Construction of statute by plain words - no judicial supplementation of defective legislative drafting - contextual limitation of statutory language - meaning of ownership expressions: 'owned by' versus continuous ownership - restrictive application to vessels condemned as prize or forfeited under the Slave Trade Abolition ActConstruction of statute by plain words - no judicial supplementation of defective legislative drafting - meaning of ownership expressions: 'owned by' versus continuous ownership - contextual limitation of statutory language - restrictive application to vessels condemned as prize or forfeited under the Slave Trade Abolition Act - Whether the Court of Bombay correctly construed the statutory words relating to ownership so as to require continuous ownership, or whether the statute must be construed by the plain words in their context without judicial addition. - HELD THAT: - Their Lordships held that the statute must be construed from its bare words and that Judges must not supply, mend or invent meanings not plainly contained in the text. The Court accepted the view that the expressions importing continuous ownership are to be confined to their immediate context - namely ships condemned as prize of war or forfeited under the Slave Trade Abolition Act - but proceeded on the alternative that, even if the words were read generally, the ordinary meaning of 'owned by' (or 'belong to') as used in the provision is ownership at the relevant time (registration) and not an implied requirement of uninterrupted or continuous ownership. The addition elsewhere in the statute of words such as 'which shall always have belonged to' shows that continuous ownership was expressed where intended; their absence in the clause in question indicates that continuous ownership was not intended there. Applying these principles, the Court found the construction adopted below to be incorrect. [Paras 1]The judgment of the Court of Bombay is reversed and judgment is entered for the plaintiff with nominal damages.Final Conclusion: Their Lordships reversed the Court of Bombay, holding that the statute must be read by its plain words in context without judicial supplementation and that the requirement of continuous ownership was not to be read into the provision; judgment for the plaintiff with nominal damages.

Presumption of joint property under commensality - deference to concurrent findings of fact by lower courts - authenticity and probative value of documentary evidence - rejection of forged instrument as basis for title - acceptance of inventory as evidence of quantum - effect of adoption on widow's interest and role as guardian/trustee - award of costs to successful respondent where appeal founded on forged instrumentDeference to concurrent findings of fact by lower courts - The appropriate approach of an appellate court when the dispute principally involves questions of fact determined by inferior courts. - HELD THAT: - The case turned chiefly on questions of fact rather than points of law. The Zilla Court's findings, affirmed by the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut (though not identically reasoned), were the product of seeing witnesses and documents and of familiarity with local habits and customs. Given that advantage, their Lordships held that the appellate court should give credit to those concurrent findings and not disturb the decree absent clear justification. [Paras 3, 4]Affirm the decree of the courts below by deferring to their concurrent findings of fact.Presumption of joint property under commensality - Whether the properties in dispute were to be treated as joint property of a family living in commensality or as separate property of an individual member. - HELD THAT: - The parties lived in commensality and possessed joint property; under the applicable principle the presumption is that property in their possession is joint until evidence is adduced showing separate ownership by a member. No credible evidence was produced to show that any part of the property derived from separate funds of the appellant. Purchases and receipts in one name were consistent with joint ownership and did not rebut the presumption. [Paras 5, 6]The real and personal property must be considered joint property.Rejection of forged instrument as basis for title - authenticity and probative value of documentary evidence - Whether the ikrar-nama relied upon by the appellants was authentic and could defeat the widow's claim to her share. - HELD THAT: - The Zilla Court found the ikrar-nama to be a fabrication; the Sudder Court considered it possibly signed but obtained when the grantor was incompetent. Their Lordships inclined to the view of the Zilla Court and concluded that no faith could be placed in the deed. Consequently it could not be given weight to defeat the widow's entitlement. [Paras 7]The ikrar-nama is not admissible as a valid deed and must be disregarded.Acceptance of inventory as evidence of quantum - Whether the inventory produced in evidence could be accepted as proving the quantum of personal property. - HELD THAT: - Although there was some suspicion regarding the inventory, both the Zilla Court and the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut believed it to be a genuine instrument acknowledged by a party against interest. A reference to ascertain amounts could not usefully be made at this distance in time. Absent justification to upset the lower courts' conclusion, their Lordships treated the inventory as proving the amount reflected in the decree. [Paras 8, 9]The inventory is to be accepted as evidence of the quantum of personal property for purposes of the decree.Effect of adoption on widow's interest and role as guardian/trustee - authenticity and probative value of documentary evidence - The legal effect of the respondent's act of adoption and the validity of the ijazut-nama empowering adoption, in relation to the decree and the parties' rights. - HELD THAT: - Authorities establish that an act of adoption, when properly effected, divests the widow and vests the property in the adopted son. The ijazut-nama was found genuine by the courts below and their Lordships saw no reason to disbelieve the witnesses who proved it. Although the decree could be read as placing the respondent in possession in her own right, the proper construction is that she prosecuted the suit as guardian for the adopted son and is to hold the undivided share accountable to him, being entitled to maintenance out of it. [Paras 10, 11, 12]The ijazut-nama is genuine; the adoption divested the widow and vested rights in the adopted son, and the decree must be treated as giving possession to the respondent as guardian/trustee for the adopted son.Award of costs to successful respondent where appeal founded on forged instrument - Whether costs of the appeal should be awarded against the appellants. - HELD THAT: - Their Lordships proceeded on the ground that a forged instrument was tendered in evidence by the appellants and that this forged instrument caused the litigation. Absent reason to depart from the common rule, the appellate court considered that the unsuccessful appellants should bear the costs of the appeal. [Paras 13]Costs of the appeal awarded against the appellants.Final Conclusion: The Decrees of the Courts below are affirmed. The property is to be treated as joint; the contested deed relied upon by the appellants is rejected; the inventory is accepted for quantum; the adoption deed is genuine and the respondent holds possession as guardian/trustee for the adopted son; costs are awarded against the appellants.