Issues: Whether a consumer dispute covered by the Consumer Protection Act is rendered arbitrable by the presence of an arbitration clause and the 2015 amendment to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and whether the High Court could be compelled to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11.

Analysis: The dispute arose from a homebuyer-consumer complaint before the consumer forum, which is a special public remedy under consumer legislation. The existence of an arbitration clause does not, by itself, extinguish the jurisdiction of consumer fora, because consumer protection law provides an additional and special remedy and consumer disputes are treated as falling within the class of disputes excluded from private adjudication by necessary implication. The amendment to Section 8 and Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 narrows judicial scrutiny to the existence of an arbitration agreement, but it does not override settled principles of non-arbitrability or compel reference where the subject matter is governed by a special beneficial statute and the consumer has chosen that statutory forum. The earlier consumer-law precedents and the later reaffirmation of those principles were held to apply equally to the Section 11 request for appointment of an arbitrator.

Conclusion: The consumer dispute was held to be non-arbitrable on the facts, and the High Court was in refusing to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11.

Issues: (i) whether, at the stage of issuing process in a private complaint for defamation, the Magistrate may consider whether the complaint and supporting material disclose a complete defence under any exception to section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860; (ii) whether the High Court, in exercise of inherent power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, may quash defamation proceedings by extending the benefit of an exception to section 499 on the basis of the complaint and materials before the Magistrate; (iii) whether the company was entitled to interference with the summoning order and whether the Fourth Exception to section 499 could be applied at that stage.

Issue (i): whether, at the stage of issuing process in a private complaint for defamation, the Magistrate may consider whether the complaint and supporting material disclose a complete defence under any exception to section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of sections 200, 202, 203 and 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 requires the Magistrate to determine only whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding on the materials produced by the complainant. The accused does not enter the arena before process is issued, but the Magistrate is not barred from applying judicial mind to the complaint and supporting material to see whether the facts disclosed by those materials themselves show that no offence is made out because an exception is clearly attracted. The exception cannot ordinarily be tested as a defence at the summoning stage, yet if the record before the Magistrate itself reveals a complete defence, dismissal is permissible.

Conclusion: The Magistrate is not bound to ignore a clearly disclosed exception and may dismiss the complaint if the materials before him themselves show that no offence of defamation is made out; otherwise, process may issue on a prima facie view.

Issue (ii): whether the High Court, in exercise of inherent power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, may quash defamation proceedings by extending the benefit of an exception to section 499 on the basis of the complaint and materials before the Magistrate.

Analysis: The inherent power of the High Court remains available to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice, but its scope is confined to the materials that were before the Magistrate and cannot be enlarged by relying on additional material not proved according to law. If the complaint, the sworn statements and any lawful material before the Magistrate do not prima facie disclose defamation, or if those materials themselves show a complete defence, quashing may be justified. Where the defence depends on disputed facts or unproved documents, the matter must ordinarily go to trial.

Conclusion: The High Court may quash proceedings only on the basis of the record before the Magistrate and not by using unproved additional material; on the present facts, interference was unwarranted.

Issue (iii): whether the company was entitled to interference with the summoning order and whether the Fourth Exception to section 499 could be applied at that stage.

Analysis: The summoning order was founded on the complaint and the evidence produced before the Trial Court, and the finding of a prima facie case was not shown to be perverse or illegal. Whether the company can ultimately rely on the Fourth Exception, and whether the authorised agent acted with the company's consent or knowledge, are matters dependent on proof at trial. The company's reliance on an unproved power of attorney and related materials could not justify quashing at the threshold.

Conclusion: No interference with the summoning order was called for, and the Fourth Exception was left open for determination by the Trial Court.

Final Conclusion: The complaint and summoning proceedings were allowed to continue, leaving the parties to establish any available defence before the Trial Court.

Ratio Decidendi: In a defamation complaint, the Magistrate may issue process on a prima facie view from the materials before him, but if those materials themselves clearly disclose a complete exception to section 499, the complaint may be dismissed; the High Court under section 482 cannot enlarge that inquiry on the basis of unproved material beyond the record.

Issues: Whether the auction purchaser was entitled to a direction for issuance of the sale certificate on the footing that the balance sale consideration and interest had been paid in compliance with the earlier orders and Rule 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, and whether such relief could be sought by a miscellaneous application in the disposed of appeal.

Analysis: Rule 9(4) required the balance purchase price to be paid within fifteen days of confirmation of sale, or within an extended period agreed in writing with the secured creditor, in any case not exceeding three months. The Court held that the time granted earlier had expired and that the later deposits were not shown to be in compliance with the order extending time up to two months after lifting of the lockdown. The applicant did not establish the relevant date of lifting of lockdown or the correct computation of the amount payable towards balance price and interest. The Court further held that neither Article 142 of the Constitution of India nor Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 could be used to override the express statutory limit under Rule 9, and that repeated miscellaneous applications seeking substantive relief in a disposed of appeal were not maintainable.

Conclusion: The applicant was not entitled to the direction sought, and the miscellaneous application was not maintainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Express statutory conditions governing payment in a secured asset auction must be strictly complied with, and the Supreme Court's inherent powers cannot be used to enlarge or bypass those statutory limits.

Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal without recording reasons that the trial court's view was not a possible view and that guilt was the only possible conclusion.

Analysis: In an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court may re-appreciate the evidence, but it can interfere only when the trial court's view is not a possible view and the evidence admits of no conclusion other than guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court did not discuss the eyewitness testimony, did not record findings on the individual or collective role of the accused, and did not explain the applicability of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. On the other hand, the trial court had undertaken a detailed scrutiny of the evidence, noted the delay in lodging the FIR, and considered the unexplained injury to one of the accused. The trial court's view was therefore a possible view on the evidence.

Conclusion: The reversal of acquittal was unsustainable, and the accused were entitled to restoration of the acquittal.

Final Conclusion: The conviction recorded by the High Court was set aside and the appeal succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: In an appeal against acquittal, interference is permissible only when the trial court's view is not a possible view and the evidence leads to no conclusion other than guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Issues: Whether a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is maintainable against an order rejecting on merits an application for review of an appealable decree passed in a civil suit.

Analysis: Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 makes an order rejecting a review application non-appealable, while an order granting review is appealable. Section 115 confers revisional power over a case decided by a subordinate court, but that power is discretionary and must be exercised with regard to the nature of the order and the existence of another effective remedy. Where an appealable decree already exists, dismissal of a review application does not alter the decree and the aggrieved party must challenge the original decree in appeal. If the revisional court itself modifies the decree while examining rejection of review, the decree merges in the revisional order and may prejudice the statutory right of appeal and objections to adverse findings. The proper course is to pursue an appeal against the decree, with delay if any to be considered in that appeal.

Conclusion: A revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is not maintainable against rejection on merits of review of an appealable decree; the High Court ought not to have entertained the revision.

Issues: Whether an unregistered lease deed executed for a term exceeding one year could be relied upon to determine the purpose of the tenancy and thereby claim the six months' notice period applicable to manufacturing leases.

Analysis: A lease from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, must be created by a registered instrument under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and non-registration attracts the bar under Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. An unregistered instrument required to be registered cannot be used to prove the main terms of the lease or the purpose for which it was granted, because that purpose formed the core dispute and was not a collateral transaction. The Court further held that the burden of proving that the premises was let for manufacturing purposes lay on the party asserting that character, and the limited collateral-purpose exception could not be used to convert the unregistered deed into admissible proof of the decisive lease term. In the absence of reliable evidence establishing manufacturing use, the tenancy remained one from month to month within Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Conclusion: The unregistered lease deed could not be relied upon to establish manufacturing purpose or to claim six months' notice, and the tenancy was rightly treated as a month-to-month tenancy.

Issues: (i) Whether statements recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act could be used as confessional statements to sustain the conviction of Balwinder Singh. (ii) Whether the prosecution proved the foundational facts and conscious possession so as to sustain Satnam Singh's conviction under the NDPS Act.

Issue (i): Whether statements recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act could be used as confessional statements to sustain the conviction of Balwinder Singh.

Analysis: In view of the later three-Judge Bench ruling in Tofan Singh, officers invested with powers under Section 53 of the NDPS Act are police officers for the purpose of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and statements recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be treated as confessional statements in a trial under the NDPS Act. Once the co-accused's statement and Balwinder Singh's own Section 67 statement were excluded, no independent incriminating evidence remained to connect him with the alleged offence.

Conclusion: The conviction of Balwinder Singh could not be sustained and he was entitled to acquittal.

Issue (ii): Whether the prosecution proved the foundational facts and conscious possession so as to sustain Satnam Singh's conviction under the NDPS Act.

Analysis: Though Satnam Singh's Section 67 statement also could not be relied upon as a confession, the prosecution case against him was supported by independent evidence, including recovery of heroin from the car being driven by him, corroboration by the independent witness, the chemical report confirming heroin, and proof that the samples remained intact. The prosecution established the foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt, whereafter the statutory presumption under Section 35 of the NDPS Act arose. The defence version was found unsubstantiated, and the challenge based on alleged irregularities and witness credibility did not create reasonable doubt.

Conclusion: The conviction and sentence of Satnam Singh were sustained.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were disposed of by granting relief only to Balwinder Singh, whose conviction was set aside, while Satnam Singh's conviction and sentence were maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: A confession recorded by an NDPS officer under Section 67 cannot be used to convict an accused, and a conviction under the NDPS Act can be sustained only when the prosecution independently proves the foundational facts of possession or conscious possession beyond reasonable doubt so as to attract the statutory presumptions.

Issues: Whether the levy of terminal tax within a Scheduled Area was invalid for want of a Governor's notification under the Fifth Schedule and in view of the inapplicability of Part IXA of the Constitution to Scheduled Areas.

Analysis: Article 244 and the Fifth Schedule govern the administration of Scheduled Areas. Paragraph 5 empowers the Governor to direct that a State law or Parliamentary law shall not apply to a Scheduled Area, or shall apply subject to exceptions and modifications. In the absence of any notification excluding or modifying the municipal enactments, those laws continued to apply. Article 243-ZC excludes Part IXA from Scheduled Areas, but that exclusion does not denude the State Legislature of power to enact municipal law. The power to authorise municipal taxation under Article 243-X is therefore not the source of the State's legislative competence in such areas, and the validity of the levy depended on the absence or presence of a valid Fifth Schedule notification. No such notification was shown.

Conclusion: The challenge to the terminal tax levy failed and the levy was upheld.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court should have exercised writ jurisdiction under Article 226 despite the borrowers having already availed the statutory remedy under the SARFAESI Act; (ii) whether, after the 2016 amendment, the borrowers' right of redemption under Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act survived beyond publication of the auction notice and till issuance of the sale certificate; (iii) whether confirmation of sale under Rule 9(2) vested the auction purchaser with an enforceable right to a sale certificate and barred the Bank from withholding it or entering a private arrangement with the borrowers; (iv) whether equitable considerations could be used to override the statutory auction process under the SARFAESI Act.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court should have exercised writ jurisdiction under Article 226 despite the borrowers having already availed the statutory remedy under the SARFAESI Act.

Analysis: The statutory framework under the SARFAESI Act provides a complete mechanism for redress, including a challenge before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The availability of such an efficacious remedy ordinarily bars recourse to Article 226, especially in matters involving recovery of public dues and enforcement of security interest. The existence of apprehension about an adverse order from the statutory forum was not a valid basis to bypass that remedy.

Conclusion: The writ petition ought not to have been entertained, and the High Court's exercise of writ jurisdiction was unjustified.

Issue (ii): Whether, after the 2016 amendment, the borrowers' right of redemption under Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act survived beyond publication of the auction notice and till issuance of the sale certificate.

Analysis: The amended Section 13(8) was interpreted as a special statutory departure from the general right of redemption under Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The amended text was held to curtail redemption by fixing the cut-off at the stage preceding publication of the auction notice. Once that stage was crossed, the borrower could no longer redeem the secured asset under the SARFAESI regime. The earlier line of cases dealing with the unamended provision was distinguished on that basis.

Conclusion: The right of redemption stood extinguished on publication of the auction notice, and not on issuance of the sale certificate.

Issue (iii): Whether confirmation of sale under Rule 9(2) vested the auction purchaser with an enforceable right to a sale certificate and barred the Bank from withholding it or entering a private arrangement with the borrowers.

Analysis: Once the highest bid was accepted and the sale was confirmed under Rule 9(2), the auction purchaser acquired a vested right to obtain the sale certificate upon compliance with the payment terms. Rule 9(6) was treated as mandatory. The Bank, having accepted the full bid amount, could not lawfully withhold the sale certificate or substitute the concluded auction process with a later private settlement with the borrowers.

Conclusion: The auction purchaser had an enforceable right to the sale certificate, and the Bank could not lawfully bypass the concluded auction.

Issue (iv): Whether equitable considerations could be used to override the statutory auction process under the SARFAESI Act.

Analysis: Equity was held incapable of supplanting clear statutory command. The Court emphasised the sanctity of public auctions and the need to preserve confidence in the auction process. Permitting a borrower to redeem at the end of the auction process after a successful bid and full payment would undermine the statute, discourage participation, and defeat the object of speedy recovery under the SARFAESI Act.

Conclusion: Equitable considerations could not override the statutory scheme or defeat the auction purchaser's rights.

Final Conclusion: The statutory auction process prevailed, the borrowers could not invoke redemption after publication of the auction notice, and the auction purchaser's rights were upheld; the impugned writ relief was set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the amended Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, the borrower's right of redemption is available only until publication of the auction notice, while confirmation of sale under Rule 9(2) crystallises the auction purchaser's right to a sale certificate and excludes equitable interference with the completed statutory process.

Issues: Whether the Will was duly executed and proved in accordance with the statutory requirements, and whether the concurrent findings upholding its validity warranted interference.

Analysis: A Will must satisfy the formal requirements of execution and attestation under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, and its execution must be proved by examining at least one attesting witness under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The propounder must establish that the testator executed the Will of his own free will, in a sound disposing state of mind, with knowledge of its contents and effect, and free from suspicious circumstances. Where suspicious circumstances are alleged or appear from the record, they must be dispelled by cogent evidence. In the present case, the attesting witness proved execution and attestation, and there was no reliable evidence of mental incapacity, undue influence, or suspicious circumstances.

Conclusion: The Will was validly executed and duly proved, and the concurrent findings upholding it did not call for interference.

Ratio Decidendi: A Will is proved when its execution and attestation satisfy Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and at least one attesting witness proves execution under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, unless the propounder fails to dispel genuine suspicious circumstances.

Issues: (i) Whether the arbitral award was liable to be set aside for want of reasons and non-compliance with the statutory requirement of a reasoned award; (ii) whether the award of compensation for loss of overheads and profit, idle machinery, and bank guarantee reduction was arbitrary, internally contradictory, and resulted in impermissible double or excessive recovery, attracting interference under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issue (i): Whether the arbitral award was liable to be set aside for want of reasons and non-compliance with the statutory requirement of a reasoned award.

Analysis: The award recorded broad conclusions on delay, responsibility, and quantification, but did not disclose any coherent reasoning or a demonstrable method for arriving at the figures awarded. A reasoned award is required under the statutory framework, and absence of discussion of material facts, contentions, and the basis of computation renders the award vulnerable. The court also noted that the arbitral tribunal stated conclusions without explaining the basis for responsibility and quantification.

Conclusion: The award was rightly interfered with for absence of adequate reasons and for non-compliance with the requirement of a reasoned award.

Issue (ii): Whether the award of compensation for loss of overheads and profit, idle machinery, and bank guarantee reduction was arbitrary, internally contradictory, and resulted in impermissible double or excessive recovery, attracting interference under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Analysis: The court held that compensation for delay must be commensurate with actual loss and cannot become a windfall. The tribunal's computation of loss of overheads and profit was found to be grossly inflated and unsupported by a clear formula or justified assumptions. The chart produced to explain the award was treated as an afterthought and did not reconcile the overlapping components of compensation. The award for idle machinery was also granted without adequate basis, and the reduction of the performance bank guarantee was made without explanation. On the governing principles under Sections 55 and 73 of the Contract Act, and the scope of interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the award was held to suffer from patent illegality and perversity.

Conclusion: The award was unsustainable because the quantified reliefs were arbitrary, unsupported, and amounted to overlapping or excessive compensation.

Final Conclusion: The arbitral award could not be sustained under the statutory standards governing reasoned decision-making, public policy, and patent illegality, and the High Court's interference with the award was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: An arbitral award may be set aside where it is unsupported by reasons, departs from the contractual and statutory basis for compensation, or grants inflated or overlapping damages that amount to patent illegality or perversity.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court could decide a second appeal by framing substantial questions of law at the time of hearing without affording adequate opportunity to address them under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; (ii) Whether the High Court could reverse concurrent findings of fact without calling for and perusing the trial court record and without demonstrating perversity or another exceptional ground.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court could decide a second appeal by framing substantial questions of law at the time of hearing without affording adequate opportunity to address them under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 requires the framing of substantial questions of law, and the parties must be given a fair opportunity to meet those questions. The framing of additional or altered questions at the hearing stage is permissible only in exceptional circumstances and after notice and hearing. A second appeal is not to be decided in haste or without the parties being adequately prepared to address the questions formulated.

Conclusion: The High Court acted contrary to the mandate of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in framing and deciding the substantial questions of law without adequate opportunity to the parties.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court could reverse concurrent findings of fact without calling for and perusing the trial court record and without demonstrating perversity or another exceptional ground.

Analysis: Interference with concurrent findings of fact in second appeal is exceptional and cannot be made merely because another view is possible. If the findings are to be upset on grounds such as perversity, no evidence, or inadmissible evidence, the record of the trial court must be examined so that the alleged infirmity is demonstrable from the material on record. Without such examination and without identifying an exceptional legal ground, the first appellate court's findings cannot be displaced.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in reversing the concurrent findings of fact without calling for the record and without establishing a legally recognised exceptional ground.

Final Conclusion: The impugned judgment was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law, with the appeal allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: In second appeal, substantial questions of law must ordinarily be framed at admission and the parties heard on them, and concurrent findings of fact may be interfered with only on recognised exceptional grounds after examining the relevant trial court record.

Issues: (i) whether the prosecution proved the appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of circumstantial evidence; (ii) whether the alleged confessional statements and recoveries could be relied upon in the absence of lawful police custody and proper proof of the discovery proceedings.

Issue (i): whether the prosecution proved the appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of circumstantial evidence.

Analysis: The case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, so the prosecution was required to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances that excluded every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt. The evidence suffered from serious gaps and inconsistencies regarding the time of disappearance, the ransom demand, the identification of the caller, the alleged last-seen circumstance, the seizure process, the call-data linkage, and the source and reliability of the DNA material. The investigation also appeared selective and uneven, leaving material links unproved.

Conclusion: The prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellants were entitled to the benefit of doubt.

Issue (ii): whether the alleged confessional statements and recoveries could be relied upon in the absence of lawful police custody and proper proof of the discovery proceedings.

Analysis: For admissibility under the discovery rule, the person must be an accused and must be in police custody. Here, the statements attributed to the appellants were recorded before arrest or before they could legally be treated as accused persons in custody. The panchnamas and seizure memos were also found to be improperly drawn, with the witnesses acting largely as formal attestors and not as independent narrators of the discovery. In these circumstances, the alleged recoveries lacked evidentiary value and could not sustain the conviction.

Conclusion: The confessional statements and recoveries were not legally admissible to support the prosecution case against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The convictions and sentences could not stand because the circumstantial evidence was incomplete and the alleged discovery-based recoveries were unreliable, warranting acquittal of all the appellants.

Ratio Decidendi: In a case based on circumstantial evidence, conviction can be sustained only if the circumstances form a complete chain excluding all reasonable hypotheses of innocence, and any discovery-based recovery is usable only when it is made by a person who is an accused and is in lawful police custody, with the discovery proved in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant was entitled to absorption as an Assistant Teacher in the Higher Secondary Section with consequential pay benefits. (ii) Whether the appellant was entitled to count past substitute service from the date of acquiring temporary status for continuity of service and related monetary benefits on regular absorption.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant was entitled to absorption as an Assistant Teacher in the Higher Secondary Section with consequential pay benefits.

Analysis: The appellant had been appointed as a substitute teacher in the pay-scale applicable to a primary teacher. The claim for absorption as Assistant Teacher in the Higher Secondary Section was never raised in the earlier round of proceedings and was inconsistent with the record of appointment and the screening process undertaken under the Master Circular. The subsequent attempt to expand the claim was barred by constructive res judicata.

Conclusion: The claim for absorption as Assistant Teacher in the Higher Secondary Section and the allied pay-scale claim was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant was entitled to count past substitute service from the date of acquiring temporary status for continuity of service and related monetary benefits on regular absorption.

Analysis: Under clauses 4.3, 5.1, 5.11 and 6 of the Master Circular dated 29.01.1991, a substitute school teacher acquires temporary status on completion of three months continuous service, gaps between engagements are ignored for that purpose, such substitutes are to be screened by a Screening Committee, and on regular absorption the date of appointment is to be reckoned from the date temporary status was attained. The appellant was treated as similarly situated to other absorbees, and the authorities could not deny continuity merely because no separate direction had been made earlier in his case.

Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to continuity of service from 04.03.1990, with re-fixation of pay and all consequential monetary and retiral benefits.

Final Conclusion: The dismissal of the appellant's challenge by the Tribunal and the High Court was set aside in part, and relief was granted only on continuity of service and consequential benefits, not on absorption as Assistant Teacher.

Ratio Decidendi: A substitute school teacher who acquires temporary status under the governing circular and is later regularly absorbed is entitled to have past service counted from the date temporary status was acquired, while a new claim inconsistent with the earlier proceedings is barred by constructive res judicata.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant was entitled to the benefit of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 on the evidence of unsoundness of mind and abnormal conduct at the time of occurrence; (ii) Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court's acquittal by reappreciating the evidence without a finding of perversity.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant was entitled to the benefit of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 on the evidence of unsoundness of mind and abnormal conduct at the time of occurrence.

Analysis: The evidence on record showed a history of psychiatric illness, prior treatment, medical opinion indicating psychotic features and impaired judgment, and conduct at the scene and immediately after the incident that was inconsistent with normal behaviour. In assessing a plea of insanity, the governing test is legal insanity, not mere medical insanity, and the accused need only bring material sufficient to create reasonable doubt or satisfy the prudent-person standard under the rule governing the burden of proof for exceptions. The surrounding evidence, including the accused's conduct and the medical material, supported the view that he was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that it was wrong or contrary to law.

Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to the benefit of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the prosecution failed to displace that defence.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court's acquittal by reappreciating the evidence without a finding of perversity.

Analysis: An appellate court may interfere with an acquittal only where the trial court's view is perverse or unreasonable. If the trial court's conclusion is a plausible one, a different view on reappreciation of evidence is not a sufficient basis to substitute a conviction. The trial court's acceptance of the insanity defence was supported by evidence and was not shown to be perverse.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in reversing the acquittal.

Final Conclusion: The conviction and sentence were set aside, the acquittal was restored, and the appellant was acquitted of the murder charge.

Ratio Decidendi: A conviction cannot be sustained where the evidence reasonably establishes the defence of legal insanity, and an acquittal supported by a plausible view of the evidence cannot be reversed in appeal unless the trial court's finding is perverse.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 is merely procedural and whether Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India has any bearing on its validity; (ii) Whether the declaration that Section 6A(1) is unconstitutional operates retrospectively or only prospectively.

Issue (i): Whether Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 is merely procedural and whether Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India has any bearing on its validity.

Analysis: Section 6A did not create any offence, did not alter punishment, and functioned only as a pre-investigation safeguard for specified categories of public servants. Article 20(1) protects against conviction and sentence under ex post facto law, but does not extend to procedural requirements governing enquiry or investigation. A change in procedure, without creation of an offence or enhancement of punishment, does not attract Article 20(1).

Conclusion: Article 20(1) has no application to Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, and the provision is procedural in character.

Issue (ii): Whether the declaration that Section 6A(1) is unconstitutional operates retrospectively or only prospectively.

Analysis: A post-Constitution law held unconstitutional for violation of Part III is void ab initio, non est, and unenforceable from inception. The distinction drawn in the authorities between pre-Constitution and post-Constitution laws shows that a post-Constitution law struck down for unconstitutionality does not survive for the period before the declaration, absent an express prospective overruling.

Conclusion: The declaration of unconstitutionality operates retrospectively, and Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 is treated as not in force from the date of its insertion.

Final Conclusion: The constitutional reference was answered in favour of retrospective operation, and the validity-based protection under Section 6A could not be sustained after the declaration of unconstitutionality.

Ratio Decidendi: A post-Constitution statutory provision held unconstitutional for violation of Part III is void ab initio and unenforceable from its inception, and a procedural safeguard of investigation does not attract Article 20(1) unless it creates an offence or enhances punishment.

Issues: Whether a transferee bank can be fastened with corporate criminal liability for alleged offences committed by the transferor bank before amalgamation, and whether the criminal proceedings and summoning order could continue against the transferee bank after the scheme of amalgamation.

Analysis: The scheme of amalgamation under the Banking Regulation Act preserved pending proceedings in a limited sense, but the proviso to the relevant clause specifically continued criminal liability against directors, secretaries, managers, officers and employees of the transferor bank. The Court held that criminal liability is ordinarily personal to the actual wrongdoer and cannot be transferred ipso facto to another juristic entity merely because of amalgamation. Reading the scheme as a whole and in the light of the object of bank amalgamation, the Court concluded that the transfer of assets and liabilities did not carry forward the transferor bank's criminal liability to the transferee bank. The material in the charge sheet showed alleged acts of officials of the erstwhile bank, and no independent criminal act of the transferee bank was made out.

Conclusion: The transferee bank could not be prosecuted for the alleged offences of the transferor bank, and the criminal proceedings, to the extent they implicated the transferee bank, were liable to be quashed.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside, the challenge by the transferee bank succeeded, and the complainant's challenge failed.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of an express statutory or scheme-based provision creating such liability, criminal liability for offences committed by a transferor company or bank does not pass to the transferee upon amalgamation, though proceedings may continue against the actual individuals alleged to have committed the offence.