Issues: Whether anticipatory bail ought to be granted where the accused had joined investigation but the State sought custodial interrogation on the ground of alleged non-cooperation.

Analysis: The accusation related to alleged bribery in connection with approval of an enhanced cost estimate, but the proceeding concerned only pre-arrest detention at the investigation stage. The Court held that the conduct attributed to the appellant could not be treated as non-cooperation so as to justify refusal of bail, and an accused who joins investigation is not expected to make self-incriminating disclosures merely to retain interim protection. Finding no need for custodial interrogation and no aggravating factor warranting detention, the impugned order was liable to be set aside.

Conclusion: Anticipatory bail was granted to the appellant, subject to terms and conditions to be fixed by the Trial Court, and the appellant was directed to continue cooperating with the investigating officer.

Issues: (i) whether the earlier view on parliamentary privilege and bribery required reconsideration, (ii) whether bribery in connection with speech or voting in the legislature is immune from prosecution under Articles 105(2) and 194(2), and (iii) whether voting in elections to the Rajya Sabha falls within the protection of Article 194(2).

Issue (i): whether the earlier view on parliamentary privilege and bribery required reconsideration

Analysis: The doctrine of stare decisis is an important principle, but it is not inflexible. A prior constitutional ruling may be reconsidered where its consequences affect public interest, constitutional values, or the orderly development of law. The prior view in PV Narasimha Rao was examined against the text of the Constitution, the function of parliamentary privilege, and the need to preserve probity in public life. The Court held that reconsideration was justified and consistent with constitutional adjudication.

Conclusion: The earlier majority view was validly reopened and reconsidered.

Issue (ii): whether bribery in connection with speech or voting in the legislature is immune from prosecution under Articles 105(2) and 194(2)

Analysis: Parliamentary privilege exists to secure the effective and fearless functioning of the House and its committees. The privilege is therefore functional and must satisfy a necessity-based test. The phrases "anything said" and "any vote given" protect the speech or vote itself, but not a separate criminal act of accepting illegal gratification. Bribery is complete on acceptance of the bribe or agreement to accept it, and its criminality does not depend on whether the promised vote or speech is ultimately delivered. A criminal prosecution for bribery is thus independent of the protected legislative act and does not fall within the constitutional immunity.

Conclusion: Bribery is not protected by Articles 105(2) and 194(2), and prosecution is maintainable.

Issue (iii): whether voting in elections to the Rajya Sabha falls within the protection of Article 194(2)

Analysis: The text of Article 194(2) extends to anything said or any vote given by a member in the Legislature, and the constitutional scheme distinguishes the Legislature from the sitting House. The vote of elected members of a State Legislative Assembly in Rajya Sabha elections is an integral part of their constitutional responsibilities and is exercised within the Legislature, even if not on the floor of the House in session. The Court held that such voting falls within the protective ambit of Article 194(2).

Conclusion: Rajya Sabha voting by members of a State Legislative Assembly is protected by Article 194(2).

Final Conclusion: The constitutional immunity recognised for legislative speech and voting does not extend to bribery, but it does extend to the act of voting in Rajya Sabha elections by State legislators. The appeal was disposed of after answering the reference in these terms.

Ratio Decidendi: Legislative privilege under Articles 105(2) and 194(2) protects only the speech or vote as an essential legislative function, not a distinct offence of bribery that is complete on acceptance of illegal gratification.

Issues: Whether enforcement of a foreign arbitral award could be refused under Section 48(2)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on the ground of arbitral bias, conflict of interest, or nondisclosure by the presiding arbitrator, so as to render the award contrary to the public policy of India.

Analysis: The relevant standard for resistance to enforcement of a foreign award is narrow and controlled by the pro-enforcement scheme of the New York Convention and Part II of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Public policy in this context is confined to the most basic notions of morality or justice, and a domestic standard of review cannot be imported at the enforcement stage. Allegations of bias must therefore cross a high threshold and, where the seat of arbitration is abroad, the party resisting enforcement is expected to raise such objections in the supervisory jurisdiction of the seat court in the first instance. Applying the IBA Guidelines and the surrounding facts, the Court found no credible conflict of interest, no breach of disclosure duty, and no material indicating that the arbitrator's independence or impartiality was compromised.

Conclusion: The objection based on bias and public policy was rejected, and the foreign award remained enforceable in India.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed because the appellants did not establish any exceptional ground warranting refusal of enforcement of the foreign award.

Ratio Decidendi: A foreign arbitral award may be refused enforcement on the ground of bias only in exceptional cases where the alleged partiality reaches the level of violating the most basic notions of morality or justice, and domestic standards of arbitral scrutiny cannot be substituted for that narrow international standard.

Issues: (i) Whether the legal representatives of a deceased sole proprietor can be directed to perform personal obligations under a development agreement entered into by the deceased proprietor. (ii) Whether monetary liabilities arising from the agreement can be enforced against the estate represented by the legal representatives.

Issue (i): Whether the legal representatives of a deceased sole proprietor can be directed to perform personal obligations under a development agreement entered into by the deceased proprietor.

Analysis: A proprietary concern is not a separate legal entity from its proprietor. Under the law of succession and contract, legal representatives represent the estate of the deceased and are answerable to the extent the estate devolves on them, but they do not become personally bound to discharge obligations that were strictly personal to the deceased. The contract here required performance involving the deceased developer's own skill, expertise, approvals, and construction obligations. Such obligations were personal in nature and did not survive so as to be specifically enforceable against heirs who were not parties to the agreement and did not carry on the proprietary business.

Conclusion: The legal representatives are not liable to perform the deceased proprietor's personal obligations under the development agreement, and the directions compelling such performance are unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether monetary liabilities arising from the agreement can be enforced against the estate represented by the legal representatives.

Analysis: A promise binds the representatives of the promisor on death unless the contract indicates a contrary intention, and a decree may be executed against legal representatives only to the extent of the property of the deceased that has come into their hands. Monetary obligations are therefore distinguishable from personal performance obligations. The estate remains liable for sums payable under the agreement, but liability cannot extend beyond the estate inherited.

Conclusion: The monetary directions survive against the estate and may be satisfied by the legal representatives only to the extent of the deceased's assets in their hands.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeed in part by relieving the legal representatives from personal contractual performance, while preserving the monetary liability recoverable from the deceased's estate.

Ratio Decidendi: Obligations under a contract that are personal to a deceased sole proprietor do not devolve on legal representatives, but monetary liabilities of the deceased remain enforceable only against the estate inherited by them.

Issues: (i) Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to discretionary relief of specific performance in view of the suppression of material facts and their pleadings and conduct concerning the nature of the property and the alleged novation. (ii) Whether the decree for damages required modification by granting interest on the awarded amount.

Issue (i): Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to discretionary relief of specific performance in view of the suppression of material facts and their pleadings and conduct concerning the nature of the property and the alleged novation.

Analysis: Relief of specific performance is an equitable and discretionary remedy under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The plaintiffs had pleaded that the defendant contracted as an individual owner, while the draft sale deed relied upon by them described him as Karta of the HUF and also recorded delivery of possession. The first plaintiff admitted that the property belonged to the HUF, yet the plaint suppressed that fact. The plaintiffs also pleaded a reduced price and delivery of possession, but the first plaintiff's evidence did not support those assertions. In these circumstances, the conduct of the plaintiffs, including incorrect and material pleadings, justified refusal of the equitable relief. The courts below were therefore right in declining to grant specific performance of the entire property.

Conclusion: The refusal of specific performance was upheld, and this issue was decided against the plaintiffs.

Issue (ii): Whether the decree for damages required modification by granting interest on the awarded amount.

Analysis: The Trial Court had awarded damages of Rs. 40,000/- but had not granted interest from the date of the decree. The amount awarded as alternative relief was found liable to carry interest to make the decree complete and workable.

Conclusion: The decree was modified to add interest at 6% per annum on the damages from the date of the Trial Court decree till payment or realisation.

Final Conclusion: The dismissal of the claim for specific performance remained undisturbed, while the monetary relief was marginally enhanced by the grant of post-decree interest.

Ratio Decidendi: Specific performance being an equitable and discretionary remedy may be refused where the plaintiff suppresses material facts or advances incorrect pleadings on essential aspects of the contract and property, even if other ancillary monetary relief is maintainable.

Issues: Whether the petitioner is entitled to regular bail despite an earlier rejection by the same Judge, where co-accused facing substantially similar allegations have been granted bail.

Analysis: The petition challenged the impugned order which rejected the petitioner's bail application solely on the ground that an earlier application by the petitioner before the same Judge had been rejected. Two co-accused with almost identical allegations had been granted regular bail by separate orders. The reasoning in the impugned order did not explain why the petitioner should receive different treatment despite the similarity of allegations and prior grants of bail to co-accused. Applying the principle of parity with co-accused and taking into account the nature and similarity of the allegations, the petitioner was found entitled to the same relief as the co-accused.

Conclusion: The petition is allowed and the petitioner is directed to be released on bail in connection with Sessions Trial No. 259/2022, subject to the satisfaction of the Trial Court.

Issues: (i) Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to an application for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and whether the petition was barred by limitation; (ii) Whether a court may refuse reference under Section 11 where the claims are ex facie and hopelessly time-barred.

Issue (i): Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to an application for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and whether the petition was barred by limitation.

Analysis: Section 11(6) contains no express limitation period, but Section 43 makes the Limitation Act applicable to arbitrations, and the residual Article 137 governs applications for which no specific period is provided. The limitation period for a Section 11(6) application begins when the right to apply accrues, which in the arbitration context is after a valid notice invoking arbitration is issued and the other side fails or refuses to act in accordance with the agreed appointment procedure. The Court held that the notice invoking arbitration was delivered on 29.11.2022, the response period expired on 28.12.2022, and the petition filed on 19.04.2023 was within three years.

Conclusion: The petition was not barred by limitation.

Issue (ii): Whether a court may refuse reference under Section 11 where the claims are ex facie and hopelessly time-barred.

Analysis: Limitation for the Section 11 petition is distinct from limitation governing the underlying substantive claims. Limitation is ordinarily an admissibility issue for the arbitral tribunal, but at the referral stage the court may conduct only a prima facie review and refuse reference where the claim is manifestly dead, ex facie time-barred, or there is no subsisting dispute. On the facts, the Court treated 28.03.2018 as the crystallisation point for the dispute, applied the exclusion of time ordered during the Covid-19 period, and held that the arbitration notice was issued within time. The claims were therefore not dead or hopelessly time-barred on the date of commencement of arbitration.

Conclusion: The court could not refuse reference on the ground that the claims were ex facie time-barred.

Final Conclusion: The dispute was referable to arbitration, and the arbitral tribunal was appointed for adjudication of the parties' claims and counter-contentions.

Ratio Decidendi: For a Section 11(6) petition, the court applies Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 from the date the right to apply accrues after failure of the notice invoking arbitration, and may refuse reference only when the claim is manifestly ex facie time-barred or dead on a prima facie review.

Issues: (i) Whether the prosecution proved a reliable chain of custody and link evidence for the seized contraband and samples; (ii) Whether the sampling and seizure procedure, including compliance with the statutory requirements governing inventory and sampling, was duly established; (iii) Whether the conviction of the accused not found at the spot could rest on police interrogation notes and alleged conspiracy.

Issue (i): Whether the prosecution proved a reliable chain of custody and link evidence for the seized contraband and samples

Analysis: The evidence showed major inconsistencies about the number of samples prepared, their custody, and their transmission to the forensic laboratory. The seizure officer stated that one sample was handed to the accused, while another witness claimed that three samples were prepared and forwarded. The record did not satisfactorily explain the safe keeping of the samples from seizure to forensic examination, nor did it establish the custody of the seized property in the police malkhana. The original seized material was also produced in a different form than that described at seizure, without any supporting memorandum or authorisation for repacking.

Conclusion: The chain of custody and link evidence were not proved, rendering the forensic report unsafe to rely upon.

Issue (ii): Whether the sampling and seizure procedure, including compliance with the statutory requirements governing inventory and sampling, was duly established

Analysis: The seizure record itself was deficient, as it did not properly account for the alleged presence of chillies with the contraband or show a separate weighment of the narcotic substance. No proceedings were taken for preparing an inventory or drawing samples before the jurisdictional Magistrate. The sampling narrative was internally inconsistent and the forensic packet description did not match the prosecution version with sufficient certainty. These defects went to the root of the reliability of the seizure and sampling process.

Conclusion: The prosecution failed to establish proper compliance with the statutory sampling procedure, and the seizure evidence could not be acted upon.

Issue (iii): Whether the conviction of the accused not found at the spot could rest on police interrogation notes and alleged conspiracy

Analysis: The accused who were not present at the spot were implicated only on the basis of interrogation notes of other accused. A confession recorded by a police officer is inadmissible, and no independent admissible evidence linked those accused to possession, transport, or any proved conspiracy. In the absence of tangible evidence, the conviction against them could not stand.

Conclusion: The conviction of the accused not found at the scene was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The prosecution case was found unreliable on both the seizure evidence and the alleged involvement of the remaining accused, and the convictions could not be sustained in law.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions under the narcotics law, conviction cannot be sustained unless the prosecution proves a reliable chain of custody and admissible evidence linking the accused to the contraband; police confessions and unsupported assumptions cannot substitute for legally proved possession or participation.

Issues: (i) Whether the Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142, can direct automatic vacation of all interim orders of stay of proceedings passed by High Courts on expiry of a fixed period. (ii) Whether the Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142, can direct High Courts to decide pending cases in which stay has been granted on a day-to-day basis and within a fixed period.

Issue (i): Whether the Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142, can direct automatic vacation of all interim orders of stay of proceedings passed by High Courts on expiry of a fixed period.

Analysis: Interim relief is granted to preserve the efficacy of final relief and ordinarily depends on established considerations such as prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. An order vacating a lawful interim stay cannot be treated as a mechanical consequence of lapse of time alone, especially where the beneficiary of the stay is not responsible for delay. Automatic vacation without hearing the affected party offends natural justice and may defeat substantive rights. Article 142 is a power to do complete justice in the matter before the Court, but it cannot be used to nullify valid judicial orders passed in favour of litigants who are not before the Court or to override substantive rights.

Conclusion: The direction for automatic vacation of interim stays on the mere expiry of time cannot be issued under Article 142 and is impermissible.

Issue (ii): Whether the Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142, can direct High Courts to decide pending cases in which stay has been granted on a day-to-day basis and within a fixed period.

Analysis: Fixing rigid timelines for disposal of pending matters across High Courts amounts to judicial legislation and ignores the differing docket pressures, priorities, and practical constraints of constitutional courts and subordinate courts. While time-bound disposal may be appropriate in exceptional circumstances, a blanket mandate that all stayed matters be heard day-to-day and concluded within a fixed period cannot be imposed as a general rule. The High Courts' constitutional autonomy and power of superintendence, together with the basic structure status of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227, prevent such blanket interference under Article 142. Procedural directions may be issued to streamline case management, but not at the cost of fairness or the right to be heard.

Conclusion: The blanket direction requiring day-to-day disposal within a fixed period cannot be issued under Article 142.

Final Conclusion: The reference is answered against the validity of the automatic-vacation and fixed-timeline directions, and the earlier approach is not approved, subject to the clarification that existing consequences already worked out under that approach are left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Article 142 cannot be used to impose blanket procedural directions that extinguish lawful interim relief or compel universal time-bound disposal in a manner that overrides natural justice, substantive rights, and the constitutional autonomy of High Courts.

Issues: Whether the appellant, in the facts of the case, was entitled to bail and whether the rigour of Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 required continued denial of bail.

Analysis: The charge-sheet had been filed, the investigation was complete, charges were yet to be framed, and the appellant had remained in custody for more than one year and eleven months. The question whether the appellant was in conscious possession of the contraband was treated as a debatable factual issue to be determined by the trial court at the appropriate stage. In these circumstances, the twin conditions under Section 37 were considered not to warrant application against the appellant at that stage.

Conclusion: The appellant was granted bail, subject to furnishing bail bonds and complying with the conditions imposed.

Issues: Whether a borrower of a project loan availed for brand-building and film post-production falls within the definition of consumer under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Analysis: The expression "consumer" excludes a person who hires or avails services for any commercial purpose. The statutory explanation preserves only those cases where services are availed exclusively for earning livelihood by means of self-employment. Applying the dominant purpose test, the loan transaction was held to be a business-to-business arrangement with a direct nexus to profit generation. The asserted self-branding object did not alter the commercial character of the transaction, since the loan was intended to facilitate revenue and profit from the underlying commercial venture.

Conclusion: The borrower was not a consumer, and the consumer complaint was not maintainable.

Final Conclusion: The order of the consumer commission was set aside in the appeal challenging maintainability, while the connected appeal on compensation did not succeed.

Ratio Decidendi: Services availed for a transaction having a direct and dominant nexus with profit generation are for a commercial purpose, and the self-employment exception does not apply to a business-to-business loan taken for commercial exploitation.

Issues: Whether the appellant was entitled to moulded relief directing payment of the awarded amount with simple interest under Article 142 of the Constitution of India despite the settled position that courts exercising jurisdiction under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot modify an arbitral award.

Analysis: The amount awarded in favour of the appellant had remained unpaid for years, and the litigation had already continued for an inordinately long period. In view of the appellant's advanced age and the prolonged non-payment, the Court found it appropriate to exercise its extraordinary powers to bring the dispute to an end. The Court therefore directed payment of the awarded sum with simple interest, while modifying the impugned judgment to that extent.

Conclusion: The appellant was held entitled to the awarded amount with simple interest at 12% per annum from 27 September 2013, and the relief granted by the impugned judgment was modified accordingly.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded and the appellant obtained enhanced monetary relief on equitable terms under Article 142.

Ratio Decidendi: Where prolonged non-payment and exceptional circumstances justify intervention, the Court may invoke Article 142 to mould relief and secure complete justice, even though modification of an arbitral award is not permitted in proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues: (i) Whether vesting of enemy property in the Custodian transfers ownership to the Custodian or the Union of India. (ii) Whether enemy property is exempt from property tax and other local taxes under Article 285 of the Constitution, and whether such taxes can be levied on the occupier or lessee.

Issue (i): Whether vesting of enemy property in the Custodian transfers ownership to the Custodian or the Union of India.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of the Enemy Property Act, 1968 treats enemy property as property belonging to or held on behalf of an enemy, while vesting it in the Custodian for preservation, management and control. The powers conferred on the Custodian, including collection of rent, payment of dues, disposal with approval, and issuance of certificates, were held to be powers of administration exercised as a trustee and not incidents of ownership. The provisions dealing with continued vesting, restriction on transfer, and divestment further showed that the vesting is protective and temporary, and does not amount to expropriation or a transfer of title to the Custodian or the Union.

Conclusion: Vesting does not transfer ownership to the Custodian or the Union of India. The Custodian holds the property as trustee for management and administration.

Issue (ii): Whether enemy property is exempt from property tax and other local taxes under Article 285 of the Constitution, and whether such taxes can be levied on the occupier or lessee.

Analysis: Article 285 exempts only the property of the Union from State taxation. Since enemy property vested in the Custodian is not Union property, the constitutional immunity does not arise. Even on the assumption that such property could be treated as Union property, clause (2) of Article 285 preserves pre-Constitution liabilities to the same tax where the property was previously liable to such levy. The relevant municipal law in force before the Constitution subjected buildings and lands in Lucknow to municipal taxation, and the later municipal enactment continued that position subject to Article 285. Section 8(2)(vi) of the Enemy Property Act, 1968 also authorises payment of taxes, duties, cesses and rates from the property. Therefore, the occupier or lessee cannot claim exemption from municipal taxation merely because the property is enemy property.

Conclusion: Enemy property is not exempt under Article 285, and the municipal property tax and allied local levies are lawfully recoverable in accordance with the Act and the municipal law.

Final Conclusion: The impugned view that the subject property was immune from municipal taxation was unsustainable, and the municipal demand was held to be maintainable in law, subject to the directions issued regarding past and future recovery.

Ratio Decidendi: Vesting of enemy property in the Custodian under the Enemy Property Act is a statutory vesting for preservation and administration, not a transfer of ownership; therefore, such property is not Union property for the purpose of Article 285, and municipal taxes lawfully applicable to the property may be levied and recovered.

Issues: Whether the contractual terms governing delayed delivery of possession entitled the purchasers to terminate the agreement and claim refund, and whether the consumer forum could disregard those terms and substitute its own view.

Analysis: The agreement created two distinct stages of possession, namely possession for fit outs and final possession upon issuance of the occupation certificate, and it also stipulated a grace period and a specific termination mechanism if possession for fit outs was not offered within time. The respondent did not offer possession for fit outs by the contractual deadline, and the purchasers exercised the contractual right to terminate within the prescribed period. Once the parties had reduced their bargain to writing, the terms had to be enforced as written. The consumer forum could not rewrite the contract by treating the delay as insufficient to justify termination or by compelling continued performance contrary to the agreed termination clause. The refund obligation and interest rate were also governed by the agreement itself.

Conclusion: The purchasers were entitled to terminate the agreement and obtain refund in terms of the contract, and the contrary view of the consumer forum was unsustainable.

Issues: Whether, after the coming into force of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, prosecution for food adulteration and sale of noxious food can still be launched under Sections 272 and 273 of the Indian Penal Code, or whether the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 occupies the field and overrides those provisions.

Analysis: The Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 is a comprehensive enactment covering unsafe food, adulteration, penalties, offences, special courts, limitation, and procedure. The definitions of "unsafe food" and "adulterant", together with the offence under Section 59, show that conduct amounting to adulteration of food and sale of noxious food is squarely covered by the special statute. Section 89 gives the Act overriding effect over any other law to the extent of inconsistency in matters covered by the Act. Where the ingredients of Sections 272 and 273 of the Indian Penal Code are made out, the corresponding offence under Section 59 of the Food Safety and Standards Act is also attracted, and the special enactment provides the governing regime.

Conclusion: Section 89 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 overrides Sections 272 and 273 of the Indian Penal Code in matters covered by the special food-safety regime, and prosecution under the Indian Penal Code for the same food-related conduct is not maintainable where the Food Safety and Standards Act applies.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside, the prosecutions under Sections 272 and 273 of the Indian Penal Code were quashed, and the authorities were left free to proceed under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 where permissible.

Ratio Decidendi: When a special food-safety statute creates a comprehensive regime and contains an overriding clause, it supersedes inconsistent general penal provisions to the extent the conduct is covered by the special statute.

Issues: Whether regular bail could be cancelled by a coordinate Single Judge on a reassessment of merits in the absence of misuse of liberty, breach of bail conditions, fraud, misrepresentation, or other supervening circumstances.

Analysis: The parameters governing grant of bail and cancellation of bail are distinct. Cancellation requires post-release misuse of liberty, breach of conditions, statutory ineligibility, or procurement of bail through fraud or misrepresentation. A finding that an earlier bail order was unjustified, illegal, or perverse concerns its setting aside by a superior court and cannot be achieved through a coordinate bench virtually reviewing the earlier order. As the charge had been framed, trial had commenced, and no recognised ground for cancellation was established, the cancellation orders were legally unsustainable.

Conclusion: The cancellation of the appellants' bail was invalid; their bail could not be cancelled on the stated grounds.

Issues: Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to a belated appeal against acquittal filed under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and whether delay in such appeal can be condoned in the absence of an express exclusion.

Analysis: The Court contrasted the old limitation regime considered in earlier authority with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Under the 1963 Act, the provisions in Sections 4 to 24 apply to special or local laws unless they are expressly excluded. The Court held that the limitation prescribed for an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not contain any express exclusion of Section 5. Authorities dealing with statutes that expressly barred enlargement of time were distinguished because their language and statutory scheme were materially different. The Court therefore concluded that the benefit of Section 5 remains available where sufficient cause is shown.

Conclusion: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and delay may be condoned if sufficient cause is established.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the High Court's order failed, and the delayed appeal against acquittal was permitted to proceed in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute prescribes limitation but does not expressly exclude Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the court retains power to condone delay in the prescribed proceeding.

Issues: Whether a decree for specific performance could be granted on an agreement to sell tribal land to a non-tribal, and whether Section 36A of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code barred such a suit at the agreement stage.

Analysis: Section 36A imposes a restriction on the actual transfer of tribal occupancy in favour of a non-tribal without the requisite previous sanction, but it does not prohibit a tribal from entering into an agreement to sell or receiving earnest money. The conveyance by sale occurs only upon execution and registration of the sale deed, and the requirement of prior sanction arises at the stage of transfer. Since the defendant had not performed his contractual obligation to execute the sale deed, the plaintiff was entitled to seek specific performance. The law governing specific performance, including the buyer's readiness and willingness, had to be applied independently of the later requirement of sanction. The earlier authority on agreements requiring governmental permission supported the view that the agreement could be enforced subject to obtaining the necessary sanction at the stage of conveyance.

Conclusion: Section 36A did not bar the suit for specific performance, and the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for specific performance subject to obtaining the requisite sanction before conveyance.

Final Conclusion: The refusal of specific performance was unsustainable, and the suit ought to have been decreed in favour of the plaintiff with compliance to follow at the stage of conveyance if required by law.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory restriction on transfer requiring prior governmental sanction does not, by itself, bar a decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell; the decree may be granted and enforced subject to obtaining the necessary sanction before actual conveyance.

Issues: (i) Whether the Electoral Bond Scheme and the amendments denying disclosure of political contributions violate the voter's right to information under Article 19(1)(a) and can be justified on the grounds of curbing black money or protecting donor privacy; (ii) Whether the deletion of the cap on corporate political contributions under the Companies Act is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

Issue (i): Whether the Electoral Bond Scheme and the amendments denying disclosure of political contributions violate the voter's right to information under Article 19(1)(a) and can be justified on the grounds of curbing black money or protecting donor privacy.

Analysis: The voter's right to information was held to extend beyond candidate-centric disclosure and to include information necessary for an informed electoral choice. Political parties were treated as a central unit in the electoral process, and information on political funding was held to be essential because money affects both electoral outcomes and governmental decision-making. The blanket anonymity created by the Scheme and the amendments to the disclosure provisions was found to disproportionately suppress this right. The stated objective of curbing black money was not accepted as a sufficient justification for restricting the right to information, and the Scheme failed the least restrictive means test because other less intrusive alternatives were available. The asserted privacy interest in donor anonymity was also not accepted as overriding the voter's constitutional interest in transparency.

Conclusion: The Scheme and the impugned disclosure exemptions were held unconstitutional and against the voter's right to information.

Issue (ii): Whether the deletion of the cap on corporate political contributions under the Companies Act is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

Analysis: Corporate political funding was held to stand on a materially different footing from individual political support because of the greater capacity of companies to influence politics and policy through concentrated financial power. Removing the statutory cap enabled unlimited corporate donations, including by loss-making and shell companies, without sufficient recognition of the different degrees of harm posed to free and fair elections. The amendment was therefore found to lack an adequate determining principle and to be inconsistent with the constitutional requirement of political equality and electoral integrity.

Conclusion: The deletion of the cap on corporate contributions was held to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

Final Conclusion: The challenged electoral finance regime was struck down in material part, and consequential directions were issued to stop fresh electoral bond issuance and to disclose existing bond-related information.

Ratio Decidendi: Information on political funding is essential to the voter's freedom of choice in a democracy, and a measure that imposes blanket anonymity on such funding or permits unregulated corporate influence fails constitutional scrutiny when less restrictive alternatives exist.