Issues: (i) Whether the appellant was entitled to bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 in view of the material collected by the Enforcement Directorate and the twin conditions under Section 45. (ii) Whether the benefit of the first proviso to Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was mandatorily available to the appellant as a woman. (iii) Whether the absence of a surviving scheduled offence, on the basis of the later charge-sheet and cognizance order, rendered the proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 without jurisdiction. (iv) Whether the appeal was liable to be dismissed for incorrect and misleading disclosures made in the special leave petition.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant was entitled to bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 in view of the material collected by the Enforcement Directorate and the twin conditions under Section 45.

Analysis: The complaint and investigative material showed a prima facie nexus between the appellant, the alleged extortion network, the movement of proceeds of crime, and acquisition of assets in the names of relatives and associates. The Court held that the material was sufficient to prima facie indicate involvement in money laundering and that bail in such cases must be considered in the light of the stringent conditions under Section 45.

Conclusion: The appellant was not entitled to bail on merits.

Issue (ii): Whether the benefit of the first proviso to Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was mandatorily available to the appellant as a woman.

Analysis: The proviso confers discretion on the Court and does not create an automatic entitlement to bail. The Court held that the category of persons mentioned in the proviso may be granted bail only upon a judicious exercise of discretion, having regard to the facts, the gravity of the accusation, and the evidence collected. On the facts, the appellant did not satisfy the Court that such special benefit should be extended.

Conclusion: The proviso did not entitle the appellant to bail as a matter of course.

Issue (iii): Whether the absence of a surviving scheduled offence, on the basis of the later charge-sheet and cognizance order, rendered the proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 without jurisdiction.

Analysis: The Court found that the later charge-sheet and cognizance order were not before the High Court when the matter was heard and that the record did not show that the predicate offence had ended in discharge, acquittal, or quashing. It further held that a charge-sheet by the investigating officer does not by itself conclude whether a scheduled offence survives; that question lies with the competent court in the predicate case.

Conclusion: The challenge based on absence of a surviving scheduled offence failed.

Issue (iv): Whether the appeal was liable to be dismissed for incorrect and misleading disclosures made in the special leave petition.

Analysis: The Court found that the special leave petition and supporting material made misleading assertions about documents that were not shown to have been before the High Court. It held that full and correct disclosure is required and deprecated the attempt to misrepresent the record.

Conclusion: The appeal was liable to be dismissed on this ground as well.

Final Conclusion: The order refusing bail was sustained, and the Court declined to interfere with the High Court's view on merits while also condemning the appellant's lack of candour in the proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, bail is controlled by the stringent requirements of Section 45, the proviso for women is discretionary and not automatic, and absence of a final adjudication extinguishing the predicate offence is necessary before a money-laundering prosecution can fail for want of a scheduled offence.

Issues: (i) Whether a person can be prosecuted for money-laundering even if she is not shown as an accused in the scheduled offence; (ii) whether the first and second properties could be treated as proceeds of crime; (iii) whether Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 becomes a scheduled offence when the conspiracy alleged is to commit an offence not included in the Schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Issue (i): Whether a person can be prosecuted for money-laundering even if she is not shown as an accused in the scheduled offence.

Analysis: Liability under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 depends on the existence of a scheduled offence and proceeds of crime connected with that offence. The offence of money-laundering is independent and may be committed by a person who is not an accused in the predicate offence, if that person knowingly assists, is party to, or is involved in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime.

Conclusion: The absence of the appellant's name in the chargesheets for the scheduled offences did not by itself bar prosecution under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Issue (ii): Whether the first and second properties could be treated as proceeds of crime.

Analysis: The first property was acquired before the alleged acts constituting the scheduled offence, and therefore it could not be linked to proceeds of crime. As to the second property, the material on record was insufficient to record a finding at the quashing stage that no tainted money was used; that question required evidence at trial. The challenge was considered only on the applicability of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, without determining valuation or the legality of the sale deeds.

Conclusion: The first property could not be treated as proceeds of crime, while the second property could not be held to be untainted at the quashing stage.

Issue (iii): Whether Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 becomes a scheduled offence when the conspiracy alleged is to commit an offence not included in the Schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The Schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is selective and does not include every offence capable of generating proceeds of crime. Penal statutes must be strictly construed, and an interpretation that allows any non-scheduled offence to be converted into a scheduled offence merely by adding Section 120B would render the Schedule redundant. Section 120B is a scheduled offence only where the alleged conspiracy is to commit an offence already included in the Schedule.

Conclusion: Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is a scheduled offence only if the conspiracy alleged is to commit an offence specifically included in the Schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; on the facts, no scheduled offence existed.

Final Conclusion: The complaint under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 could not be sustained against the appellant because the alleged conspiracy did not relate to a scheduled offence, and the proceedings were quashed as against her.

Ratio Decidendi: An offence under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is a scheduled offence under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 only when the alleged conspiracy is to commit an offence already specified in the Schedule; otherwise, the Schedule cannot be expanded by implication.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant was entitled to bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 in view of the twin conditions in section 45. (ii) Whether the appellant could claim bail on parity or on the ground of delay in trial and prolonged incarceration.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant was entitled to bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 in view of the twin conditions in section 45.

Analysis: The offence of money laundering is an independent offence under section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and is attracted where a person is knowingly involved in any process or activity connected with proceeds of crime, including concealment, possession, acquisition, use, or projecting it as untainted property. Statements recorded under section 50 of the Act and the documentary material collected in the investigation were held sufficient at the prima facie stage to show the appellant's involvement. The Court reiterated that the rigours of section 45 are mandatory and apply even to bail under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and that the statutory presumption under section 24 operates unless rebutted.

Conclusion: The appellant did not satisfy the statutory requirements for bail and was not entitled to release.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant could claim bail on parity or on the ground of delay in trial and prolonged incarceration.

Analysis: The Court held that parity is not an absolute rule and depends on the specific role attributed to the accused. The appellant's role was found to be materially distinct from the co-accused whose cases were relied upon. The Court also held that the apprehension of long trial and prolonged incarceration did not override the failure to satisfy section 45, and that relief based on delay had to be considered in the light of the statutory scheme and the seriousness of economic offences. Economic offences were treated as grave offences affecting the financial health of the country, warranting a different approach in bail matters.

Conclusion: The appellant could not secure bail on parity or on the ground of delay and prolonged incarceration.

Final Conclusion: The bail appeal was rejected after the Court found that the appellant failed to cross the statutory threshold under the money-laundering law and that the circumstances relied upon did not justify interference with the refusal of bail.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, bail cannot be granted unless the accused satisfies the mandatory twin conditions in section 45 on a prima facie basis, and parity or delay cannot override that statutory mandate where material shows involvement in a money-laundering process connected with proceeds of crime.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellants were entitled to bail in the pending prosecutions under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and allied offences at the stage of the appeal; (ii) Whether prolonged incarceration and the constitutional right to speedy trial warranted release on bail or only a liberty to renew the prayer on change of circumstances.

Issue (i): Whether the appellants were entitled to bail in the pending prosecutions under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and allied offences at the stage of the appeal.

Analysis: Bail under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was examined on the basis of a tentative assessment of the material, without conducting a detailed trial on merits. The statutory test was treated as requiring broad probabilities and not a final determination of guilt. On the material noticed, the Court found a prima facie case sufficient to decline bail at that stage.

Conclusion: Bail was not granted at that stage and the prayer for release was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether prolonged incarceration and the constitutional right to speedy trial warranted release on bail or only a liberty to renew the prayer on change of circumstances.

Analysis: The Court recognised that prolonged pre-trial detention and delay in trial are relevant considerations and that the right to speedy trial is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It also noted that Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 informs bail discretion, but does not operate as an absolute mandate for release in every case under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. In view of the assurance regarding expeditious progress of trial, the Court permitted the accused to renew the request if circumstances changed or the trial became unduly delayed.

Conclusion: Prolonged custody did not justify release on the present appeal, though liberty was reserved to seek bail again on change in circumstances or continued delay.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were dismissed, the refusal of bail was maintained, and all observations were confined to the disposal of the present proceedings without affecting the trial on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: In bail matters under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the court must make only a tentative assessment on broad probabilities, but prolonged incarceration and delay in trial may justify reconsideration of bail in appropriate future circumstances rather than automatic release in the first instance.

Issues: (i) whether arrest under Section 19 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 and the consequential remand orders were valid when the authorized officer did not furnish the written grounds of arrest to the arrestees; (ii) whether the Court remanding a person arrested under Section 19 is duty-bound to verify strict compliance with the statutory safeguards and may refuse to validate an arrest made in breach of them.

Issue (i): whether arrest under Section 19 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 and the consequential remand orders were valid when the authorized officer did not furnish the written grounds of arrest to the arrestees.

Analysis: Section 19 requires the authorized officer to record reasons for belief in writing, inform the arrested person of the grounds of arrest, and forward the order and material to the Adjudicating Authority. The constitutional guarantee under Article 22(1) is meaningful only if the arrested person is enabled to know the basis of arrest in a practical and effective manner. Merely reading out or permitting reading of the grounds, without furnishing a written copy, does not adequately secure that right, especially where the grounds may be lengthy and the arrested person needs them to seek legal remedy and contest continued detention.

Conclusion: The arrest was not in compliance with Section 19(1) and Article 22(1), and the consequential custody could not be sustained.

Issue (ii): whether the Court remanding a person arrested under Section 19 is duty-bound to verify strict compliance with the statutory safeguards and may refuse to validate an arrest made in breach of them.

Analysis: The remanding Court must examine whether the preconditions for arrest under Section 19 have been satisfied and whether the arrest is lawful, because remand does not cure an arrest that is constitutionally or statutorily infirm. The Magistrate or remanding Court has an active obligation under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, read with Section 19 of the Act, to satisfy itself about compliance with the statutory safeguards before authorising custody. A mechanical remand order, without recording such satisfaction, fails to discharge that duty.

Conclusion: The remand orders were unsustainable because the requisite judicial scrutiny of compliance with Section 19 was absent.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded, the impugned arrest and remand orders were set aside, and release was directed unless detention was otherwise required in some other case.

Ratio Decidendi: In an arrest under Section 19 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002, the arrested person must be furnished the written grounds of arrest as a matter of course, and the remanding Court must independently verify compliance with the statutory safeguards before authorising custody.

Issues: (i) Whether a writ of habeas corpus was maintainable after the arrestee had been produced before the Magistrate and remanded by a reasoned judicial order; (ii) Whether Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 applied to an arrest under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and whether Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 permitted custody of the investigating agency beyond the first 15 days of remand.

Issue (i): Whether a writ of habeas corpus was maintainable after the arrestee had been produced before the Magistrate and remanded by a reasoned judicial order.

Analysis: Once the arrestee was forwarded to the Magistrate in compliance with the special statute, custody became judicial custody. A writ of habeas corpus lies only against illegal detention, not to bypass a judicial remand order passed with application of mind. Where the remand order is reasoned, the remedy lies by challenge to that order under the applicable statutory framework and not by habeas corpus, except in cases of demonstrable illegality in the arrest process itself.

Conclusion: The writ of habeas corpus was not maintainable, and the challenge to detention on that basis failed.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 applied to an arrest under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and whether Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 permitted custody of the investigating agency beyond the first 15 days of remand.

Analysis: The special enactment contains its own arrest safeguards in Section 19 and its own procedural scheme, with Section 65 making the Code applicable only so far as it is not inconsistent. On that footing, Section 41A was held inapplicable to arrests under the special enactment. Reading Section 167 of the Code harmoniously with the special statute, the Court held that the Magistrate may authorise custody as the occasion arises during the period of investigation and that the expression "such custody" is not confined to the first 15 days in the narrow sense urged by the appellants. The Court also held that physical custody had not yet been taken by the respondents because the arrestee remained in hospital under judicial orders, and the period affected by those orders could not defeat the investigating agency's entitlement.

Conclusion: Section 41A had no application to the arrest under the special enactment, and the respondents' position on custody and exclusion of time was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the legality of the detention and remand failed, while the investigating agency's entitlement to custody for the remaining period within the statutory limit was recognised.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, habeas corpus is not the proper remedy against a reasoned judicial remand order, Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not apply to such arrests, and Section 167 of the Code is to be read with the special statute so that custody may be authorised in aid of investigation in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court could direct de novo investigation by wiping out the earlier investigation and without confining itself to the limited contours for ordering fresh investigation; (ii) Whether the Enforcement Directorate could initiate proceedings and issue summons on the basis of the predicate offences and the alleged proceeds of crime; (iii) Whether the High Court rightly permitted the Enforcement Directorate to inspect documents before the Special Court and thereafter seek copies; (iv) Whether the orders refusing extension of time for further investigation and the connected contempt petitions and interlocutory request survived.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court could direct de novo investigation by wiping out the earlier investigation and without confining itself to the limited contours for ordering fresh investigation.

Analysis: Fresh, reinvestigation or de novo investigation is an exceptional power that can be exercised only by superior courts in rare cases where the earlier investigation is shown to be unfair, tainted, mala fide or otherwise incapable of being acted upon. When such a direction is issued, the court must clearly indicate the fate of the investigation already conducted. A blanket direction to restart the matter ab initio, wipe out the earlier investigation and collect fresh material without legal basis exceeds the narrow limits of the power. The impugned order also ran counter to the earlier directions requiring proper investigation into the corruption allegations and inclusion of the Prevention of Corruption Act offences.

Conclusion: The de novo investigation order was unsustainable and was set aside. The appeals on this issue succeeded.

Issue (ii): Whether the Enforcement Directorate could initiate proceedings and issue summons on the basis of the predicate offences and the alleged proceeds of crime.

Analysis: Money-laundering under the statutory scheme is not contingent on prior identification of a segregated property before the Enforcement Directorate can act. Where the predicate complaints disclose corruption involving illegal gratification, the tainted money itself constitutes proceeds of crime. The offence is a continuing process involving the person, the process or activity, and the product, namely proceeds of crime. On the facts, the allegations disclosed scheduled offences, acquisition and possession of tainted money, and thus a sufficient jurisdictional foundation existed for the Enforcement Directorate to register proceedings and summon persons in aid of the investigation.

Conclusion: The challenge to the Enforcement Directorate's proceedings failed and the writ petitions were liable to be dismissed. The appeals on this issue succeeded.

Issue (iii): Whether the High Court rightly permitted the Enforcement Directorate to inspect documents before the Special Court and thereafter seek copies.

Analysis: The order did not direct disclosure of unmarked documents as certified copies. It only enabled inspection under the applicable Rules of Practice followed by a proper third-party copy application. That course was not inconsistent with the restriction on supplying certified copies of unmarked documents, and the electronic-record objection did not bar mere inspection. The High Court's limited facilitation of access to records was therefore within jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The appeal against the inspection order failed and was dismissed.

Issue (iv): Whether the orders refusing extension of time for further investigation and the connected contempt petitions and interlocutory request survived.

Analysis: Refusal to extend time did not extinguish the earlier direction for further investigation, especially when a further report had already been filed. The contempt allegations were not made out on the record as the alleged non-compliance was attributable to the procedural and judicial status of the matters. The request for constitution of a Special Investigation Team was also premature on the materials then available.

Conclusion: The appeal against the refusal of extension, the contempt petitions, and the interlocutory application were dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The batch resulted in partial success for the appellants: the de novo investigation order and the order restraining the Enforcement Directorate were set aside, while the challenge to document inspection, the extension-related appeal, the contempt petitions, and the special investigation team request were rejected or dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether offences under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 are cognizable and non-bailable and the complaint was without authority; (ii) Whether the prosecution complaint and connected proceedings were liable to be quashed for want of the petitioners' knowledge of the proceeds of crime and for alleged abuse of process.

Issue (i): Whether offences under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 are cognizable and non-bailable and the complaint was without authority.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of Section 45, as substituted and clarified by the explanatory amendment, was read with Section 19 to hold that offences under the Act are cognizable and non-bailable. The authorized officer was competent to lodge the prosecution complaint, and the objection that the complaint lacked authority was found unsustainable.

Conclusion: The objection to cognizability, non-bailability, and authority to file the complaint was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the prosecution complaint and connected proceedings were liable to be quashed for want of the petitioners' knowledge of the proceeds of crime and for alleged abuse of process.

Analysis: Section 3 was construed to cover direct or indirect attempts, assistance, participation, or involvement in any process or activity connected with proceeds of crime. The Court held that knowledge is not the sole sine qua non where direct involvement in concealment, possession, acquisition, use, or projection as untainted property is alleged. Since the complaint contained material showing prima facie involvement in scheduled-offence-linked laundering activity, the case did not fall within the limited categories warranting quashing under the inherent jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The proceedings were held not to be liable to quashing.

Final Conclusion: The petitions failed on merits, and the impugned proceedings were permitted to continue in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: For an offence under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the prosecution is not confined to proving prior knowledge alone; prima facie direct or indirect involvement in any process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is sufficient to resist quashing, and the inherent power to quash must be exercised sparingly only in exceptional cases.

Issues: Whether the petitioner could be permitted to furnish a bank guarantee in lieu of the amount covered by the provisional attachment and obtain release of the attached properties.

Analysis: The relief sought was for substitution of the attachment by a bank guarantee. The Court declined to accept a bank guarantee and noted that in the relied-upon precedent, the comparable relief had not been granted in that form, but security by a fixed deposit receipt of a nationalised bank with lien in favour of the investigating agencies had been accepted as a condition for lifting attachment. The respondents expressed no objection to security being furnished by a fixed deposit receipt with lien. The Court therefore directed that upon furnishing a fixed deposit receipt for the specified amount with lien in favour of the CBI and the Enforcement Directorate within the stipulated time, the provisional attachment would be lifted.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not granted permission to furnish a bank guarantee, but was granted relief by way of furnishing a fixed deposit receipt with lien, on compliance with which the attachment stood lifted.

Issues: Whether the appellant was entitled to bail in proceedings under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002, in view of the statutory bail restrictions and the allegations in the prosecution complaint.

Analysis: The appellant had remained in custody since 26.09.2022, while the predicate FIR had remained pending for years without a final report. The Court noted that the prosecution complaint itself described the appellant's role in a manner that could support the argument that the second condition under clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 45 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 was satisfied. On that material, the Court held that continued incarceration was not justified. The apprehension that the appellant might flee was addressed by imposing bail safeguards, including surrender of passport and regular appearance before the Special Court.

Conclusion: The appellant was held entitled to bail, with conditions to be fixed by the Special Court and with additional conditions imposed by the Supreme Court.

Final Conclusion: The proceeding was resolved in favour of the appellant by ordering release on bail subject to conditions designed to secure attendance and prevent flight.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the complaint material itself supports satisfaction of the statutory bail condition and further custody is not justified on the facts, bail may be granted subject to appropriate safeguards against absconding.

Issues: (i) Whether the Special Court, PMLA, Lucknow lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the prosecution complaint under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002; (ii) whether the residence of most accused and witnesses in Kerala and South India furnished a ground to transfer the case to Ernakulam; (iii) whether the petitioner's remand under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 barred the filing of the complaint at Lucknow.

Issue (i): Whether the Special Court, PMLA, Lucknow lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the prosecution complaint under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The territorial jurisdiction for a complaint under the PMLA depends on the place where any of the processes or activities constituting the offence of money-laundering under Section 3 take place, and not on the place where the scheduled offence was registered or tried. The complaint disclosed material linking the alleged laundering activity to Uttar Pradesh, including transfers connected with the UP ATS investigation. On that basis, the Special Court at Lucknow could not be said to be without territorial jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The objection to territorial jurisdiction was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the residence of most accused and witnesses in Kerala and South India furnished a ground to transfer the case to Ernakulam.

Analysis: The residence of accused persons or the location of witnesses, by itself, was held insufficient to justify transfer of a criminal proceeding. Those circumstances did not establish any legal basis for shifting the prosecution complaint from the court seized of the matter.

Conclusion: No transfer was warranted on this ground.

Issue (iii): Whether the petitioner's remand under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 barred the filing of the complaint at Lucknow.

Analysis: Section 167(2) operates with reference to the Magistrate to whom the accused is forwarded and expressly applies even where that Magistrate may not have jurisdiction to try the case. The remand order therefore did not render the later complaint at Lucknow impermissible.

Conclusion: The remand-based objection failed.

Final Conclusion: The transfer request failed on every substantive ground, as the Special Court at Lucknow had no demonstrated lack of jurisdiction and no other legally valid basis existed to shift the proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: For a prosecution under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002, territorial jurisdiction is determined by the place where the money-laundering activity is alleged to have occurred, and a transfer cannot be ordered merely because accused persons or witnesses are located elsewhere or because the accused was remanded by a court that may not have trial jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether, for computing the 60/90 day period under the first proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the day on which the Magistrate orders remand is to be included or excluded; and whether the accused become entitled to default bail when the charge-sheet is filed after expiry of that period.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, read with Section 57 and the proviso to Section 167(2), was held to create a custody regime that begins on the date the Magistrate authorizes remand. The earlier view that excluded the remand day was rejected as having overlooked the binding earlier decision that treated the remand day as part of the statutory period. The Court held that the General Clauses Act, 1897 does not govern computation under Section 167(2) because the provision is not framed as a limitation period running from a fixed terminus a quo to a terminus ad quem. The interpretation adopted was anchored in personal liberty under Articles 21 and 22(2) of the Constitution of India, and in the principle that ambiguity in a liberty-curtailing provision must be resolved in favour of the accused.

Conclusion: The date of remand is included in computing the 60/90 day period under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the accused acquire an indefeasible right to default bail once that period expires without filing of the charge-sheet or final report. The impugned order granting default bail was therefore upheld, and the appeals failed.

Ratio Decidendi: For the purpose of default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the statutory remand period must be computed from the date of the Magistrate's remand order itself, and not by excluding that date; on expiry of the prescribed period, the accused acquire an indefeasible right to be released on bail if the final report is not filed before the right is availed.

Issues: (i) Whether the restrictions contained in Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 apply to an application for anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in a money-laundering case; (ii) whether the grant of anticipatory bail was sustainable on the facts, having regard to the seriousness of the allegations and the stage of investigation.

Issue (i): Whether the restrictions contained in Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 apply to an application for anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in a money-laundering case.

Analysis: The statutory bar on release contained in Section 45 is attached to offences under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. Once anticipatory bail is sought in connection with an offence under that Act, the underlying rigour of Section 45 is attracted, even though the application is made under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The earlier understanding that Section 45 would not govern anticipatory bail proceedings was held to be incorrect.

Conclusion: The restrictions under Section 45 apply to anticipatory bail proceedings in a case under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and the contrary view was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the grant of anticipatory bail was sustainable on the facts, having regard to the seriousness of the allegations and the stage of investigation.

Analysis: The allegations concerned serious economic offences involving money laundering, and the investigation was still continuing. The material collected by the investigating agency indicated the need for further inquiry, including the role and nexus of the accused. The order granting anticipatory bail did not properly account for the seriousness of the alleged offence or the settled caution required in economic offences.

Conclusion: The grant of anticipatory bail was held to be unsustainable and was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the anticipatory bail order was quashed, and the accused was left to be dealt with in accordance with law, including consideration of any regular bail application on its own merits.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution for money laundering under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the statutory restrictions on bail contained in Section 45 govern even an application for anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.