(a)(i) is framed in clear terms and punishes a person who is and continues to be a member of such association. The reasoning that mere membership is insufficient, and that an additional overt act or mens rea must be shown, is inconsistent with the text and scheme of the Act, especially when the association has already undergone the statutory safeguards before being declared unlawful.

Conclusion: The earlier view that mere membership would not attract liability unless accompanied by violence, incitement, or other overt conduct is not a good law; continued membership of a duly declared unlawful association is punishable under Section 10(a)(i).

Issue (ii): Whether American free speech precedents could be relied upon to read down the statutory provision in the Indian constitutional setting, and whether such reading down was permissible without a challenge to the provision's constitutional validity and without hearing the Union of India.

Analysis: The freedoms under Article 19 are subject to explicit constitutional restrictions in India, including restrictions in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India. The constitutional structure of India is materially different from the First Amendment framework in the United States, and foreign decisions cannot be transplanted as the sole basis for interpretation. Reading down is not justified where the provision is plain and unambiguous and its validity is not under challenge. A Parliamentary provision should not be read down in the absence of the Union of India when its interests are directly affected by the interpretation.

Conclusion: Reliance on the American precedents to dilute Section 10(a)(i) was unwarranted, and the earlier reading down of the provision was impermissible.

Final Conclusion: The reference was answered by reaffirming the statutory validity and full operation of Section 10(a)(i) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and by disapproving the contrary earlier view on mere membership, active membership, and reading down.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an association is lawfully declared unlawful under the statutory procedure, continued membership after such declaration is itself punishable, and Indian constitutional freedoms must be construed with the express reasonable restrictions and the distinct structure of Article 19 in mind rather than by importing foreign free speech doctrine as controlling law.

Issues: Whether the conviction for corruption offences could be sustained when the complainant and shadow witness turned hostile and the prosecution failed to prove demand of illegal gratification.

Analysis: Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is a sine qua non for offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Mere recovery of tainted currency notes, without proof of demand, is insufficient to sustain conviction. Where the complainant is hostile or unavailable, demand may still be proved through other direct or circumstantial evidence, but a presumption can arise only after foundational facts are established. On the evidence on record, the prosecution failed to prove demand, and the recovery evidence alone could not establish guilt.

Conclusion: The conviction and sentence were not sustainable and the appellant was entitled to acquittal.

Ratio Decidendi: In corruption prosecutions, demand of illegal gratification must be proved as a foundational fact, and recovery of tainted money by itself does not establish guilt in the absence of proof of demand.

Issues: Whether orders of the Armed Forces Tribunal are amenable to challenge before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and whether there is any per se bar on such judicial review.

Analysis: The constitutional power of judicial review under Article 226 forms part of the basic structure and cannot be curtailed by implication or by a restrictive reading of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007. The limitation in Article 227(4) is confined to superintendence and does not extinguish writ jurisdiction. The restrictive appellate scheme under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act, together with Article 136(2), does not create a complete ouster of the High Court's jurisdiction. The Court rejected the view that certain categories of Armed Forces Tribunal matters are wholly insulated from writ review, and held that the High Court may intervene where there is denial of fundamental rights, jurisdictional error, or an error of law apparent on the face of the record, while remaining mindful of judicial self-restraint.

Conclusion: There is no per se restriction on the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 by the High Court against orders of the Armed Forces Tribunal, and the contrary view was held to be incorrect.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petitions challenging abolition of the Odisha Administrative Tribunal were maintainable; (ii) whether Article 323A of the Constitution mandates establishment of State Administrative Tribunals and bars their abolition; (iii) whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 could be invoked to rescind the notification establishing the Tribunal; (iv) whether the abolition notification was arbitrary or violative of Article 14 and the right of access to justice; (v) whether principles of natural justice were breached by not hearing affected stakeholders; (vi) whether the Union Government became functus officio after establishing the Tribunal; and (vii) whether the notification was invalid for not being expressed in the name of the President.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petitions challenging abolition of the Odisha Administrative Tribunal were maintainable

Analysis: The petitioners were registered associations and alleged violation of legal and constitutional rights, including access to justice and equality. A petitioner invoking writ jurisdiction need not prove the claim at the threshold, but must show a legal grievance capable of examination under Article 226.

Conclusion: The writ petitions were maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether Article 323A of the Constitution mandates establishment of State Administrative Tribunals and bars their abolition

Analysis: The word "may" in Article 323A indicates an enabling and directory power, not a compulsory mandate. The scheme, object, and context of the provision show that Parliament was empowered, but not obliged, to create tribunals, and the same logic permits reassessment of their utility after creation.

Conclusion: Article 323A does not mandate establishment or continuation of State Administrative Tribunals and does not bar abolition.

Issue (iii): Whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 could be invoked to rescind the notification establishing the Tribunal

Analysis: Section 21 embodies a rule of construction permitting rescission where the parent statute is not repugnant to such power. The decision to establish the Tribunal was administrative and based on policy, not quasi-judicial. The Administrative Tribunals Act does not contain anything inconsistent with rescission of the establishing notification, and abolition merely restores the pre-existing forum.

Conclusion: Section 21 was validly invoked to rescind the notification establishing the Tribunal.

Issue (iv): Whether the abolition notification was arbitrary or violative of Article 14 and the right of access to justice

Analysis: The State and Union Governments relied on relevant considerations, including the impact of later constitutional developments, pendency, disposal rate, and expenditure. The abolition was not based on extraneous factors and was not so unreasonable that no rational authority would adopt it. Access to justice was preserved because service matters would be heard by the High Court, and the policy did not leave litigants remediless.

Conclusion: The abolition notification was neither arbitrary nor violative of Article 14 or the fundamental right of access to justice.

Issue (v): Whether principles of natural justice were breached by not hearing affected stakeholders

Analysis: The decision to abolish the Tribunal was a policy decision. A pre-decisional hearing to every affected person or class member is not required for policy choices of general application, though such decisions remain open to judicial review if otherwise unlawful.

Conclusion: There was no violation of natural justice.

Issue (vi): Whether the Union Government became functus officio after establishing the Tribunal

Analysis: Functus officio applies to adjudicative decisions that have attained finality, not to policy decisions of the executive. The power to establish a tribunal did not exhaust the Government's authority to revisit policy and rescind the notification later.

Conclusion: The Union Government did not become functus officio.

Issue (vii): Whether the notification was invalid for not being expressed in the name of the President

Analysis: Article 77 is directory as to form. Non-compliance with the form of expression does not invalidate executive action taken under statutory authority; it only removes the presumption of proper authentication. The notification was otherwise a valid exercise of statutory power.

Conclusion: The notification was not invalid on that ground.

Final Conclusion: The abolition of the Odisha Administrative Tribunal was upheld as constitutionally and legally valid, and the challenge to the notification was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: A tribunal established under an enabling statutory or constitutional framework may be abolished by rescinding the establishing notification where the original establishment was an administrative policy decision, the governing statute is not repugnant to such rescission, and the abolition is not arbitrary, unconstitutional, or violative of natural justice or access to justice.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

Whether High Courts have complied with this Court's directions concerning custody, bail and treatment of undertrial prisoners and whether personal presence of Registrars is warranted where compliance is absent or incomplete.

Whether subordinate courts are failing to follow binding precedents (including directions in Satender Kumar Antil and related pronouncements) resulting in unnecessary remands or incarceration, and what supervisory steps High Courts must take.

Whether public prosecutors and prosecuting agencies are obliged to represent the correct legal position in light of this Court's pronouncements and whether States/UTs must issue standing orders and training to ensure compliance.

Whether the principles applicable to bail extend equally to anticipatory bail and whether trial courts' practice of remanding accused who appear pursuant to summons/anticipatory-bail orders must be curtailed.

Whether remedial administrative and judicial measures (personal appearance of Registrars/Home Secretaries, appointment of Amicus Curiae, issuance of standing orders, directions to prosecuting agencies) are appropriate and necessary to secure compliance and prevent further abuses.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1 - High Court and subordinate court compliance with this Court's directions on custody and undertrial prisoners

Legal framework: The supervisory jurisdiction of High Courts over subordinate judiciary requires them to ensure subordinate courts apply binding directions of the Supreme Court concerning custody, bail and treatment of undertrial prisoners.

Precedent treatment: The Court relies on its earlier directions (including Satender Kumar Antil and similar decisions) as binding law to be followed by trial courts and High Courts; such precedents are treated as authoritative and not to be disregarded.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court examined filed compliance affidavits and discovered non-compliance or partial compliance across multiple High Courts and districts. The continued issuance of orders remanding accused to custody despite binding directions constitutes an aberration that leads to unnecessary incarceration and additional litigation. Where compliance reports are not filed or copies not supplied, mere filing before the High Court is insufficient for assisting this Court and the Bar.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - High Courts must ensure full compliance by subordinate courts with this Court's orders; partial or non-compliance can attract directions for personal attendance by High Court officers. Obiter - suggestions regarding judicial work withdrawal or sending Magistrates for upgradation are advisory but stem from supervisory concern.

Conclusions: The Court directed personal presence of Registrars of High Courts found non-compliant (or not properly represented) and tasked High Courts to follow up and secure full compliance across all districts/courts. High Courts must issue necessary directions to subordinate judiciary to prevent recurrence.

Issue 2 - Trial courts' practice of remanding persons who appear pursuant to summons/anticipatory bail and its correctness

Legal framework: Principles governing bail and anticipatory bail as articulated by this Court - anticipatory bail is a species of bail - and the requirement that remand to custody should not be routine where this Court's directions preclude arrest/remand.

Precedent treatment: This Court referred to observations in a recent Criminal Appeal (para 10 and 12) criticizing a practice in some parts of the country of remanding accused immediately upon appearance; that decision granted conditional release in the event of remand. The Court treats those observations as applicable law.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court clarifies that earlier enunciations regarding bail apply equally to anticipatory bail; fears of remand by trial courts despite non-seeking of custody by investigating agencies justify prophylactic relief. Where accused have cooperated and not been arrested during investigation or where charge sheets are filed, remanding them to custody upon appearance is improper absent legitimate grounds.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Anticipatory bail principles apply as a species of bail and entitle affected persons to protection against remand where remand would contradict higher court directions. Obiter - the broader correctness of entrenched local practices is suggested to be open to testing in an appropriate case.

Conclusions: The Court affirmed that reliefs granted regarding bail extend to anticipatory bail; ordered that applicants in listed matters appear before trial courts but shall not be arrested in the interim. The Court signalled openness to test the correctness of routine remands in appropriate cases.

Issue 3 - Duty of public prosecutors and prosecuting agencies to represent correct legal position

Legal framework: As officers of the Court, public prosecutors are duty-bound to present the correct law and not to advance positions contrary to binding Supreme Court pronouncements.

Precedent treatment: The Court relied on prior findings criticizing public prosecutors who took contrary positions (citing an earlier order in Aman Preet Singh) and reiterated expectations of fairness and legal consciousness from prosecutors.

Interpretation and reasoning: Instances were highlighted where public prosecutors advanced submissions inconsistent with this Court's orders, potentially contributing to wrongful remands. The Court emphasized systemic responsibility of prosecuting agencies and State governments to issue standing directions and to arrange training to update prosecutors on settled law.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Public prosecutors must plead and argue the correct legal position in conformity with this Court's decisions; prosecuting agencies/States must issue directives and training. Obiter - the method and frequency of training and the role of Directors of Prosecution are recommended measures.

Conclusions: The Court directed that prosecuting agencies/States circulate directions through Heads of Prosecution, arrange training, and ensure public prosecutors follow the legal position; the CBI and other agencies were directed to issue such instructions.

Issue 4 - Administrative remedies: standing orders, compliance affidavits, appointment of Amicus Curiae, and personal appearance of administrative officers

Legal framework: The Court's supervisory powers permit issuance of administrative directions to secure compliance (e.g., requiring standing orders, affidavits, personal attendance of Home Secretaries/Registrars) and to appoint assisting counsel such as an Amicus Curiae to ensure effective implementation.

Precedent treatment: The Court applied standard supervisory measures to enforce earlier directions; the appointment of an Amicus where assistance is required follows established practice to monitor compliance and collate information.

Interpretation and reasoning: Non-filing or incomplete filing of compliance reports undermines effective supervision. Where States/UTs have not issued standing orders or failed to supply copies of affidavits, the Court finds it necessary to compel administrative officers' personal attendance and to appoint an Amicus to receive compliance affidavits and coordinate follow-up. Part compliance at district/court levels requires High Courts' active follow-up.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - The Court may call for personal appearance of Registrars/Home Secretaries and appoint Amicus Curiae to secure compliance; States must issue standing orders within stipulated time or face further directions. Obiter - suggestions regarding the specific form of follow-up are illustrative rather than exhaustive.

Conclusions: The Court appointed an Amicus Curiae to receive compliance affidavits and assist monitoring; granted States/UTs and High Courts a final time period (three weeks from 03.02.2023) to file compliance and issue standing orders, failing which personal attendance of Home Secretaries/Registrars will be directed. Copies of compliance documents must be furnished to the Amicus and the Court.

Issue 5 - Interim relief in individual applications where applicants were never arrested during investigation but are now at risk of custody

Legal framework: Interim protection is appropriate where applicants face imminent arrest or remand contrary to higher court directions, especially when medical/other humanitarian considerations are present.

Precedent treatment: The Court relied on its supervisory practice to grant interim protections in analogous situations and on prior observations that remand should not be routine.

Interpretation and reasoning: For multiple listed interlocutory applications where circumstances were the same (co-accused who appeared and were not to be arrested), the Court granted interim protection from arrest pending the main matter. In a case highlighting medical vulnerability, the Court sought instructions and listed the matter for urgent consideration.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Interim non-arrest directions are appropriate in cases where applicants appear pursuant to orders and where arrest would conflict with higher court protections. Obiter - the specific humanitarian observations are fact-sensitive and advisory for similar future cases.

Conclusions: The Court ordered that several applicants appear before trial courts but shall not be arrested in the interim; urgent matters were listed for prompt hearing and prosecuting agencies directed to accept notice where appropriate.

Cross-references

Issues regarding prosecutorial duties (Issue 3) and High Courts' supervisory responsibility (Issue 1) are interlinked: effective prosecution aligned with settled law reduces wrongful remands; both systemic and individual administrative measures (Issue 4) are necessary to implement judicial directives and protect liberty (Issue 2 and Issue 5).

Issues: Whether the appellants, who had cooperated during investigation and against whom summons had been issued for appearance after filing of the final report, were entitled to anticipatory protection against arrest.

Analysis: The Court noted that the investigating agency had not sought custodial interrogation during the long period between registration of the FIR and filing of the final report. The material against the appellants was largely documentary in nature, and the immediate apprehension was of remand by the Trial Court upon appearance in response to summons, rather than arrest at the instance of the investigating agency. In these circumstances, the need for custody at that stage was not made out.

Conclusion: The appellants were entitled to protection, and bail was directed in the event of arrest, subject to terms and conditions imposed by the Special Court.

Ratio Decidendi: Where custodial interrogation is not shown to be necessary and the case substantially rests on documentary material, anticipatory protection may be granted even after filing of the final report, particularly when the apprehended custody arises upon appearance before the trial court.

Issues: Whether, on the evidence led by the prosecution, demand of illegal gratification and its acceptance were proved so as to sustain conviction under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Analysis: The demand of illegal gratification is a foundational fact for offences under Section 7 and clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The prosecution may prove such demand and acceptance by direct evidence or, in the absence of direct evidence, by circumstantial evidence, but the circumstances relied upon must be fully proved and must lead only to the inference that a demand for gratification was made. Mere recovery of currency notes or a bare request for money is not enough. The presumption under Section 20 arises only after the basic facts of demand and acceptance are proved. On the record, the evidence of the shadow witness did not establish a specific demand of gratification in his presence, and the surrounding circumstances created serious doubt about the prosecution version.

Conclusion: The prosecution failed to prove demand and acceptance of illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt; the conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) could not stand.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, demand and acceptance of illegal gratification are essential facts in issue and may be proved by circumstantial evidence, but only where the proved circumstances unerringly establish the demand; without proof of those foundational facts, the statutory presumption under Section 20 cannot be invoked.

Issues: Whether the review and recall applications were maintainable and whether the earlier orders disposing of the civil appeals could be recalled in view of the subsequent Constitution Bench ruling overruling the precedent on which those orders were based.

Analysis: The review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is controlled by Article 137 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court Rules, and Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The majority held that the later Constitution Bench decision had expressly overruled the earlier precedent and all decisions following it, and that this change justified recall of the earlier orders in the peculiar facts of these land acquisition matters. It was also emphasized that many matters had been decided solely on the basis of the overruled precedent, and that allowing rehearing would protect larger public interest where possession of land had already been taken and used for public purposes.

Conclusion: The review and recall applications were maintainable and were allowed. The earlier orders in the connected civil appeals were recalled and the appeals were restored for fresh consideration on merits in light of the later Constitution Bench ruling.