Issues: (i) Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was maintainable against an auction notice issued in exercise of powers under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 when a statutory remedy under Section 17 of that Act was available. (ii) Whether an agreement to sell holder could invoke Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 to obstruct the auction, especially where the underlying transaction was entered into without the permission of the Bank or the Tribunal and had been treated as void.

Issue (i): Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was maintainable against an auction notice issued in exercise of powers under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 when a statutory remedy under Section 17 of that Act was available.

Analysis: The challenge before the High Court was to measures taken by the Bank under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The statutory scheme provided an efficacious remedy under Section 17 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The auction had already taken place and the writ petition was filed thereafter, yet the High Court entertained it. In the presence of the special remedy under the SARFAESI Act, recourse to writ jurisdiction was not warranted on the facts of the case.

Conclusion: The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the challenge to the auction notice could not be sustained in writ jurisdiction.

Issue (ii): Whether an agreement to sell holder could invoke Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 to obstruct the auction, especially where the underlying transaction was entered into without the permission of the Bank or the Tribunal and had been treated as void.

Analysis: The agreement to sell in favour of the original writ petitioner was executed during pending proceedings before the Tribunal, with knowledge of those proceedings, and without prior permission of the Bank or the Tribunal. The Tribunal had already recorded that such transaction was void. The Court also noted that the auction purchaser had participated in the sale and deposited the required amount, while the original writ petitioner had not secured any valid right to defeat the auction by relying on Section 13(8). The Court further held that the benefit of a void transaction could not be claimed by the writ petitioner or his heirs.

Conclusion: Section 13(8) did not assist the agreement to sell holder, and the auction could not be stalled on that basis.

Final Conclusion: The High Court's order was unsustainable; the auction purchaser was entitled to completion of the sale upon payment of the balance consideration, and the amounts deposited by the writ petitioner were directed to be returned with interest.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an efficacious statutory remedy exists under the SARFAESI Act, writ jurisdiction should not be used to challenge measures under Section 13(4), and a person claiming only under a void agreement to sell cannot invoke Section 13(8) to defeat a completed auction process.

The Supreme Court dismissed multiple intervention and direction applications, stating that the remedy lies in pointing out the judgment of this Court and seeking orders from the concerned Court. If the judgment is perceived to be followed in breach, rights should be agitated in independent proceedings. The Court emphasized that it will not entertain such applications henceforth, and the Registry should not list them.

The High Courts have filed compliance affidavits. However, non-compliance persists in certain districts. The Court directed High Courts to ensure compliance and inform the Supreme Court accordingly. The Allahabad High Court was specifically called upon to file an affidavit within four weeks, detailing steps taken and identifying judicial officers frequently passing non-conforming orders. The Court emphasized the need for judicial officers to upgrade their skills in a Judicial Academy.

Mr. Sidharth Luthra, Amicus Curiae, noted the lack of material to assist the Court regarding directions to prosecutors. The Court directed compliance within four weeks, with advance copies to Mr. Luthra. Failure to comply would necessitate the presence of concerned Secretaries or heads of prosecuting agencies in Court. Training programs should be organized to update Prosecutors.

The Court highlighted specific non-compliance cases, including orders from the Sessions Judge, Lucknow, and the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption CBI Court No.1, Ghaziabad. These cases illustrated judicial officers not following the Supreme Court's judgment, necessitating skill upgradation in a Judicial Academy.

The Court noted that some States/UTs have yet to file compliance reports or supply standing orders. Non-compliant States include Karnataka, Telangana, Haryana, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Daman and Diu, and Lakshadweep. States that filed affidavits but not standing orders include Tamil Nadu, Assam, UT of Puducherry, Kerala, and Odisha. The Court directed these States to supply copies within two weeks, failing which Home Secretaries would need to be present in Court. States with non-conforming standing orders, such as Manipur, Andaman & Nicobar Islands, and West Bengal, were given two weeks to issue corrected orders.

Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASG, acknowledged the non-compliance of the CBI affidavit and requested time to file a correct affidavit within four weeks. The Court made interim orders dated 21.03.2023 absolute and disposed of the related applications.

Next hearing is scheduled for 08.08.2023.

Issues: (i) The scope and ambit of the Supreme Court's power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India; (ii) Whether, on settlement between parties, the Court can grant divorce by mutual consent under Article 142(1) without insisting on the waiting period and procedure under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and also quash connected proceedings; (iii) Whether the Court can grant divorce under Article 142(1) on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage even when one spouse opposes it.

Issue (i): The constitutional power under Article 142(1) is a wide equitable power meant to do complete justice in a cause or matter. It is not controlled by ordinary statutory limitations, but its exercise must respect fundamental general and specific public policy. The Court must consider the substantive law and cannot ignore express prohibitions rooted in fundamental public policy, yet it may depart from procedure and, in a proper case, even relax the operation of substantive law to prevent injustice.

Conclusion: The power under Article 142(1) is expansive and may be exercised beyond procedural rules, subject to restraint, public policy, and the need to do complete justice in the cause or matter.

Issue (ii): In matrimonial disputes resolved by genuine settlement, the Court may grant a decree of divorce by mutual consent under Article 142(1) without compelling the parties to undergo the statutory second motion under Section 13-B(2). The Court may also bring an end to allied proceedings, including criminal and other connected actions, where the settlement is voluntary and comprehensive and the relevant safeguards are satisfied.

Conclusion: Yes. The Court can dissolve the marriage by mutual consent under Article 142(1) without following the second-motion procedure, and may also quash connected proceedings in an appropriate case.

Issue (iii): In exceptional matrimonial cases, where the marriage is found to be wholly unworkable, emotionally dead, and beyond salvage, the Court may grant divorce under Article 142(1) on the ground of irretrievable breakdown even if one spouse opposes the relief. The power is discretionary and must be exercised with great care, after assessing the length of separation, attempts at reconciliation, the nature of allegations, financial and child-related consequences, and the overall justice of the case.

Conclusion: Yes. The Court may grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage under Article 142(1) despite opposition by one spouse, if complete justice so requires.

Final Conclusion: The reference is answered by affirming the Court's equitable power to dissolve a marriage and to give comprehensive relief in matrimonial matters, including by dispensing with procedural formalities where the statutory conditions and the demands of justice are satisfied.

Ratio Decidendi: Article 142(1) empowers the Supreme Court to mould relief in matrimonial disputes to do complete justice, including dispensing with procedural requirements and granting divorce in exceptional cases, so long as the exercise of power does not violate fundamental public policy or an express statutory prohibition rooted in such policy.

Issues: Whether the disputes raised in the civil suit, which arose out of multiple agreements and involved parties not bound by the arbitration clause, were required to be referred to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Analysis: The principal licence agreement contained an arbitration clause, but the later tripartite arrangement with the bank and the subsequent conveyance-related transactions did not. The suit sought interconnected reliefs against both signatories and non-signatories, including cancellation of conveyances, injunctions, and reliefs arising from the mortgage and later transactions. The subject-matter of the suit was therefore not wholly covered by the arbitration agreement. The governing principle is that Section 8 applies only where the matter before the court is the subject of a valid arbitration agreement, and the court will not compel arbitration where the dispute cannot be severed from claims involving non-parties or from non-arbitrable reliefs. The later pro-arbitration approach does not override the requirement that the entire subject-matter, as framed in the suit, must be referable to arbitration on the existing agreements.

Conclusion: The dispute was not referable to arbitration under Section 8, and the refusal to bifurcate the suit or send only part of it to arbitration was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed because the civil suit involved an inseparable mix of arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims arising from multiple transactions, including agreements without arbitration clauses and claims against non-signatories.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 8 cannot be invoked to split a composite civil suit for partial reference to arbitration when the entire subject-matter is not covered by a valid arbitration agreement and the dispute necessarily involves non-signatories and non-arbitrable claims.

Issues: (i) Whether a charge-sheet filed within the extended statutory period becomes incomplete for default-bail purposes because sanction for prosecution under the UAPA and the Explosive Substances Act had not yet been granted or placed before the court; (ii) Whether failure to file the charge-sheet directly before the Special Court under the NIA Act, instead of before the Magistrate followed by committal proceedings, entitled the accused to default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issue (i): Whether a charge-sheet filed within the extended statutory period becomes incomplete for default-bail purposes because sanction for prosecution under the UAPA and the Explosive Substances Act had not yet been granted or placed before the court.

Analysis: The statutory scheme distinguished investigation from cognizance. The filing of a final report under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 marks completion of investigation, whereas sanction is required only at the stage of cognizance. Section 167(2) governs completion of investigation within the prescribed period and does not make default bail depend on prior grant of sanction. The Court held that sanction may be produced later and that delay in obtaining or filing sanction may affect cognizance or trial management, but it does not convert a duly filed charge-sheet into a non est filing for the purpose of default bail.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the accused. Filing of the charge-sheet within time was sufficient compliance with Section 167(2), and no right to default bail accrued on the ground that sanction had not yet been granted or filed.

Issue (ii): Whether failure to file the charge-sheet directly before the Special Court under the NIA Act, instead of before the Magistrate followed by committal proceedings, entitled the accused to default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The Court held that although prosecutions under the UAPA read with the NIA Act should proceed before the Special Court and committal under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not required, the initial filing before the Magistrate did not affect the accused's right under Section 167(2). The defect related to forum and procedure for cognizance, not to completion of investigation. Since the charge-sheet had already been filed within time and the application for default bail was moved after that filing, the procedural error did not revive an extinguished statutory right.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the accused. The mistaken filing before the Magistrate and subsequent committal did not create a right to default bail.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed because the investigation had been completed within the extended period and the subsequent defects complained of were procedural to cognizance and forum, not grounds to reopen the extinguished claim for statutory default bail.

Ratio Decidendi: For purposes of default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, completion of investigation is evidenced by filing of the charge-sheet within the prescribed time, and the absence or delay of sanction for prosecution concerns cognizance rather than investigation.

Issues: Whether the plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on the ground that it disclosed an illusory cause of action and was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The plaint was examined on its own averments and was found to rest on the premise that the partition deed of 11.03.1953 contained an error in the survey number. However, no relief was sought against that partition deed, even though the suit in substance proceeded on the assertion that the deed was and that subsequent transactions were without title. On a meaningful reading, the pleadings showed an attempt to avoid the limitation bar by not challenging the foundational document directly. The suit was therefore treated as one created by clever drafting, disclosing no real cause of action and amounting to an abuse of process.

Conclusion: The plaint was liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the conclusion was in favour of the appellants.

Ratio Decidendi: A plaint that, on a meaningful reading, discloses only a cleverly drafted and illusory cause of action and is framed to circumvent limitation can be rejected at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Issues: (i) Whether further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 could be undertaken after the final report had been accepted and the closure report had been acted upon, and whether recall or review of the acceptance order was necessary. (ii) Whether the lapse of time in commencing further investigation and the consequent delay in trial barred continuation of the prosecution.

Issue (i): Whether further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 could be undertaken after the final report had been accepted and the closure report had been acted upon, and whether recall or review of the acceptance order was necessary.

Analysis: Section 173(8) expressly preserves the power of the investigating agency to conduct further investigation after forwarding a report under Section 173(2). Further investigation is a continuation of the earlier investigation and not a fresh or de novo investigation. The acceptance of a closure report is a judicial order, but it does not extinguish the statutory power to investigate further when fresh material comes to light. The prior acceptance order need not be recalled, reviewed, or quashed before such investigation is undertaken.

Conclusion: Further investigation was permissible, and the Special Court had jurisdiction to permit it without first recalling the order accepting the closure report.

Issue (ii): Whether the lapse of time in commencing further investigation and the consequent delay in trial barred continuation of the prosecution.

Analysis: Delay by itself does not defeat a criminal prosecution where further investigation is otherwise warranted to discover the truth and secure a fair trial. The imperative of a fair and effective investigation prevails over a mere claim of speedy disposal, and further investigation cannot be rejected solely because time has passed since the closure report.

Conclusion: The delay did not bar further investigation or continuation of the prosecution.

Final Conclusion: The prosecution could proceed on the basis of the further investigation and the chargesheet filed thereafter, and the orders quashing the proceedings could not stand.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 authorises further investigation even after acceptance of a closure report, and such investigation is a continuation of the earlier one which does not require prior recall or review of the acceptance order.

Issues: Whether the complaint disclosed the ingredients of the alleged offences or was an abuse of process arising from a purely contractual dispute.

Analysis: The parties' transaction was governed by the inter-corporate deposit agreement and letter of pledge, which authorised invocation and sale of the pledged shares, including sale to the lender or its group companies. The allegations in the complaint were found to be inconsistent with those contractual terms. The record also showed that the complainant was aware of the sale of shares as early as 2001, sought information later, and still waited until 2011 to file the complaint. In these circumstances, the dispute was held to be essentially civil and the criminal complaint did not disclose the essential ingredients of the offences alleged.

Conclusion: The complaint was not maintainable as a criminal prosecution and was liable to be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the contractual documents expressly permit the impugned act and the grievance is pursued after inordinate delay on facts showing a civil dispute, criminal proceedings cannot be sustained in the absence of the basic ingredients of the alleged offences.

Issues: (i) whether the dispute relating to cancellation of the development agreement fell within the arbitration clause; (ii) whether a proceeding under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is an action in rem so as to exclude arbitration.

Issue (i): whether the dispute relating to cancellation of the development agreement fell within the arbitration clause.

Analysis: The agreement contained a broad clause covering all disputes arising out of or in connection with the agreement. The controversy whether the development agreement stood cancelled or could be lawfully cancelled arose directly from that instrument and therefore answered the contractual expression governing referral of disputes.

Conclusion: The dispute was covered by the arbitration clause and was referable to arbitration.

Issue (ii): whether a proceeding under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is an action in rem so as to exclude arbitration.

Analysis: The earlier decision relied upon by the Court had already clarified that an action for cancellation of an instrument under Section 31 is not an action in rem. That principle removed the sole basis on which the High Court had declined to give effect to the arbitration clause and the order under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Conclusion: A Section 31 proceeding is not an action in rem and does not bar arbitration.

Final Conclusion: The High Court's interference was unwarranted, the trial court's referral order was restored, and the dispute was directed to proceed in arbitration.

Ratio Decidendi: A dispute arising out of or in connection with an agreement is arbitral where the parties have agreed to refer such disputes to arbitration, and an action for cancellation of an instrument under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is not an action in rem.

Issues: (i) Whether the auction and confirmation of sale of the sick industrial company's asset were valid despite absence of a valuation report, non-disclosure of reserve price, and non-compliance with the Asset Sale Committee conditions. (ii) Whether a later higher offer by persons not participating in the auction could displace the confirmed bid or justify interference with the sale process.

Issue (i): Whether the auction and confirmation of sale of the sick industrial company's asset were valid despite absence of a valuation report, non-disclosure of reserve price, and non-compliance with the Asset Sale Committee conditions.

Analysis: The sale process had to conform to the statutory scheme governing disposal of assets of a sick company. The operating agency was required to obtain valuation, fix the reserve price, and proceed in accordance with the prescribed method of sale and publicity. The record did not show a valuation report or disclosure of reserve price in the auction notice. The successful bidder also failed to furnish the stipulated bank guarantee and did not pay the consideration within the prescribed time. In the absence of competitive bidding and in view of the breached conditions, the confirmation of sale could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The auction confirmation was invalid and the High Court's decision restoring the rejection of the bid was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether a later higher offer by persons not participating in the auction could displace the confirmed bid or justify interference with the sale process.

Analysis: A later offer cannot ordinarily undo a completed auction process, but that principle did not assist the appellants because the auction process itself was defective and the bid had not been lawfully confirmed on a proper statutory footing. The persons residing in the property were not strangers to the proceedings and their challenge could not be rejected merely on locus grounds. Their later offer, though not decisive by itself, reinforced the need for a fresh process to secure the best possible value in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The later offer did not validate the flawed sale process, and interference with the confirmed bid was justified.

Final Conclusion: The sale process was found inconsistent with the governing statutory requirements and the bidder's non-compliance with the auction conditions, so the impugned confirmation of sale was not allowed to stand and the matter remained open to a fresh lawful process to secure optimum value.

Ratio Decidendi: Where disposal of assets of a sick industrial company is undertaken without valuation, without disclosure of reserve price, and in breach of the auction conditions essential to securing competitive bidding and timely payment, confirmation of the sale cannot be sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether a chargesheet or prosecution complaint can be filed in piecemeal before completing the investigation; (ii) whether filing such an incomplete chargesheet extinguishes the right to default bail; (iii) whether remand can be continued beyond the stipulated period during pending investigation.

Issue (i): Whether a chargesheet or prosecution complaint can be filed in piecemeal before completing the investigation.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of investigation under the Code of Criminal Procedure requires completion of investigation before a final report or complaint is filed. The historical background, the Law Commission reports, and the purpose of Section 167(2) show that incomplete reports were never meant to be used as a device to prolong custody. Filing a chargesheet while investigation remains pending defeats the protective time limit built into the remand framework.

Conclusion: A chargesheet or prosecution complaint cannot be filed in piecemeal before completing the investigation if the object is to deprive the accused of default bail.

Issue (ii): Whether filing such an incomplete chargesheet extinguishes the right to default bail.

Analysis: The right under Section 167(2) is treated as a safeguard against arbitrary detention and is linked to Article 21. That right arises when the investigation is not completed within the prescribed period and is not defeated by filing a supplementary or incomplete chargesheet that itself records that investigation is still pending. To accept such a filing as sufficient would reduce the statutory safeguard to a formality and permit circumvention of the bail entitlement.

Conclusion: Filing an incomplete chargesheet does not extinguish the right to default bail.

Issue (iii): Whether remand can be continued beyond the stipulated period during pending investigation.

Analysis: The remand power under the Code is limited by the maximum period fixed for investigation-based custody. Once that period expires without a validly completed investigation, the accused must be offered default bail if prepared to furnish it. Continuation of remand on the basis of incomplete investigation and repeated supplementary filings is inconsistent with the mandate of Section 167(2) and the protection of personal liberty.

Conclusion: Remand cannot be continued beyond the stipulated period without offering default bail.

Final Conclusion: The challenged custody was held to be unsustainable, the interim bail was affirmed, and the writ petition was brought to an end by granting the relief sought.

Ratio Decidendi: The right to default bail under Section 167(2) is a liberty-protecting safeguard that cannot be defeated by filing an incomplete or piecemeal chargesheet before investigation is completed.

Issues: (i) Whether, on a composite auction sale of the company's assets, a conveyance deed could be registered only for the land and buildings by excluding plant and machinery from the value for stamp duty purposes. (ii) Whether the registering authority could look beyond the recitals and schedule in the deed and determine stamp duty on the basis of the true nature and extent of the transaction, including by applying the provisions on facts affecting duty and undervalued instruments.

Issue (i): Whether, on a composite auction sale of the company's assets, a conveyance deed could be registered only for the land and buildings by excluding plant and machinery from the value for stamp duty purposes.

Analysis: The auction sale and the sale deed disclosed a single transaction for sale of the company's assets as a whole, described as being on an as-is-where-is basis and for a consolidated consideration. The deed's preamble showed that the consideration related to land, buildings, civil works, plant and machinery, and current assets. The Court held that the recital and surrounding circumstances showed an intention to convey not merely the land but also such plant and machinery as were permanently attached to the earth and formed part of the immovable property. Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, together with the definitions of immovable property in the Registration Act, 1908, and the General Clauses Act, 1897, supported the conclusion that the transfer carried all incidents attached to the land. The attempt to value only part of the composite transfer was held to be inconsistent with the true nature of the conveyance.

Conclusion: The exclusion of plant and machinery from the conveyance for stamp duty purposes was not permissible; the conveyance covered the attached plant and machinery also, to the extent they answered the description of immovable property.

Issue (ii): Whether the registering authority could look beyond the recitals and schedule in the deed and determine stamp duty on the basis of the true nature and extent of the transaction, including by applying the provisions on facts affecting duty and undervalued instruments.

Analysis: The Court held that the proviso added to Section 27 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, by the Andhra Pradesh amendment empowered the registering officer to inspect the property, make local enquiries, and examine connected records to ensure that the facts affecting duty were truly set forth. Section 47A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, also enabled action where market value was not truly stated. In light of these provisions, the authority was entitled to examine the substance of the transaction, determine the correct market value of the property actually conveyed, and assess deficit duty. The earlier restrictive approach under pre-amendment law did not govern the Andhra Pradesh regime after insertion of the proviso to Section 27 and Section 47A. The Court also held that the value of current assets had to be separately dealt with, and the exemption issue under the Government Order was left for reconsideration in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The registering authority was competent to examine the true transaction and determine stamp duty on the correct market value of the immovable property conveyed, including embedded plant and machinery.

Final Conclusion: The impugned judgment was set aside in part, the single judge's approach was substantially restored with modifications, and the matter was remitted for reconsideration of the value of plant and machinery and the exemption question in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: In a composite conveyance of assets sold as a single transaction, stamp duty is chargeable on the true substance of the transfer and the registering authority may, where statute so permits, look beyond the form of the deed to ascertain the correct market value of the immovable property actually conveyed, including permanently attached plant and machinery.

Issues: (i) Whether confessional statements recorded by officers empowered under the NDPS Act could be relied upon against the accused. (ii) Whether the statements of independent witnesses were admissible in the absence of proof that their presence could not be secured. (iii) Whether the drawing of samples at the time of seizure, without compliance with section 52A of the NDPS Act, vitiated the prosecution case. (iv) Whether the prosecution proved possession of the contraband by the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue (i): Whether confessional statements recorded by officers empowered under the NDPS Act could be relied upon against the accused.

Analysis: Officers invested with powers under section 53 of the NDPS Act are police officers for the purpose of section 25 of the Evidence Act. A statement recorded under section 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in a trial under the NDPS Act, and such statements must be excluded from consideration.

Conclusion: The confessional statements were inadmissible and could not be used against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the statements of independent witnesses were admissible in the absence of proof that their presence could not be secured.

Analysis: The relevant statutory requirement made such statements relevant only in specified circumstances, including where the maker was dead, unavailable, incapable of giving evidence, kept out of the way, or where attendance could not be obtained without unreasonable delay or expense. The prosecution failed to establish any of these conditions, and no explanation was offered for the non-examination of the witnesses.

Conclusion: The statements of the independent witnesses were not admissible in evidence.

Issue (iii): Whether the drawing of samples at the time of seizure, without compliance with section 52A of the NDPS Act, vitiated the prosecution case.

Analysis: The statutory scheme requires the seized contraband to be forwarded for inventory, certification, and drawing of representative samples in the presence and under the supervision of the Magistrate. Samples drawn at the stage of seizure, without following that process, do not satisfy the requirement and create serious doubt about the prosecution version regarding the seized substance.

Conclusion: The sampling process was not in conformity with section 52A and seriously undermined the prosecution case.

Issue (iv): Whether the prosecution proved possession of the contraband by the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

Analysis: The contraband was recovered from a room occupied by another accused, while the appellants were not shown to have custody of the bag or control over the room. The evidence did not establish that they brought the contraband there or were in actual or constructive possession of it. In the absence of reliable corroborative evidence, the prosecution case remained doubtful.

Conclusion: The prosecution failed to prove possession of the contraband by the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

Final Conclusion: The conviction could not be sustained because the inadmissible confessional material, the defective sampling process, and the absence of proof of possession left the prosecution case unproved.

Ratio Decidendi: Confessional statements made to officers empowered under section 53 of the NDPS Act are barred by section 25 of the Evidence Act, and compliance with section 52A is mandatory for representative sampling and evidentiary use of the seized contraband; absent reliable proof of possession, conviction cannot stand.

Issues: (i) Whether an arbitration agreement contained in an instrument chargeable to stamp duty but not duly stamped is non-existent, unenforceable, or invalid until the instrument is validated under the Stamp Act; (ii) whether, at the Section 11 stage, the Court must impound the unstamped instrument or leave stamping and impounding to the arbitral tribunal.

Issue (i): Whether an arbitration agreement contained in an instrument chargeable to stamp duty but not duly stamped is non-existent, unenforceable, or invalid until the instrument is validated under the Stamp Act.

Analysis: An arbitration agreement may be embedded in a commercial instrument and may attract stamp duty under the Stamp Act. The statutory scheme of the Stamp Act bars an unstamped instrument from being acted upon until duty and penalty, if any, are paid and the instrument is endorsed as duly stamped. The Contract Act draws a distinction between agreements enforceable by law and agreements not enforceable by law, and an unstamped instrument, while capable of being cured, cannot be treated as enforceable in the meantime. The Court rejected the view that separability and Kompetenz-Kompetenz displace the stamp law consequence at the referral stage.

Conclusion: The arbitration agreement in an unstamped instrument is non-existent in law for the purpose of acting upon it until the instrument is validated under the Stamp Act.

Issue (ii): Whether, at the Section 11 stage, the Court must impound the unstamped instrument or leave stamping and impounding to the arbitral tribunal.

Analysis: Section 11(6A) confines the Court to the existence of an arbitration agreement, but that limited inquiry does not authorise disregard of the mandatory duty under Sections 33 and 35 of the Stamp Act where the original instrument is produced and is found unstamped or insufficiently stamped. The Court held that the statutory mandate to impound and follow the stamp procedure applies at the referral stage, while a certified copy must disclose that the stamp duty on the original has been paid. The contrary view would weaken the revenue-protective object of the Stamp Act and permit the Court to act upon an unstamped instrument.

Conclusion: The Court must act under Sections 33 and 35 of the Stamp Act at the referral stage where the original unstamped instrument is before it, and a non-disclosing certified copy cannot be acted upon.

Final Conclusion: The reference was answered by holding that an unstamped instrument containing an arbitration clause cannot be acted upon until cured under the Stamp Act, and that the referral court cannot bypass the stamp-duty mandate while considering a request for appointment of arbitrator.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an arbitration agreement is contained in an instrument that is chargeable to stamp duty, the agreement cannot be acted upon at the referral stage unless the instrument is duly stamped and validated in the manner prescribed by the Stamp Act; the Court must give effect to the mandatory impounding and stamping regime notwithstanding Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues: Whether conviction of the registered owner of a vehicle under Section 25 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 could be sustained in the absence of proof that the vehicle was used with his knowledge and consent and without the prosecution first proving the foundational facts for drawing the presumption under Section 35 of that Act.

Analysis: Section 25 applies only where the owner knowingly permits use of the vehicle for commission of an offence. The prosecution produced no reliable material to show that the appellant had knowledge of the alleged transport of narcotics or had consented to such use. The evidence also did not establish the foundational facts necessary to invoke the statutory presumption under Section 35. In the absence of such proof, the reverse burden could not be shifted to the appellant, and conviction could not rest merely on his status as registered owner.

Conclusion: The conviction under Section 25 was not sustainable and the appellant was entitled to relief.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the impugned judgments were set aside, and the appellant stood acquitted of the charge.

Ratio Decidendi: For liability of a vehicle owner under Section 25 of the NDPS Act, the prosecution must first prove knowledge and consent through foundational facts before any presumption under Section 35 can arise; ownership alone is insufficient.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant's conviction for murder and allied offences could be sustained on the basis of circumstantial evidence and the alleged recoveries; (ii) Whether the charge of criminal conspiracy and the investigation conducted under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were proved in law.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant's conviction for murder and allied offences could be sustained on the basis of circumstantial evidence and the alleged recoveries.

Analysis: The prosecution case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence. The independent witnesses associated with the alleged recovery did not support the prosecution, and the witness testimony relied upon by the courts below did not establish that the appellant had used the weapon or was otherwise directly connected with the killing. The alleged recoveries and forensic linkage were found unsafe to rely upon because the supporting memos, scientific reports, and examination of material witnesses were deficient. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be firmly established and must form a complete chain consistent only with guilt; that standard was not satisfied.

Conclusion: The conviction for murder and the allied charges could not be sustained and was set aside in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the charge of criminal conspiracy and the investigation conducted under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were proved in law.

Analysis: Criminal conspiracy requires proof of an agreement and a meeting of minds to commit an unlawful act. The record did not establish such prior agreement, and the appellant could not be convicted of conspiracy merely because he was said to have concealed incriminating articles. The investigation also suffered from serious infirmities, including defects in the arrest and recovery process, absence of reliable case diary support, non-examination of material witnesses, and failure to prove the scientific reports. These lapses undermined the credibility of the prosecution version.

Conclusion: The charge of criminal conspiracy was not proved, and the investigation was found unreliable, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The prosecution evidence did not meet the standard required for conviction in a circumstantial case, and the impugned judgment could not stand.

Ratio Decidendi: In a case resting on circumstantial evidence, conviction can be sustained only when the proven circumstances form a complete and unbroken chain pointing exclusively to guilt; absent proof of a prior agreement, a charge of criminal conspiracy also fails.

Issues: Whether the earlier decision in Vidya Drolia treated the effect of an unstamped or under-stamped underlying contract on an arbitration agreement as finally decided, and whether the cited observations on existence and validity of an arbitration agreement constituted binding ratio.

Analysis: The Court held that Vidya Drolia did not examine or decide the effect of an unstamped or under-stamped underlying contract on the arbitration agreement. The reference made there to Garware Wall Ropes was in a different context, namely the meaning of "existence" of an arbitration agreement and the connected question as to who decides existence at the referral stage under Sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Applying the distinction between ratio decidendi and obiter dicta, the Court reiterated that only the principle necessary for the decision binds as precedent. It also referred to the inversion test, under which a proposition is not ratio if the result would remain unchanged even after removing that proposition from the judgment.

Conclusion: Vidya Drolia was not a precedent on the unstamped-contract issue, and the special leave petitions were dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The order clarifies the limited precedential scope of Vidya Drolia and reiterates that only the ative principle essential to the outcome operates as binding precedent.

Ratio Decidendi: A proposition is binding only if it is essential to the decision and survives the inversion test; observations not necessary to decide the issue are obiter and do not constitute precedent.

Issues: Whether cognizance and summons issued against a public servant could be sustained without previous sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, where the acts complained of were traceable to the exercise or purported exercise of official duties.

Analysis: The appellant was a public servant and the acts relied upon by the prosecution arose from his official role as licensing authority. The order impugned, the show-cause notice, the response in the writ proceedings, and the final direction regarding removal of seats were all connected with the discharge of official functions. The governing test is whether there is a reasonable connection between the alleged act and the official duty, not whether the accused is ultimately guilty. Even if the act is said to have been excessive or irregular, sanction is required where the act bears such relation to official duty that it can be said to have been done in the discharge of, or in purported exercise of, such duty.

Conclusion: Cognizance taken against the appellant without previous sanction was not sustainable, and the proceedings were liable to be quashed in so far as the appellant was concerned.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the alleged act of a public servant has a reasonable nexus with the discharge or purported discharge of official duty, prior sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is a condition precedent to cognizance; absent such sanction, the cognizance is bad in law.

Issues: (i) Whether notifications, circulars, orders and statutory levies issued by instrumentalities of the State, including Indian Railways, MoEF, CIL and State Governments, constitute 'Change in Law' under the PPAs; (ii) Whether shortfall in domestic coal supply due to changes in the New Coal Distribution Policy and allied coal-allocation measures constitutes 'Change in Law'; (iii) Whether carrying cost on admitted 'Change in Law' claims is recoverable and, if so, at what rate and from what date; (iv) Whether the additional State levies and cesses, including forest tax and other environmental or development imposts, fall within 'Change in Law'.

Issue (i): Whether notifications, circulars, orders and statutory levies issued by instrumentalities of the State, including Indian Railways, MoEF, CIL and State Governments, constitute 'Change in Law' under the PPAs.

Analysis: The definition of 'Law' in the PPAs covered statutes, ordinances, regulations, notifications, rules, orders and interpretations having force of law, including actions of Indian governmental instrumentalities. Charges revised by the Railway Board, coal-quality requirements imposed by MoEF, and levies imposed by CIL and State authorities after the cut-off date were treated as measures having legal force. The Court applied the principle that post cut-off date increases imposed by governmental instrumentalities alter the contractual cost structure and attract restitution.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in favour of the generators and such measures were held to be 'Change in Law'.

Issue (ii): Whether shortfall in domestic coal supply due to changes in the New Coal Distribution Policy and allied coal-allocation measures constitutes 'Change in Law'.

Analysis: The Court followed its earlier decisions holding that changes in the New Coal Distribution Policy affecting assured coal supply amount to a change in law event. The reduction or reconfiguration of assured coal linkage after the relevant cut-off date was treated as a legally cognisable change under the PPAs.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in favour of the generators.

Issue (iii): Whether carrying cost on admitted 'Change in Law' claims is recoverable and, if so, at what rate and from what date.

Analysis: The PPAs created a restitutionary mechanism through supplementary billing and late payment surcharge provisions. The Court held that compensation must restore the affected party to the same economic position and that delayed recovery of change-in-law compensation justifies carrying cost. The contractual scheme and prior precedent supported interest on carrying cost rather than a re-writing of the agreement.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in favour of the generators, and carrying cost was upheld.

Issue (iv): Whether the additional State levies and cesses, including forest tax and other environmental or development imposts, fall within 'Change in Law'.

Analysis: The Court held that fresh levies imposed by State Governments or their instrumentalities under statutory powers, after the cut-off date, are part of 'Law' for the purposes of the PPAs. Accordingly, imposts such as forest tax, coal terminal surcharge, environmental upkar and development upkar were treated as compensable change-in-law events where they arose from post cut-off notifications or statutory action.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in favour of the generators.

Final Conclusion: The Court upheld the broad application of the PPA change-in-law regime to post cut-off statutory levies, regulatory charges and governmental notifications, and sustained the restitutionary compensation framework including carrying cost, while declining interference with the concurrent findings of the expert regulatory bodies.

Ratio Decidendi: Under a PPA that defines 'Law' broadly and incorporates restitution, any post cut-off statutory levy, notification, order or governmental instruction having force of law and increasing the generator's cost is compensable as 'Change in Law', and delayed recovery of such compensation carries carrying cost consistent with the contractual restitutionary mechanism.

Issues: (i) Whether the civil court could restrain the secured creditor from proceeding against the secured asset in view of the statutory bar under the SARFAESI Act, 2002; (ii) Whether the Division Bench was justified in interfering with the Single Judge's discretionary order vacating the interim injunction.

Issue (i): Whether the civil court could restrain the secured creditor from proceeding against the secured asset in view of the statutory bar under the SARFAESI Act, 2002.

Analysis: Section 34 bars civil court jurisdiction in respect of matters that a Debts Recovery Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine, including matters in respect of which action may be taken under the Act. The limited exception recognised by precedent is confined to cases of fraud or claims so absurd and untenable that no inquiry is required. The statutory remedies under Sections 17 and 18 remain available to an aggrieved party. On the facts, the challenge did not fall within the narrow exception.

Conclusion: The civil court could not restrain the secured creditor from taking steps under the SARFAESI Act, 2002.

Issue (ii): Whether the Division Bench was justified in interfering with the Single Judge's discretionary order vacating the interim injunction.

Analysis: In an appeal against exercise of discretion in interlocutory matters, interference is warranted only when the discretion is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, perverse, or contrary to settled principles. The Single Judge had vacated the interim protection on the basis of the statutory bar, which was a legally sustainable view. The Division Bench substituted its own discretion without satisfying the limited grounds for appellate interference.

Conclusion: The Division Bench was not justified in interfering with the Single Judge's order.

Final Conclusion: The appellate interference was unsustainable, and the order restoring the bank's right to proceed against the secured property stood revived.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 bars civil court intervention in matters within the DRT's domain except in narrowly confined cases of fraud or manifestly untenable claims, and an appellate court should not disturb a reasoned discretionary injunction order unless the discretion is shown to be perversely exercised.