Issues: Whether disputes in the suits could be referred to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 when some defendants were not parties to the arbitration agreement and the reliefs sought extended to third parties.

Analysis: The arbitration clause in the memorandum of understanding was executed only between the appellant and the first respondent. One suit impleaded a company that was not a party to the memorandum, and the other sought reliefs against Canara Bank, which was also not a party to the arbitration agreement. The presence of such non-signatories and the nature of the reliefs made the dispute unsuitable for a compulsory reference under Section 8. The referral to arbitration was therefore not legally sustainable.

Conclusion: The reference to arbitration was held to be erroneous and unsustainable, in favour of the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: A dispute cannot be referred under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 where effective adjudication requires parties who are not bound by the arbitration agreement.

Issues: Whether the appellant was entitled to bail and whether the impugned order rejecting bail could be sustained.

Analysis: At the stage of bail, a detailed examination of evidence is impermissible. The relevant considerations are the existence of a prima facie case, the possibility of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses, and the possibility of absconding, along with the gravity of the offence. The impugned order was found to be internally inconsistent because it stated that prima facie assessment was not necessary at the bail stage, yet proceeded to record prima facie findings on the offence. The Court also noted that custodial interrogation had already been completed, the appellant had remained in custody, the evidence was largely documentary and already with the investigating agency, and the charge-sheet had been filed. The apprehension of witness influence could be addressed by appropriate conditions.

Conclusion: The appellant was held entitled to bail, and the rejection of bail by the High Court was not sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: At the bail stage, courts must avoid detailed evaluation of evidence, and where custodial interrogation is complete and the material is largely documentary, bail may be granted despite seriousness of the allegations if appropriate safeguards can address apprehensions of witness influence.

Issues: (i) Whether leave to appeal against acquittal ought to be granted on the facts proved; (ii) Whether the prosecution evidence, taken as a whole, established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue (i): Whether leave to appeal against acquittal ought to be granted on the facts proved.

Analysis: Interference with an acquittal is not warranted merely because another view is possible. Where the trial court's view is a plausible one based on proper appreciation of evidence and there is no showing that relevant material was ignored or misread, an appellate court should not disturb the acquittal.

Conclusion: Leave to appeal was not justified.

Issue (ii): Whether the prosecution evidence, taken as a whole, established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Analysis: The two eyewitnesses who accompanied the deceased could not identify the accused, and the claimed eyewitness was found unreliable for want of prompt disclosure and for the manner in which his affidavit evidence emerged. The medical evidence indicated death from a .12 bore weapon, while the cartridges linked to service rifles did not complete the chain against the accused. The circumstances therefore did not form a complete chain pointing only to the accused, and the benefit of doubt was available to them.

Conclusion: Guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Final Conclusion: The acquittal stood undisturbed, and no interference with the High Court's refusal to grant leave was called for.

Ratio Decidendi: In an appeal against acquittal, interference is unwarranted unless the trial court's view is perverse or ignores material evidence, and a conviction on circumstantial evidence can follow only when the circumstances form a complete chain excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

Issues: (i) Whether the respondents were entitled to relief despite a delay of several decades in challenging the final publication of record of rights; (ii) whether the writ petition was maintainable after withdrawal of an earlier civil suit for the same relief without liberty to file afresh and in the absence of disclosure of material facts; (iii) whether relief could be granted merely on the basis of internal governmental notings without any communicated order.

Issue (i): Whether the respondents were entitled to relief despite a delay of several decades in challenging the final publication of record of rights.

Analysis: Final publication of the record of rights had taken place in 1962, while the respondents invoked later proceedings only after long and unexplained intervals. The appropriate remedy against the final record of rights was not pursued within the statutory time, and the subsequent proceedings reflected prolonged inaction and acquiescence. Stale claims cannot be revived in writ jurisdiction where the delay is inordinate and unjustified.

Conclusion: The delay and laches were fatal, and no relief was admissible to the respondents.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petition was maintainable after withdrawal of an earlier civil suit for the same relief without liberty to file afresh and in the absence of disclosure of material facts.

Analysis: The civil suit had been withdrawn without liberty to institute a fresh suit, yet the later writ petition sought substantially the same relief. The earlier suit and its withdrawal were not disclosed in the writ proceedings. The principles governing constructive res judicata apply to writ proceedings, and suppression of material facts disentitles a litigant to discretionary relief.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable and the respondents were not entitled to relief on this ground.

Issue (iii): Whether relief could be granted merely on the basis of internal governmental notings without any communicated order.

Analysis: Internal notings are only part of the decision-making process and do not by themselves create enforceable rights unless culminated in a formal and communicated order. In the absence of any communicated governmental order granting allotment of land, the respondents could not claim a right merely from file notings.

Conclusion: No relief could be granted solely on the basis of official notings.

Final Conclusion: The impugned appellate order was unsustainable, and the challenge to the High Court's interference succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: A stale claim challenging a final revenue record, pursued after unexplained delay and after withdrawal of an earlier proceeding without liberty, cannot be revived in writ jurisdiction, and unenforceable internal notings do not confer rights absent a communicated governmental order.

Issues: Whether the conviction under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 could be sustained when the prosecution failed to establish compliance with the disposal and sampling procedure under Section 52A and the seizure evidence was rendered doubtful by hostile witnesses, non-production of seized contraband, and other material inconsistencies.

Analysis: Section 52A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 requires the officer to prepare an inventory, approach the Magistrate, and obtain certification of the inventory, photographs, or samples, which alone then acquire the character of primary evidence. The Court treated this procedure as mandatory and emphasized that non-compliance deprives the prosecution of the evidentiary benefit of the statutory primary evidence mechanism. The record showed no application before the Magistrate, no certified inventory, and no satisfactory explanation for the disposal or non-production of the seized contraband. Independent witnesses to the seizure and related proceedings turned hostile, key witnesses were not examined, and one prosecution witness gave testimony suggesting the contraband was already in the police station before the alleged recovery. These circumstances, viewed cumulatively, created serious doubt about the genuineness of the seizure and the prosecution version. In such a case, the burden on the prosecution under the stringent NDPS framework was not discharged, and the absence of reliable physical evidence warranted an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Conclusion: The conviction could not be sustained. The prosecution failed to prove the recovery and possession of contraband with the certainty required in NDPS cases, and the appellant was entitled to acquittal.

Final Conclusion: The prosecution case was held to be unreliable for want of mandatory compliance with the statutory procedure and for want of trustworthy evidence of seizure, resulting in acquittal.

Ratio Decidendi: In NDPS prosecutions, strict compliance with Section 52A is mandatory for the evidentiary use of seized contraband, and where the prosecution fails to produce reliable primary evidence of seizure and recovery, conviction cannot be sustained on the basis of doubtful or merely formal evidence.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court could introduce a minimum cut-off for the viva voce after the selection process had begun and after the viva voce was conducted; (ii) Whether the petitioners had a substantive legitimate expectation that the merit list would be prepared only on the basis of aggregate marks in the written examination and viva voce without a viva voce cut-off; (iii) Whether the relief of induction into the Higher Judicial Service could be granted after the lapse of several years.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court could introduce a minimum cut-off for the viva voce after the selection process had begun and after the viva voce was conducted.

Analysis: The governing rule, the examination scheme and the recruitment notification together required preparation of the merit list on the basis of aggregate marks obtained in the written examination and the viva voce. The scheme expressly stated that there would be no cut-off marks for the viva voce. The High Court introduced the cut-off only after the viva voce was completed, and the later amendment of the rules could not govern a process that had already commenced under the unamended regime.

Conclusion: The introduction of the viva voce cut-off was contrary to the unamended rules and was unlawful.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioners had a substantive legitimate expectation that the merit list would be prepared only on the basis of aggregate marks in the written examination and viva voce without a viva voce cut-off.

Analysis: A public authority's established rule, scheme and notification can generate a legitimate expectation of consistent and predictable treatment. The petitioners were entitled to expect that the merit list would be drawn on the notified basis and that no new qualifying requirement would be added after the viva voce. The deviation from the notified method was inconsistent with good administration, lacked the required basis in the prevailing rules, and amounted to arbitrary state action under Article 14.

Conclusion: The petitioners' substantive legitimate expectation was frustrated and the High Court's action was arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

Issue (iii): Whether the relief of induction into the Higher Judicial Service could be granted after the lapse of several years.

Analysis: Although the challenge to the selection process succeeded, the selected candidates had been functioning as District Judges for a long period by the time of decision. Unseating them at that stage would be harsh and contrary to public interest, especially where they were otherwise qualified and had acquired experience in judicial office.

Conclusion: No direction for induction of the petitioners into the Higher Judicial Service was granted.

Final Conclusion: The selection method was held to be unlawful, and the petitioners succeeded on the merits of their challenge, but the Court declined to disturb the appointments already made in view of the elapsed time and public interest.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a public recruitment process is governed by a statutory rule, a notified scheme and an examination notification, the authority cannot add a new disqualifying condition after the process has commenced and after the viva voce is over; such a departure defeats substantive legitimate expectation and is arbitrary unless justified by a compelling public interest established on the record.

Issues: (i) Whether the amendments to the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, and the Fundamental Rules, 1922, which permitted extension of tenure of the Director of Enforcement and the Director of CBI up to one year at a time subject to a five-year ceiling, were ultra vires. (ii) Whether the orders dated 17 November 2021 and 17 November 2022 extending the tenure of the Director of Enforcement were valid in law.

Issue (i): Whether the amendments to the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, and the Fundamental Rules, 1922, which permitted extension of tenure of the Director of Enforcement and the Director of CBI up to one year at a time subject to a five-year ceiling, were ultra vires.

Analysis: The challenged amendments were tested on settled limits of judicial review over legislation. The Court reiterated that a law can be invalidated only for lack of legislative competence or violation of constitutional provisions, and that mere allegations of arbitrariness or policy disagreement are insufficient. The amended provisions were examined against the earlier directions in Vineet Narain and related decisions. The Court found that the appointment process remained insulated through high-level committees, that extensions could be granted only on recommendation of those committees, in public interest, and for recorded reasons, and that the minimum tenure of two years was not disturbed.

Conclusion: The amendments were held valid and the challenge to them was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the orders dated 17 November 2021 and 17 November 2022 extending the tenure of the Director of Enforcement were valid in law.

Analysis: The Court held that in the earlier judgment the parties had been bound by a specific mandamus that no further extension would be granted. A later legislative change could not undo that inter partes direction, and the subsequent extension orders were therefore inconsistent with the binding mandamus. The Court, however, took note of public interest considerations and the need for a smooth transition in the office.

Conclusion: The extension orders were held illegal, though temporary continuation in office was permitted up to 31 July 2023.

Final Conclusion: The statutory amendments were upheld, but the specific extension orders in favour of the incumbent Director of Enforcement were invalidated, subject to a limited transition period.

Ratio Decidendi: A legislative amendment may alter the legal basis of a prior judgment, but it cannot retrospectively nullify a binding mandamus inter partes; extensions of tenure affecting insulated high public offices must also conform to the terms of the governing statute and the limits of the earlier judicial direction.

Issues: Whether anticipatory bail granted in a case involving alleged forgery of a power of attorney and sale deed, coupled with suspected collusion and large-scale land fraud, ought to be sustained, and whether custodial interrogation was necessary despite pending civil proceedings.

Analysis: Anticipatory bail is a discretionary protection intended to safeguard liberty, but the discretion must be exercised after considering the nature and gravity of the accusation, the role attributed to the accused, and the necessity of custodial interrogation. Where the allegations disclose a serious prima facie case of forged documents, suspicious delay in obtaining certified copies of the alleged power of attorney, absence of the original document, non-disclosure of consideration-related formalities, and circumstances suggesting a coordinated attempt to divest elderly owners of valuable land, a deeper criminal investigation is warranted. The pendency of civil suits does not bar examination of forgery and fraud in criminal proceedings, and the existence of civil remedies does not dilute the need for a free and effective investigation.

Conclusion: The grant of anticipatory bail was unsustainable, and custodial interrogation through a thorough investigation was justified.

Issues: Whether a special leave petition challenging an order passed in review is maintainable, and whether the question of maintainability of a subsequent special leave petition after withdrawal of the earlier petition without express liberty warrants consideration by a larger Bench.

Analysis: The governing framework considered included the bar under Order XLVII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 against appeal from an order rejecting review, and the line of authority on the effect of withdrawal of a special leave petition and the absence of merger in a non-speaking dismissal. The competing authorities were examined on the question whether liberty to seek review in the High Court, without express permission to file a fresh special leave petition, leaves the door open for a subsequent challenge. The Court found that the issue raises an important question of law with wider consequences and that the competing strands of reasoning require authoritative consideration.

Conclusion: The question of law was not finally answered by the Bench and was directed to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for constitution of a larger Bench.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the correctness and scope of the maintainability of a subsequent special leave petition after review-related proceedings raise a substantial question of law with wider implications, the matter may be referred for decision by a larger Bench rather than finally resolved by the referring Bench.

Issues: Whether the National Green Tribunal could base its directions on an expert committee report without first furnishing the report and recommendations to the affected parties and affording them an opportunity to file objections and be heard.

Analysis: The National Green Tribunal is an adjudicatory body guided by the principles of natural justice under Section 19(1) of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010. Expert committee reports are only aids to adjudication and do not replace the Tribunal's duty to decide the dispute itself. Where the Tribunal proposes to rely on such material, fairness requires prior disclosure to the parties and a reasonable opportunity to respond. In the present case, the recommendations were uploaded only a few days before the impugned order, and no effective opportunity was given to the appellants to object. The Tribunal therefore relied on undisclosed material and delegated core adjudicatory function in a manner inconsistent with audi alteram partem.

Conclusion: The impugned order was unsustainable for violation of natural justice and was set aside, with the matter remanded to the National Green Tribunal for reconsideration after permitting objections and hearing the parties.

Issues: Whether the review petitions disclosed any error apparent on the face of the record or any other ground warranting review of the prior judgment.

Analysis: The scope of review under Article 137 of the Constitution of India, Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as well as the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, is confined to a patent error, discovery of new matter, or analogous sufficient cause. A review court cannot sit in appeal over its own judgment, reargue matters already considered, or entertain a contention that requires a long-drawn process of reasoning to establish error. The grounds urged were held to have already been examined in the earlier judgment and the review was found to be an attempt to secure a different view on the merits.

Conclusion: No case for review was made out; the petitions were not maintainable on the asserted grounds and were liable to be dismissed.

Issues: Whether the appellant, whose reinstatement had been ordered, was entitled to back wages and whether he had discharged the burden of showing that he was not gainfully employed after termination.

Analysis: The burden regarding gainful employment after dismissal lies initially on the employee, as the fact is within his special knowledge and is governed by the principle reflected in Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Court held that this is a negative burden which may be discharged by pleadings, an affidavit, or other material depending on the facts. In the present case, the statement of claim contained a specific assertion that the appellant was unemployed, and he was also cross-examined on the issue. At the same time, the later withdrawal of the earlier affidavit and omission of the specific assertion in the fresh affidavit meant that full back wages for the entire period could not be granted. The record did not show any positive material from the employer proving alternative income, but the circumstances justified limiting relief.

Conclusion: The appellant was held entitled to back wages only in part, and not for the entire period between termination and reinstatement.

Ratio Decidendi: In claims for back wages after reinstatement, the employee bears the initial burden to show non-gainful employment, but the extent of relief depends on the pleadings, evidence, and surrounding circumstances of the case.

Issues: Whether the High Court could decide the first appeal without considering the appellants' cross-objections seeking enhancement of compensation.

Analysis: Cross-objections filed under Order 41 Rule 22 have the characteristics of a regular appeal and require full adjudication. A first appellate court must apply its mind to every issue pressed before it and record reasoned findings. The High Court's judgment neither discussed nor referred to the appellants' cross-objections, despite separately analysing the other matters arising in the appeal.

Conclusion: The failure to adjudicate the cross-objections vitiated the appellate judgment; the matter was required to be sent back to the High Court for fresh determination of the grounds raised in those cross-objections.

Issues: Whether a condition requiring deposit of money as a precondition for grant of anticipatory bail was legally sustainable, and whether the matter called for reconsideration of the bail application on its own merits.

Analysis: The governing principles for anticipatory bail require that any condition imposed under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 must be reasonable, relevant to securing the investigation or trial, and not harsh, onerous, excessive, or unrelated to the fairness of the criminal process. A bail court cannot use the power under Section 438 to compel recovery of alleged money involved in a private dispute, since criminal proceedings are not a substitute for civil recovery. The authorities relied on reaffirm that payment-linked conditions are impermissible where they effectively transform anticipatory bail into a recovery mechanism. In the present case, the impugned deposit condition was founded on an undertaking and not on the statutory parameters governing anticipatory bail, and the dispute was predominantly civil in nature.

Conclusion: The condition directing deposit of Rs. 22,00,000/- as a prerequisite for anticipatory bail was unsustainable, and the matter was remitted for fresh consideration of the bail application on its own merits.

Ratio Decidendi: Conditions attached to anticipatory bail must be confined to the purposes recognised by Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and cannot be used to enforce payment or recovery of alleged dues in a private dispute.

Issues: Whether the criminal proceedings against the petitioner were liable to be quashed for want of a prima facie case and whether the materials collected in investigation disclosed sufficient involvement to permit the trial to proceed.

Analysis: The allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet, read with the statement of the complainant and the proposed witnesses, were not found to be so patently absurd or inherently improbable as to justify quashing at the threshold. The Court reiterated that at the stage of quashing or framing of charge, the inquiry is confined to whether the uncontroverted materials disclose the basic ingredients of an offence, without undertaking a meticulous examination of evidence or assessing likely conviction. The additional documents relied upon by the petitioner were held to be matters for defence at trial and not decisive for quashing. The Court further held that the allegation that the petitioner was present when cash was counted and that she acted in concert with the principal accused was enough to support a prima facie inference of conspiracy and limited involvement.

Conclusion: The petition for quashing was not maintainable on the merits and the prosecution was permitted to continue; the challenge failed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal did not warrant interference, save for the Court's separate clarification regarding the alleged section 180 charge and its warning concerning the reply affidavit, and the criminal trial was allowed to proceed uninfluenced by the observations in the judgment.

Ratio Decidendi: Quashing of criminal proceedings at the charge stage is justified only in rare cases where the uncontroverted record does not disclose the basic ingredients of an offence or the prosecution is shown to be an abuse of process; where the materials disclose a prima facie case, the trial must be allowed to proceed.

Issues: (i) Whether the management could be permitted to challenge reinstatement and back wages after having voluntarily implemented the award and allowed the workmen to continue in service for many years; (ii) Whether the direction of regularisation in service could be sustained in the facts of the case.

Issue (i): Whether the management could be permitted to challenge reinstatement and back wages after having voluntarily implemented the award and allowed the workmen to continue in service for many years.

Analysis: The management had obtained only conditional interim protection and was required to pay wages last drawn during the writ proceedings. Instead of merely preserving its interim protection, it reinstated the workmen and further issued orders absorbing them in regular service. The Court treated this as voluntary implementation of the award in substance, followed by prolonged inaction while the workmen remained in service for about two decades. In such circumstances, the management could not approbate and reprobate by accepting the benefit of the award and later seeking to reopen it after the workmen had altered their position.

Conclusion: The challenge to reinstatement and back wages was not maintainable, and the award on these aspects was upheld in favour of the workmen.

Issue (ii): Whether the direction of regularisation in service could be sustained in the facts of the case.

Analysis: Although the Division Bench had set aside regularisation on the reasoning that the reference did not expressly seek that relief, the Court found that the decisive facts were ignored. The workmen had already been absorbed and had served for a long period pursuant to the management's own implementation of the award. The Court held that disturbing that position after such a long lapse of time would be unjust and would defeat the effect of the earlier compliance and the settled factual position.

Conclusion: The direction restoring regularisation was sustained, and the workmen succeeded on this issue.

Final Conclusion: The workmen's appeal succeeded, the management's appeal failed, and the earlier award and the learned Single Judge's order were restored, leaving the long-settled service position undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: A party that voluntarily implements an award and allows the opposite party to alter its position over a substantial period cannot later resile from that conduct and invoke judicial correction to undo the settled benefit.

Issues: (i) Whether previous sanction under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was required to prosecute the appellant who had retired before filing of the final report; (ii) whether the pardon granted to the approver before the Special Court procedure was vitiated for non-compliance with the Code; (iii) whether the conviction of the first appellant for conspiracy, cheating, forgery, using forged documents and corruption could be sustained on the evidence; (iv) whether the convictions of the fourth and seventh appellants were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether previous sanction under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was required to prosecute the appellant who had retired before filing of the final report

Analysis: Protection under Section 197(1) applies where the act complained of bears a reasonable connection with the discharge of official duty and is not merely a cloak for criminal conduct. The decision to resort to restricted tender was traceable to the existing policy and fell within the realm of official decision-making, even if the act was alleged to be improper or motivated. The prosecution had not obtained previous sanction for the retired appellant.

Conclusion: The prosecution was hit by want of sanction and the issue was answered in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the pardon granted to the approver before the Special Court procedure was vitiated for non-compliance with the Code

Analysis: The statutory scheme distinguishes between pardon tendered by a Magistrate under Section 306 and pardon tendered after cognizance by a Special Court under Section 307 read with Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Where cognizance is taken directly by the Special Court, the committal route is bypassed and the requirement of examining the approver twice under Section 306(4)(a) does not apply. The approver was examined in trial and the accused had an opportunity to cross-examine on the confession and pardon proceedings.

Conclusion: There was no procedural illegality in the grant or use of pardon, and this issue was answered against the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the conviction of the first appellant for conspiracy, cheating, forgery, using forged documents and corruption could be sustained on the evidence

Analysis: The approver's testimony was found unreliable and insufficiently corroborated in material particulars. The record did not establish that the tender process, the alleged bogus firms, or the monetary transaction proved a criminal conspiracy or cheating beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence also failed to prove the ingredient of wrongful loss or unlawful gain necessary for the corruption charge, and the finding under the provision dealing with false evidence was unsupported by the pleadings and the statutory bar on cognizance. On the whole, the prosecution case against the first appellant was not proved.

Conclusion: The convictions of the first appellant could not be sustained and the issue was answered in his favour.

Issue (iv): Whether the convictions of the fourth and seventh appellants were sustainable

Analysis: The fourth appellant's role was confined to a later committee stage after the tender process had already advanced, and the evidence did not establish participation in conspiracy or forgery. The seventh appellant's alleged involvement in obtaining demand drafts was not proved by admissible or reliable handwriting evidence, and the mere transfer of money to a firm in which he was a partner did not by itself establish the offences charged. The findings based on Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 were unsustainable because no admitted or proved specimen was properly before the Court.

Conclusion: The convictions of the fourth and seventh appellants were unsustainable and the issue was answered in their favour.

Final Conclusion: The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed on the sanction objection as to the first appellant, rejected the challenge to the pardon procedure, and found the evidence insufficient to sustain the convictions of the appellants. The convictions and sentences were set aside and the appellants were acquitted.

Ratio Decidendi: An act connected with an official decision taken under an existing policy may attract the protection of sanction if it bears a reasonable nexus to official duty, and where a Special Court takes cognizance directly, the approver procedure under Section 306 of the Code does not apply in the same manner as in committal cases; convictions cannot rest on uncorroborated or unreliable approver evidence or on speculative findings of conspiracy, loss, or forgery.

Issues: Whether the documents relied upon by the plaintiff, namely the agreement to sell, general power of attorney, will, possession memo and receipt of consideration, conferred title or enforceable possessory rights sufficient to sustain a decree for eviction and mesne profits after termination of the defendant's licence.

Analysis: An agreement to sell does not by itself transfer ownership in immovable property, and title cannot pass without a registered conveyance in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act. However, where the purchaser has paid the consideration and has been placed in possession in part performance of the agreement, the purchaser acquires possessory rights protected by section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. A general power of attorney and a will, by themselves, do not confer present title. On the facts found, the plaintiff had settled possessory title, while the defendant's later occupation was only as a licencee.

Conclusion: The plaintiff was entitled to protect his possessory rights and to seek eviction and mesne profits after valid termination of the licence. The appeal fails.

Issues: (i) Whether a contract entered into in the name of the President of India is immune from the application of Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; (ii) Whether Clause 28 of the tender conditions, which empowers a serving officer to appoint a serving officer as sole arbitrator, is hit by Section 12(5) read with Paragraph 1 of the Seventh Schedule.

Issue (i): Whether a contract entered into in the name of the President of India is immune from the application of Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Analysis: Article 299 of the Constitution of India prescribes the formal requirements for contracts made in the exercise of executive power, but it does not create a substantive immunity from general statutory norms governing contractual relations. A contract executed in the name of the President of India remains subject to statutory prescriptions that govern the parties' rights and obligations, including rules designed to prevent conflicts of interest in arbitral appointments.

Conclusion: The contract is not immune from Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issue (ii): Whether Clause 28 of the tender conditions, which empowers a serving officer to appoint a serving officer as sole arbitrator, is hit by Section 12(5) read with Paragraph 1 of the Seventh Schedule.

Analysis: Section 12(5) makes ineligible any person whose relationship with a party falls within the Seventh Schedule, notwithstanding any prior agreement to the contrary, unless there is a post-dispute written waiver. Paragraph 1 of the Seventh Schedule covers an arbitrator who is an employee of a party. Clause 28 authorises the Secretary of one department of the Union to appoint an officer of another department of the Union as sole arbitrator, while both remain employees of the same government entity. Such a unilateral appointment mechanism creates the very conflict of interest that the amended law seeks to prevent. The earlier decision upholding panels of retired officers in a multi-member context does not validate a clause permitting appointment of a serving employee as sole arbitrator by another serving employee of the same party.

Conclusion: Clause 28 is in conflict with Section 12(5) read with Paragraph 1 of the Seventh Schedule, and the proposed appointment cannot be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The application for appointment of an arbitrator is allowed, and an independent former judge is appointed as sole arbitrator to decide the disputes subject to the mandatory disclosures under Section 12.

Ratio Decidendi: A party to a contract cannot, by prior agreement, confer a valid power to appoint a sole arbitrator who is ineligible under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and a contract executed in the name of the President of India does not exempt the Government from this statutory bar.