Issues: Whether a Civil Revision Petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was maintainable against an order dismissing an application for condonation of delay in filing an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, where an appeal lay under Order XLIII Rule 1(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: An order rejecting an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is appealable under Order XLIII Rule 1(d). The remedy under Order IX Rule 13 and the remedy of appeal against an ex parte decree under Section 96(2) are concurrent remedies, but where an express appellate remedy exists, revision under Section 115 cannot be invoked. Since the challenge before the High Court was to an order refusing condonation of delay and, consequentially, refusing to set aside the ex parte decree, the proper remedy was an appeal and not a revision.

Conclusion: The Civil Revision Petition was not maintainable, and the High Court's order was set aside; liberty was reserved to pursue an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(d).

Issues: (i) Whether the grant of upgraded pay scale and NPA to the single officer in the common cadre by executive orders without amendment of governing rules was legal; (ii) Whether other officers in the same cadre governed by the same rules were entitled to parity of pay-scale and attendant reliefs.

Issue (i): Legality of executive orders conferring higher pay-scale and NPA on a single post-holder without corresponding amendment of the rules governing the cadre.

Analysis: The issue was examined in the factual context of recruitment under a single set of rules, subsequent executive orders redesignating posts, separate notifications issued for a lone post, and reliance on certain pay-commission recommendations that did not apply to the post-holder's duties. Consideration was given to whether the executive could isolate a single incumbent of a cadre for upgradation and allowances absent rule amendment or valid justification, and to the conduct and documentary record showing deputations, endorsements, and later withdrawal of NPA.

Conclusion: The grant of upgraded pay-scale and NPA to the single officer was illegal and is quashed; the related executive orders justifying those benefits are set aside.

Issue (ii): Entitlement of other cadre members to the same upgraded pay-scale and allowances as the officer who received the benefit.

Analysis: The claim for parity was considered against the governing recruitment rules, the nature of duties performed across subjects in the cadre, and the absence of lawful amendment or consistent application of the pay-commission recommendations to the cadre as a whole. The effect of declaring the post ex-cadre and subsequent rule notifications was examined to determine whether parity followed or whether the original grant itself was unsupportable.

Conclusion: The other officers are not entitled to the upgraded pay-scale or allowances because the grant to the single officer was illegal; prayers for parity accordingly fail.

Final Conclusion: The impugned tribunal and High Court orders upholding the executive grants are quashed and set aside; the appeal is allowed, and recovery of amounts wrongly paid is directed to be effected (including from responsible decision-makers) by instalments as appropriate.

Ratio Decidendi: An executive cannot validly confer an upgraded pay-scale and allowances to a single member of a cadre governed by a common statutory or recruitment rule-set, or create ex-cadre status to justify such preferential treatment, without lawful amendment or proper rule-based justification; such grants are liable to be quashed and recovery ordered where illegality is established.

Issues: (i) whether reappointment is permissible in respect of a tenure post; (ii) whether the outer-age limit under Section 10(9) applied to reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor; (iii) whether reappointment had to follow the same process as a fresh appointment under Section 10; and (iv) whether the Chancellor abdicated his statutory power by acting on the State Government's request.

Issue (i): whether reappointment is permissible in respect of a tenure post.

Analysis: A tenure post ends with expiry of the term, but the statute may still provide for a further appointment to the same office. The concept of reappointment signifies continuation for another term where the enabling provision so permits. The existence of a fixed tenure does not, by itself, exclude reappointment.

Conclusion: Reappointment is permissible even in respect of a tenure post.

Issue (ii): whether the outer-age limit under Section 10(9) applied to reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor.

Analysis: Section 10(9) governs the eligibility of a person at the stage of initial appointment, while Section 10(10) governs the incumbent Vice-Chancellor after appointment and expressly makes the incumbent eligible for reappointment. Reading the age bar into the reappointment provision would add a limitation the legislature did not express and would defeat the object of the reappointment clause.

Conclusion: The outer-age limit under Section 10(9) does not apply to reappointment under Section 10(10).

Issue (iii): whether reappointment had to follow the same process as a fresh appointment under Section 10.

Analysis: The statutory scheme and the UGC Regulations prescribe a search-cum-selection process for appointment, but the reappointment provision contains no such procedural mandate. Reappointment upon expiry of the first term is not the same as a fresh appointment and does not require reopening the entire selection process or constituting a new selection committee.

Conclusion: Reappointment did not have to follow the same process as a fresh appointment under Section 10.

Issue (iv): whether the Chancellor abdicated his statutory power by acting on the State Government's request.

Analysis: A statutory power vested in a particular authority must be exercised by that authority on its own judgment and not at the behest of an extraneous body. The sequence of events showed that the reappointment was prompted by the State Government's intervention, and the Chancellor did not exercise an independent decision-making judgment. This vitiated the process of reappointment.

Conclusion: The Chancellor abdicated his statutory power and the reappointment was vitiated.

Final Conclusion: The reappointment notification could not stand, as the decision-making process was contrary to law and was tainted by extraneous governmental interference.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute empowers a designated authority to make a reappointment, that authority must exercise an independent statutory discretion; procedural requirements for initial appointment do not automatically govern reappointment unless the statute so provides, and extraneous governmental dictation invalidates the decision.

Issues: Whether the High Court could quash the FIR by undertaking a detailed evaluation of disputed facts concerning the agreements, authority of company representatives, fiduciary deposit of gold bars, and alleged criminal liability.

Analysis: The validity and binding character of the agreements, the authority of their signatory, the nature of the alleged deposit, the effect of account confirmations, and the alleged obligation to account for sale proceeds were disputed factual matters. The investigation had already recorded witness statements under the prescribed procedure, which had not been considered in the quashing decision. Whether the allegations disclose only a civil dispute or also satisfy the ingredients of criminal offences must be assessed after the relevant facts are ascertained through investigation; a civil wrong may, in an appropriate case, also constitute a criminal offence.

Conclusion: The High Court could not conclusively determine disputed facts to quash the FIR. The quashing order was set aside and the investigation was directed to continue independently of observations in the impugned judgment and the present order.

Issues: (i) whether the bar under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 applied to the agreement to sell executed on 04.02.1988; (ii) whether a copy of the document could be adduced as secondary evidence when the original was not in the party's possession; (iii) whether the earlier decision in Jupadi Kesava Rao governed the facts of the case.

Issue (i): whether the bar under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 applied to the agreement to sell executed on 04.02.1988.

Analysis: The applicability of Section 35 depended on whether the instrument was chargeable with duty at the relevant time and whether it was not duly stamped. The Court held that stamp duty liability is determined with reference to the date of execution of the instrument. The amendment introducing the deeming explanation in Article 23 of Schedule I-A created a new obligation and could not be applied retrospectively to agreements executed before the amendment. Since the document in question was executed on 04.02.1988, it was not chargeable with duty at the relevant time.

Conclusion: The bar under Section 35 did not apply, and the finding was in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): whether a copy of the document could be adduced as secondary evidence when the original was not in the party's possession.

Analysis: Secondary evidence is governed by Sections 61, 63 and 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and may be permitted when the original is unavailable and the foundational requirements are satisfied. A copy may be received as secondary evidence if the party establishes the circumstances bringing the case within Section 65 and proves that the copy is a true copy of the original. The Court held that the document could be taken on record as secondary evidence, with admissibility to be decided independently in accordance with law.

Conclusion: A copy of the document could be adduced as secondary evidence if the legal requirements were met, and the finding was in favour of the appellant.

Issue (iii): whether the decision in Jupadi Kesava Rao governed the facts of the case.

Analysis: The earlier decision concerned an instrument that was chargeable with duty but insufficiently stamped. The present case was materially different because the agreement to sell was not chargeable with duty at the relevant time of execution. On that factual distinction, the earlier ruling did not control the present dispute.

Conclusion: Jupadi Kesava Rao was distinguishable and did not bar secondary evidence in the present case.

Final Conclusion: The retrospective application of the stamping amendment was rejected, the evidentiary objection failed, and the appellant was entitled to have the copy considered as secondary evidence in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A stamping amendment that creates a new obligation operates prospectively, and Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 bars secondary evidence only where the original instrument was chargeable with duty and not duly stamped at the relevant time.

Issues: Whether the appellants were entitled to discharge on the basis that the charge was groundless and the criminal proceedings amounted to abuse of process, and whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with the order rejecting discharge.

Analysis: The Court held that at the stage of discharge under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Magistrate or Judge must examine the material placed by the prosecution to see whether there is sufficient ground to proceed and whether the record discloses at least a prima facie case, strong suspicion, or grave suspicion against the accused. The Court reiterated that while the defence is ordinarily not to be tried at that stage, unimpeachable material and basic infirmities apparent from the prosecution material can be considered to prevent an unjustified trial. On the facts, the tenancy claim rested on a document found prima facie to be forged, there was no other credible material showing possession, and the investigation itself had not found offences under the more serious allegations. In these circumstances, the criminal case was held to be unsustainable and abusive of process.

Conclusion: The appellants were entitled to discharge and the refusal to discharge them was set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the prosecution material, even on its face, does not disclose sufficient grounds to proceed and instead shows the accusation to be groundless or abusive, the accused may be discharged at the threshold to avoid a vexatious trial.

Issues: (i) Whether the material circumstances relied upon by the prosecution were specifically put to the accused in his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (ii) Whether the conviction could be sustained when the only incriminating circumstances against the accused were not so put and no other connecting material remained.

Issue (i): Whether the material circumstances relied upon by the prosecution were specifically put to the accused in his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The prosecution relied on two incriminating circumstances: that the railway receipt for the contraband parcels stood in the accused's name and that he had enquired about the parcels at the railway station. These circumstances were not specifically and distinctly put to the accused in his Section 313 examination. The purpose of that examination is to enable the accused to explain each material circumstance appearing in evidence against him, and omission to do so amounts to a serious irregularity when prejudice is shown.

Conclusion: The material circumstances were not properly put to the accused, and the omission was material.

Issue (ii): Whether the conviction could be sustained when the only incriminating circumstances against the accused were not so put and no other connecting material remained.

Analysis: Once the unput circumstances were excluded from consideration, nothing remained on record to connect the accused with the offence. In the facts of the case, the lapse caused serious prejudice to the defence, and a fresh examination at such a distant stage was found inappropriate. The defect was not treated as curable on the facts, and the conviction could not stand.

Conclusion: The conviction was unsustainable and the accused was entitled to acquittal.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded as against the present appellant, and the conviction and sentence were set aside only in his case.

Ratio Decidendi: Material incriminating circumstances must be specifically put to the accused under Section 313; where the omission causes prejudice and no other evidence remains to sustain guilt, the conviction cannot be maintained.

Issues: (i) Whether the insured warehouse at Survey No. 9/3 was covered under the policy; (ii) whether the fire was shown to have been caused by the insured's negligence so as to justify repudiation under the policy conditions; (iii) whether the customs duty component was recoverable under the claim and whether the insurer could raise additional grounds beyond the repudiation letter.

Issue (i): Whether the insured warehouse at Survey No. 9/3 was covered under the policy.

Analysis: The policy documents, leave and licence arrangement, customs-related permissions, and surrounding communications consistently identified the insured premises at Survey No. 9/3. The materials on record did not support the insurer's stand that the fire occurred outside the insured location.

Conclusion: The warehouse where the fire occurred was covered under the policy, against the insurer's contention.

Issue (ii): Whether the fire was shown to have been caused by the insured's negligence so as to justify repudiation under the policy conditions.

Analysis: Multiple reports from public authorities, police, and independent surveyors pointed to electrical short circuit, while the insurer's forensic material was treated as inconclusive. The rooftop repair work was not found to be an alteration increasing the insured risk, and the insurer was held bound by the grounds stated in the repudiation letter and could not add new grounds at the hearing. The surveyor's report was treated as important but not final or binding.

Conclusion: The insurer failed to establish negligence or a valid policy breach, and the repudiation on that basis was unjustified.

Issue (iii): Whether the customs duty component was recoverable under the claim and whether the insurer could raise additional grounds beyond the repudiation letter.

Analysis: The claim included customs duty payable in respect of destroyed bonded goods, and the insured had undertaken that the amount could be paid directly to the customs authorities. The Court accepted that unjust enrichment did not arise and that the duty component could be handled through direct payment. It also reaffirmed that the insurer could not travel beyond the stated repudiation grounds.

Conclusion: The customs duty component was not disallowed, and the insurer's additional objections were rejected.

Final Conclusion: The denial of the insurance claim was held to be wrongful, the insured's claim was sustained, and the appeal failed with the duty component to be remitted directly to the customs authorities.

Ratio Decidendi: An insurer cannot justify repudiation on grounds not stated in the repudiation letter, a surveyor's report is not conclusive, and liability under a fire policy cannot be avoided merely because the precise cause of fire is disputed if the insured is not shown to have caused the fire or breached the policy in a material way.

Issues: (i) Whether the Will dated 03.05.1982 was duly proved and valid; (ii) Whether the registered adoption deed and the alleged adoption of 18.04.1982 were proved in accordance with law.

Issue (i): Whether the Will dated 03.05.1982 was duly proved and valid

Analysis: A Will must be proved in accordance with Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, read with Sections 68 and 69 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Registration by itself does not establish validity. At least one attesting witness must ordinarily be examined, and where that is not possible, the requirements of Section 69 must still be satisfied by reliable proof of an attesting witness's handwriting and the executant's signature. The evidence adduced did not satisfy these requirements. The attesting witnesses were not examined, the alternative proof under Section 69 was not established by competent evidence, and the testimony of the scribe and other witnesses created further doubt as to execution and attestation. Suspicious circumstances also surrounded the document, including the unexplained exclusion of a close family heir and inconsistencies regarding the circumstances in which the Will was prepared and signed.

Conclusion: The Will dated 03.05.1982 was not proved in accordance with law and was held to be invalid.

Issue (ii): Whether the registered adoption deed and the alleged adoption of 18.04.1982 were proved in accordance with law

Analysis: A registered adoption deed raises only a rebuttable presumption under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. A valid adoption must also satisfy the mandatory requirements of Section 11, including the actual giving and taking of the child in adoption. The evidence did not convincingly establish the ceremony of adoption, the identity of the woman shown in the photographs, or the actual giving and taking. The witnesses were partisan or uncertain on material particulars, the documentary versions were inconsistent as to the place of adoption, and the surrounding circumstances rendered the alleged adoption improbable. The presumption attached to the registered deed was therefore successfully rebutted.

Conclusion: The alleged adoption was not proved in accordance with law and the registered adoption deed did not confer any right on the claimant.

Final Conclusion: The claimant failed to establish either the Will or the adoption, and therefore acquired no right or share in the suit properties; the High Court's decision was affirmed and the appeal failed.

Ratio Decidendi: A registered Will or adoption deed does not by itself establish validity; the propounder must prove due execution, attestation, and the mandatory statutory requirements, and a rebuttable presumption arising from registration can be displaced by credible evidence and suspicious circumstances.

Issues: (i) whether the power under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can be exercised by the High Court or Court of Session in respect of an FIR registered outside its territorial jurisdiction; (ii) whether transit anticipatory bail or interim protection may be granted to enable an applicant to approach the court of competent jurisdiction.

Issue (i): whether the power under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can be exercised by the High Court or Court of Session in respect of an FIR registered outside its territorial jurisdiction.

Analysis: Section 438 confers a statutory remedy to a person apprehending arrest on a non-bailable accusation. The provision does not expressly confine the forum to the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the FIR is lodged. The scheme of the Code distinguishes territorial jurisdiction for inquiry and trial from the pre-arrest protection sought on the basis of apprehended arrest. A restrictive construction that ties anticipatory bail only to the place of registration of the FIR would unduly curtail personal liberty and access to justice, and may cause irremediable prejudice in appropriate cases.

Conclusion: The High Court or Court of Session is not barred from considering a limited application for anticipatory bail merely because the FIR is registered outside its territorial jurisdiction.

Issue (ii): whether transit anticipatory bail or interim protection may be granted to enable an applicant to approach the court of competent jurisdiction.

Analysis: The remedy of transit anticipatory bail or interim protection serves to protect personal liberty where immediate arrest is apprehended and the applicant cannot practically secure relief from the competent forum in time. Such relief must be exceptional and compelling, supported by reasons, and ordinarily preceded by notice to the investigating officer and Public Prosecutor. The Court may grant only limited protection for a fixed period so that the applicant can move the competent court for full relief on merits. This approach balances liberty, investigation, territorial discipline, and the avoidance of forum shopping.

Conclusion: Transit anticipatory bail or limited interim protection is permissible in exceptional cases, subject to safeguards and for a short duration to enable approach to the competent court.

Final Conclusion: The impugned anticipatory bail orders were set aside, but the accused were protected from coercive steps for four weeks to seek anticipatory bail before the court having territorial jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is not territorially confined to the court where the FIR is registered, and a court may grant limited transit anticipatory bail or interim protection in exceptional cases to preserve personal liberty and access to justice, subject to notice and other safeguards.

Issues: Whether the appellant was liable to pay fixed capacity charges under the power purchase agreement despite not consenting to the respondent's arrangement for procurement of RLNG and declaration of capacity on that basis.

Analysis: The agreement treated LNG, natural gas and RLNG as primary fuels for the generating station, while consent of the appellant was expressly required only where liquid fuel was to be arranged. The obligation to obtain approval under the separate commercial-implication clause could not be read so as to qualify a capacity declaration otherwise permitted by the clause dealing with primary fuel. The agreement had to be read as a whole, and its structure showed that capacity charges were fixed charges payable on declared capacity, independent of actual scheduling or off-take. Reading a consent condition into the RLNG arrangement would contradict the plain terms of the contract and its commercial purpose, particularly in light of the need to preserve the viability of the generating station during a domestic gas shortage.

Conclusion: The appellant remained liable to pay the fixed capacity charges, and the challenge to the orders affirming such liability failed.

Ratio Decidendi: A commercial contract must be construed according to its plain terms as a whole, and a consent requirement applicable to one type of fuel arrangement cannot be implied into another arrangement expressly permitted by the contract; fixed capacity charges remain payable on declared capacity made in accordance with the contract.

Issues: (i) whether the essential eligibility conditions could be relaxed after the last date for receipt of applications and without fresh publicity; (ii) whether the qualification prescription in the 2014 Rules was ambiguous enough to justify clarification or relaxation on the question of recognised institutions and equivalent diplomas; (iii) whether candidates holding higher or different qualifications could be treated as eligible in the absence of any rule or advertisement to that effect; and (iv) whether the State could be compelled to fill all advertised vacancies under the old rules or prevent recruitment under the amended rules.

Issue (i): whether the essential eligibility conditions could be relaxed after the last date for receipt of applications and without fresh publicity

Analysis: Eligibility conditions in a recruitment advertisement ordinarily must be satisfied by the last date fixed for receipt of applications. Even where the governing rules permit relaxation, that power must be reserved in the advertisement and its exercise must be made known by adequate publicity so that all similarly situated candidates get an equal opportunity to compete. A mid-stream relaxation, after the cut-off date and without extending the last date or issuing a proper corrigendum, changes the rules of the game after the process has begun and offends the constitutional requirement of fairness and equality in public employment.

Conclusion: The post-deadline relaxation was not legally sustainable and was invalid for the advertised posts.

Issue (ii): whether the qualification prescription in the 2014 Rules was ambiguous enough to justify clarification or relaxation on the question of recognised institutions and equivalent diplomas

Analysis: The prescribed qualification required a one-year diploma in specified computer disciplines from a recognised university or institution. The record did not establish any genuine ambiguity warranting a blanket relaxation in favour of private or otherwise unverified institutions. Where a statutory framework exists for recognition and affiliation, an institution cannot be treated as recognised dehors that framework. The impugned clarification went beyond mere interpretation and effectively altered the eligibility standard by introducing courses and institutions not covered by the original prescription, without a properly publicised change in the recruitment criteria.

Conclusion: The supposed ambiguity did not justify the relaxation, and the clarification could not validate eligibility for institutions or diplomas outside the prescribed regime.

Issue (iii): whether candidates holding higher or different qualifications could be treated as eligible in the absence of any rule or advertisement to that effect

Analysis: The rules and the advertisement specifically prescribed the qualifications to be possessed. In the absence of an express provision, a higher or different qualification cannot be presumed to include, or substitute for, the stated qualification. Equivalence is a matter for the employer or the rule-making authority, not for judicial expansion of the recruitment criteria. The claim that higher qualifications necessarily met the prescribed standard was therefore untenable.

Conclusion: Candidates not satisfying the prescribed qualifications could not be treated as eligible merely because they claimed higher or different qualifications.

Issue (iv): whether the State could be compelled to fill all advertised vacancies under the old rules or prevent recruitment under the amended rules

Analysis: An employer is not bound to fill every advertised vacancy and may proceed under a fresh or amended recruitment regime. A candidate in a select list has no indefeasible right to appointment. Once the governing rules changed, the State was entitled to carry forward or re-advertise vacancies in accordance with the amended rules, and recruitment for the later advertisement had to be governed by the then-operative regime.

Conclusion: The State could not be compelled to fill all vacancies under the old rules, and recruitment under the amended rules could proceed in accordance with the later notifications.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the post-deadline relaxation succeeded in substantial part, the directions to redraw the merit list and split the later recruitment were set aside, the later recruitment was left to proceed under the extant rules, and the appointments already made in the earlier recruitment were not disturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: A relaxation of recruitment qualifications after the prescribed cut-off date, without prior reservation in the advertisement and without fresh public notice to all prospective candidates, is inconsistent with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India; likewise, higher or different qualifications cannot be treated as equivalent in the absence of an express rule or authorised determination by the employer or rule-making authority.

Issues: (i) Whether the carrier was liable for compensation for negligent delay in delivery of the air consignment; (ii) whether the principal was bound by the delivery schedule promised by its agent; and (iii) whether compensation could exceed the amount claimed in the complaint.

Issue (i): Whether the carrier was liable for compensation for negligent delay in delivery of the air consignment.

Analysis: The delivery schedule issued at the time of booking, the revised schedule, and the admitted delivery of the goods only after about one and a half months established that the consignment was not delivered within the promised time. The statutory scheme under the Carriage by Air Act made the carrier liable for damage occasioned by delay, and the consignee was entitled to enforce the contractual rights when the goods had not arrived within the stipulated period.

Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the appellant and delay-based liability was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the principal was bound by the delivery schedule promised by its agent.

Analysis: The booking was made through the agent, who communicated the expected delivery time and the revised schedule. The carrier did not establish that the agent lacked authority or acted beyond the scope of agency. On the settled principles governing express, implied, and ostensible authority, the principal was bound by the agent's promise regarding time-bound delivery.

Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the appellant and the carrier was held bound by the agent's commitment.

Issue (iii): Whether compensation could exceed the amount claimed in the complaint.

Analysis: The complaint had sought compensation for loss of business and reputation only up to a specified amount. Since a party cannot be awarded relief beyond what was prayed for, the compensation could not be enhanced merely on the basis of a higher calculation under the carriage regime.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellant and the compensation was confined to the amount claimed.

Final Conclusion: The findings on delay and liability were affirmed, but the monetary relief was restricted to the pleaded claim, and the appeals were not entitled to any further interference.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a carrier's agent issues a delivery schedule and the carrier fails to disprove the agent's authority, the principal is bound by that commitment and is liable for delay under the carriage-by-air regime, but monetary relief cannot exceed the claim made in the pleadings.

Issues: Whether the order granting bail could be sustained where the allegations included offences under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the accused was arraigned with the aid of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Analysis: The bail order was founded on the claims of innocence, an undertaking to cooperate with the trial, the absence of a specific overt act, and the completion of investigation. In a case involving a serious allegation under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and constructive liability under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, those considerations by themselves were held to be insufficient for granting bail without due regard to the relevant circumstances.

Conclusion: The bail order was unsustainable and was set aside; the matter was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether a contractual condition requiring pre-deposit of 7% of the claim amount for invocation of arbitration was enforceable and consistent with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (ii) Whether there was any conflict between the decisions in S.K. Jain and ICOMM Tele Limited on pre-deposit clauses in arbitration agreements. (iii) Whether, in a petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Court could examine the validity of the pre-deposit condition on the touchstone of Article 14. (iv) Whether the clause empowering the Principal Secretary/Secretary to appoint the sole arbitrator was valid in view of the law on unilateral appointment.

Issue (i): Whether a contractual condition requiring pre-deposit of 7% of the claim amount for invocation of arbitration was enforceable and consistent with Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The pre-deposit condition was examined against the statutory scheme of arbitration, including the limited referral role under Section 11 and the cost regime under Section 31A. The Court distinguished clauses that merely secure costs and refund the deposit from clauses that make arbitration conditional upon an upfront monetary hurdle without any rational mechanism of adjustment. It held that a blanket 7% pre-deposit, with no clear provision for adjustment or refund linked to the outcome, was vague, disproportionate, and vulnerable to arbitrariness. The Court further held that such a condition could deter access to arbitration and lacked a rational nexus with the object of discouraging frivolous claims.

Conclusion: The pre-deposit condition was held invalid and unenforceable, and the issue was answered in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether there was any conflict between the decisions in S.K. Jain and ICOMM Tele Limited on pre-deposit clauses in arbitration agreements.

Analysis: The Court reconciled the two decisions by holding that they concerned materially different clauses. In S.K. Jain, the deposit operated as a refundable security, adjustable against costs, whereas in ICOMM Tele Limited the clause mandated a deposit-at-call with forfeiture features that could operate even against a successful claimant. The Court held that ICOMM Tele Limited did not overrule S.K. Jain and that the two decisions turned on the distinct wording and consequences of the clauses involved.

Conclusion: No direct conflict was found between the two decisions, and the issue was answered against the respondent's contention.

Issue (iii): Whether, in a petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Court could examine the validity of the pre-deposit condition on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The Court held that the existence inquiry under Section 11(6) includes a prima facie examination of the validity of the arbitration agreement. It observed that an arbitration clause must conform not only to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 but also to the Constitution, and that there can be no consent against law or waiver of fundamental rights. Accordingly, where a contractual precondition to arbitration is manifestly arbitrary or unconstitutional, the Court can refuse to enforce it at the referral stage.

Conclusion: The Court held that it could examine the clause under Article 14 in a Section 11(6) proceeding, and the issue was answered in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (iv): Whether the clause empowering the Principal Secretary/Secretary to appoint the sole arbitrator was valid in view of the law on unilateral appointment.

Analysis: The Court applied the principle that a party interested in the outcome of the dispute cannot have an exclusive right to appoint the sole arbitrator. Reading the arbitration clause in the light of the post-amendment neutrality requirements under Section 12, the Court held that the unilateral appointment mechanism conflicted with the law declared in Perkins Eastman and the statutory mandate of independence and impartiality.

Conclusion: The appointment mechanism was held invalid, and the issue was answered in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The impugned contractual restrictions were ignored, an independent sole arbitrator was appointed, and the arbitration was permitted to proceed under a neutral constitution of the tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi: A contractual precondition that imposes an arbitrary and unjustified monetary barrier to arbitration, or vests exclusive appointment power in an interested party, is unenforceable if it conflicts with the Constitution or the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; at the Section 11 stage, the Court may refuse to give effect to such clauses and appoint an independent arbitrator.

Issues: Whether a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India was maintainable to challenge an award of the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council when the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 provides a statutory challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 subject to the pre-deposit requirement under Section 19 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006.

Analysis: Proceedings before the Facilitation Council under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 are governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and a challenge to the resulting award lies under Section 34 of that Act. Section 19 imposes a mandatory pre-deposit of seventy-five per cent of the award amount as a condition for entertaining such a challenge. Resort to writ jurisdiction to avoid that statutory discipline would defeat the scheme and object of the special enactment. The merits of the limitation issue did not require adjudication once the writ petition was held to be not maintainable.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable, and the challenge to the Facilitation Council's award had to be pursued through the statutory remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, subject to Section 19 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute provides a complete statutory mechanism for challenging an arbitral award and imposes a pre-deposit condition, writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass that statutory remedy.

Issues: (i) Whether the Central Complaints Committee could consider the second complaint dated 18.09.2012 in the disciplinary inquiry; (ii) Whether the Central Complaints Committee was vitiated by putting questions to witnesses and by conducting the examination-in-chief; (iii) Whether the findings were based on no evidence or mere conjectures and surmises; (iv) Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the penalty.

Issue (i): Whether the Central Complaints Committee could consider the second complaint dated 18.09.2012 in the disciplinary inquiry.

Analysis: The complaint mechanism under the standing order enabled an aggrieved person to approach the Complaints Committee and did not prohibit later or additional complaints. The second complaint was filed promptly after the Committee was constituted and before the first hearing. In disciplinary proceedings, the material need only have probative value, and the proper inquiry is whether any real prejudice was caused.

Conclusion: The Committee was entitled to consider the second complaint and no prejudice was shown to have been caused to the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the Central Complaints Committee was vitiated by putting questions to witnesses and by conducting the examination-in-chief.

Analysis: Under the disciplinary scheme, the Complaints Committee functions as the inquiring authority. The standing order and the inquiry framework permit a fair, thorough, and sensitive procedure, including controlled questioning of witnesses. The Committee was not required to remain a passive recorder, and its questioning of witnesses did not by itself offend natural justice.

Conclusion: The inquiry was not vitiated on that ground.

Issue (iii): Whether the findings were based on no evidence or mere conjectures and surmises.

Analysis: Judicial review in disciplinary matters is limited to the fairness of the process and whether there is some tangible evidence supporting the finding. The record contained oral evidence from several witnesses supporting the allegations of unwelcome conduct, repeated calls, visits, and work-related victimisation. The absence of call records on one aspect did not convert the entire case into one of no evidence.

Conclusion: The findings were supported by evidence and were not vitiated as being based on conjecture or surmise.

Issue (iv): Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the penalty.

Analysis: The High Court interfered on technical grounds without applying the governing principles of prejudice, the limited scope of judicial review, and the distinction between sufficiency and existence of evidence. The disciplinary finding of proved sexual harassment was sustainable on the record and the penalty imposed could not be invalidated on the grounds accepted by the High Court.

Conclusion: The High Court erred in law in setting aside the penalty.

Final Conclusion: The disciplinary action was restored and the challenge to it failed; the judgment of the High Court was set aside and the penalty against the respondent stood revived.

Ratio Decidendi: In disciplinary inquiries on sexual harassment, courts interfere only for procedural unfairness causing prejudice or where findings are unsupported by any evidence, and a complaints committee may consider timely additional complaints and actively question witnesses if the procedure remains fair.

Issues: Whether the prosecution could be permitted to recall a witness under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and produce a certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 at a later stage before the trial was over, where the electronic devices were already on record as primary evidence.

Analysis: The electronic devices seized in the case were already produced before the Trial Court and were treated as primary evidence. The certificate under Section 65B was sought only to satisfy the legal requirement for proving the CFSL report prepared from those devices. The Court applied the principle that a certificate is unnecessary when the original electronic record itself is produced, and relied on the settled position that non-production of the certificate is a curable defect. It further held that, so long as the trial is not over, the certificate may be produced at any stage if the court finds that no irreversible prejudice will be caused to the accused and the exercise serves the cause of justice.

Conclusion: The prosecution was entitled to recall the witness and produce the Section 65B certificate, and the refusal by the courts below was set aside in favour of the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: A certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 may be permitted to be produced at any stage before the conclusion of trial, and a court may allow recall of a witness under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 where doing so causes no irreversible prejudice and advances the search for truth.

Issues: Whether an agreement to sell entered into during the operation of the statutory restriction on sale of fragments was void and incapable of specific performance.

Analysis: The statutory bar applied to a sale, conveyance, lease or transfer of rights in a fragment. An agreement to sell, by itself, neither conveys title nor transfers ownership rights. The alleged statutory violation was neither pleaded by the respondents nor made the subject of an issue before the trial court. Further, the suit for specific performance was instituted after repeal of the statutory restriction, when execution of the sale deed would not contravene that law.

Conclusion: The agreement to sell was not void under the statutory restriction and was enforceable by specific performance.

Issues: Whether title or an enforceable right to seek possession of immovable property could be claimed on the basis of unregistered agreement to sell, power of attorney, affidavit and will, and whether the suit for possession and mesne profits was maintainable on that basis.

Analysis: The Court held that no title in immovable property can pass through unregistered documents such as an agreement to sell or a general power of attorney. The statutory scheme under the Registration Act, 1908 and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 makes compulsory registration central to the transfer of rights in immovable property. Even a registered agreement to sell does not by itself convey title and can, at best, support a claim for specific performance. The embargo created by the statute cannot be bypassed by relying on customary documents or by treating the plaintiff as having ownership rights under such instruments. The reasoning that the suit could be sustained as one filed by an attorney on behalf of the true owner was also not accepted because the plaint did not disclose such a basis.

Conclusion: The suit could not be maintained on the basis of the unregistered documents, and the decree of possession and mesne profits was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the suit stood dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Unregistered documents such as an agreement to sell and a power of attorney do not confer title or an enforceable right in immovable property, and possession cannot be claimed on that basis absent a valid registered conveyance or a properly pleaded agency action on behalf of the true owner.