Issues: (i) Whether the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 applied to the corporation and its employees. (ii) Whether, after the Inspector of Labour had already decided the employees' claim, the High Court could require them to raise a fresh industrial dispute on non-employment.

Issue (i): Whether the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 applied to the corporation and its employees.

Analysis: The corporation was found to be carrying on multiple activities of a commercial character, including purchase and supply of medicines, distribution of equipment, warehousing, maintenance, and construction for third parties. The mere presence of construction among its objects did not attract the statutory exemption, because the exemption applies to establishments engaged exclusively in construction work. The employees concerned were also found to have completed the requisite continuous service of 480 days in 24 calendar months, bringing them within the statutory entitlement to permanency.

Conclusion: The Act applied to the corporation and the concerned employees, and the claim to permanent status was sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether, after the Inspector of Labour had already decided the employees' claim, the High Court could require them to raise a fresh industrial dispute on non-employment.

Analysis: The remand from the earlier round was limited to consideration of the applicability of the Act. Once that issue was answered in favour of the employees, the order of the Inspector of Labour, rendered under the Act and holding the employees entitled to permanent status, ought not to have been displaced by directing them to start afresh under the Industrial Disputes Act. Re-litigation of an already decided entitlement was unwarranted.

Conclusion: The High Court could not insist on a fresh industrial dispute, and the Inspector of Labour's order was to be given effect to.

Final Conclusion: The corporation's challenge failed, and the employees' claim for implementation of the permanent status order succeeded, with consequential relief to follow according to law.

Ratio Decidendi: An establishment engaged in several commercial activities does not lose statutory coverage merely because one of its objects is construction, and where entitlement has already been finally determined under the governing statute, a limited remand cannot be used to compel the workmen to re-establish the same claim in fresh proceedings.

Issues: Whether the procedure in Clause 7 of the Motor Spirit and High Speed Diesel (Regulation of Supply, Distribution and Prevention of Malpractices) Order, 2005 read with Section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 governed termination of dealership for breach of contractual terms when the dealer was not being prosecuted for violation of the Control Order.

Analysis: The Control Order was held to operate in the context of penal prosecution for contravention of the order. Its search and seizure procedure, including the reference to Section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, was treated as relevant where a person is sought to be prosecuted for breach of the Control Order. The dispute before the Court, however, concerned termination of the dealership agreement on alleged breach of the contractual terms, not prosecution for violation of the Control Order. The Court also distinguished the earlier authorities relied upon by the respondent, holding that they did not govern a case where termination was founded on breach of the agreement rather than lack of notice or other procedural infirmity of the kind considered in those cases.

Conclusion: The procedure under Clause 7 of the Control Order and Section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 did not control the contractual termination in the facts of the case, and the termination based on breach of the dealership agreement was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: Where action is taken only for breach of a dealership agreement and not for prosecution under the Control Order, the search and seizure safeguards in the Control Order and Section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 are not attracted.

Issues: (i) Whether the application for refund of stamp duty was barred by limitation under the Stamp Act; (ii) Whether the appellant was entitled to refund of stamp duty on the facts of the case.

Issue (i): Whether the application for refund of stamp duty was barred by limitation under the Stamp Act.

Analysis: The application for refund was made within six months of the instrument, while the subsequent cancellation deed and supporting material were part of the separate evidentiary process contemplated by the statutory scheme. The provisions governing refund and enquiry did not require all documents or evidence to be filed along with the initial application itself. The refusal of refund solely because the cancellation deed was executed later was therefore a technical approach inconsistent with the statutory framework.

Conclusion: The refund claim was not liable to be rejected as time-barred on the facts presented.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant was entitled to refund of stamp duty on the facts of the case.

Analysis: The appellant paid stamp duty in bona fide expectation of registration, but the conveyance was never lodged because the vendor had already dealt with the property earlier and a cancellation deed was later executed. The Court treated the case as one where the claimant had acted with due diligence and had been pursuing lawful remedies. It applied the principle that expiry of limitation may bar the remedy but does not extinguish the underlying right, and that the State should not defeat a just claim by relying on technical objections alone.

Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to refund of the stamp duty amount.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside and the State was directed to refund the stamp duty collected in connection with the unexecuted conveyance.

Ratio Decidendi: In a bona fide claim for refund of stamp duty, the statutory requirement of timely application must be read separately from the evidentiary enquiry for establishing entitlement, and a just refund claim should not be defeated merely on technical grounds where the claimant acted diligently and the underlying transaction failed.

Issues: (i) Whether the agreement to sell was duly proved as executed by all co-owners or through a valid power of attorney, and (ii) whether the plaintiff's failure to enter the witness box and the delayed filing of the suit disentitled him to specific performance.

Issue (i): Whether the agreement to sell was duly proved as executed by all co-owners or through a valid power of attorney.

Analysis: The agreement and subsequent endorsements were signed only by one person, while the names of all co-owners were not mentioned and the alleged power of attorney authorising execution on their behalf was neither produced nor proved. In the absence of proof of authority, the execution could not be treated as an agreement by all co-owners. A suit for specific performance cannot be decreed against non-signatory co-owners on such unproved footing.

Conclusion: The agreement was not proved to have been executed by all co-owners, and the claim for specific performance on that basis failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the plaintiff's failure to enter the witness box and the delayed filing of the suit disentitled him to specific performance.

Analysis: In a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff must prove readiness and willingness as a matter within his personal knowledge and must ordinarily subject himself to cross-examination. A power of attorney holder can speak only to acts within his own knowledge and cannot depose in place of the principal on matters such as readiness and willingness. The suit was also instituted at the last stage of limitation after substantial delay despite knowledge of the subsequent sale, which made the relief discretionary and unsuitable on the facts.

Conclusion: The plaintiff failed to prove readiness and willingness through admissible evidence, and the delay provided an additional ground to refuse specific performance.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the High Court's decision was rejected, and the dismissal of the suit for specific performance was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: In a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff must personally prove readiness and willingness where that fact lies within his own knowledge, and a power of attorney holder cannot substitute for the plaintiff on such matters; further, an unproved authority cannot bind non-signatory co-owners to the agreement.

Issues: (i) Whether a reliability charge could be levied on a continuous process industry on an express feeder that was already paying a higher tariff for uninterrupted supply. (ii) Whether non-participation in the public hearing barred the consumer from maintaining a statutory appeal against the tariff order.

Issue (i): Whether a reliability charge could be levied on a continuous process industry on an express feeder that was already paying a higher tariff for uninterrupted supply.

Analysis: The consumer was a continuous process industry on an express feeder and was not subjected to load-shedding. The tariff applicable to such consumers was already higher than the tariff for non-continuous industries, and that higher tariff represented compensation for uninterrupted supply. No statutory provision, rule, or regulation was shown to authorise a further reliability charge over and above the existing tariff structure for such consumers.

Conclusion: The levy of reliability charge on the consumer was not sustainable and the issue is answered in favour of the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether non-participation in the public hearing barred the consumer from maintaining a statutory appeal against the tariff order.

Analysis: A statutory appeal under Section 111 of the Electricity Act, 2003 is available to any person aggrieved by the order of the Commission. The consumer was directly affected by the levy and therefore qualified as a person aggrieved. The mere fact that the consumer did not personally participate in the public hearing did not take away the right to challenge the order in appeal.

Conclusion: The consumer was entitled to maintain the appeal and the issue is answered in favour of the respondent.

Final Conclusion: The levy of reliability charge could not be sustained against the consumer, and the appeal challenging the Tribunal's view failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where consumers of a category are already paying a higher tariff for assured supply, an additional reliability charge cannot be imposed absent statutory authority; and a person directly affected by such levy remains a person aggrieved entitled to invoke statutory appeal.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court was justified in ordering a de novo trial on the ground that the trial had been conducted in violation of the accused's right to a fair trial and the procedural safeguards under the criminal process; (ii) Whether the observations made against the trial judge in the remand order warranted interference.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court was justified in ordering a de novo trial on the ground that the trial had been conducted in violation of the accused's right to a fair trial and the procedural safeguards under the criminal process.

Analysis: The right to fair trial was treated as a core component of Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India, and compliance with the procedural safeguards under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was held to be essential at the stages of remand, supply of documents, framing of charge, examination of witnesses, defence evidence and sentencing. The Court emphasised that video conferencing is ordinarily an exception for the production of an accused, that the accused must have a meaningful opportunity to consult counsel after supply of documents, and that the trial court must not proceed in undue haste. On the facts, the record showed repeated denial of adequate opportunity, non-observance of the video conferencing rules, non-application of the witness protection framework, hurried framing of charge and completion of the trial in an exceptionally compressed time frame, causing serious prejudice and failure of justice. In such circumstances, Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 did not protect the proceedings from interference, and retrial was warranted only where the irregularities were so material that prejudice to the accused was established.

Conclusion: The challenge to the High Court's direction for a de novo trial failed, and the order setting aside the trial judgment and directing retrial was sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether the observations made against the trial judge in the remand order warranted interference.

Analysis: The Court noted that the impugned remarks were made in the context of judicial review of the conduct of the trial and the manner in which the proceedings were handled. It also held that, in the absence of any pending disciplinary action or proposal requiring a hearing, the judicial officer could not insist on a separate hearing on the merits of those observations in the appeal as framed. The challenge was therefore confined to the propriety of interference in the appellate proceedings, and no independent basis for disturbing the observations was shown.

Conclusion: The objection to the observations against the trial judge was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were dismissed, the de novo trial direction remained in force, and the ancillary directions concerning expeditious trial and consideration of sentencing policy were issued as part of the final disposal.

Ratio Decidendi: A retrial or de novo trial may be ordered only when procedural violations are substantial, the accused suffers demonstrated prejudice, and the irregularity results in a failure of justice that cannot be cured otherwise.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellants had shown sufficient cause for condonation of the large delay in filing the batch of appeals and connected applications, and which grounds could be accepted for that purpose; (ii) What consequential relief should follow in the different categories of matters after condonation of delay and grant of leave.

Issue (i): Whether the appellants had shown sufficient cause for condonation of the large delay in filing the batch of appeals and connected applications, and which grounds could be accepted for that purpose.

Analysis: The governing test under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is whether the applicant has shown sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed period. The Court held that subsequent change of law after expiry of limitation cannot by itself revive a concluded matter, that government entities are not entitled to a special indulgence merely by reason of their institutional character, and that a general plea based on discouragement of fresh SLPs is insufficient. The COVID-19 extension orders apply only where limitation was alive during the excluded period. At the same time, allegations of suppression of material facts in a set of cases warranted prima facie scrutiny, and the broader consequences for public infrastructure and public interest justified a liberal approach where the delay was attributable to the unusual legal flux and the absence of mala fides.

Conclusion: Delay was condoned in the batch overall, with exclusion of the categories specifically carved out by the Court, while the grounds of subsequent change of law and special governmental latitude were rejected as independent bases for condonation.

Issue (ii): What consequential relief should follow in the different categories of matters after condonation of delay and grant of leave.

Analysis: After condonation and grant of leave, the Court segregated the matters by category. In cases covered by the later Constitution Bench ruling on Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, the High Court judgments were set aside and the acquisition was upheld. In cases involving allegations of suppression of facts, the impugned orders were set aside and the writ petitions restored to the High Court for fact-finding and decision on who was entitled to compensation. In the category already covered by the Court's earlier batch directions, the matters were disposed of under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Certain matters were de-tagged because they were either rendered infructuous, required separate examination, or had notice issued only on delay. The remaining matters were disposed of in the terms stated by the Court, including directions to proceed with fresh acquisition where necessary.

Conclusion: The appeals and connected matters were allowed, remanded, disposed of, or rendered infructuous category-wise, with the principal effect that some acquisition lapses were reversed, some matters were restored for factual inquiry, and the remainder were disposed of under the Court's directions.

Final Conclusion: The Court adopted a category-wise disposal: it condoned delay in the main batch, upheld acquisition in cases governed by the later law on Section 24(2), revived the suppressed-facts matters for High Court inquiry, and issued further directions to ensure completion of public projects where fresh acquisition was required.

Ratio Decidendi: Subsequent change of law does not, by itself, constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay in a finally concluded matter; delay may be condoned where public interest, unusual legal uncertainty, or prima facie suppression of material facts justifies it, but the consequence must be determined category-wise according to the applicable legal position and factual posture.

Issues: Whether the arbitral tribunal could validly terminate the arbitral proceedings under Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on the ground that the claimant had abandoned the claim and the continuation of the proceedings had become unnecessary.

Analysis: Section 32(2)(c) can be invoked only when the arbitral tribunal records satisfaction, on the material before it, that continuation of the proceedings has become unnecessary or impossible. Mere inactivity by a claimant, or failure to request a hearing date, does not by itself establish abandonment. Abandonment may be express or implied, but implied abandonment can be inferred only from clinching circumstances that leave no other reasonable conclusion. The tribunal also has a duty to conduct the proceedings and fix hearings; if a party defaults at a hearing, the tribunal may resort to the mechanism under Section 25. On the facts, the claimant had participated in the connected arbitration, no hearing on its separate claim had been fixed for a substantial period, and the material did not establish any express or implied abandonment.

Conclusion: The termination of the arbitral proceedings under Section 32(2)(c) was invalid and unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed, and the order setting aside the termination of the arbitral proceedings was sustained, with the parties left to take steps for substitution of the arbitrator in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 32(2)(c) permits termination of arbitral proceedings only on a recorded and material-based finding that continuation has become unnecessary or impossible; abandonment of a claim cannot be inferred from mere inaction or non-request for a hearing date unless the conduct unmistakably leads to that sole inference.

Issues: (i) Whether the suit for dissolution and rendition of accounts was barred by limitation on account of the death of a partner and automatic dissolution of the partnership; (ii) whether the concurrent findings sustaining dissolution and rendition of accounts in the second matter called for interference.

Issue (i): Whether the suit for dissolution and rendition of accounts was barred by limitation on account of the death of a partner and automatic dissolution of the partnership.

Analysis: The partnership was a partnership at will and one partner had admittedly died in 1984. On that event, the firm stood dissolved by operation of law under the governing partnership provision, unless there was a contract to the contrary, which was absent. The period for a suit for rendition of accounts runs from dissolution, and a suit filed in 1996 was therefore beyond the prescribed period. The bar of limitation operates even if not pleaded, and where the facts showing bar are admitted, limitation is a pure question of law that the court must notice.

Conclusion: The suit was barred by limitation and the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim on that ground was justified.

Issue (ii): Whether the concurrent findings sustaining dissolution and rendition of accounts in the second matter called for interference.

Analysis: The material on record did not disclose any infirmity in the decree directing dissolution of the firm and rendition of accounts. The courts below had recorded concurrent findings of fact in favour of the plaintiff, and no exceptional ground was made out for interference in appellate jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The challenge to the concurrent findings failed and no interference was warranted.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were disposed of with one matter resulting in restoration of the decree against the plaintiff's claim and the other matter left undisturbed, reflecting only partial success for the appellants overall.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a partnership stands dissolved by death of a partner, the limitation for rendition of accounts runs from that dissolution, and a court must dismiss a time-barred suit even if limitation was not pleaded; concurrent findings of fact are not disturbed absent exceptional error.

Issues: Whether the review petition disclosed an error apparent on the face of the record because the earlier judgment did not consider the binding effect of the Constitution Bench decision in Bhagat Ram, the reasoning of the Full Bench in Jai Singh II, and the doctrine of stare decisis.

Analysis: The review jurisdiction is narrow and cannot be used as a disguised appeal, but a judgment may be recalled where a material and manifest error is shown. The earlier judgment was found to have proceeded without dealing with the controlling Constitution Bench ruling in Bhagat Ram on the effect of Sections 23-A and 24 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, under which vesting and modification of rights do not occur until possession changes. The earlier judgment also failed to answer the Full Bench's reasoning in Jai Singh II based on prior authorities and long-settled understanding of bachat land, including the plea founded on stare decisis. That non-consideration was treated as a material error affecting the soundness of the decision.

Conclusion: The review was maintainable and the earlier judgment was liable to be recalled.

Final Conclusion: The prior appellate decision stood recalled and the appeal was restored for fresh hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: Failure to consider a binding precedent directly governing the issue, or the settled line of authority forming the basis of the controversy, constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record warranting review and recall.

Issues: Whether an accused arrested under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was entitled to bail under Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on completion of half of the prescribed sentence period, when the trial had not commenced and no delay was attributable to the accused.

Analysis: Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is a beneficial provision intended to prevent prolonged pre-trial incarceration and applies even in proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The entitlement under that provision is not absolute and may be declined where the delay in trial is attributable to the accused or other circumstances justify denial. On the facts found, the accused had undergone more than three and a half years of incarceration, the charge had not been framed, the trial had not commenced, and no circumstance was shown to justify denial of the statutory benefit.

Conclusion: The accused was held entitled to be enlarged on bail under Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the appeals were allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 applies to prosecutions under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and bail must follow on completion of the statutory incarceration threshold unless the Court finds a valid reason to deny the benefit.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 352 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 confers power on the Municipal Commissioner to compulsorily acquire immovable property. (ii) Whether the presence of a compensation provision under Section 363 can by itself validate compulsory acquisition without the procedural safeguards required by Article 300A of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): Whether Section 352 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 confers power on the Municipal Commissioner to compulsorily acquire immovable property.

Analysis: Section 352 is located in the part of the Act dealing with streets and public places and is framed as a provision enabling the Municipal Commissioner to identify land required for public streets, parks, squares, gardens and parking places. The actual process for acquisition is separately placed in Chapter XXXIII, where Section 535 recognises the Corporation's power to acquire property, Section 536 provides for acquisition by agreement, and Section 537 provides for compulsory acquisition through the State Government on application by the Municipal Commissioner. On text, context and scheme, Section 352 does not itself contain the power of compulsory acquisition.

Conclusion: Section 352 does not confer a standalone power of compulsory acquisition; that power lies under the acquisition provisions of the Act, particularly Section 537.

Issue (ii): Whether the presence of a compensation provision under Section 363 can by itself validate compulsory acquisition without the procedural safeguards required by Article 300A of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The constitutional protection of property under Article 300A is not exhausted by compensation alone. A valid deprivation of property requires authority of law and must satisfy the minimum constitutional content of acquisition, including notice, opportunity to object, a reasoned decision, public purpose, fair compensation, an efficient and timely process, and final vesting. Section 363 was treated as a compensation provision linked to acquisition by agreement and not as a substitute for a lawful compulsory-acquisition process. In the absence of the necessary procedural framework, a mere payment mechanism cannot cure the invalidity of the acquisition.

Conclusion: Section 363 does not validate compulsory acquisition in the absence of the procedural safeguards mandated by Article 300A.

Final Conclusion: The acquisition action taken under Section 352 was illegal, and the challenge to the High Court's judgment failed. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi: A provision that merely identifies land for a public purpose and a separate compensation clause cannot constitute valid compulsory acquisition unless the statute also provides the essential procedural safeguards that form part of the authority of law under Article 300A.

Issues: (i) whether the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 were intended to cover professions and professional services; (ii) whether the legal profession is sui generis and distinct from other professions; (iii) whether legal services hired from an advocate fall within the exclusion for a contract of personal service under the definition of service.

Issue (i): whether the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 were intended to cover professions and professional services.

Analysis: The statutory scheme, object and history of consumer legislation show that it was enacted to protect consumers against unfair trade practices and unethical business practices in the market for goods and services. The legislative materials did not indicate any intention to bring professions, or services rendered by professionals, within its scope. The same legislative purpose continued in the 2019 re-enactment.

Conclusion: The Acts were not intended to include professions or professional services within their ambit.

Issue (ii): whether the legal profession is sui generis and distinct from other professions.

Analysis: The legal profession requires specialised learning, independent judgment, fidelity to the court, and duties owed not only to the client but also to the court, the opponent, and the profession itself. Its regulation under the Advocates Act, 1961 and the Bar Council rules, together with its role in the administration of justice, makes it different in kind from ordinary commercial or service occupations.

Conclusion: The legal profession is sui generis and cannot be equated with other professions.

Issue (iii): whether legal services hired from an advocate fall within the exclusion for a contract of personal service under the definition of service.

Analysis: An advocate acts on the basis of appointment through vakalatnama and is subject to the client's authority in the conduct of the case, while also owing binding professional duties. This relationship involves substantial client control and agency-like features, bringing it within the exclusion of a contract of personal service. Such a relationship is therefore outside the statutory definition of service under the consumer law.

Conclusion: Legal services hired from an advocate are excluded as a contract of personal service, and a consumer complaint for deficiency in such services is not maintainable.

Final Conclusion: The consumer law does not extend to complaints alleging deficiency in services rendered by advocates in legal practice, and the impugned consumer forum view was set aside. The connected appeals were disposed of in the same manner.

Ratio Decidendi: Professional legal services rendered by an advocate in the course of legal practice are excluded from consumer protection legislation because the legal profession is a regulated, sui generis profession and the advocate-client relationship, in such matters, is a contract of personal service rather than a consumer service relationship.

Issues: (i) Whether delay in reporting a seizure to the Magistrate under Section 102(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 vitiates the seizure order; (ii) What is the meaning of the expression "forthwith" in Section 102(3) and what consequence follows from delayed reporting.

Issue (i): Whether delay in reporting a seizure to the Magistrate under Section 102(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 vitiates the seizure order.

Analysis: The reporting duty under Section 102(3) is a procedural obligation attached to the exercise of the power of seizure under Section 102(1), but it is not a jurisdictional precondition to the validity of the seizure itself. The legislative history, the scheme of disposal of property under Sections 457 and 459, and the contrast with provisions such as Section 105E show that the power to seize is complete on lawful exercise under Section 102(1), while reporting serves a separate administrative and supervisory purpose. Delay in reporting may bear on the evidentiary value of the seizure or invite explanation and scrutiny, but it does not nullify the seizure order merely because the report was not sent forthwith.

Conclusion: Delayed reporting does not vitiate the seizure order.

Issue (ii): What is the meaning of the expression "forthwith" in Section 102(3) and what consequence follows from delayed reporting.

Analysis: The expression "forthwith" was construed to mean as soon as may be, with reasonable speed and expedition, and within a reasonable time in the circumstances. The Magistrate must therefore examine whether reporting was prompt in the factual context and, if delay is shown, whether a reasonable explanation exists. Where delay is unexplained or shows deliberate disregard or wanton negligence, appropriate departmental action may follow. The consequence is not invalidation of the seizure, but possible administrative or evidentiary consequences depending on the facts proved.

Conclusion: "Forthwith" means prompt reporting within a reasonable time, and delay may attract explanatory or departmental consequences but not automatic invalidation of the seizure.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded to the extent that the order of de-freezing could not be sustained on the sole ground of delayed reporting, and the legal position was settled by overruling the contrary line of authority.

Ratio Decidendi: Non-reporting or delayed reporting of seizure to the Magistrate under Section 102(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is not a condition precedent to the validity of seizure under Section 102(1); it is a separate procedural obligation whose breach does not by itself vitiate the seizure, though it may have evidentiary or administrative consequences.

Issues: Whether the claim for compensation arising from acquisition of land could be rejected on the ground of delay and laches, and whether the High Court was justified in disposing of the matter without examining the legality of the State's failure to determine and pay compensation.

Analysis: The land had been acquired for a public purpose, but no compensation award had been passed for decades and the owner had persistently sought compensation. The right to property, though no longer a fundamental right, remains a constitutional and human right protected by Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, and deprivation of property must be in accordance with law and upon payment of compensation. Delay and laches cannot be applied mechanically where the cause of action is continuing and the State's failure to act itself is under challenge. The High Court was required to enquire why compensation was not determined at the time of acquisition and on what basis the later figure was arrived at, instead of directing the claimant to make another application.

Conclusion: The rejection of the writ petition on the ground of delay was not sustainable, and the High Court's disposal of the appeal was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The matter was remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law, with an expectation of expeditious disposal.

Ratio Decidendi: Delay and laches do not bar constitutional relief where the State has retained possession of property without determining or paying compensation and the grievance discloses a continuing cause of action.

Issues: Whether the respondent could be excluded from the definition of consumer on the ground that the service was obtained for a commercial purpose, and whether the burden to prove such exclusion lay on the service provider.

Analysis: The definition of consumer was treated as having three parts: the initial jurisdictional requirement of hiring or availing services for consideration, the exclusion for services availed for a commercial purpose, and the exception relating to exclusive self-employment for earning livelihood. The first part had to be proved by the complainant. The commercial-purpose exclusion, being a matter specially pleaded by the service provider, had to be established by that party on a preponderance of probabilities. The principle that one who pleads must prove was applied with reference to the Evidence Act. Only if the service provider discharged that burden would the onus shift to the complainant to show that the services were availed exclusively for earning livelihood by self-employment. On the facts, the appellant had only asserted commercial purpose and had not led evidence to probabilise that plea.

Conclusion: The respondent was not shown to be outside the definition of consumer on the ground of commercial purpose, and the maintainability objection failed.

Ratio Decidendi: A service provider who asserts that services were availed for a commercial purpose bears the burden of proving that exclusion, and the complainant is not required to prove self-employment unless that burden is first discharged.

ISSUES:

Whether the High Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226, was entitled to entertain a dispute arising purely from contractual obligations seeking monetary relief/damages.Whether a party who participates in a tender process with full knowledge of its terms can subsequently challenge the tender conditions and claim damages for delay caused by its own failure to comply with those conditions.Whether the principle of nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria (no one can take advantage of his own wrong) applies to a party seeking relief for loss caused by its own non-compliance with contractual terms.The appropriateness of quantifying damages and awarding compensation through writ jurisdiction as opposed to civil proceedings.

RULINGS / HOLDINGS:

The High Court was not entitled to entertain the claim for damages arising out of a purely contractual dispute in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction; such relief is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.A party who participates in a tender process with full knowledge of the terms and conditions is estopped from subsequently challenging those terms to avoid compliance and cannot claim damages for delay caused by its own failure to fulfill mandatory conditions.The maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria applies, and a party cannot take advantage of its own wrong to gain a favorable interpretation of law or claim undue benefit.The quantification and award of damages require determination of disputed questions of fact, which are beyond the competence of a writ court and should be adjudicated by the competent civil forum agreed upon by the parties.

RATIONALE:

The Court applied the principle that disputes arising purely from contractual obligations, without statutory flavor, are not amenable to writ jurisdiction because such jurisdiction is extraordinary and not intended to decide factual disputes or claims for damages.The Court relied on the established legal maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria, as expounded in precedent, emphasizing that a wrongdoer cannot profit from his own wrong, and that a party who causes delay or non-performance cannot claim damages for the consequences of such conduct.The Court referred to authoritative precedent holding that contractual disputes involving disputed facts and quantification of amounts payable are best resolved by the forum agreed upon by the parties, such as civil courts or arbitration, rather than by writ courts lacking expertise in such matters.The Court noted that the respondent-bidder's failure to comply with Clause-8 of the Notice Inviting Tender, including non-deposit of post-dated cheques and bank guarantee, caused the delay in issuance of the work order, thereby disentitling him from claiming compensation for the curtailed contract period.The Court rejected the equitable approach adopted by the High Court, holding that the extraordinary writ jurisdiction cannot be used to grant damages or compensation which require detailed factual inquiry and quantification.

Issues: Whether the controversy concerning recovery of time-barred dues under the Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 read with the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 requires consideration by a larger Bench in view of the perceived tension between the earlier decisions on limitation and statutory recovery.

Analysis: The order examines the competing lines of authority on whether limitation merely bars the remedy or also prevents coercive recovery under special recovery statutes. It notes the prior view that the relevant recovery provisions confer a distinct statutory power to recover amounts due as arrears of land revenue, while also recognising that the issue cannot be conclusively resolved at the two-Judge level in light of the questions raised about the interaction between the earlier authorities and the statutory scheme.

Conclusion: The matter is required to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for constitution of an appropriate three-Judge Bench.

Final Conclusion: No final ruling on the merits of the recoverability of the alleged time-barred dues is rendered in this order, and the controversy is referred for consideration by a larger Bench.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a two-Judge Bench finds that the controversy involves questions requiring authoritative resolution after considering the relevant competing precedents and statutory scheme, the matter may be referred for adjudication by a larger Bench instead of finally deciding the merits.

Issues: (i) Whether the claim for increased royalty, sales tax, and forest transit fee was payable under the contract on account of subsequent legislative or notified increases; (ii) Whether the claim for construction of embankment was payable as a separate embankment work or was included in clearing and grubbing.

Issue (i): Whether the claim for increased royalty, sales tax, and forest transit fee was payable under the contract on account of subsequent legislative or notified increases;

Analysis: The dispute turned on the construction of the price-adjustment and escalation clauses in the contract, particularly the distinction between ordinary price variation covered by the agreed formula and additional cost arising from subsequent statutory or notified increases. The earlier binding understanding of the same contractual clauses had already treated enhanced royalty and analogous statutory levies as falling within the separate compensatory clause for additional cost, rather than being exhausted by the general wholesale price index mechanism. The claimed increase in sales tax was also found to be factually established on the material before the Court.

Conclusion: The claim was held admissible and interference with its allowance was declined.

Issue (ii): Whether the claim for construction of embankment was payable as a separate embankment work or was included in clearing and grubbing.

Analysis: The award on this claim rested on a majority view of technical members of the arbitral tribunal, supported by the material on record. The question was one of contractual interpretation and factual appreciation within the arbitral domain. In the absence of perversity or patent illegality, the courts under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 were not to reappreciate the evidence or substitute a different contractual construction merely because another view was possible. The majority view that the embankment work was separately payable was therefore allowed to stand.

Conclusion: The claim was upheld and no ground for judicial interference was found.

Final Conclusion: The award survived challenge in respect of both disputed claims, as the courts found no basis to interfere within the narrow confines of arbitral review.

Ratio Decidendi: In arbitration, a reasonable interpretation of contractual clauses by the arbitral tribunal must be upheld on judicial review, and courts exercising jurisdiction under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot interfere unless the award is vitiated by patent illegality or is contrary to public policy.