Issues: Whether criminal proceedings arising out of a commercial bank transaction, after full settlement and issuance of no dues certificate, should be quashed in exercise of inherent and writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: The dispute originated from commercial credit facilities and later turned into recovery proceedings before the DRT. The settlement was concluded, the dues were paid, and the Bank issued a no dues certificate. The allegations against the bank official were not substantiated, and the penal action against the appellants rested on a transaction that had overwhelmingly civil and commercial features. The principles governing quashing of criminal proceedings in settled civil, commercial, and financial disputes support intervention where continuation of prosecution would amount to oppression, abuse of process, and an exercise in futility, especially when the matter is at an early stage and the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak.

Conclusion: The criminal proceedings were liable to be quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a criminal case springs from a predominantly commercial or financial transaction and the parties have fully settled their dispute, the Court may quash the proceedings if continuation would amount to abuse of process and the likelihood of conviction is remote.

Issues: Whether the prosecution proved the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt so as to sustain the conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, and whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court's conviction and acquitting the accused.

Analysis: The prosecution evidence of the complainant, the shadow witness and supporting witnesses was found to establish the demand, acceptance and recovery of the bribe amount. The Court treated the discrepancies relied upon by the High Court as minor and attributable to the long delay between the trap and the depositions. It held that the documentary and oral evidence, including the trap proceedings and phenolphthalein test, were sufficient to prove the charges. The Court also held that the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act applied once demand and acceptance were proved, and that the High Court had erred in discarding reliable evidence on hypertechnical grounds.

Conclusion: The acquittal was set aside and the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court were restored, as the charges under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 stood proved.

Ratio Decidendi: In a corruption prosecution, once demand and acceptance of illegal gratification are proved by credible oral and documentary evidence, minor inconsistencies do not displace the prosecution case, and the statutory presumption under Section 20 operates to sustain conviction.

Issues: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was the same person as Seema Choudhari, the accused shown in the contemporaneous records relating to recovery and arrest.

Analysis: The prosecution bore the burden of establishing that the person found in the vehicle at the time of recovery was the appellant. The contemporaneous documents, including the FIR, seizure memo, arrest memo, remand report and medical examination memo, consistently recorded the name Seema Choudhari and did not mention the appellant. The order passed on the bail application could not be treated as a final adjudication on identity, as it was based only on a summary inquiry without oral evidence. The appellant's examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 also did not put to her the case that she and Seema Choudhari were the same person, causing prejudice.

Conclusion: The prosecution failed to prove the appellant's identity as the accused arrested on 4 March 2016. The conviction could not be sustained and the appellant was entitled to acquittal.

Final Conclusion: The conviction and sentence were set aside insofar as the appellant was concerned, and she was acquitted of the charges.

Ratio Decidendi: A conviction cannot be sustained unless the prosecution proves, beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused before the court is the same person against whom the incriminating occurrence and contemporaneous records are directed, and the accused must be given a fair opportunity to meet that case.

Issues: (i) Whether the amended Order XX Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, applicable to commercial disputes, makes communication of the judgment a mandatory condition for commencement of limitation for filing an appeal under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015; (ii) whether a delay of 301 days in filing the commercial appeal could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Issue (i): Whether the amended Order XX Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, applicable to commercial disputes, makes communication of the judgment a mandatory condition for commencement of limitation for filing an appeal under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is aimed at speedy resolution of commercial disputes. The amended provision requiring issuance of copies of the judgment was read in that context, and the obligation of the court to supply copies was held not to relieve litigants of their own duty to act diligently and seek the order if it is not received within a reasonable time. The earlier authorities relied upon were distinguished on their facts, as those cases involved prompt efforts by the parties to obtain copies and a different statutory setting.

Conclusion: The provision was held to be directory and not mandatory, and limitation was not held to await formal communication of the judgment copy.

Issue (ii): Whether a delay of 301 days in filing the commercial appeal could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: Condonation under Section 5 in commercial matters must be tested against the object of strict timelines and speedy disposal. The delay here was far beyond the period for which exceptional condonation could be considered, and the applicants were found negligent in not making timely efforts to obtain the certified copy or monitor the case through their legal department and counsel. Negligence, inaction, and lack of bona fides were treated as fatal to the request for condonation.

Conclusion: The delay was not condonable and the refusal to condone the delay was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the refusal to condone delay failed, and the limitation ruling of the High Court was affirmed, leaving the commercial appeal time-barred.

Ratio Decidendi: In commercial disputes, the requirement to supply copies of judgments under the amended procedural rule is directory, not a substitute for litigant diligence, and long delays caused by negligence or inaction do not constitute sufficient cause for condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Issues: (i) What are the parameters for determining whether a work or an article falls within the limitation set out in Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act, thereby classifying it as a design under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act? (ii) Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the order of the Commercial Court and in rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?

Issue (i): What are the parameters for determining whether a work or an article falls within the limitation set out in Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act, thereby classifying it as a design under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act?

Analysis: The overlap between copyrightable artistic works and registrable designs was held to be resolved by a two-step inquiry. First, it must be determined whether the work is an original artistic work protected by the Copyright Act or a design derived from such work and applied industrially within the meaning of Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act. If the work is not merely an artistic work, the dominant purpose and functional utility of the article must be examined to see whether it answers the statutory definition of design. The Court held that visual appeal, industrial application, and exclusion of pure mechanical or functional features are relevant indicators, and that the inquiry must be case-specific.

Conclusion: The governing test is whether the work is an original artistic work or an industrially applied design, and if the latter, whether its dominant character is assessed by functional utility under the Designs Act.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the order of the Commercial Court and in rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?

Analysis: The Court held that the question whether the engineering drawings were a design within the meaning of the Designs Act, and whether Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act barred the suit, could not be conclusively decided at the stage of Order VII Rule 11. The plaint disclosed triable issues, and the dispute involved a mixed question of law and fact requiring evidence. The Commercial Court had therefore erred in rejecting the plaint on a threshold assumption, while the High Court correctly restored the suit and directed trial.

Conclusion: The High Court did not err, and the rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 was rightly set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were dismissed, the suit was held to be maintainable for trial, and the Commercial Court was directed to decide the remaining issues on their merits in accordance with the test laid down for distinguishing copyright from design.

Ratio Decidendi: A plaint alleging copyright infringement in respect of industrial drawings cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 merely on the assumption that the drawings are registrable designs; the applicability of Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act and the distinction between an artistic work and a design ordinarily require a fact-sensitive inquiry and trial.

Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in granting bail to accused persons involved in an organised interstate child-trafficking racket, and whether the impugned bail orders suffered from non-application of mind and were liable to be set aside.

Analysis: The allegations disclosed kidnapping, purchase and resale of minor children across States, with recovery of children from the custody of several accused and with material indicating a coordinated trafficking network. The offence was treated as grave, affecting children's welfare and public order, and the Court reiterated that in serious offences the grant of bail must turn on settled factors such as the nature and gravity of the accusation, prima facie evidence, likelihood of absconding, and the possibility of witness intimidation or obstruction of justice. The Court found that the High Court had granted bail in a callous and mechanical manner, without adequate regard to the seriousness of the accusations, the organised nature of the racket, the role attributed to each accused, and the fact that several accused had absconded after release.

Conclusion: The High Court's bail orders were unsustainable and were set aside. The accused persons were directed to surrender and be taken into custody.

Issue (ii): What consequential directions were required for effective progress of the criminal cases and protection of the trial process.

Analysis: Since the cases involved multiple accused, pending committal, and a demonstrated risk of abscondence and tampering, the Court issued directions for prompt committal, framing of charge, speedy trial, appointment of special public prosecutors, police protection to victims, apprehension of absconding accused, school admission and educational support for trafficked children, and reporting/implementation measures across States and High Courts.

Conclusion: The proceedings were finally disposed of with operative directions aimed at securing custody of the accused, expediting the trials, and strengthening systemic responses to child trafficking.

Final Conclusion: The impugned bail orders in the child-trafficking matters were annulled, the accused were ordered to surrender, and a series of mandatory directions were issued to ensure expeditious trial and victim protection.

Ratio Decidendi: In cases involving organised child trafficking, bail cannot be sustained if granted mechanically or without due regard to the gravity of the offence, prima facie material, likelihood of absconding, and the risk of witness interference; the societal interest in a fair and effective trial may justify setting aside such bail orders.

Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in remanding the matter for a fresh trial on limitation instead of deciding the second appeal on the substantial question of law already framed, and whether the suit was barred by limitation despite the absence of a separate issue on limitation at the trial stage.

Analysis: Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 confines a second appeal to substantial questions of law, and once such a question is framed the High Court is expected to decide it on merits. The question of limitation, though often factual-cum-legal, can become a question of law where the pleadings and evidence already show long delay and no plausible explanation for it. A separate issue on limitation is not indispensable when the broader issue and the evidence already cover the controversy, and the court remains bound by Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to reject a suit instituted beyond time. The courts below had examined the evidence, found knowledge of the earlier proceedings, and held the suit to be hopelessly time-barred. In those circumstances, remand merely because a separate limitation issue had not been framed was unwarranted and would only prolong litigation without serving any useful purpose.

Conclusion: The remand ordered by the High Court was unjustified, and the finding that the suit was barred by limitation was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: In second appeal, the High Court must decide the substantial question of law on merits and should not remand a matter for a fresh trial merely because a separate limitation issue was not framed, where the pleadings and evidence already disclose that the suit is barred by limitation.

Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the criminal proceedings and chargesheet against the accused by exercising inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The allegations disclosed a serious financial irregularity involving large payments said to have been made towards GST liability and allegedly misappropriated. The Court reiterated that inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and that quashing is warranted only where the case falls within the recognised categories governing such power. At the stage of quashing, the Court does not undertake a mini-trial or test the truthfulness of the accusations. On the material available, the respondent's own statement contained material broadly consistent with the co-accused's version, and the record was not such as to justify termination of the prosecution at the threshold.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings. The appeal was allowed and the criminal proceedings were restored for trial.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, criminal prosecution should not be quashed where the complaint and accompanying material disclose a prima facie case and the allegations require trial for proper adjudication.

Issues: Whether the agreement dated 16.08.1967 created a conducting arrangement for the hotel business, or a leave and licence arrangement for the premises so as to confer deemed tenancy under section 15A of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.

Analysis: The agreement was construed as a whole by applying the ordinary and literal meaning of its terms. The document described the parties as owner and conductor, stated that the owner was giving the business on a conducting basis, fixed royalty as consideration, required the conductor to run only the owner's hotel business, prohibited transfer to third parties, required return of fixtures and complete charge on termination, and did not transfer possession of the premises as a tenancy or licence of occupation. In view of the clear wording of the deed, sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 barred oral evidence to vary its terms. The surrounding circumstances and receipts for royalty did not alter the legal character of the arrangement, and the absence of any clause transferring possession was treated as a significant indication that only the business was entrusted.

Conclusion: The agreement was held to be an agreement for conducting the hotel business and not a leave and licence of the premises. The plaintiff was not entitled to claim deemed tenancy under section 15A.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a written agreement is clear and unambiguous, its legal character must be determined from its terms as a whole, and oral evidence cannot be used to contradict that character unless a recognised exception under the Evidence Act applies.

Issues: Whether a complainant in a cheque dishonour prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is a victim within the meaning of Section 2(wa) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and can therefore appeal against acquittal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code without seeking special leave under Section 378(4) of the Code.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 372 of the Code confers an independent right on a victim to prefer an appeal against acquittal, conviction for a lesser offence, or inadequate compensation. The definition of victim in Section 2(wa) is broad and includes a person who has suffered loss or injury caused by the act or omission for which the accused has been charged. In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the payee or holder of the dishonoured cheque suffers economic loss from the dishonour and is therefore a victim. A complaint under Section 138 is a private complaint, but that does not exclude the complainant from also being the victim. The statutory requirement of special leave under Section 378(4) applies to a complainant proceeding as such and does not curtail the separate appellate right of a victim under the proviso to Section 372.

Conclusion: The complainant in a Section 138 prosecution is a victim and may appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code without obtaining special leave under Section 378(4).

Issues: Whether the special leave petition and the challenge to the High Court's rejection of the Section 11 application should be disposed of in terms of the recorded settlement and the impugned order set aside.

Analysis: The parties placed on record a written settlement signed by them, under which the respondent agreed to make payments, continue to pay monthly licence compensation and property tax, and vacate the premises by the agreed date. The settlement also recorded mutual withdrawals of pending allegations and complaints and sought disposal of the proceedings in terms of the minutes of the consent order. In view of the settlement, no further adjudication on the underlying dispute was necessary.

Conclusion: The petition was disposed of in terms of the settlement and the High Court's order, which did not survive after the compromise, was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The dispute was finally concluded on the basis of the parties' settlement, with the proceedings terminated and the impugned order withdrawn from effect.

The core legal issues considered in this judgment are:

• Whether the special condition in the insurance contract, stipulating that the voyage should commence and complete before the monsoon sets in, was breached by the Appellant.
• Whether the doctrine of uberrima fides was compromised by the Appellant's conduct.
• Whether the rule of contra proferentem applies to the interpretation of the special condition in the insurance contract.
• Whether the special condition is valid and material to the insurance contract.
• Whether the Respondent's repudiation of the insurance claim was justified based on the alleged breach of the special condition.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

1. Breach of Special Condition

The insurance contract included a special condition that the voyage should commence and complete before the monsoon sets in. The Court examined the literal interpretation of this phrase, considering the DGS Circular which delineates the foul weather period as starting on 1st June on the West Coast and 1st May on the East Coast. The Court found that the voyage commenced on 6th June 2013, after the monsoon had set in on the West Coast, thus breaching the special condition.

2. Doctrine of Uberrima Fides

The doctrine of uberrima fides requires good faith in insurance contracts. The Respondent argued that the Appellant failed to disclose its intention to sail during the foul season, compromising this doctrine. The Court noted that the insurance was for a period covering the foul weather, and the Appellant had disclosed the purpose of the insurance as a voyage from Mumbai to Kolkata. Therefore, the Court found no breach of uberrima fides by the Appellant.

3. Application of Contra Proferentem

The Appellant argued that the special condition was ambiguous and should be construed against the Respondent under the rule of contra proferentem. The Court examined precedents and concluded that the special condition was not ambiguous per se, as it could be interpreted literally. The Court rejected the application of contra proferentem, as the ambiguity was not inherent in the contract but introduced by external factors.

4. Validity and Materiality of Special Condition

The Court considered whether the special condition was valid and material to the insurance contract. It found that the condition was non-material, as it was impossible for the Appellant to comply with it given the voyage from Mumbai to Kolkata during the insurance period. The Court held that the special condition was likely a standard term used by the Respondent and was impliedly waived due to its non-material nature.

5. Justification for Repudiation of Insurance Claim

The Respondent's repudiation of the insurance claim was based on the alleged breach of the special condition. The Court found that the special condition could not be treated as a condition precedent to waive liability under the policy, as it would lead to absurd results and defeat the purpose of the insurance contract. The Court held that the Respondent was not justified in repudiating the claim on this ground.

SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

The Court held that the special condition in the insurance contract was non-material and could not be used to justify the repudiation of the insurance claim. The Court emphasized the importance of interpreting insurance contracts strictly, with a focus on good faith and the purpose of the contract. The Court set aside the NCDRC's order and remanded the matter for further determination of the insured sum liable to be paid by the Respondent.

Final Determinations:

• The appeal was allowed, and the impugned order of the NCDRC was set aside.
• The matter was remanded to the NCDRC to determine the extent of the insured sum payable by the Respondent to the Appellant.
• The Court directed the NCDRC to consider the matter expeditiously, given the long-standing nature of the claim.

The core legal issues considered in this judgment include:

1. Whether the appellant, United India Insurance Co. Ltd., was liable to compensate the respondent, M/s. Park Leather Industries Ltd., under the insurance policy for the damage and loss suffered due to the collapse of the factory shed.

2. Whether the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) correctly determined the quantum of compensation payable to the respondent.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

1. Liability under the Insurance Policy

Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The case revolves around the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, under which the respondent filed a complaint with the NCDRC. The insurance policy in question covered fire and special perils, including inundation.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court noted that the appellant did not contest its liability to compensate the respondent under the insurance policy. The appellant's primary contention was focused on the quantum of compensation determined by the NCDRC.

Key Evidence and Findings: The respondent claimed that the factory shed collapsed due to heavy rainfall, which was covered under the policy as inundation. The appellant initially repudiated the claim, arguing that the damage was due to gradual weakening and seepage, not covered by the policy.

Application of Law to Facts: The Court accepted the NCDRC's determination of liability, as the appellant did not dispute this aspect. The focus shifted to the assessment of compensation.

2. Quantum of Compensation

Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The determination of compensation involves assessing the actual loss suffered, as evidenced by surveyor reports and other relevant documentation.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court found that the NCDRC erred in its assessment of compensation. The NCDRC relied solely on the respondent's surveyor report, which was introduced in a rejoinder, without giving the appellant an opportunity to contest it.

Key Evidence and Findings: The respondent's surveyor assessed the loss at Rs.46,97,085/-, while the appellant's surveyor assessed it at Rs.8,89,176/-. The NCDRC accepted the respondent's assessment without independent verification or consideration of the appellant's position.

Application of Law to Facts: The Court emphasized that the NCDRC should have independently evaluated the evidence and allowed both parties to present their arguments regarding the quantum of compensation.

Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellant argued that it could not contest the respondent's surveyor report as it was introduced after the written statement was filed. The Court agreed, indicating that the NCDRC's reliance on the respondent's report without proper scrutiny was unjustified.

Conclusions: The Court concluded that the NCDRC must reassess the quantum of compensation by allowing both parties to present evidence and arguments. The matter was remitted to the NCDRC for fresh consideration.

SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning: The Court stated, "The NCDRC did not independently apply its mind to the quantification of the claim and blindly acted upon the alleged failure of the appellant to deny the assessment in the surveyor's report produced by the respondent."

Core Principles Established: The judgment reinforces the principle that tribunals must independently assess evidence and allow parties to contest claims, especially when new evidence is introduced after initial pleadings.

Final Determinations on Each Issue: The Court upheld the determination of liability under the insurance policy but remitted the issue of quantum of compensation to the NCDRC for fresh assessment.

The core issue considered by the Court was whether the recovery of financial benefits extended to the appellants while they were in service is justified after their retirement, particularly when such recovery was ordered without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellants.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

The Court examined the legal framework and precedents concerning the recovery of excess payments made to employees. The relevant legal framework includes established principles from previous judgments, such as Sahib Ram vs. State of Haryana, Shyam Babu Verma vs. Union of India, Union of India vs. M. Bhaskar, V. Gangaram vs. Regional Jt. Director, and Thomas Daniel vs. State of Kerala & Ors.

In these cases, the Court consistently held that recovery of excess payments is not permissible if the payment was not due to any misrepresentation or fraud by the employee and was made due to an erroneous interpretation of rules by the employer. The Court emphasized that relief against such recovery is granted not because of any inherent right of the employee but as an exercise of judicial discretion to alleviate hardship.

Key evidence and findings in the present case indicated that the financial benefits were granted to the appellants without any fraud or misrepresentation on their part. The benefits were extended based on the recommendations of the Shetty Commission and were later deemed erroneous by the respondents. The appellants had retired by the time the recovery was ordered, and no opportunity for a hearing was provided to them before the recovery orders were issued.

The Court applied the established legal principles to the facts of the case, noting that the appellants were low-paid employees who had retired and that the recovery would cause undue hardship. The Court also considered that the appellants were not given a chance to present their case before the recovery orders were made.

Competing arguments were addressed by noting that the respondents argued the appellants were not entitled to the financial benefits and had agreed to refund any excess payments. However, the Court found that the lack of opportunity for a hearing and the principles established in prior judgments outweighed these arguments.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

The Court held that the recovery of excess payments from retired employees, particularly without a hearing, is unsustainable. The Court quoted significant legal reasoning from past judgments, emphasizing that recovery is impermissible when there is no misrepresentation or fraud, and the payment was made due to an erroneous interpretation by the employer.

Core principles established include the prohibition of recovery from retired employees or those nearing retirement, particularly when the excess payment was made over a long period and without the employee's fault. The Court reiterated that such recovery is inequitable and causes undue hardship.

The final determination was to allow the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and the subsequent orders directing the appellants to deposit the excess drawn arrears.

Issues: (i) Whether the buyer was continuously ready and willing to perform the Agreement to Sell so as to justify a decree for specific performance, notwithstanding receipt and encashment of refund instruments after cancellation of the agreement; (ii) Whether the suit for specific performance was maintainable in the absence of a prayer challenging the cancellation of the agreement, and whether suppression of the cancellation letter and refund instruments disentitled the buyer to relief.

Issue (i): Whether the buyer was continuously ready and willing to perform the Agreement to Sell so as to justify a decree for specific performance, notwithstanding receipt and encashment of refund instruments after cancellation of the agreement?

Analysis: Specific performance is a discretionary and equitable relief and the plaintiff must plead and prove continuous readiness and willingness from the date of the contract until the decree. Readiness concerns capacity to perform, while willingness is inferred from conduct and surrounding circumstances. Here, the buyer admittedly received the cancellation letter and refund instruments before filing the suit and later encashed the demand drafts without objection. That conduct was inconsistent with an intention to keep the contract alive or to proceed with execution of the sale deed. Once such conduct showed absence of willingness, the fact that the entire advance amount had not been refunded became immaterial.

Conclusion: The buyer failed to establish continuous readiness and willingness, and the decree for specific performance could not be sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether the suit for specific performance was maintainable in the absence of a prayer challenging the cancellation of the agreement, and whether suppression of the cancellation letter and refund instruments disentitled the buyer to relief?

Analysis: A subsisting and enforceable agreement is a jurisdictional fact for specific performance. Once the seller had issued a cancellation letter before the suit, the buyer was required to seek a declaration that the cancellation was bad in law and not binding. In the absence of such a prayer, the suit could not proceed on the basis of a cancelled agreement. The plaint also failed to disclose the cancellation letter and refund instruments, which amounted to suppression of material facts in a suit seeking an equitable relief. Such suppression disentitles a litigant from discretionary relief.

Conclusion: The suit was not maintainable on the pleaded foundation, and suppression of material facts independently barred equitable relief.

Final Conclusion: The agreement to sell could not be specifically enforced, and the decrees in favour of the buyer were set aside with consequential reliefs.

Ratio Decidendi: A suit for specific performance requires a subsisting contract, continuous readiness and willingness throughout the proceedings, and full disclosure of material facts; acceptance of refund after cancellation may amount to acceptance of repudiation, and a suit challenging a cancelled agreement must also seek appropriate declaratory relief.

Issues: Whether an employee removed from service after being found guilty of gross misconduct was entitled to pensionary and other superannuation benefits under the applicable bipartite settlement and pension regulations, and whether the appellate order granting terminal benefits had attained finality.

Analysis: The applicable bipartite settlement, as amended, permitted removal from service with superannuation benefits that would otherwise be due under the governing rules or regulations. Regulation 22(1) of the pension regulations provided for forfeiture of past service on dismissal, removal or termination. The provisions were read together and harmonised by applying the earlier binding decision on the interplay between the settlement and the regulations. On that construction, an employee otherwise eligible for pension could not be denied superannuation benefits merely because the punishment was removal from service with terminal benefits. The appellate authority's order substituting dismissal with removal from service and expressly preserving terminal benefits was not challenged and had attained finality.

Conclusion: The employee was entitled to pensionary benefits in terms of the final appellate order and the governing settlement and regulations.

Issues: (i) whether the respondents' written communication amounted to an acknowledgment of liability so as to extend limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act; (ii) whether the recovery proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 ought to have been deferred pending disposal of the respondents' intra-court appeals concerning the retrospective tariff revision.

Issue (i): Whether the respondents' written communication amounted to an acknowledgment of liability so as to extend limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act.

Analysis: The limitation period was treated as governed by the Limitation Act in proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The written response dated 04.02.2015 was undisputed and was read as a clear acknowledgment that payment of the revised demand was being resisted only because the challenge to retrospective application was pending. An acknowledgment need not be an unconditional admission of liability; it is sufficient if the writing recognises the subsisting obligation and refers to the time for payment not having arrived. On that basis, a fresh limitation period was held to run from the date of acknowledgment.

Conclusion: The written communication constituted an acknowledgment within Section 18 of the Limitation Act and extended limitation.

Issue (ii): Whether the recovery proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 ought to have been deferred pending disposal of the respondents' intra-court appeals concerning the retrospective tariff revision.

Analysis: The respondents' challenge to the revised tariff was already pending in intra-court appeals, and the demand proceedings were directly dependent on the outcome of those appeals. The pendency of those appeals had a direct bearing on whether retrospective recovery could ultimately be enforced. In these circumstances, the High Court ought not to have proceeded to sustain the quashing of the recovery action on limitation alone without awaiting the outcome of the connected appeals.

Conclusion: The recovery proceedings should have been kept in abeyance pending disposal of the intra-court appeals.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the writ petitions were restored for consideration after disposal of the pending intra-court appeals, leaving the enforceability of the demand to depend on the eventual outcome of those appeals.

Ratio Decidendi: A written communication that recognises a subsisting demand and explains that payment is deferred because a related challenge is pending can amount to acknowledgment in writing for the purpose of extending limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, and where the enforceability of a demand depends directly on pending connected appeals, the recovery proceedings ought to await their outcome.

Issues: Whether an application to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was filed within limitation after excluding the date of receipt of the award under Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and applying Section 4 of that Act when the three-month period expired on a court holiday.

Analysis: Section 34(3) prescribes a period of three months from the date of receipt of the arbitral award, with a further condonable period of thirty days on sufficient cause being shown. The expression used for the primary period is three months, not ninety days. Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act applies to proceedings under Section 34, so the day on which the award was received must be excluded while computing limitation. Once that day is excluded, the three-month period commenced on the next day and expired on a court holiday. In such a situation, Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies and permits filing on the next working day. Accordingly, the application filed on the next working day was within limitation and no separate plea for condonation was required.

Conclusion: The application under Section 34 was within limitation, and the challenge to the arbitral award was not barred by time.

Ratio Decidendi: For purposes of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the date of receipt of the arbitral award is excluded under Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963, and Section 4 of that Act applies where the three-month period expires on a court holiday, allowing filing on the next working day.

Issues: Whether prior sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963 was required before taking cognisance against the accused police officers for the alleged acts, and whether the criminal proceedings could be quashed for want of such sanction.

Analysis: The governing test is whether the alleged acts were reasonably connected with the discharge of official duty. Sanction is attracted not only where the act is strictly within official duty, but also where it is done while purporting to act in the discharge of duty or under colour of, or in excess of, such duty or authority. Where the complaint discloses acts having a reasonable nexus with official functions, the bar against cognisance operates; if the acts are wholly unconnected with official duty, sanction is unnecessary. Applying that principle, the allegations against the accused arose from their role as police officers in connection with investigation and related police action, and the excess alleged did not sever the nexus with official duty.

Conclusion: Prior sanction was necessary before cognisance could be taken, and the proceedings initiated without such sanction were unsustainable. The challenge to the prosecution succeeded in favour of the appellants.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the alleged misconduct of a public servant has a reasonable connection with official duty, prior sanction is mandatory even if the act is said to be in excess of authority or done under colour of duty.

Issues: Whether the allegations and materials disclosed cheating so as to justify continuation of the criminal proceeding, or whether the dispute was only a civil/commercial breach of contract liable to be quashed.

Analysis: The parties' dealings showed a continuing business transaction in which coal was supplied on credit. The crucial question was whether dishonest inducement existed at the inception of the transaction. The later notarized agreement and the non-payment under it, by themselves, did not establish deception from the beginning. The collected material did not show that, after the subsequent agreement, further supplies were made or that the complainant suffered wrongful loss on that footing. The record also did not disclose that the appellant was insolvent or in such financial straits that he must have known repayment was impossible. Mere failure to honour a promise or inability to pay because of business setbacks does not, without more, amount to cheating.

Conclusion: The allegations did not make out cheating and the criminal proceeding was not fit to continue; the quashing relief ought to be granted in favour of the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: To constitute cheating in a commercial transaction, the materials must show dishonest inducement at the inception and resultant parting with property or wrongful loss; a mere subsequent breach of promise or failure to repay does not, by itself, establish the offence.