Issues: Whether the exemption from payment of Market fee under Clause 11.4.2(i) of the Industrial Policy, 2003 also extended to Rural Development fee.

Analysis: Market fee and Rural Development fee are levied under separate statutes serving different objects and are collected for different funds and purposes. The policy expressly referred to exemption from Market fee, but did not specifically grant exemption from Rural Development fee. The Court held that similarity in collection machinery or overlap in subject matter does not justify reading an unexpressed exemption into the policy. The later departmental communications also did not assist the respondent in claiming an automatic extension of exemption to Rural Development fee.

Conclusion: The exemption under the Industrial Policy, 2003 covered only Market fee and not Rural Development fee.

Issues: (i) whether the appellant's mistaken bid in the e-auction was a bona fide human error warranting interference and permission for rectification or a fresh auction; (ii) whether enforcement of the bid and forfeiture consequences were disproportionate in the facts.

Issue (i): whether the appellant's mistaken bid in the e-auction was a bona fide human error warranting interference and permission for rectification or a fresh auction.

Analysis: The bid was entered in a competitive auction process where the appellant had earlier bid in marginal increments and immediately on discovering the error sought correction. The record showed that the e-auction platform did not provide any option to cancel or rectify a bid once submitted, and the respondents did not specifically deny the appellant's prompt attempts to inform them. In the circumstances, the mistaken entry was treated as inadvertent rather than deliberate, and the absence of any contractual or procedural mechanism for correction weighed in favour of equitable intervention.

Conclusion: The mistake was bona fide, and the appellant was entitled to relief against strict enforcement of the erroneous bid.

Issue (ii): whether enforcement of the bid and forfeiture consequences were disproportionate in the facts.

Analysis: Judicial review in tender and commercial matters is ordinarily restrained, but interference is justified where rigidity produces manifest unfairness. Applying the doctrine of proportionality, the Court held that forfeiture of the entire security deposit for an evident clerical or typing error would be punitive and unconscionable. At the same time, the appellant's lack of care could not be ignored, and a moderated financial consequence was necessary to protect the public interest and the integrity of the bidding process. Exercising power under Article 142, the impugned communication was quashed and the State was left free to hold a fresh e-auction, with a monetary payment directed against the appellant in substitution of full forfeiture.

Conclusion: Full forfeiture and rigid enforcement were held to be disproportionate, and limited equitable relief was granted with compensatory directions.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed in part by setting aside the impugned judgment, granting relief from the erroneous bid consequences, and permitting the respondents to proceed with a fresh auction while imposing moderated monetary consequences on the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: In a tender or e-auction process, a prompt and bona fide bidding mistake may justify equitable interference where the platform provides no mechanism for correction and strict enforcement would be disproportionate; relief must balance fairness to the bidder with protection of the public interest.

Issues: Whether the appellant, on the facts admitted and proved, fell within the ambit of Paragraph 13 of the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1995 so as to sustain recovery of the overcharged amount and interest demanded by the NPPA.

Analysis: Paragraph 13 empowers recovery of amounts charged in excess of the notified price from manufacturers, importers, or distributors. The definitions of dealer, distributor, and wholesaler in the DPCO overlap and are not mutually exclusive. The appellant's own replies showed purchase of the drug from the manufacturer, and its factual stand remained inconsistent as to the source and nature of its dealings. In that backdrop, the appellant could not successfully claim exclusion from Paragraph 13 merely by describing itself as a dealer and not a distributor. The object of the provision is price control and recovery of excess amounts from those involved in the marketing chain, and it warranted a practical rather than a narrow construction.

Conclusion: The appellant was amenable to recovery under Paragraph 13 of the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1995, and the challenge to the demand failed.

1. Whether the Sub-Deputy Inspectors of Schools/Assistant Basic Shiksha Adhikaris (SDI/ABSA) and Deputy Basic Shiksha Adhikaris (DBSA) are entitled to the higher pay scale of Rs. 7500-12000 with effect from 01.07.2001 or only from 01.12.2008 as per the Government Order of 2011.

2. Whether the earlier High Court judgment dated 06.05.2002 directing grant of higher pay scale to SDI/ABSA and DBSA stands merged and superseded by the subsequent order dated 08.12.2010 of the Supreme Court and the 2011 Government Order.

3. Application and scope of the doctrine of merger in the context of appellate orders passed by the Supreme Court and its effect on prior High Court judgments.

4. Whether the principle of res judicata applies to the High Court judgment of 06.05.2002 after the Supreme Court's order dated 08.12.2010.

5. Legality and propriety of recovery of excess payments made to retired employees who were paid higher pay scales than entitled.

6. Whether delay in filing the intra-court appeal by the State against the Single Judge's judgment dated 02.02.2018 ought to have been condoned by the High Court.

7. The extent of judicial interference permissible in State policy decisions regarding cadre restructuring, pay scale fixation, and merger of posts.

Issue 1: Entitlement of SDI/ABSA and DBSA to Higher Pay Scale from 01.07.2001 or 01.12.2008

- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The pay scales of State Government teachers were revised based on the Fifth Central Pay Commission recommendations, effective 01.07.2001. The 2001 Government Order revised pay scales of Headmasters but did not revise those of SDI/ABSA and DBSA, leading to pay disparity.

- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court noted that the 2011 Government Order merged the posts of SDI/ABSA and DBSA into a single cadre of Block Education Officers with pay scale Rs. 7500-12000, notionally effective from 01.01.2006 and monetary benefits from 01.12.2008. The Court held that the 2011 Order was a bona fide attempt by the State to rectify pay anomalies and was approved by the Supreme Court in its 2010 order.

- Application of Law to Facts: The Court found no legal basis to grant the higher pay scale retrospectively from 01.07.2001 as claimed by the Respondents. The pay scale granted under the 2011 Order, effective from 01.12.2008, was held to be the correct and enforceable entitlement.

- Conclusions: The Respondents and similarly placed employees are entitled to pay scale Rs. 7500-12000 as per the 2011 Order, notionally from 01.01.2006 and actually from 01.12.2008. Earlier claims for pay scale from 01.07.2001 were not upheld.

Issue 2: Effect of the Doctrine of Merger on the High Court Judgment dated 06.05.2002 and the Supreme Court Order dated 08.12.2010

- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The doctrine of merger, as explained in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala and other decisions, provides that when a superior court grants leave and disposes of an appeal, the lower court's order merges into the superior court's order, which alone remains effective.

- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Supreme Court held that the High Court judgment dated 06.05.2002 stood merged into the Supreme Court's order dated 08.12.2010, which dismissed the appeal after considering the State's proposed policy to redress pay anomalies. The earlier High Court judgment lost its independent existence and enforceability.

- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Single Judge had erroneously held that the High Court judgment operated as res judicata and was independent of the Supreme Court order. The Supreme Court clarified that the Single Judge misunderstood the doctrine of merger and misapplied the principle of res judicata.

- Conclusions: The Supreme Court's order dated 08.12.2010 is the final and binding order; the 2002 High Court judgment merged therein and does not operate independently.

Issue 3: Application of the Principle of Res Judicata

- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Res judicata bars re-litigation of issues already decided by a competent court. However, when a higher court modifies or supersedes a lower court's decision, the principle applies to the higher court's order.

- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court held that the High Court's 2002 judgment cannot be treated as res judicata after being merged into the Supreme Court's 2010 order. The finality and binding effect rest with the Supreme Court's order.

- Conclusions: The doctrine of res judicata applies to the Supreme Court's 2010 order, not to the earlier High Court judgment.

Issue 4: Legality of Recovery of Excess Payments from Retired Employees

- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The Court referred to the principles laid down in State of Punjab v. Rafique Masih, which disapproved recovery of excess payments from retired employees or those due to retire within one year.

- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court agreed with the Single Judge's view that recovery orders against retired employees who had received higher pay scales were improper and contrary to settled principles.

- Conclusions: Recovery of excess payments from retired employees is not permissible; the Single Judge's direction to set aside such recovery is affirmed.

Issue 5: Delay in Filing Intra-Court Appeal and Condonation of Delay

- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The Court noted that delay condonation requires valid grounds and that no special privilege is to be extended to the State. The principles from State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal were cited.

- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The High Court dismissed the intra-court appeal filed by the State after a delay of 428 days, finding no sufficient grounds for condonation. The Supreme Court observed the State's negligence but did not find it necessary to decide whether delay should be condoned.

- Conclusions: The delay was inordinate and unexplained; however, the Supreme Court proceeded on the premise that even if condonation were granted, setting aside the order would not serve justice.

Issue 6: Judicial Review of State Policy Decisions on Cadre Restructuring and Pay Fixation

- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The Court referred to settled principles that pay scale fixation and cadre restructuring are policy decisions within the State's prerogative and courts interfere only if such decisions violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court held that the State's decision to merge posts and fix pay scales as per the Rizvi Committee's recommendations was a legitimate policy decision. The pay disparity arose due to the State's decision to revise pay scales of Headmasters without corresponding revision for SDI/ABSA and DBSA.

- Application of Law to Facts: The Court found no violation of equality or arbitrariness in the State's measures. The anomaly was addressed through restructuring and pay scale revision approved by the Supreme Court.

- Conclusions: Judicial interference in the policy decision was unwarranted; the State's actions were lawful and within its administrative discretion.

Issue 7: Remedy and Relief to the Parties to End Protracted Litigation

- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: Recognizing the prolonged litigation spanning over two decades, the Court invoked its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice and bring finality. It balanced the interests of the parties, especially retired employees, and the State's financial burden.

- Conclusions and Directions: The Court allowed the appeal in part, approved the 2011 Order, held the Respondents entitled to pay scale from 01.01.2006 notionally and 01.12.2008 actually, prohibited recovery of excess payments from retirees, and directed payment of arrears with interest within four months. The Court restricted the benefit to employees of the Education Department and cautioned against using this order as precedent by other departments.

Issues: Whether, at the stage of discharge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the court could consider defence material or had to confine itself to the prosecution record; and whether the materials placed by the prosecution disclosed a prima facie case of criminal conspiracy or common intention against the appellant so as to justify framing of charge.

Issue (i): Whether, at the stage of discharge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the court could consider defence material or had to confine itself to the prosecution record.

Analysis: The governing rule is that the expression "the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith" means the prosecution material placed before the court. At the discharge stage, the court may sift the materials only to determine whether a prima facie case exists, but it cannot undertake a roving inquiry, weigh evidence as if in trial, or consider defence material. A discharge order must be based on the absence of sufficient ground for proceeding on the prosecution record alone.

Conclusion: The court was required to confine itself to the prosecution record and could not rely on defence material.

Issue (ii): Whether the materials placed by the prosecution disclosed a prima facie case of criminal conspiracy or common intention against the appellant so as to justify framing of charge.

Analysis: The prosecution record did not contain any direct or even inferable material showing an agreement or meeting of minds between the appellant and the police officials for the alleged custodial death. The materials showed, at most, that the appellant had lodged the earlier robbery complaint and later informed the police about the missing employee's fate. The suspicion recorded by the courts below rested on conjecture rather than on prosecution material disclosing the essential ingredients of conspiracy or common intention.

Conclusion: No prima facie case was made out against the appellant; the charge could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The discharge application ought to have been allowed because the prosecution record did not disclose sufficient ground to put the appellant to trial for the alleged offences.

Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of discharge, the court must restrict itself to the prosecution record and may frame a charge only where those materials disclose a prima facie case amounting to more than mere suspicion; conjecture or defence material cannot supply the missing foundation for prosecution.

Issues: (i) Whether an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be compounded at the appellate stage after conviction on the basis of a settlement between the parties. (ii) Whether the conviction and sentence were liable to be set aside in view of the compromise and payment made to the complainant.

Issue (i): Whether an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be compounded at the appellate stage after conviction on the basis of a settlement between the parties.

Analysis: Offences under the Negotiable Instruments Act are compoundable under Section 147, and post-conviction compounding requires the leave of the appellate court in terms of Section 320(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The settlement was verified through the complainant's affidavit, which confirmed receipt of the agreed amount and expressed no objection to setting aside the conviction. The compromise was found to be genuine and legally permissible.

Conclusion: The offence could be compounded at the appellate stage on the basis of the verified settlement.

Issue (ii): Whether the conviction and sentence were liable to be set aside in view of the compromise and payment made to the complainant.

Analysis: Since the amount due was paid and the complainant accepted the settlement, continuation of the conviction would serve no useful purpose. The decision reflects the principle that, in cheque dishonour matters, the compensatory aspect of the remedy deserves preference and courts should encourage bona fide compounding. On that basis, the impugned judgments were liable to be interfered with.

Conclusion: The conviction and sentence were set aside and the appellants were acquitted.

Final Conclusion: The dispute stood resolved by a lawful compromise, and the criminal liability arising from the cheque dishonour prosecution was extinguished by setting aside the conviction.

Ratio Decidendi: A cheque dishonour conviction may be set aside at the appellate stage where the offence is compoundable, the settlement is genuine, and the complainant has received the settled amount with no objection to compounding.

Issues: Whether the second suit for recovery of arrears, warehousing charges and damages was barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and whether the plaint in the later commercial suit was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The first suit had specifically reserved the right to claim arrears, storage charges, warehouse charges and damages in a separate proceeding. Leave to institute a separate suit had also been sought and granted by the Trial Court. The claims in the two suits arose from different causes of action, and there was no relinquishment of the claim or omission to sue for the reliefs now claimed. On these facts, the bar under Order II Rule 2 was not attracted. Since the later suit was maintainable, the application for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) also failed.

Conclusion: The second suit was not barred and the rejection application was rightly dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the earlier plaint expressly reserves a claim and leave to sue separately is granted, a later suit founded on a distinct cause of action is not barred by Order II Rule 2, and rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) is not warranted.

Issues: (i) Whether a divorced Muslim woman governed by the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 is barred from seeking maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (ii) Whether any maintenance or provision awarded under the 1986 Act can be taken into account while dealing with an order under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issue (i): Whether a divorced Muslim woman governed by the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 is barred from seeking maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is a secular measure of social justice intended to prevent vagrancy and destitution. The definition of wife includes a divorced woman who has not remarried. The 1986 Act was construed in the light of prior precedent to confer additional protection on divorced Muslim women, not to extinguish the remedy under Section 125. The non-obstante clause in Section 3 of the 1986 Act does not create an express or implied bar against the secular remedy. Sections 5 and 7 of the 1986 Act were treated as enabling and transitional provisions, not as provisions excluding the operation of Section 125. A divorced Muslim woman, therefore, may proceed under Section 125, and the option under the 1986 Act remains available.

Conclusion: A divorced Muslim woman is not barred from invoking Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the remedy is available in addition to the 1986 Act.

Issue (ii): Whether any maintenance or provision awarded under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 can be taken into account while dealing with an order under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The two regimes were held to operate in distinct but harmonious fields. If a divorced Muslim woman has already received a reasonable substitute or benefit under customary, personal, or statutory law, the court may consider that circumstance so as to avoid double benefit. Section 127(3)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was recognised as the provision that balances an existing order under Section 125 against sums already received on divorce. The court therefore held that maintenance under the 1986 Act can be accounted for when adjusting or altering relief under Section 125, but it does not defeat the maintainability of a Section 125 claim.

Conclusion: Any amount awarded or received under the 1986 Act may be considered for adjustment under Section 127(3)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, but it does not extinguish the right to proceed under Section 125.

Final Conclusion: The statutory scheme was read harmoniously so that the 1986 Act supplements, rather than supplants, the secular maintenance remedy, and the challenge to the maintenance order failed.

Ratio Decidendi: The 1986 Act is an additional, not exclusive, remedy for divorced Muslim women, and it does not bar recourse to Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; any overlapping relief may be adjusted under Section 127(3)(b) to prevent double benefit.

Issues: (i) Whether the principles of Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 apply to writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in relation to a revenue auction sale. (ii) Whether the auction sale conducted under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 was vitiated for breach of the mandatory notice, confirmation and possession provisions, and whether the Additional Commissioner had jurisdiction to entertain the appeals under Section 247 of that Code.

Issue (i): Whether the principles of Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 apply to writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in relation to a revenue auction sale.

Analysis: The Code of Civil Procedure does not govern writ proceedings under Article 226, save for limited procedural principles where the writ court may find them useful. The exclusion of Article 226 proceedings from Section 141 of the Code makes it clear that the procedural restriction contained in Order XXI Rule 90 cannot be imported as a mandatory limitation on the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction. A writ court is concerned with legality, fairness, transparency and non-arbitrariness in State action, and may intervene where the auction process is contrary to mandatory law or vitiated by illegality, without being confined to the exact framework of execution-sale jurisprudence under the Code.

Conclusion: The principles of Order XXI Rule 90 do not apply as a mandatory rule to writ proceedings under Article 226; the issue is answered against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the auction sale conducted under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 was vitiated for breach of the mandatory notice, confirmation and possession provisions, and whether the Additional Commissioner had jurisdiction to entertain the appeals under Section 247 of that Code.

Analysis: The sale process was found to have departed from the mandatory scheme of the Revenue Code. The auction was held before the expiry of the statutory notice period, the sale certificate was issued before confirmation, possession was handed over before lawful confirmation, and material objections were suppressed from the confirming authority. These were treated as breaches going to the root of the matter, not mere irregularities. On jurisdiction, once the sale certificate had been issued and the statutory remedy under Section 210 had become ineffective in the circumstances, the appellate remedy under Section 247 was held to be available, and the appellate authority's order could not be interfered with so as to revive an illegal confirmation order.

Conclusion: The sale was held to be vitiated by breach of mandatory statutory requirements, and the Additional Commissioner's appellate jurisdiction was sustained; the issue is answered against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were disposed of by affirming the High Court's refusal to unsettle the appellate order, while granting limited conditional relief by directing the appellant to make payment within the stipulated time.

Ratio Decidendi: In writ jurisdiction, the court is not confined by Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and a public auction conducted by State revenue authorities must strictly comply with the mandatory statutory requirements governing notice, confirmation and delivery of possession.

Issues: Whether, after an instrument chargeable to duty has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit without a judicial determination on its sufficiency of stamp, the trial court can recall that process in exercise of its inherent power under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and require payment of deficit duty and penalty notwithstanding the bar under section 35 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 and the remedy under section 58 thereof.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of sections 33, 34, 35 and 58 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 requires the court, when a chargeable instrument is produced, to examine whether it is duly stamped and to impound it if it is not. Admission in evidence is not a mere mechanical act; it must follow a judicial determination on admissibility. If the court has actually decided the question, section 35 bars reopening the matter in the same proceeding, leaving the limited supervisory remedy under section 58. But where the document is marked and exhibited without application of mind and there is no real adjudication on stamping, the bar under section 35 does not operate. In such a situation, the trial court may correct the inadvertent admission by invoking its inherent power to prevent abuse of process and to secure the ends of justice.

Conclusion: The trial court was competent to revisit the marking of the instrument and to direct payment of deficit stamp duty and penalty. The High Court's contrary view was unsustainable.

Issues: Whether the petitions under Article 32 challenging the levy and collection of Border Tax / Authorisation Fee were entertainable when the State enactments and rules were not under challenge and the petitioners had an available remedy before the jurisdictional High Courts.

Analysis: The petitions concerned demands raised by States under their own enactments and rules framed with reference to Entries 56 and 57 of List II. The State provisions themselves were not assailed. In that setting, the challenge to the border levy could not be examined under Article 32 in the absence of a direct attack on the statutory source of power. The proper course for the petitioners was to approach the jurisdictional High Courts and challenge the relevant State law provisions there.

Conclusion: The petitions were not entertained on merits and were disposed of without interference with the State demands, with liberty to the petitioners to pursue relief before the jurisdictional High Courts.

The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:

• What is the scope of judicial review of the actions of the State in matters relating to contract/tender disputes under writ jurisdictionRs.
• Whether the action of the Respondent in cancelling the tender via its notice dated 07.02.2023 was amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High CourtRs. If so, whether the said action could be termed as arbitrary or unfair and in consequence of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of IndiaRs.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

i. Scope of Judicial Review of the actions of the State in matters relating to Contract/Tender under Writ Jurisdiction.

a. Earlier Position of Law and Misconception of the State as a Largesse.

The earlier position of law was that disputes arising from contracts with the State were not adjudicated under writ jurisdiction, as they were considered private law matters. This position was established in cases like Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, where the court held that contractual disputes should be resolved through ordinary suits, not writ petitions.

Over time, this view evolved. Courts recognized that State actions in contracts could involve public law elements, subjecting them to judicial review if they were arbitrary or unfair. This shift acknowledged that the State's actions, even in contracts, must comply with Article 14 of the Constitution, ensuring fairness and non-arbitrariness.

b. Concept of 'Public Law' Element: Scope of Judicial Review in Contractual Matters.

The courts developed doctrines to guide judicial review, ensuring administrative actions were not arbitrary or discriminatory. This evolution allowed for judicial oversight in contractual matters involving the State, balancing efficiency and fairness.

In Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation, the court held that even contractual actions by the State could be reviewed for arbitrariness, discrimination, or unfairness. The decision in LIC v. Consumer Education & Research Centre further established that actions with public elements could be challenged under writ jurisdiction.

The decision in ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India marked a turning point, affirming that relief against State actions in contractual obligations could be sought under writ jurisdiction.

c. Meaning and True Import of Arbitrariness of State Actions in Contractual Disputes.

Arbitrariness in State actions is assessed by examining if the decision is based on discernible principles and if it satisfies the test of reasonableness. An action uninformed by reason is arbitrary and violates Article 14. The courts ensure that State actions in contractual matters are not capricious or motivated by extraneous considerations.

ii. Whether the action of cancelling the tender is arbitrary or unfair and in consequence of violation of Article 14 of the ConstitutionRs.

The Respondent's cancellation of the tender was challenged as arbitrary and influenced by extraneous considerations. The cancellation notice cited technical faults and a change in policy as reasons. However, the internal file-notings revealed that the cancellation was at the behest of a minister, without genuine consideration of the alleged faults or policy change.

The court scrutinized the internal file-notings, concluding that the cancellation was not based on valid reasons or public interest. The decision was deemed arbitrary, influenced by extraneous factors, and not supported by the internal deliberations or the actual circumstances.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

The court held that the writ petition filed by the Appellant was maintainable, as the cancellation of the tender involved a public law element. The cancellation was not a mere contractual dispute but an arbitrary exercise of executive power.

The court emphasized the importance of maintaining the sanctity of public tenders, ensuring transparency, competition, and fairness in public procurement processes. Arbitrary cancellations undermine trust in public procurement and deter participation.

The court quashed the notice of cancellation dated 07.02.2023, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The decision reinforced the obligation of the State to act fairly and not arbitrarily, even in contractual matters, upholding the principles of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Issues: Whether the Appellate Court hearing an appeal under Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 could remand the Section 34 petition for fresh consideration, and whether such remand was warranted on the facts.

Analysis: The scope of interference under Section 37 is narrower than under Section 34, and the Appellate Court must examine whether the Section 34 Court stayed within the limited grounds available under the Act. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not impose a statutory bar on remand, but remand is not to be ordered routinely. It may be justified only in exceptional situations, such as summary disposal without consideration on merits, want of notice, or absence of necessary parties. Where the Section 34 Court has rendered an elaborate, reasoned decision on the merits of the challenge to the award, the proper course for the Appellate Court is to decide the appeal on merits rather than send the matter back.

Conclusion: The remand ordered by the Division Bench was unwarranted, because the Section 34 judgment had dealt with the merits in detail and no exceptional circumstance justified a fresh hearing.

Final Conclusion: The order of remand was set aside, the appeal before the High Court was restored for decision on merits, and the merits of the arbitral award and the Section 34 judgment were left open for reconsideration by the High Court.

Ratio Decidendi: In an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, remand to the Section 34 Court is permissible only in exceptional cases and not where the Section 34 Court has already adjudicated the challenge to the award on merits with reasoned findings.

Issues: (i) Whether a bail condition requiring an accused to drop a PIN on Google Maps, enabling monitoring of movement, was lawful; (ii) whether the condition requiring a certificate of assurance from the foreign accused's Embassy or High Commission could be sustained and whether reconsideration of the earlier direction was necessary.

Issue (i): Whether a bail condition requiring an accused to drop a PIN on Google Maps, enabling monitoring of movement, was lawful.

Analysis: Bail conditions must remain within the scope of Section 437(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and any additional condition must serve the interests of justice without becoming arbitrary, fanciful, freakish, or impossible to comply with. The constitutional protection under Article 21 of the Constitution of India applies even to an accused enlarged on bail, and the condition cannot justify constant surveillance of movements or intrusion into privacy. The material placed on record showed that a Google Maps PIN marks only a static location chosen by the user and does not enable real-time tracking of the user or device. A condition that is redundant, unnecessary, and capable of being understood as authorising surveillance cannot stand as a valid bail condition.

Conclusion: The condition requiring dropping of a PIN on Google Maps was illegal and was directed to be deleted, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the condition requiring a certificate of assurance from the foreign accused's Embassy or High Commission could be sustained and whether reconsideration of the earlier direction was necessary.

Analysis: The earlier directions in the precedent relied upon were intended as one-time measures for delayed trials and were not meant to curtail the statutory power to grant bail under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. Such a certificate is beyond the control of the accused, and bail cannot be defeated by an impossible condition. If the Embassy or High Commission does not issue the certificate within a reasonable time, the court may dispense with the requirement and impose other appropriate conditions such as surrender of passport or periodic reporting. The Court also found that the matter did not call for reference to a larger Bench on the foreign-national condition.

Conclusion: The certificate condition was not mandatory in every case, the reference to a larger Bench was declined, and the condition was ordered to be deleted, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The impugned bail order was modified by removing the two challenged conditions, while the matter was kept pending for further orders on compliance.

Ratio Decidendi: Bail conditions must be proportionate, legally permissible, and capable of compliance, and they cannot authorise real-time surveillance or impose an impossible requirement that effectively nullifies the grant of bail.

Issues: Whether a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 filed on the first day after court reopening was within limitation and entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: The period of limitation for an application to set aside an arbitral award is three months from receipt of the award, with a further outer period of thirty days available only on sufficient cause being shown. In computing the three months, the date of receipt of the award is excluded under Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963. On that basis, the prescribed period ended before the court vacation began. Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies only where the prescribed period expires on a day when the court is closed, and the proviso to Section 34(3) does not expand the prescribed period for that purpose. The petition was filed after the outer period had also expired.

Conclusion: The petition was barred by limitation and was not entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Issues: Whether the appellant proved payment of the alleged additional advance of Rs. 15,00,000, so as to sustain refund of Rs. 18,00,000 with interest, when the payment of only Rs. 3,00,000 stood established.

Analysis: The Court accepted the concurrent finding that the initial advance of Rs. 3,00,000 had been proved. The disputed question was the alleged subsequent payment of Rs. 15,00,000. On that aspect, the Court found the evidence unreliable because the claim rested only on the plaintiff's testimony without independent corroboration, the contemporaneous notice did not mention such substantial further payment, and the endorsement relied upon did not inspire confidence in the manner of execution and signing. The Court agreed with the High Court that the additional payment was not established by positive evidence. The Court also noted that the refusal of specific performance had already attained finality and that the refund claim had to stand or fall on proof of the total advance amount.

Conclusion: The appellant failed to prove payment of the additional Rs. 15,00,000, and the finding that only Rs. 3,00,000 was established was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: A claim for refund of an alleged larger advance cannot be sustained without cogent corroborative proof of the disputed payment, especially where the contemporaneous record does not support the asserted transaction.

Issues: (i) Whether prolonged incarceration and delay in commencement of trial violated the right to speedy trial under Article 21 so as to justify bail. (ii) Whether the statutory rigours governing special-law prosecutions barred grant of bail despite the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty.

Issue (i): Whether prolonged incarceration and delay in commencement of trial violated the right to speedy trial under Article 21 so as to justify bail.

Analysis: The appellant had remained in custody for more than four years as an undertrial, and even charges had not been framed. The anticipated prosecution evidence was extensive, making early conclusion of the trial uncertain. The legal position applied was that bail is not to be withheld as punishment and that the right to a reasonably expeditious trial is an integral part of Article 21. Long incarceration without trial was treated as a serious infringement of constitutional liberty.

Conclusion: The right to speedy trial was held to have been infringed, and this supported release on bail.

Issue (ii): Whether the statutory rigours governing special-law prosecutions barred grant of bail despite the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty.

Analysis: The decision proceeded on the basis that statutory restrictions in special enactments do not completely exclude constitutional power to grant bail where trial is not likely to conclude within a reasonable time. The special procedure under the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 and the restrictive bail regime under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 could not override the constitutional protection where continued detention had become unjustified. The mandate for expeditious day-to-day trial under the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 reinforced the concern that delay had become oppressive.

Conclusion: The statutory restrictions did not prevent grant of bail on the facts of the case.

Final Conclusion: Bail was granted because the constitutional right to speedy trial was found to have been violated by prolonged incarceration and inordinate delay, and the special statutory regime did not justify continued detention in the circumstances.

Ratio Decidendi: Where trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time and incarceration has become prolonged, constitutional courts may grant bail notwithstanding stringent statutory restrictions, because the right to speedy trial under Article 21 prevails against mechanical denial of liberty.

Issues: (i) Whether the dismissal of a civil appeal by one co-respondent in the first round operated as res judicata against the other appellant in the second round; (ii) Whether alleged suppression of the first round of litigation justified dismissal of the appeals at the threshold; (iii) Whether the doctrine of merger barred the present civil appeals; and (iv) Whether subsequent purchasers who acquired land after acquisition notifications could seek a declaration of lapse and whether cases involving alleged fraud or title suppression required remand.

Issue (i): Whether the dismissal of a civil appeal by one co-respondent in the first round operated as res judicata against the other appellant in the second round.

Analysis: Res judicata between co-defendants or co-respondents applies only where there is a conflict of interest between them, the conflict must be necessary for deciding the relief, and the issue must have been finally decided. The co-respondents in the earlier round did not have inter se conflict and no directly and substantially disputed issue between them was adjudicated. A prior decision on a question of law does not bar reconsideration where the cause of action is different or where public interest and the changed legal position make a rigid application inappropriate.

Conclusion: The plea of res judicata was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether alleged suppression of the first round of litigation justified dismissal of the appeals at the threshold.

Analysis: Suppression disqualifies a litigant only when the withheld fact is material, meaning it would have affected the merits or the relief. The prior dismissal orders relied on by the landowners were examined, but the Court found no sufficient basis to dismiss the appeals merely because those earlier proceedings were not disclosed in the present round. The omission was not treated as a material suppression warranting denial of relief.

Conclusion: The appeals were not rejected on the ground of suppression of material facts.

Issue (iii): Whether the doctrine of merger barred the present civil appeals.

Analysis: The doctrine of merger is not of universal application and must be tested against the nature of jurisdiction exercised, the subject matter challenged, and the procedural posture of the earlier order. The Court accepted the settled position that merger does not operate mechanically in every case and emphasized that, in the exceptional factual setting before it, a rigid application would create serious disparity and public inconvenience. The Court therefore invoked its extraordinary constitutional power to do complete justice and declined to treat merger as a bar in the manner urged by the landowners.

Conclusion: The doctrine of merger did not bar the present batch of matters.

Issue (iv): Whether subsequent purchasers who acquired land after acquisition notifications could seek a declaration of lapse and whether cases involving alleged fraud or title suppression required remand.

Analysis: Subsequent purchasers after issuance of the acquisition notification do not acquire enforceable rights to challenge the acquisition or seek lapse, and a void transaction cannot confer a right to reclaim land under the lapse provision. In cases involving allegations of concealment of later sale transactions, ownership disputes, or gaon sabha vesting, a fact-finding inquiry was found necessary and the High Court was considered the proper forum to examine the factual controversy. Different categories of cases were therefore given different treatment: some were disposed of with directions under Article 142, some were treated as infructuous, some were allowed because lapse under the governing test did not arise, and the fraud/title cases were remitted.

Conclusion: Subsequent purchasers were held not entitled to seek lapse, while the fraud and title-dispute cases were remanded to the High Court.

Final Conclusion: The batch was disposed of by a category-wise framework: relief was moulded under Article 142 for some matters, some matters were allowed or treated as infructuous, and the cases involving alleged fraud or title suppression were sent back for fresh factual adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: Res judicata and merger do not operate mechanically between co-respondents in a prior round where no inter se conflict was adjudicated, and a subsequent purchaser after acquisition notification cannot claim lapse under the land acquisition lapse provision; where title or fraud issues require factual inquiry, remand is appropriate.

Issues: (i) Whether review petitions could be entertained on the basis that an earlier precedent had been subsequently overruled or recalled and on the strength of the alleged "liberty" said to be contained in an earlier judgment; (ii) whether miscellaneous applications styled as clarification, modification or recall applications were maintainable when they were, in substance, attempts to seek review of final orders.

Issue (i): Whether review petitions could be entertained on the basis that an earlier precedent had been subsequently overruled or recalled and on the strength of the alleged "liberty" said to be contained in an earlier judgment.

Analysis: The power of review under Article 137 of the Constitution of India read with Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is narrowly confined to the grounds recognized by law. The Explanation to Rule 1 of Order XLVII expressly bars review merely because the legal position has since been reversed or modified in another case. A judgment that was correct when rendered does not become reviewable because of a subsequent change in law. The alleged "liberty" in the earlier decision was not construed as a carte blanche to reopen finally concluded matters behind the back of affected parties, and a co-equal Bench could not treat that observation as creating a general right to seek review on the basis of later developments. The grounds urged were held to fall outside the permissible scope of review.

Conclusion: The review petitions were not maintainable on the basis of the subsequent overruling or recall of the earlier precedent, and the contention founded on the alleged liberty was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether miscellaneous applications styled as clarification, modification or recall applications were maintainable when they were, in substance, attempts to seek review of final orders.

Analysis: Applications cannot be allowed to bypass the statutory discipline governing review by being dressed up as miscellaneous, clarification or recall requests. Where the substance of the application is reconsideration of a concluded judgment or order, the Court will treat it according to its true nature. The inherent powers preserved by Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India cannot be used to create a review jurisdiction where the statute does not permit one. Finality of judicial determinations and the legislative bar in the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 cannot be circumvented by nomenclature.

Conclusion: The miscellaneous applications were held not maintainable.

Final Conclusion: The reference was answered against reopening the final judgments through review or disguised review applications, while limited remand and consequential directions were issued in selected matters under the Court's constitutional powers.

Ratio Decidendi: A final judgment cannot be reviewed merely because the legal position has later changed by overruling or recall of the precedent on which it was based, and applications in substance seeking such reconsideration remain barred notwithstanding their label or the invocation of inherent powers.