Issues: (i) whether a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 can be treated as a constructive trust for the purposes of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; (ii) whether the plaint disclosed a breach of trust or necessity for directions of the court in the administration of the trust; (iii) whether the plaintiffs were persons having an interest in the trust and had instituted the suit in a representative capacity; and (iv) whether the reliefs sought and the dominant purpose of the suit fell within Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Issue (i): whether a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 can be treated as a constructive trust for the purposes of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: A registered society is not, by itself, an express trust merely because its property vests in its governing body under Section 5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. However, Section 5 contemplates vesting in trustees where a separate trust exists or is created, and the Court accepted that a constructive trust may also arise where the society's fiduciaries divert or withhold property received for charitable objects. The pleadings and governing documents showed charitable objects, a no-profit structure, and control of funds in fiduciary hands, supporting the prima facie application of the doctrine.

Conclusion: The society could be treated, on the facts pleaded, as falling within the ambit of a constructive trust.

Issue (ii): whether the plaint disclosed a breach of trust or necessity for directions of the court in the administration of the trust.

Analysis: For Section 92, allegations must show either breach of trust or that court directions are necessary for proper administration. The plaint alleged siphoning of funds, financial impropriety, diversion of donor money, and mismanagement. At the leave stage, the Court was not to conduct a full factual inquiry, but only to see whether the averments prima facie disclosed the condition. The allegations were held sufficient to show at least a need for judicial directions and possible breach of fiduciary obligations, though the truth of those allegations would remain for trial.

Conclusion: The requirement of breach of trust or necessity for directions was prima facie satisfied.

Issue (iii): whether the plaintiffs were persons having an interest in the trust and had instituted the suit in a representative capacity.

Analysis: The phrase "persons having an interest in the trust" requires a real, present and substantial interest, not a remote or illusory one. The plaintiffs were closely associated with the society's functioning, one being a co-founder and former president and the other a current board member. The suit also disclosed allegations affecting the wider body of beneficiaries and not merely private disputes, so the representative character was not negated merely because personal grievances were also pleaded.

Conclusion: The plaintiffs were persons interested in the trust and the suit was maintainable in a representative capacity.

Issue (iv): whether the reliefs sought and the dominant purpose of the suit fell within Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The Court distinguished between purely personal claims and reliefs relatable to trust administration. Prayers for removal of trustees, rendition of accounts, and settlement of a scheme were held to fall within clauses of Section 92(1), even though some prayers also reflected personal grievance. The dominant purpose test required looking at the plaint as a whole, and the presence of some private reliefs did not defeat maintainability where the suit also sought reliefs of the kind contemplated by Section 92 and was founded on allegations affecting public charitable administration.

Conclusion: The reliefs and the dominant purpose of the suit brought it within Section 92.

Final Conclusion: The leave granted under Section 92 was upheld, and the suit was allowed to proceed for adjudication on the alleged constructive trust and related reliefs, while purely personal grievances were left outside the special jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: A registered society may fall within Section 92 where its properties are held in a fiduciary capacity and the pleadings prima facie disclose a constructive trust, breach of fiduciary obligation, and reliefs of the kind enumerated in Section 92, assessed by the dominant purpose of the suit rather than isolated personal prayers.

Issues: (i) Whether wind energy projects that did not avail accelerated depreciation were entitled to seek project-wise tariff determination before the State Commission; (ii) whether the fixed tariff in the power purchase agreements barred such projects from seeking a different tariff.

Issue (i): Whether wind energy projects that did not avail accelerated depreciation were entitled to seek project-wise tariff determination before the State Commission.

Analysis: Tariff under the Electricity Act, 2003 is fixed statutorily by the Appropriate Commission under the tariff framework, and the State Commission had itself made the higher fixed tariff applicable only to projects that availed accelerated depreciation under the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the Income-Tax Rules, 1962. The statutory scheme governing depreciation required the option to be exercised at the relevant time for the assessment year in which generation commenced. Since the respondent companies did not avail accelerated depreciation, the tariff meant for projects availing that benefit could not be applied to them. The Commission had also specifically indicated that projects not availing the benefit could seek separate consideration on a case-by-case basis.

Conclusion: The respondent companies were entitled to approach the State Commission for determination of a separate tariff.

Issue (ii): Whether the fixed tariff in the power purchase agreements barred such projects from seeking a different tariff.

Analysis: The power purchase agreements could not override the statutory tariff framework or the State Commission's express stipulation that the fixed tariff applied only to projects availing accelerated depreciation. The generating companies had not given any binding commitment at the time of contracting that they would necessarily avail accelerated depreciation when the statutory option arose. In the absence of such commitment, a tariff clause framed for a different category of projects could not estop them from seeking the correct tariff applicable to their projects. The public character of the procuring entity and the renewable energy policy framework also reinforced that the contractual clause could not be used to impose an inapplicable tariff.

Conclusion: The power purchase agreements did not bar the respondent companies from seeking separate tariff determination.

Final Conclusion: The statutory tariff fixed for wind projects availing accelerated depreciation could not be imposed on projects that did not avail that benefit, and the appeals failed.

Ratio Decidendi: A tariff fixed by the Commission for a specific category of renewable energy projects cannot be enforced against projects outside that category, and a contractual tariff clause cannot defeat the statutory power of tariff determination where no binding commitment was obtained at the time the statutory option arose.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition was maintainable on the touchstone of public law element; (ii) Whether disputes arising from the concession agreement fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal under the 1983 Act, excluding private arbitration under the 1996 Act; (iii) Whether withdrawal of the earlier reference without liberty barred the appellant from pursuing restoration and the same claims in another forum.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition was maintainable on the touchstone of public law element.

Analysis: A writ under Article 226 is not confined to disputes against the State in the strict sense. Where a State-owned entity invokes writ jurisdiction against a private contractor, maintainability depends on the presence of a public law element. The dispute here was not a mere enforcement of private contractual obligations, but a challenge to the invocation of private arbitration notwithstanding an asserted statutory forum under the special enactment governing works contracts. The project concerned a State road and the relief sought related to the forum competent to adjudicate disputes affecting a public function.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether disputes arising from the concession agreement fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal under the 1983 Act, excluding private arbitration under the 1996 Act.

Analysis: The concession agreement was treated as a works contract within the statutory definition. The special statute defines disputes to include ascertained or ascertainable money claims arising out of works contracts, mandates reference to the Tribunal irrespective of any contractual arbitration clause, and bars civil court jurisdiction. The agreement could not contract around the statutory mandate. Prior binding decisions recognizing the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal in works contract disputes were applied, and the monetary claims were held to be covered by the statutory definition of dispute.

Conclusion: The Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction, and the private arbitration proceedings could not be sustained.

Issue (iii): Whether withdrawal of the earlier reference without liberty barred the appellant from pursuing restoration and the same claims in another forum.

Analysis: The reference before the Tribunal had been withdrawn without obtaining liberty to institute a fresh reference. The withdrawal provision imposes a substantive bar on filing a fresh reference on the same subject matter. At the same time, in the interests of justice, the appellant was permitted to seek recall of the withdrawal order and restoration of the earlier reference before the Tribunal, which would then consider the request on merits in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The appellant was barred from re-agitating the withdrawn claims in a fresh proceeding, but was permitted to apply for restoration of the earlier reference before the Tribunal.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to private arbitration failed on merits, the statutory forum was upheld, and the appellant was given a limited opportunity to seek revival of the earlier reference before the Tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute creates an exclusive forum for works-contract disputes and mandates reference to that forum notwithstanding any arbitration clause, private arbitration is excluded by operation of law, and withdrawal of a statutory reference without liberty bars a fresh reference on the same subject matter.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1.1 Whether an intra-court appeal (Letters Patent Appeal) lay against a Single Judge's order passed in contempt proceedings, where the order (a) held the appellants guilty of contempt, and (b) simultaneously determined substantive service rights of the respondent, including entitlement to promotion to the rank of IG.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

2.1 Maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal against Single Judge's contempt order involving determination of substantive rights

Legal framework

2.1.1 The Court referred to the principles summarised in paragraph 11 of the decision in "Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. and Others v. Chunilal Nanda and Others", particularly:

2.1.1.1 An appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 lies only against an order imposing punishment for contempt (para 11.I).

2.1.1.2 Directions or decisions made in contempt proceedings on the merits of the dispute between parties are not in exercise of the "jurisdiction to punish for contempt" and are not appealable under Section 19 (para 11.IV).

2.1.1.3 However, if in contempt proceedings the High Court decides any issue or makes any direction relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, such order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal where available (para 11.V).

Interpretation and reasoning

2.1.2 The Court noted that the Single Judge's order dated 2 June 2023 did two distinct things:

2.1.2.1 It held the appellants (then respondents) guilty of contempt for willful disobedience of the Division Bench's judgment dated 24 December 2019 in respect of pay fixation, seniority and consequential benefits including promotion (para 39).

2.1.2.2 It effectively crystallised a substantive service right by proceeding on the basis that the respondent was entitled to promotion to the rank of IG, at least with effect from 2021, and granted six weeks' time to issue a fresh order granting such promotion to bring him at par with his immediate junior (para 41 read with para 38-39).

2.1.3 The Court emphasised that the finding of willful disobedience (contempt) was immediately preceded by the recording of the respondent's submission claiming entitlement to promotions up to the rank of IG from 2021 till retirement, and was followed by a direction to issue an order granting promotion to the rank of IG. On a plain reading, this meant that the Single Judge had gone beyond merely determining contempt and had adjudicated on substantive rights relating to promotion.

2.1.4 The Division Bench, in dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal as not maintainable, had proceeded on the understanding that:

2.1.4.1 No punishment for contempt had been imposed, and therefore no appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act was maintainable.

2.1.4.2 The Single Judge's observations were only for determining whether there was willful disobedience and did not crystallise any rights or obligations between the parties (paras 52-53).

2.1.5 The Court held that the Division Bench erred by confining its analysis only to Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act and by relying on the respondent's submission about how the Single Judge's order should be "understood", instead of examining the order on its own terms.

2.1.6 Applying the principles in "Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd.", the Court drew a distinction between:

2.1.6.1 The aspect of the Single Judge's order which related to holding the appellants guilty of contempt-appealable under Section 19 only upon imposition of punishment.

2.1.6.2 The aspect relating to adjudication of the respondent's entitlement to promotion to the rank of IG-constituting a determination of the merits of the underlying service dispute, which was amenable to challenge in an intra-court appeal (Letters Patent Appeal) in terms of para 11(V) of the precedent.

2.1.7 The Court clarified that the question whether an intra-court appeal lies must be determined by the true character and content of the Single Judge's order, not by later submissions seeking to limit its effect. Since the Single Judge's order had clearly crystallised a right to promotion and issued a direction to grant IG rank, that part of the order was appealable intra-court.

Conclusions

2.1.8 An appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act is not maintainable in the absence of an order imposing punishment for contempt; to that extent, the contempt finding alone was not appealable under Section 19 at this stage.

2.1.9 However, where, in contempt proceedings, a Single Judge adjudicates or crystallises substantive rights between the parties-such as directing promotion to a particular rank-such part of the order is not an exercise of "jurisdiction to punish for contempt" and is amenable to an intra-court appeal (Letters Patent Appeal), in line with para 11(V) of "Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd.".

2.1.10 The Division Bench erred in holding that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable and in treating the Single Judge's order as not deciding any dispute about rights and obligations other than contempt.

2.1.11 The impugned order of the Division Bench dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal for want of maintainability was set aside, and the Letters Patent Appeal, along with associated applications, was restored to the file of the Division Bench for consideration on merits, with all contentions of the parties kept open and a direction for expeditious disposal.

Issues: Whether the MSME revival and rehabilitation framework prevented a secured creditor from classifying the borrower's account as non-performing and issuing notice under the SARFAESI regime without first identifying incipient stress, and whether the borrower could invoke that framework for the first time at the stage of action under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act.

Analysis: The framework in the 29 May 2015 notification was read as a whole and harmoniously, so that the sequence of identification by the bank or creditor and identification by the enterprise gave effect to both sides' obligations. The borrower was required to act with vigilance and, where it reasonably apprehended failure of business or inability to pay debts, to initiate the framework by a verified claim. On such invocation, the secured creditor would be bound to consider the request and keep further SARFAESI action in abeyance. However, the framework did not bar the creditor from classifying a defaulting account as non-performing or from issuing notice under section 13(2) where the borrower had not earlier invoked the framework. A claim raised only after notice, and especially at the stage of proceedings under section 14, was treated as a belated attempt to restrain lawful SARFAESI steps. The availability of a statutory remedy under section 17 also weighed against interference under Article 32.

Conclusion: The borrower was not entitled to the claimed protection at the belated stage, and no interference under Article 32 was warranted.

Ratio Decidendi: The MSME revival framework operates on a harmonised scheme of reciprocal obligations: the borrower must timely invoke it with a verified claim, and only then does the secured creditor become bound to consider the claim and hold further SARFAESI action in abeyance; absent such invocation, classification of the account and notice under section 13(2) are not barred, and belated reliance on the framework cannot defeat the SARFAESI process.

Issues: Whether the deceased employee's fatal road accident while commuting to work arose out of and in the course of employment under the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923.

Analysis: The phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment" in the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 is to be construed in the light of its beneficial object and the cognate scheme of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. The earlier restrictive approach in the commuting context was found to have been neutralised by the later statutory intervention in Section 51E of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, which was treated as clarificatory and retrospective because it resolved the ambiguity surrounding accidents occurring while travelling between residence and place of work. The Court also relied on the theory of notional extension and the principle that statutes in pari materia may be read together where they serve a common social welfare object. On the undisputed facts, the deceased was a night watchman proceeding to work during his duty hours and the accident occurred about 5 km from the factory, establishing a sufficient nexus between the circumstances, time and place of the accident and the employment.

Conclusion: The fatal accident is held to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, and compensation under the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 is payable.

Final Conclusion: The High Court's reversal was set aside and the compensation award of the Commissioner was restored in favour of the claimants.

Ratio Decidendi: A commuting accident may fall within "arising out of and in the course of employment" where the statutory context and the facts establish a real nexus between the journey and the employment, and the provision must be construed liberally in a social welfare statute.

Issues: (i) Whether bail granted on the basis of an accused's undertaking to deposit money can be sustained when the undertaking is later breached; (ii) whether regular bail or anticipatory bail can be granted subject to a monetary deposit or similar financial undertaking.

Issue (i): Whether bail granted on the basis of an accused's undertaking to deposit money can be sustained when the undertaking is later breached.

Analysis: The accused had voluntarily filed an affidavit undertaking to deposit a specified amount to obtain bail and had secured release on that basis. The undertaking was treated as part of the basis on which liberty was granted. After taking benefit of the order, the accused did not honour the undertaking and sought to characterise the condition as onerous. The Court held that a litigant cannot accept the advantage of an order obtained on a representation and later resile from it by questioning the very condition that secured relief.

Conclusion: The breach of the undertaking justified cancellation of bail.

Issue (ii): Whether regular bail or anticipatory bail can be granted subject to a monetary deposit or similar financial undertaking.

Analysis: Bail jurisdiction must be exercised on merits and not as a mechanism for recovery of money or enforcement of private claims. A financial deposit cannot ordinarily be imposed as a condition for bail, and courts should not decide bail applications on undertakings to pay money. The Court disapproved the practice of granting liberty on such conditions and directed that bail pleas must be decided strictly on merits in accordance with law.

Conclusion: Monetary deposit cannot be the basis of granting regular bail or anticipatory bail, and such conditional orders are impermissible.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was rejected, the cancellation of bail was left undisturbed, and a binding caution was issued that bail decisions must not rest on monetary undertakings.

Ratio Decidendi: Bail cannot be granted on the basis of an accused's promise to deposit money, and where liberty has been obtained on such an undertaking, deliberate breach of that undertaking can justify cancellation of bail; bail must be determined on merits, not as a device for financial recovery.

Issues: (i) Whether an application under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can be entertained without first approaching the police authorities; (ii) whether the Magistrate's order directing registration of FIR was passed without application of mind; (iii) whether completion of investigation and filing of chargesheets barred quashing of the FIR and the Magistrate's order; (iv) whether the dispute was purely civil and devoid of criminality; and (v) whether the impugned FIR was a successive FIR based on the same allegations as an earlier FIR.

Issue (i): Whether an application under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can be entertained without first approaching the police authorities.

Analysis: The statutory scheme requires the informant to first approach the officer in charge of the police station under Section 154(1) and, on refusal, the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3). Only thereafter may recourse be taken to the Magistrate under Section 156(3). Direct approach to the Magistrate without exhausting those remedies is ordinarily improper, though the Magistrate remains competent to act where a cognizable offence is disclosed.

Conclusion: The application ought ordinarily not to have been entertained directly, but the order was not rendered jurisdiction solely on that account.

Issue (ii): Whether the Magistrate's order directing registration of FIR was passed without application of mind.

Analysis: An order under Section 156(3) must reflect application of mind and be supported by reasons. The order in question recorded that counsel was heard, the complaint was perused, and the material disclosed a cognizable offence. That recording was sufficient to show application of mind for the limited purpose of directing registration of the FIR.

Conclusion: The Magistrate's order was not vitiated for want of application of mind.

Issue (iii): Whether completion of investigation and filing of chargesheets barred quashing of the FIR and the Magistrate's order.

Analysis: Since the foundational order directing registration of FIR was not illegal or without jurisdiction, the investigation undertaken pursuant to it and the chargesheets filed thereafter could not be nullified merely because the High Court was invited to exercise its extraordinary or inherent jurisdiction. Discretionary interference was not warranted in the absence of miscarriage of justice.

Conclusion: The refusal to quash the FIR and the Magistrate's order on this ground was justified.

Issue (iv): Whether the dispute was purely civil and devoid of criminality.

Analysis: Although the dispute arose out of a memorandum of understanding and involved contractual breach-like allegations, the complaint also contained assertions of inducement, cheating, and criminal conspiracy. At the quashing stage, the Court cannot test the truthfulness of those allegations or separate the civil and criminal elements on a factual inquiry requiring evidence.

Conclusion: The FIR disclosed allegations that could constitute criminal offences, and it could not be quashed merely as a civil dispute.

Issue (v): Whether the impugned FIR was a successive FIR based on the same allegations as an earlier FIR.

Analysis: Though the later FIR was similar to the earlier one, it was not shown to be virtually identical in all respects. The earlier FIR had not culminated in trial, conviction, acquittal, or discharge, and the bar against multiple proceedings for the same offence did not operate in the manner urged. The later FIR was therefore not liable to be struck down on the basis of successive FIR principles.

Conclusion: The impugned FIR was not shown to be impermissible as a successive FIR.

Final Conclusion: The challenges to the FIR and the Magistrate's order failed, and the Court declined to interfere with the concurrent orders below.

Ratio Decidendi: Direct recourse to a Magistrate under Section 156(3) without first availing the statutory police remedies is ordinarily irregular but not void if a cognizable offence is disclosed; an order under Section 156(3) is sustained where it reflects application of mind and reasons, and quashing is not warranted where the FIR discloses criminal allegations and no impermissible successive FIR bar is established.

ISSUES:

Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be filed before the Court having territorial jurisdiction over the branch of the bank where the payee maintains the account.Whether the Court's jurisdiction is determined by the location of the drawee bank branch where the cheque is presented or the branch where the payee's account is maintained.The correctness of the Magistrate's and High Court's orders returning the complaint for lack of territorial jurisdiction based on the location of the drawee bank branch.

RULINGS / HOLDINGS:

The Court held that Section 142(2)(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act clearly vests jurisdiction in the Court within whose local jurisdiction the branch of the bank where the payee maintains the account is situated, and not the branch where the cheque is presented for collection.It was established that the payee maintained his bank account with the Kotak Mahindra Bank at the Bendurwell, Mangalore Branch, and therefore, the complaint was rightly filed before the Court in Mangalore.The Magistrate's order returning the complaint on the ground that the drawee bank was located at Mumbai was erroneous and opposed to the clear mandate of Section 142(2)(a) of the N.I. Act.The High Court erred in confirming the Magistrate's order based on the incorrect assumption that the payee maintained his account at the Mumbai branch.The appeals were allowed, setting aside the impugned orders, and the Magistrate at Mangalore was directed to entertain and adjudicate the complaint cases expeditiously in accordance with law.

RATIONALE:

The Court applied the statutory framework under Section 138 and Section 142(2)(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, as amended in 2015, which governs the territorial jurisdiction for offences relating to dishonour of cheques.The Court relied on the authoritative interpretation in Bridgestone India Private Limited vs. Inderpal Singh, which affirmed that jurisdiction lies where the payee's bank account is maintained, not where the cheque is presented.The Court corrected the factual misunderstanding regarding the location of the payee's bank account, emphasizing that the account was maintained at the Mangalore branch, notwithstanding the cheque's presentation at the Mumbai branch.No dissent or doctrinal shift was indicated; the judgment reaffirmed established principles governing jurisdiction under the N.I. Act post-amendment.

Issues: Whether, in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, amendment of the complaint could be permitted after cognizance had been taken and whether the proposed correction altered the nature of the complaint or caused prejudice to the accused.

Analysis: The settled position is that a criminal court is not powerless to permit amendment of a complaint where the defect is curable, the amendment is formal or otherwise appropriate in the circumstances, and no prejudice is caused to the accused. The governing consideration is whether the amendment is necessary to correct an infirmity that can be cured without altering the essential character of the proceedings. The written complaint requirement under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, does not exclude all amendments as a matter of principle. The test of prejudice, reflected also in the scheme of alteration of charge under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, remains central. On the facts, the amendment related only to the description of the goods supplied, was sought at a stage when the complainant's evidence was incomplete, and did not change the nature of the prosecution. The High Court's focus on GST consequences was extraneous to the issue whether the complaint itself could be corrected.

Conclusion: The amendment was permissible, no prejudice was shown, and the order refusing to sustain the trial court's allowance of amendment could not stand.

Ratio Decidendi: A complaint in a criminal prosecution may be amended to cure a formal or curable defect, even after cognizance, if the amendment does not change the nature of the case and causes no prejudice to the accused.

Issues: Whether the acknowledgment contained in the respondent's communication dated 21.05.1992 attracts the extended period of limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in respect of the appellant's entire suit claim for Rs.3,07,115.85.

Analysis: Section 18 requires an acknowledgment in writing of liability in respect of the property or right in question so that a fresh period of limitation is computed from the time of such acknowledgment. An acknowledgment operates only in respect of a present subsisting liability and cannot extend limitation for a liability or claim that was not the subject-matter of the acknowledgment. The respondent's communication accepted liability only for Rs.27,874.10 as full and final settlement and disputed the larger contract value and the balance claimed. The decisions relied upon by the appellant are fact-sensitive; where there is a clear acknowledgment of the full claim the extended period applies, but where the acknowledgment is limited to a specific smaller sum the protection of Section 18 is confined to that sum.

Conclusion: The acknowledgment dated 21.05.1992 does not extend the period of limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the appellant's entire suit claim of Rs.3,07,115.85; the benefit of extended limitation is confined to the acknowledged amount of Rs.27,874.10. The appeal is dismissed.

Issues: Whether the grant of anticipatory bail to the accused respondents was justified in view of the gravity of the allegations, the need for custodial investigation, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the alleged suppression of material facts, and the alleged breach of bail conditions.

Analysis: Anticipatory bail is an exceptional remedy and is not to be granted routinely. The allegations in the FIR disclosed serious offences involving an alleged attempt to forcibly dispossess the complainant from inherited property, with further material indicating concealment of the fact that the interim injunction had already been set aside. The record also disclosed criminal antecedents and allegations of threatening witnesses, which reinforced the need for custodial investigation. In these circumstances, the grant of pre-arrest bail without due regard to the gravity of the case and the investigation requirements was unsustainable.

Conclusion: The grant of anticipatory bail was not justified and the relief granted to the accused respondents was liable to be cancelled.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order granting pre-arrest bail was set aside and the accused respondents were required to surrender, with liberty to seek regular bail in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Anticipatory bail should be refused where the allegations are grave, custodial interrogation is necessary, and the record shows suppression of material facts or conduct undermining the fairness of the investigation.

Issues: Whether the strictures passed against a judicial officer in the impugned bail order were warranted and required to be expunged.

Analysis: The appeal concerned adverse observations made against a judicial officer while deciding a bail matter. The governing principle is that superior courts may correct erroneous orders, but should ordinarily refrain from recording personal criticism of a judicial officer's conduct or calibre in the judicial order itself. If any concern exists regarding the conduct of a subordinate judicial officer, the safer course is to decide the lis on merits and place the matter before the administrative side of the High Court for appropriate consideration. The impugned strictures were also founded on a precedent later reversed, and they were recorded without giving the judicial officer an opportunity of explanation.

Conclusion: The strictures were uncalled for and were expunged, with the impugned order modified accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi: Personal adverse remarks against a judicial officer should ordinarily be avoided in judicial orders, and concerns about conduct should be dealt with separately on the administrative side rather than by condemning the officer unheard.

Issues: (i) Whether the question of existence of an arbitration agreement should be left for the arbitral tribunal to decide; (ii) Whether clause 13 would constitute an arbitration agreement between the parties as contemplated under Section 7 of the 1996 Act; (iii) Whether clause 32 of Instructions to Bidders negates the existence of an arbitration agreement.

Issue (i): Whether the question of existence of an arbitration agreement should be left for the arbitral tribunal to decide

Analysis: The scope of Section 11, after the 2015 amendment, is confined to examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. The referral court is required to undertake only a limited, prima facie scrutiny of the material placed before it and not a mini-trial on disputed questions of fact or evidence. The doctrine of competence-competence permits the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction, but that does not oust the court's threshold duty to see whether an arbitration agreement is prima facie shown to exist.

Conclusion: The question of existence of an arbitration agreement cannot be left entirely to the arbitral tribunal at the Section 11 stage.

Issue (ii): Whether clause 13 would constitute an arbitration agreement between the parties as contemplated under Section 7 of the 1996 Act

Analysis: An arbitration agreement must disclose an intention to submit disputes to a private tribunal and a binding obligation to be governed by its decision. A clause that merely permits or enables arbitration, or contemplates arbitration only if parties later agree, does not satisfy the requirement of consensus ad idem. Clause 13, read as a whole, provided a staged process for internal settlement and thereafter stated that redressal of disputes may be sought through arbitration in cases other than Government agencies. The wording was permissive and did not create a binding commitment that either party could unilaterally invoke arbitration as of right.

Conclusion: Clause 13 does not constitute an arbitration agreement.

Issue (iii): Whether clause 32 of Instructions to Bidders negates the existence of an arbitration agreement

Analysis: Clause 32 only specifies the civil court jurisdiction for disputes arising out of the tender and the contract. It does not by itself exclude arbitration or operate as a substitute for an arbitration clause. Since no arbitration agreement was found in clause 13, the discussion on clause 32 did not alter the result.

Conclusion: Clause 32 does not independently establish or negate arbitration, and the issue does not affect the outcome.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the contractual clause relied upon was not a binding arbitration agreement and the request for appointment of an arbitrator was therefore unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A clause is an arbitration agreement only if it evinces a binding and present intention to refer disputes to arbitration; a merely permissive or future-contingent reference does not satisfy Section 7.

Issues: (i) Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to conciliation proceedings under Section 18(2) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, and whether a time-barred claim can be referred to conciliation; (ii) Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to arbitration proceedings under Section 18(3) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, whether a time-barred claim can be referred to arbitration, and whether disclosure of unpaid amounts in the buyer's financial statements under Section 22 extends limitation.

Issue (i): Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to conciliation proceedings under Section 18(2) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, and whether a time-barred claim can be referred to conciliation.

Analysis: Conciliation under Section 18(2) is an out-of-court, non-adjudicatory and non-coercive process governed by the conciliation provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Limitation Act applies to suits, appeals and applications before courts, and neither the MSMED Act nor the Limitation Act contains any provision extending its operation to conciliation. The expiry of limitation bars the remedy in court but does not extinguish the underlying debt. A time-barred debt may still be settled by agreement, and a settlement arrived at through conciliation is in the nature of a valid contract.

Conclusion: The Limitation Act does not apply to conciliation proceedings under Section 18(2), and a time-barred claim can be referred to conciliation.

Issue (ii): Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to arbitration proceedings under Section 18(3) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, whether a time-barred claim can be referred to arbitration, and whether disclosure of unpaid amounts in the buyer's financial statements under Section 22 extends limitation.

Analysis: Section 18(3) creates a statutory deeming fiction that makes arbitration under the MSMED Act subject to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as if it were pursuant to an arbitration agreement. That incorporation attracts Section 43 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and with it the Limitation Act. The special law prevails over the general rule in Section 2(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to the extent of inconsistency. Time-barred claims therefore cannot be excluded from the arbitral reference on the footing that they are stale. As to Section 22, disclosure of unpaid amounts in financial statements may in an appropriate case amount to acknowledgment, but the effect of such disclosure must be tested case by case.

Conclusion: The Limitation Act applies to arbitration proceedings under Section 18(3), and time-barred claims are governed by that limitation regime; the effect of Section 22 disclosure is not automatic and depends on the facts.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeed only to the extent that conciliation under the MSMED Act is not controlled by the Limitation Act, while the position that limitation governs arbitration under the same statutory framework is maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute mandates conciliation and arbitration and expressly incorporates the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for arbitration, limitation applies to the arbitral stage through Section 43 but not to the non-adjudicatory conciliatory stage; the special statute's deeming and overriding provisions prevail over the general exclusion in Section 2(4).

Issues: Whether a notice terminating tenancy sent by registered post under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was validly served when the postal cover was returned with the endorsement "ND", and whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the ejectment decree on that basis.

Analysis: Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1887 creates a statutory presumption of service where a document is properly addressed, prepaid and sent by registered post, unless the contrary is proved. The notice in the present case was admittedly sent by registered post. The endorsement "ND" did not displace the statutory presumption merely because the postal article was not actually delivered. The Court reaffirmed that service by registered post, in the absence of rebuttal, is treated as deemed service. The High Court proceeded without giving effect to this statutory position and treated non-delivery as if it automatically negatived service. The revisional interference was also unwarranted, as none of the limited grounds justifying interference in revision, such as want of jurisdiction or denial of a proper trial, was made out.

Conclusion: The notice was deemed to have been served, and the High Court erred in setting aside the ejectment decree. The finding is in favour of the appellant.

Issues: (i) Whether Note 3 of Regulation 55 of the CERC (Terms and Conditions of Tariff) Regulations, 2019 bars the generating company from supplying free power to the State beyond 13% and overrides the free power obligation under the Implementation Agreement; (ii) Whether the writ petition seeking alignment of the Implementation Agreement with the Regulations and the CERC order dated 17.03.2022 was maintainable before the High Court.

Issue (i): Whether Note 3 of Regulation 55 of the CERC (Terms and Conditions of Tariff) Regulations, 2019 bars the generating company from supplying free power to the State beyond 13% and overrides the free power obligation under the Implementation Agreement.

Analysis: Note 3 of Regulation 55, read with Regulation 44 and the tariff framework under the Electricity Act, 2003, operates for tariff computation and billing. It requires free energy for the home State to be taken as 13% or actual, whichever is less, for determining saleable capacity and the pass-through recoverable from beneficiaries. The regulation does not prohibit the actual contractual supply of free power above 13% and does not nullify a pre-existing contractual undertaking to supply a higher quantum. The generating company's contractual obligation under the Implementation Agreement therefore remains intact, while the regulatory cap limits only the tariff pass-through.

Conclusion: The Regulation does not bar supply beyond 13% and the Implementation Agreement is not overridden.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petition seeking alignment of the Implementation Agreement with the Regulations and the CERC order dated 17.03.2022 was maintainable before the High Court.

Analysis: The Electricity Act, 2003 constitutes a complete regulatory code entrusting tariff determination, regulation-making, and interpretation of tariff regulations to the specialized regulator, with statutory appellate remedies available. The dispute involved interpretation of tariff regulations and their effect on contractual arrangements, which lay within the CERC's domain. The CERC's order dated 17.03.2022 only held that the PPA and PSAs were overridden to the extent inconsistent with the Regulations for tariff purposes and did not decide the Implementation Agreement as modified or extinguished. In these circumstances, the High Court ought not to have exercised writ jurisdiction to realign the contractual documents on the basis of the tariff regulations or the CERC order.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable.

Final Conclusion: The regulatory cap under Note 3 of Regulation 55 affects tariff computation alone, not the parties' contractual free power obligation, and the High Court could not rewrite the Implementation Agreement in writ proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: A tariff regulation that caps free energy for tariff purposes does not, by itself, extinguish or amend a pre-existing contractual obligation to supply a higher quantum of free power, and disputes on the interpretation and effect of such tariff regulations must ordinarily be pursued before the specialized regulatory forum and statutory appellate mechanism.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether a notice issued by the Investigating Agency under Section 35(3) of the BNSS, 2023 can be validly served through WhatsApp or other modes of electronic communication, as an alternative/substitute to the modes of service prescribed under the BNSS, 2023.

(ii) Whether provisions permitting electronic issuance/service of Court summons (including Sections 63, 64 and 71 of the BNSS, 2023) or the enabling provision on electronic mode for trials, inquiries and proceedings (Section 530 of the BNSS, 2023) justify extending electronic service to a Section 35 notice issued during investigation.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i): Validity of electronic service (WhatsApp/other electronic communication) for a Section 35 BNSS notice

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court considered the statutory recognition of "electronic communication" under the BNSS, 2023, the scope of Section 530 (electronic mode for trials, inquiries and proceedings), and the scheme of Section 35 governing arrest without warrant and the mandatory issuance of notice where arrest is not required.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that Section 35 contains a substantive safeguard connected to personal liberty. A notice under Section 35(3) is not a mere informational formality: once served, it imposes a duty to comply, and non-compliance may lead to arrest under Section 35(6), subject to the Investigating Agency's discretion. Because non-compliance can have a "drastic effect" on liberty, service must be effected in a manner that protects this substantive right. The Court applied a purposive and plain reading of the BNSS, 2023 and found that the Legislature has clearly demarcated where electronic communication is permissible, and has not included service of a Section 35 notice within those permissible categories. The Court treated this omission as conscious and reflective of legislative intent, particularly since the statutory scheme restricts electronic modes to certain procedures which, as understood by the Court, do not bear on liberty in the same immediate way.

Conclusions: Electronic communication (including WhatsApp) is not a valid mode for service of a notice under Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023, and cannot be recognised as an alternative or substitute to the BNSS-prescribed mode of service.

Issue (ii): Whether electronic service provisions for Court summons and Section 530 can be used to extend electronic service to Section 35 notices

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court examined Sections 63 and 64 (form and service of Court summons, including electronic form bearing the Court seal/image or digital signature), Section 71 (electronic service of summons on witnesses), and Section 530 (electronic mode for "trials, inquiries and proceedings"), alongside the statutory distinction between investigation and Court processes.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court rejected the analogy between a Section 35 notice and Court summons. It held that summons issued by a Court are a judicial act and travel on a different footing from a Section 35 notice, which is an executive act during investigation; the procedure for one cannot be read into the other. The Court further held that reliance on Section 71 (electronic service of summons on witnesses) does not assist because non-compliance with such summons was treated as not having the same immediate bearing on liberty as non-compliance with a Section 35 notice, which may lead to arrest under Section 35(6). The Court also addressed Section 530, holding that the Legislature has limited electronic mode to trials, inquiries and proceedings, and the absence of investigation-related service of Section 35 notices from this framework supports the conclusion that such electronic service is not permitted.

Conclusions: Provisions enabling electronic service/issuance of Court summons and the electronic-mode framework under Section 530 do not permit, by implication, electronic service of a Section 35 notice. Section 35 notice service remains confined to the modes recognised and prescribed under the BNSS, 2023, and cannot be expanded by analogy or implication.

Issues: Whether the Employees' Provident Fund authorities were justified in treating the appellant and the other company as one establishment for the purposes of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, and in denying infancy protection on that basis.

Analysis: The applicable test is not confined to whether two units are separate juristic entities or whether they have separate registrations. In determining whether establishments are one, the relevant considerations include unity of ownership, management and control, unity of finance, common administration, geographical proximity, common workforce or transferability of employees, and functional integrality. No single factor is ative in every case, and the facts must be viewed cumulatively in the context of a beneficial welfare statute. Separate incorporation, separate accounts, and distinct registrations under other enactments are not conclusive. On the facts found, the two concerns operated from contiguous premises, shared common contact details, website, e-mail and administrative set-up, had common security, common family control in management, and common funding from the same family source.

Conclusion: The authorities were justified in clubbing the two units and treating them as one establishment under the Act. The appellant was not entitled to infancy protection, and the liability from the earlier date was sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal fails on merits because the material on record established a single integrated establishment for provident fund purposes.

Ratio Decidendi: For a welfare enactment like the provident fund law, separate legal personality or separate registrations do not prevent clubbing where the cumulative facts show unity of management, finance and control, and functional integrality of the concerns.

Issues: Whether Regulation 33 of the Central Bank of India (Employees') Pension Regulations, 1995 requires prior consultation with the Board of Directors before pension payable to a compulsorily retired employee is reduced, and whether a post facto approval can cure the absence of such consultation.

Analysis: Regulation 33 was construed as a composite provision. Clause (1) permits a superior authority to award compulsory retirement pension not below two-thirds of full pension, while clause (2) covers situations where the competent authority, including in appellate or review jurisdiction, awards less than full pension and mandates consultation with the Board before the order is passed. Reading the clauses separately would render the appellate and review language in clause (2) ineffective and would permit circumvention of the safeguard. The right to pension was treated as a valuable property right protected by law, so any reduction below full pension had to comply strictly with the prescribed procedure. The absence of prior consultation could not be validated by subsequent approval, because the regulation contemplates consultation as a pre-decisional safeguard.

Conclusion: The reduction of pension without prior consultation with the Board of Directors was invalid, and the challenge to the High Court's view succeeded. The Bank was left free to take a fresh decision in accordance with Regulation 33 after hearing the employee and consulting the Board.