Issues: (i) Whether the Telecom Consumers Protection (Ninth Amendment) Regulations, 2015 were ultra vires the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997; (ii) whether the impugned regulation was manifestly arbitrary and imposed an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on business; (iii) whether the impugned regulation unlawfully interfered with licence conditions; and (iv) whether the regulation-making process satisfied the statutory requirement of transparency.

Issue (i): Whether the Telecom Consumers Protection (Ninth Amendment) Regulations, 2015 were ultra vires the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997.

Analysis: The power to frame regulations under Section 36 is wide, but it must be exercised consistently with the Act and to carry out its purposes. The impugned regulation did not lay down any quality standard or enforce any licence term; instead, it imposed a compensatory liability for each call drop notwithstanding the existing 2% call-drop tolerance under the quality-of-service regime. By ignoring the statutory balance between consumer and service-provider interests and by proceeding on a premise that was inconsistent with the Act's purpose, the regulation could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The regulation was held to be ultra vires the Act and invalid.

Issue (ii): Whether the impugned regulation was manifestly arbitrary and imposed an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on business.

Analysis: Delegated legislation is vulnerable if it is manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable. The impugned regulation proceeded on the assumption that every call drop was attributable to the service provider, although material placed before the Authority itself showed that call drops may arise from consumer-side and other causes. The regulation also prescribed compensation without a rational basis for the amount, the cap of three calls per day, or the choice to compensate only the calling consumer. It disregarded the existing quality-of-service tolerance and imposed liability without proof of fault or actual loss.

Conclusion: The impugned regulation was held to be manifestly arbitrary and to violate Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

Issue (iii): Whether the impugned regulation unlawfully interfered with licence conditions.

Analysis: The licence required compliance with prescribed quality-of-service standards, but the impugned regulation did not set such a standard. Instead, it created a monetary consequence detached from the contractual quality clauses and from any established fault-based breach. As framed, it altered the practical incidents of the licence relationship without authority to do so in the manner adopted.

Conclusion: The impugned regulation was held to be impermissible on this ground as well.

Issue (iv): Whether the regulation-making process satisfied the statutory requirement of transparency.

Analysis: Although stakeholders were consulted, the record did not disclose any reasoned response to the core objection that call drops occur for multiple causes, many beyond the service provider's control. The explanation in support of the regulation did not demonstrate an informed, reasoned, and transparent resolution of the significant objections raised in consultation.

Conclusion: The process was held to fall short of the transparency requirement under Section 11(4).

Final Conclusion: The impugned regulation could not be sustained either as a valid exercise of delegated power or as constitutionally reasonable regulatory action, and it was struck down.

Ratio Decidendi: A delegated regulation that imposes consumer compensation on a strict no-fault basis, without rational support in the statutory scheme or a reasoned basis for the liability imposed, is ultra vires the enabling Act and liable to be invalidated for manifest arbitrariness and unreasonableness.

Issues: Whether the Commission could enhance the contractual rate of interest on refund of the registration amount and award litigation charges in the absence of any finding of unfair trade practice or restrictive or monopolistic trade practice.

Analysis: The statutory framework under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 empowered inquiry into monopolistic trade practice, restrictive trade practice and unfair trade practice. The respondent's grievance on cancellation charges had already failed, and there was no finding that the appellant's conduct in refunding the registration amount with interest at the agreed contractual rate was unfair, unreasonable or contrary to the declared scheme. The award of a higher rate of interest was made only on the view that the refund interest should not be lower than the default interest charged from applicants, but no material, pleading or proof established any unfair trade practice, unreasonable pricing, or obligation to place the deposits in higher-yield investments. Litigation charges were likewise unsupported once no wrongful conduct was found.

Conclusion: The enhancement of interest to 12% per annum and the award of litigation charges were unjustified, and the appellant succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of a proved unfair, restrictive or monopolistic trade practice, a statutory authority cannot rewrite an agreed contractual rate of interest or award compensation on mere notions of equity.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

The core legal issue in this judgment is whether the fixation of a benchmark for selection after the commencement of the recruitment process constitutes an impermissible change in the selection criteria. Specifically, the question is whether setting a benchmark of 70 marks for the General Category and 65 marks for the Reserved Category after the written test and interview amounts to changing the "rules of the game" midway through the selection process.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents:

The legal framework involves the principles governing recruitment processes, particularly the prohibition against altering selection criteria after the process has commenced. The appellants relied on the precedent set in Himani Malhotra vs. High Court of Delhi, where the Supreme Court held that introducing minimum qualifying marks for viva voce after the selection process had begun was impermissible.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning:

The court distinguished the present case from Himani Malhotra by noting that in the current matter, the selection criteria of 80 marks for the written test and 20 marks for the interview were established from the outset. The court reasoned that the benchmark was not a change in criteria but rather a permissible shortlisting tool to ensure the selection of the most meritorious candidates.

Key Evidence and Findings:

The appellants participated in the written test and interview, securing more than the minimum required marks in the written test. However, they were not selected due to not meeting the newly fixed benchmark of 65 marks for the Reserved Category. The court found that the respondents had not disclosed this benchmark at the time of the advertisement or the commencement of the recruitment process.

Application of Law to Facts:

The court applied the principle that while rules governing selection cannot be changed mid-process, the fixation of a benchmark post-interview did not constitute such a change. It was deemed a legitimate exercise of the employer's discretion to ensure high standards of competence.

Treatment of Competing Arguments:

The appellants argued that the fixation of the benchmark was arbitrary and contrary to the established legal principles. The respondents contended that the benchmark was necessary due to the high number of applicants and was within their prerogative. The court sided with the respondents, finding their actions justified and not in violation of legal norms.

Conclusions:

The court concluded that the fixation of the benchmark was a permissible exercise of discretion aimed at shortlisting the most qualified candidates and did not amount to an impermissible change in the selection criteria.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning:

"In the absence of any rule on this aspect in the first instance, this does not amount to changing the 'rules of the game'. The High Court has rightly held that it is not a situation where securing of minimum marks was introduced which was not stipulated in the advertisement, standard was fixed for the purpose of selection."

Core Principles Established:

The court established that setting a benchmark for final selection, even if not initially disclosed, is permissible if it serves the purpose of ensuring the selection of meritorious candidates and does not alter the fundamental selection criteria established at the outset.

Final Determinations on Each Issue:

The appeals were dismissed, with the court affirming that the fixation of a benchmark was a legitimate exercise of discretion by the employer and did not constitute a change in the selection criteria. The court emphasized the importance of maintaining high standards in recruitment processes, particularly for specialized roles.

Issues: Whether the impugned orders of the Commission and the Appellate Tribunal could be sustained when they contained no reasons in support of the conclusions reached, and whether the matter was liable to be remanded for reconsideration.

Analysis: Orders passed in quasi-judicial proceedings must disclose at least brief reasons, since such reasons are necessary to support the conclusions and enable proper judicial scrutiny. Where the orders merely record conclusions without reasoning, they cannot be sustained. The Court did not enter into the merits of the dispute or the preliminary objections, and confined itself to the absence of reasons in the impugned orders.

Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside for want of reasons and the matters were remanded to the Appellate Tribunal for fresh consideration on merits, including the preliminary objections.

Issues: Whether an application for compensation under Section 12B of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 is maintainable without separate proceedings under Section 10 or Section 36B of that Act.

Analysis: Section 12B confers a distinct remedy enabling a claimant to seek compensation for loss or damage caused by monopolistic, restrictive or unfair trade practice. The power under Section 12B(3) to conduct an inquiry into the allegations in the compensation application is independent of the Commission's powers under Sections 10 and 36B. The absence of any express textual link making Section 12B dependent on prior proceedings under Sections 10 or 36B, coupled with the scheme of the provision and its introduction as an additional remedy, shows that Parliament did not intend such interdependence. The earlier decision relied on by the Tribunal did not decide this specific question.

Conclusion: An application under Section 12B is maintainable without the prior initiation of separate proceedings under Section 10 or Section 36B.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside and the compensation applications were held to be maintainable, while leaving the respondents free to contest whether any monopolistic, restrictive or unfair trade practice was made out on the merits before the Tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 12B of the MRTP Act constitutes an independent compensatory remedy, and its maintainability does not depend on prior proceedings under Sections 10 or 36B unless the statute expressly so provides.

Issues: Whether a party before the Consumer Fora can be represented by an authorised agent, whether such representation is barred by the Advocates Act, 1961, and whether the Consumer Protection Rules and Regulations permit such appearance and audience.

Analysis: The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is a benevolent social welfare statute intended to provide a speedy, inexpensive and simple remedy to consumers. The rules framed under the Act expressly define an agent and permit a party to appear through an authorised agent before the Consumer Fora. The statutory scheme was read as allowing representation by non-advocates, especially because many consumer disputes are small, technical or economically unsuitable for compulsory engagement of advocates. The provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961 were held not to be violated because the appearance of an authorised agent under the consumer law does not amount to practising law as such, and the legislature had consciously created that option. The Court also relied on the regulatory safeguards enabling the Consumer Fora to control misconduct, misuse and professionalised representation by agents.

Conclusion: The authorised agent may appear and represent a party before the Consumer Fora, and such appearance is not inconsistent with the Advocates Act, 1961.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special consumer statute and the rules made under it expressly permit representation through an authorised agent, that statutory permission prevails and the authorised agent's appearance does not amount to unauthorised practice of law, subject to regulatory control by the forum.

Issues: (i) whether a direction issued by the Commission under section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 forming a prima facie opinion and referring the matter for investigation is appealable under section 53A; (ii) whether notice or hearing is mandatory at the stage of formation of prima facie opinion under section 26(1) and whether reasons must be recorded at that stage; (iii) whether the Commission is a necessary or proper party in an appeal before the Tribunal; (iv) when the Commission may exercise power to pass interim restraint orders under section 33; and (v) whether procedural directions were required to secure expeditious disposal under the statutory scheme.

Issue (i): whether a direction issued by the Commission under section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 forming a prima facie opinion and referring the matter for investigation is appealable under section 53A.

Analysis: The appellate provision was held to be limited to the directions, decisions and orders expressly made appealable by the statute. A direction under section 26(1) was characterised as a preliminary, administrative step directing investigation and not as an adjudicatory order determining rights or obligations. The statutory scheme also distinguished such a direction from orders under section 26(2) and other expressly appealable orders. The right of appeal being a creature of statute, no broader appeal could be inferred by implication.

Conclusion: The section 26(1) direction is not appealable under section 53A.

Issue (ii): whether notice or hearing is mandatory at the stage of formation of prima facie opinion under section 26(1) and whether reasons must be recorded at that stage.

Analysis: The statutory language of section 26(1) contains no requirement of prior notice or hearing before the Commission forms a prima facie view. The scheme contemplates notice and hearing at later stages, after receipt of the Director General's report and before final adjudication. The function under section 26(1) was treated as inquisitorial and preparatory, so audi alteram partem was not attracted as a matter of right at that stage. The Commission was, however, expected to indicate at least some reasons for its prima facie view, while detailed speaking reasons were required for adjudicatory orders affecting rights.

Conclusion: No prior notice or hearing is required under section 26(1) as a matter of right, but the prima facie view should be supported by minimal reasons.

Issue (iii): whether the Commission is a necessary or proper party in an appeal before the Tribunal.

Analysis: The statutory framework recognises the Commission as a body corporate with the right to participate in proceedings and to be represented before the Tribunal. Where proceedings are initiated suo motu, the Commission was held to be a necessary party, and in other matters it was at least a proper party because its presence assists complete and effective adjudication and avoids multiplicity of litigation. The Tribunal's contrary view was rejected.

Conclusion: The Commission is a necessary party in suo motu matters and a proper party in other appeals before the Tribunal.

Issue (iv): when the Commission may exercise power to pass interim restraint orders under section 33.

Analysis: Section 33 was interpreted as a power exercisable only during inquiry, which commences after a direction for investigation under section 26(1). The Commission must record a higher level of satisfaction than a mere prima facie view and may pass ex parte restraint orders only in compelling and exceptional circumstances. Such orders require prompt post-decisional hearing and must be used sparingly because of their potentially serious market consequences.

Conclusion: Interim restraint under section 33 is available only after inquiry has commenced and on recorded higher satisfaction in exceptional cases.

Issue (v): whether procedural directions were required to secure expeditious disposal under the statutory scheme.

Analysis: The Act was held to embody a time-bound and expeditious enforcement framework. To prevent delay from defeating the statutory object of protecting competition, the Court issued directions fixing outer time limits for the Commission and the Director General, including early consideration of prima facie issues, prompt completion of inquiry, timely reporting, and confidentiality safeguards.

Conclusion: Procedural directions were warranted to ensure expeditious and effective enforcement of the Act.

Final Conclusion: The statutory scheme was construed narrowly on appealability and broadly on effective competition enforcement, resulting in a partial modification of the Tribunal's order, recognition of the Commission's procedural role, and issuance of time-bound directions for competition proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the Competition Act, 2002, only those Commission orders expressly made appealable are amenable to appeal, while a prima facie direction under section 26(1) is a non-adjudicatory preparatory step that does not require prior notice or hearing as a matter of right but must be supported by minimal reasons.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of leaving open the challenge to the validity of the relevant provisions and rules for consideration in an appropriate future proceeding after the proposed amendments, if any, to the enactment.

The core legal questions considered by the Court include:

(a) Whether the three major manufacturers-H.D.C., Mukand, and Bharatiya-formed a cartel by quoting identical prices in the tender for supply of cast steel bogies to the Railways, and whether the suspicion of cartel formation was justified and bona fide.

(b) Whether the Railways' decision to fix dual pricing-offering a lower price to the three big manufacturers and a higher price to smaller manufacturers-was reasonable, bona fide, and not arbitrary or discriminatory.

(c) Whether the allocation of quantities among manufacturers, especially the reduction of allotment to the three big manufacturers on the basis of alleged cartel formation, was justified or arbitrary.

(d) Whether the Railways' rejection of post-tender correspondence offering lower prices by the big manufacturers and refusal to accept their lower price offers violated principles of fairness, natural justice, or legitimate expectation.

(e) The scope and applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the context of government contracts and tender procedures, including whether the manufacturers had a legitimate expectation of treatment consistent with prior practice and policy.

(f) The extent of judicial scrutiny permissible over government decisions relating to economic policy, tender acceptance, price fixation, and allocation of contracts, particularly in light of anti-monopoly and public interest considerations.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

(a) Alleged Cartel Formation by Three Big Manufacturers

Legal Framework and Precedents: The concept of a cartel is defined as an association or agreement among producers to control production, sales, and prices to obtain monopoly power, thereby restraining trade and competition. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act in the U.S. and similar competition laws prohibit such combinations. Price-fixing agreements are illegal per se, and mere identical pricing may raise suspicion but is not conclusive proof of cartel formation. The Court referred to authoritative definitions from legal dictionaries and American jurisprudence, including the need for evidence of an agreement or conspiracy to restrain trade.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court found that the identical price quoted by the three big manufacturers and their post-tender offer to reduce prices raised a reasonable suspicion of cartel formation but did not constitute conclusive proof. The authorities, including the Tender Committee, Financial Commissioner, and Minister, acted bona fide in entertaining this suspicion based on the record and circumstances. However, the Court held that there was insufficient material to definitively conclude that a cartel existed.

Key Evidence and Findings: The identical tender price of Rs. 77,666 by the three manufacturers, the post-tender correspondence offering lower prices, and the Railways' internal notes expressing concern about monopolistic tendencies formed the basis of suspicion. Yet, no direct evidence of an agreement or conspiracy was produced.

Application of Law to Facts: Mere identical pricing and voluntary price reduction offers do not amount to proof of cartel formation without evidence of concerted action or agreement. The Court emphasized the need for caution before labeling such conduct as cartelization.

Treatment of Competing Arguments: The manufacturers argued that the identical pricing was coincidental or competitive and that their lower price offers were bona fide attempts to supply at reasonable rates. The Railways contended that the conduct indicated anti-competitive intent. The Court balanced these views and found the suspicion reasonable but not conclusively established.

Conclusions: The suspicion of cartel formation was reasonable and bona fide but not proven. Therefore, punitive actions premised solely on cartel formation were unwarranted.

(b) Dual Pricing and Price Fixation

Legal Framework and Precedents: Government contracts and tender processes must comply with Article 14 of the Constitution, prohibiting arbitrariness and discrimination. However, the Government has discretion in awarding contracts and may reject the lowest bid if it is not reasonable or realistic. Judicial review of economic policy decisions is limited, and courts defer to expert bodies unless decisions are arbitrary or mala fide. Precedents emphasize the need for reasonableness, public interest, and non-arbitrariness in administrative decisions.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court held that the Railways' fixation of Rs. 76,000 as a reasonable price for smaller manufacturers and Rs. 67,000 for the three big manufacturers (based on their commitment) was a bona fide policy decision aimed at preventing monopolistic dominance and protecting smaller firms. Dual pricing under these circumstances was not discriminatory but a rational measure to sustain competition and public interest.

Key Evidence and Findings: The Tender Committee's price evaluation, the post-tender price reduction offers, the Railways' internal notes, and the Minister's orders showed a deliberate policy to balance price competitiveness with industrial health. The Court noted that the lower price offered by the big manufacturers was not accepted for all to avoid making smaller manufacturers unviable.

Application of Law to Facts: The Government's discretion to fix different prices for different categories of manufacturers was exercised on reasonable grounds, supported by economic and public interest considerations. The Court rejected the High Court's direction to fix a uniform price of Rs. 67,000 for all manufacturers as unsustainable.

Treatment of Competing Arguments: The manufacturers contended that dual pricing was discriminatory and punitive; the Railways maintained it was necessary to prevent monopoly and ensure healthy competition. The Court sided with the Railways' policy rationale.

Conclusions: Dual pricing was reasonable, bona fide, and not arbitrary or discriminatory under the circumstances.

(c) Allocation of Quantities Among Manufacturers

Legal Framework and Precedents: Allocation of contract quantities is subject to administrative discretion but must be exercised fairly, reasonably, and not arbitrarily. The Government must follow objective criteria and avoid punitive measures not supported by evidence.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court held that the reduction of quota to the three big manufacturers on the basis of alleged cartel formation was unjustified since cartel formation was not established. The Minister's variations to the Tender Committee's recommendations were partly punitive and hence unsustainable. However, the allocation to smaller manufacturers, including BIFR companies and wagon builders, was based on relevant considerations such as capacity, past performance, and public interest in sustaining smaller units.

Key Evidence and Findings: The Tender Committee's recommendations were based on assessed capacity, performance, and historical data. The Minister's changes were motivated by suspicion of cartel and desire to rehabilitate smaller firms. The Court emphasized that the Minister's discretion must be exercised on objective and justifiable grounds.

Application of Law to Facts: The Court restored the allocation to the three big manufacturers as per the Tender Committee's recommendations and allowed the smaller manufacturers' allocations to stand, subject to future adjustments on objective criteria.

Treatment of Competing Arguments: The big manufacturers challenged the punitive reduction; the Railways defended it as necessary to curb monopolistic tendencies. The Court balanced these views and found only the punitive reduction unjustified.

Conclusions: Allocation must be based on objective criteria; punitive reduction without proof of cartel formation is unjustified.

(d) Post-Tender Correspondence and Natural Justice

Legal Framework and Precedents: Tender conditions and procedures govern acceptance or rejection of offers. Post-tender negotiations are exceptions and must be handled with care. Principles of natural justice require fairness and opportunity to be heard when decisions adversely affect parties. However, the Government's discretion in contract awards is broad, subject to reasonableness and public interest.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Railways' initial rejection of post-tender lower price offers was based on policy to prevent short-term gains at the cost of long-term competition. The Court found no arbitrariness or mala fide in this approach. However, the manufacturers had no absolute right to have their post-tender offers accepted. The Railways' decision to negotiate and accept a price of Rs. 67,000 was consistent with policy and fairness.

Key Evidence and Findings: Tender conditions reserved the right to accept or reject any tender or part thereof. The Railways' internal notes and correspondence showed a reasoned approach. The Court noted that the manufacturers were given opportunity to place data supporting their price offers.

Application of Law to Facts: The Railways acted within their discretion and in good faith. No violation of natural justice or legitimate expectation arose from rejection or modification of post-tender offers.

Treatment of Competing Arguments: Manufacturers argued for acceptance of lower prices and fairness; Railways emphasized policy and public interest. The Court upheld Railways' discretion.

Conclusions: No breach of natural justice or unfairness in handling post-tender offers.

(e) Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation

Legal Framework and Precedents: Legitimate expectation arises from past practice, representations, or established procedures, creating an expectation of consistent treatment. It does not confer a substantive right but requires fairness and due process before changing established practices. Judicial review protects against arbitrary or unfair denial of such expectations but does not prevent policy changes in public interest. Leading authorities emphasize the limited scope of this doctrine and its procedural focus.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court acknowledged that the manufacturers had a legitimate expectation based on past tender practices and policies. However, the Railways' discretion to change policy for valid public interest reasons, including preventing monopolies and promoting healthy competition, was recognized. The Court held that the doctrine does not grant an absolute right to continuation of prior treatment, especially when overridden by overriding public interest. The Railways' decision was not arbitrary or mala fide and thus did not violate legitimate expectation principles.

Key Evidence and Findings: Past tender practices showed flexibility in price fixation and allocation. The Railways' rules and tender conditions allowed discretion. The manufacturers were not denied opportunity to present data or make representations. The Court emphasized the need to balance legitimate expectation with public interest and policy considerations.

Application of Law to Facts: The Railways' policy change and decision to fix dual pricing and adjust allocations were within the scope of lawful discretion and public interest. The manufacturers' legitimate expectation was not unlawfully defeated.

Treatment of Competing Arguments: Manufacturers contended that the change was arbitrary and violated natural justice; Railways argued policy necessity and fairness. The Court sided with the latter.

Conclusions: Legitimate expectation does not preclude reasonable policy changes; no violation found here.

(f) Judicial Review of Government Economic Policy and Tender Decisions

Legal Framework and Precedents: Courts recognize the broad discretion of the Government in economic and contract matters. Judicial interference is limited to cases of arbitrariness, mala fide, or violation of constitutional principles. The doctrine of "play in the joints" allows flexibility in complex economic decisions. Precedents emphasize deference to expert bodies and policy makers.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court reiterated that the Railways' decisions on price fixation, tender acceptance, and quantity allocation are policy decisions within the Government's domain. Unless shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory, or mala fide, such decisions are not subject to judicial interference. The Railways' policy to prevent monopolistic tendencies and protect smaller manufacturers was a rational and reasonable exercise of discretion.

Key Evidence and Findings: The Court relied on detailed records of the tender process, internal notes, and policy considerations. It noted the Government's duty to act in public interest and promote social and economic justice.

Application of Law to Facts: The Railways' actions were consistent with constitutional mandates and policy objectives. The Court declined to substitute its judgment for that of the Government.

Treatment of Competing Arguments: Petitioners sought strict adherence to tender rules and uniform pricing; the Government emphasized policy and public interest. The Court favored the Government's reasoned approach.

Conclusions: Judicial review is limited; the Government's economic policy decisions in this case were lawful and reasonable.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

"There is no enough of material to conclude that M/s. H.D.C., Mukand and Bhartiya formed a cartel. However, there was scope for entertaining suspicion by the Tender Committee that they formed a cartel since all the three of them quoted identical price and the opinion entertained by the concerned authorities including the Minister that the three big manufacturers formed a cartel was not per se malicious or was actuated by any extraneous considerations and the authorities acted in a bonafide manner in taking the stand that the three big manufacturers formed a cartel."

"The direction of the High Court that the supply of bogie should be at Rs. 67,000 by every manufacturer cannot be sustained and that a fresh consideration of a reasonable price is called for. The Tender Committee shall reconsider the question of fixation of reasonable price. While doing so it shall consider the offer of Rs. 67,000 made by M/s H.D.C. and Mukand alongwith the data that would be given by them in support of their offer and the percentage of profits available to all the manufacturers and other relevant aspects and then fix a reasonable price at which the manufacturers would be able to supply."

"Dual pricing under certain circumstances may be reasonable and the stand of the railways to adopt dual pricing under the circumstances is bonafide and not malafide. M/s H.D.C., Mukand and Bharatiya must be deemed to be in a position to supply at the rate of Rs. 67,000 per bogie and thus they form a distinct category. The smaller manufacturers belong to a different category and if a different price is fixed for them it is not discriminatory."

"If the price that to be fixed by the Tender Committee as directed by us happens to be more than Rs. 67,000 than that would be applicable to the smaller manufacturers only and not to M/s H.D.C., Mukand and Bharatiya who on their own commitment have to supply at the rate of Rs. 67,000."

"The three big manufacturers M/s H.D.C., Mukand and Bharatiya should be allotted the quantities as per the recommendations of the Tender Committee. However, the quantities finally allotted by the competent authority to the smaller manufacturers need not be disturbed and the railway authorities may make necessary adjustments next year in the matter of allocation of quantities to them taking into consideration the allotments given to them this year."

"The Government cannot act arbitrarily and without reason and if it does, its action would be liable to be invalidated. If the Government awards a contract or leases out or otherwise deals with its property or grants any other largess, it would be liable to be tested for its validity on the touch-stone of reasonableness and public interest and if it fails to satisfy either test, it would be unconstitutional and invalid."

"The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right; but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law."

"Legitimate expectation does not unlock the gate which shuts the court out of review on the merits. The notion of legitimate expectation was introduced at a time when the courts were developing the common law to suit modern conditions and were sweeping away the unnecessary archaisms of the prerogative writs, but it should not be used to subvert the principled justification for curial intervention in the exercise of administrative power."

"The Railways particularly the Financial Commissioner as well as the Minister and initially the Tender Committee formed an opinion that these three big manufacturers formed a cartel and also quoted an unworkable predatory price at the post-tender stage. therefore from the point of view of preventing monopoly in the public interest the decision in question was then in a bonafide manner. However, on a factual basis we held that the alleged formation of a cartel was only in the realm of suspicion and in that view the decision was modified."

"Dual pricing would not be bad in the circumstances mentioned above and the Railways' stand to adopt dual pricing under the circumstances is bonafide and not malafide."

"The Government's policy to prohibit concentration of economic power and to control monopolies so that ownership and control of material resources are distributed to subserve the common good and to ensure reduction in concentration of wealth and economic power is in public interest and is a valid policy."