Issues: Whether GST reimbursement claims concerning contracts executed after 1 July 2017 could be denied by applying paragraph 3(iv), instead of paragraph 4, of Notification No. 5050-F(Y) dated August 16, 2017.

Analysis: A plain-meaning interpretation of the Notification distinguishes pre-GST contracts from post-GST contracts. Paragraph 3(iv) is confined to pre-GST contracts, whereas paragraph 4 applies to post-GST contracts and ongoing projects covered by its terms. Reliance on paragraph 3(iv) to reject a post-GST reimbursement claim was therefore based on a misconstruction of the Notification. The factual entitlement and quantification of the reimbursement claim were not adjudicated.

Conclusion: Paragraph 3(iv) cannot be invoked to deny GST reimbursement in respect of contracts executed after 1 July 2017; such claims fall for consideration under paragraph 4 of Notification No. 5050-F(Y) dated August 16, 2017.

Issues: (i) Whether the statutory minimum penalty under Section 73(9) could be interfered with on the plea that the breach was minor, absent a constitutional challenge; and (ii) Whether the assessment order required intervention because it was issued without affording a hearing.

Issue (i): Whether the statutory minimum penalty under Section 73(9) could be interfered with on the plea that the breach was minor, absent a constitutional challenge.

Analysis: The applicable GST provisions draw a distinction between Section 74(1), which does not prescribe a minimum amount, and Section 73(9), which prescribes a minimum penalty. Although that distinction may furnish a basis to challenge the validity of the provisions, no such challenge was made.

Conclusion: Interference with the statutory minimum penalty was not warranted in the absence of a constitutional challenge, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment order required intervention because it was issued without affording a hearing.

Analysis: The order had been issued without giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing. The alleged breach also appeared prima facie to be minor. Fair adjudication required an opportunity to contest the tax proposals on merits, upon remittance of the tax demand within the stipulated period.

Conclusion: The denial of hearing vitiated the assessment order, and the assessee was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to contest the tax proposals on merits upon payment of the tax demand, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A challenge to the statutory penalty provision cannot succeed without directly questioning its validity, whereas an assessment made in breach of natural justice requires a fresh merits determination after affording a reasonable hearing.

Issues: Whether regular bail should be granted in a prosecution alleging fraudulent availment and transfer of input tax credit through bogus firms.

Analysis: The applicant had remained in custody since 23.06.2026, the investigation had culminated in filing of the charge-sheet, and the material was documentary in nature. Bail granted in similar matters and bail extended to another accused in a comparable case supported parity.

Conclusion: Regular bail was warranted on the recorded circumstances.

Issues: (i) Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised despite the statutory appellate remedy where non-service of the show-cause notice and denial of personal hearing are alleged; (ii) Whether the absence of remand power with the Appellate Authority permits bypassing the statutory appeal.

Issue (i): Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised despite the statutory appellate remedy where non-service of the show-cause notice and denial of personal hearing are alleged.

Analysis: Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be invoked notwithstanding an alternative remedy in exceptional cases involving jurisdictional error or breach of natural justice. The alleged non-service of the notice and denial of an effective personal hearing depended upon verification of the notices, their mode of service, receipt, and allied record. These were disputed factual matters suitable for determination in the statutory appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Any hearing-related infirmity was curable and did not establish a jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: The alleged defects in service and hearing do not justify writ intervention and must be raised before the Appellate Authority.

Issue (ii): Whether the absence of remand power with the Appellate Authority permits bypassing the statutory appeal.

Analysis: The power to decide an appeal on merits through a fresh and independent appraisal of the record is distinct from the power to remand. The lack of remand power does not impair the Appellate Authority's jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and determine the objections on merits.

Conclusion: Absence of remand power does not permit bypassing the statutory appellate remedy.

Final Conclusion: The factual and procedural objections remain open for independent adjudication on their merits in the statutory appellate process.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appeal should not be bypassed for fact-dependent and curable allegations of defective service or breach of natural justice, and the absence of remand power does not diminish the appellate authority's power to decide the appeal on merits.

Issues: Whether an ex parte tax assessment order could be sustained where it was not passed on the notified hearing date and no notice of the subsequently fixed hearing date was given.

Analysis: Where the assessing authority does not decide the matter on the date fixed for hearing and instead fixes another date, it must communicate that subsequent date to the taxpayer. Failure to do so deprives the taxpayer of an effective opportunity of personal hearing and results in a breach of the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: An ex parte assessment made without notice of the subsequent hearing date is unsustainable for breach of natural justice.

Issues: Whether a show cause notice and adjudication order electronically uploaded on the GST portal, but bearing neither a physical signature nor a digital signature, are legally valid under Rule 26(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.

Analysis: Rule 26(3) makes electronic issuance and authentication through a digital signature certificate, e-signature, or other Board-notified mode cumulative and mandatory requirements. Portal upload, generation of an ARN or reference number, and the officer's authenticated portal login establish only access to the portal; they do not authenticate the contents of a particular notice or order. A signature attributes the document to the competent officer, fixes responsibility, and protects against arbitrariness. No notified alternative mode of verification was shown. The complete absence of authentication is a jurisdictional defect, not a curable irregularity under Section 160. The statutory appellate remedy does not bar writ jurisdiction where the purported adjudication order has no legal existence.

Conclusion: The unsigned show cause notice and adjudication order were non est in law; consequently, the recovery notice and bank-account attachment founded on them could not survive. Fresh proceedings may be initiated in accordance with law using duly authenticated documents.

Issues: (i) Whether the show-cause notice issued on 29.11.2024 satisfied the requirement under Section 73(2) that it be issued at least three months before the terminal date for an order under Section 73(10); (ii) Whether the ex parte determination under Section 73(9) should be interfered with to afford an opportunity to contest the show-cause notice.

Issue (i): Whether the show-cause notice issued on 29.11.2024 satisfied the requirement under Section 73(2) that it be issued at least three months before the terminal date for an order under Section 73(10).

Analysis: Section 73 establishes a single statutory adjudicatory process beginning with the notice under Section 73(1) and culminating in the order under Section 73(9), subject to the outer limit in Section 73(10). A month is a calendar month under Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and the date of issuance is excluded while computing the prescribed interval under Section 9 of that Act. Section 73(2) requires a minimum available interval before the statutory terminal date; it does not prescribe an independent backward-calculated corresponding-date cut-off. Excluding 29.11.2024, the full calendar months of December 2024, January 2025 and February 2025 were available before 28.02.2025.

Conclusion: The notice was within the limitation prescribed by Section 73(2), in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the ex parte determination under Section 73(9) should be interfered with to afford an opportunity to contest the show-cause notice.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under Sections 73 and 75 contemplates an opportunity to contest the proposed demand before its determination. Since the proceedings had culminated during the pendency of the challenge, an opportunity to submit a reply to the notice was necessary to enable adjudication after consideration of the appellant's defence.

Conclusion: The determination under Section 73(9) was interfered with to enable the appellant to contest the notice, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The notice remains valid, but the demand requires fresh completion of the statutory adjudicatory process after the appellant is given the specified opportunity to respond.

Ratio Decidendi: For Section 73(2), the minimum interval of three months is satisfied where, after excluding the date of issuance of notice, three calendar months remain available before the terminal date under Section 73(10); a backward corresponding-date calculation is not an independent limitation cut-off.

Issues: Whether proceedings and consequential demands founded solely on Rule 96(10), after its unconditional omission without a saving clause, could survive.

Analysis: Rule 96(10) of the CGST/WBGST Rules, 2017 was omitted with effect from 8 October 2024 without a saving clause. The applicable principle is that, absent a statutory saving provision or legal fiction preserving accrued proceedings, an omitted rule ceases to exist and no proceedings may be initiated or continued solely under it. The departmental instruction accepting this position also required field formations not to initiate or pursue such proceedings.

Conclusion: The proceedings under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and consequential orders founded solely on omitted Rule 96(10) were unsustainable and stood quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the petitioner should be enlarged on bail pending trial for the alleged offences.

Analysis: The request for bail under the statutory bail jurisdiction was assessed with reference to the filing of the charge sheet, custody since 15.07.2026, absence of flight risk and criminal antecedents, the maximum prescribed punishment of five years, and the absence of a need for further undertrial detention. The pending investigation concerning co-accused was safeguarded through stringent conditions.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to bail on stringent conditions.

Issues: Whether the accused was entitled to bail in a prosecution under the Central Goods and Services Tax law.

Analysis: Article 21 of the Constitution of India protects personal liberty through a just, fair and reasonable procedure, and pre-conviction detention is not punitive. Bail is directed to securing attendance at trial, while prolonged custody, absence of criminal antecedents, parity with similarly placed co-accused, completion of investigation, absence of charge framing, the limited maximum sentence, and absence of material suggesting flight risk, witness intimidation or evidence tampering support release. The absence of assessment proceedings under Sections 73 and 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could also bear upon the criminal prosecution. The prosecution was substantially documentary, the alleged offences were triable by a Magistrate, and the trial was not likely to conclude within a reasonable time.

Conclusion: The accused was entitled to bail.

Issues: Whether a repeated show-cause notice and retrospective cancellation of GST registration could be sustained when earlier proceedings on identical registration-fraud allegations had been dropped and the cancellation relied upon allegations concerning fraudulent availment and passing of input tax credit that were not stated in the notice.

Analysis: The earlier cancellation proceedings had been dropped after the assessee responded to a notice founded on the allegation that registration had been obtained through fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts. The subsequent notice was founded on the same allegation and substantially identical intelligence material. The cancellation order nevertheless relied on alleged fraudulent availment and passing of ineligible input tax credit, although the assessee had not been required to answer those allegations in the show-cause notice. This reflected non-application of mind and denied the assessee an opportunity to respond to the grounds ultimately relied upon. The merits of the allegations were left open.

Conclusion: The repeated show-cause notice and the registration-cancellation order were set aside. The authorities may initiate fresh proceedings through a proper notice and after affording an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: Whether partial rejection of refund claims for unutilised input tax credit without affording a hearing or recording reasons was valid.

Analysis: Refund applications under Section 54(3) were partly rejected without a prior opportunity of hearing and without any reasons being assigned for the rejected portion. These deficiencies constituted a breach of the principles of natural justice and the duty to issue a reasoned decision.

Conclusion: The partial rejection of the refund claims was invalid for violation of the principles of natural justice.

Issues: Whether the penalty imposed for GST non-compliance was sustainable after the petitioner had filed returns and paid the applicable late fees, particularly where the aggregate penalty exceeded the statutory maximum.

Analysis: The returns had already been filed and late fees paid in accordance with law. The aggregate penalty of Rs. 50,000 was found to exceed the maximum permissible limit under the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice and penalty order were quashed and set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether GST was payable on services completed in 2015, though post-facto approval and billing occurred after 1 July 2017; (ii) Whether interest was payable on the withheld contractual amount and, if so, at what rate.

Issue (i): Whether GST was payable on services completed in 2015, though post-facto approval and billing occurred after 1 July 2017.

Analysis: Deployment of technical personnel for repair and maintenance constituted a supply of services. Under the time-of-supply framework in Sections 13(1) and 13(2), read with the transitional protection in Section 142(11)(b) of the West Bengal Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, taxability depended on when the service was actually supplied. The service had been fully rendered before the GST appointed day. The post-facto approval and subsequent raising of bills did not alter the date of supply. The applicable Government memorandum likewise treated services supplied before 1 July 2017, where invoiced later, as falling under the erstwhile Service Tax regime.

Conclusion: GST was not payable on the completed service; any applicable tax was governed by the pre-GST Service Tax regime. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest was payable on the withheld contractual amount and, if so, at what rate.

Analysis: Although there was no restraint against payment in the pending civil suit, the existence of the taxability dispute meant that the delay could not be wholly attributed to the respondents. The claimed commercial rate of 12% was therefore not warranted, while interest at the prevailing banking rate was appropriate.

Conclusion: Interest was payable at 8% per annum from the date of submission of the bills until actual payment. This issue was partly decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Services actually supplied and completed before commencement of GST remain governed by the pre-GST tax regime notwithstanding later approval or invoicing, and the unpaid amount attracts interest at the banking rate.

Ratio Decidendi: For transitional tax purposes, liability is determined by the actual date of supply of services; subsequent approval or invoicing cannot subject a completed pre-GST service to GST.

Issues: Whether a detailed GST adjudication order issued without a physical signature, digital signature or e-signature is valid and protected as a curable defect.

Analysis: Rule 26(3) requires orders to be electronically issued with a digital signature certificate, e-signature, or another notified mode of verification. The signature requirement fixes authorship and accountability. The saving provision for defects applies only where the proceeding is in substance and effect compliant with the statutory requirements; a signed DRC-07 does not cure the absence of a signature on the detailed adjudication order.

Conclusion: A detailed adjudication order without a physical or electronic signature is not in substantive compliance with Rule 26(3) and is invalid; the defect is not saved as a mere mistake, defect or omission.

Issues: Whether a composite show-cause notice covering several financial years or tax periods is permissible under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The GST framework treats liability, returns, assessment, and recovery as referable to distinct tax periods and financial years. The statutory limitation for determination and recovery runs independently for each relevant financial year. Combining multiple years with separate due dates and limitation periods in one notice is inconsistent with this year-wise structure and impairs the taxpayer's ability to respond to each period separately. The dismissal in limine of a challenge to a contrary High Court view did not attract the doctrine of merger. Authorities within the Court's territorial jurisdiction were bound by the Court's earlier decisions holding against such consolidation.

Conclusion: A composite show-cause notice consolidating multiple financial years or tax periods is not permissible; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether delay in filing a statutory appeal could be condoned where sufficient cause was established and the mandatory pre-deposit had been made.

Analysis: The delay was attributed to the serious illness of the person entrusted with attending to the business affairs, supported by medical material. The pre-deposit requirement had been complied with before the appeal was filed. Treating the appeal as barred solely on limitation, without giving effect to the demonstrated sufficient cause and substantial compliance with the pre-deposit requirement, was found to be unduly technical and to render the statutory appellate remedy illusory.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned in favour of the assessee; the appellate dismissal was quashed, and the appeal was directed to be admitted and decided on merits.

Issues: Whether rejection of the appeal as time-barred without considering the grounds in the delay-condonation application was sustainable.

Analysis: The stated reason treated acceptance of an appeal beyond the prescribed period as rendering the statutory limitation provisions ineffective. That approach did not address the specific explanation tendered for the nine-day delay or demonstrate consideration of the delay-condonation application. A determination on limitation must deal with the material submissions and disclose reasons.

Conclusion: The rejection of the delay-condonation request without consideration of the petitioner's stated grounds was unsustainable; the limitation issue must be determined afresh through a reasoned order after hearing the petitioner.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petitions were entertainable despite the available statutory appellate remedy; (ii) Whether licensing by an original copyright holder of cinematographic films before 1 October 2021 was licensing of information technology software taxable at 18%, or licensing of intellectual-property rights in goods other than information technology software taxable at 12%; (iii) Whether the pre-1 October 2021 GST regularisation on an as-is-where-is basis extended to producer-to-distributor licensing of theatrical rights.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petitions were entertainable despite the available statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: Article 226 of the Constitution of India permits writ intervention notwithstanding an alternative remedy where the impugned action suffers from a jurisdictional error or the controversy is purely legal and does not require resolution of disputed facts. The classification issue turned on the statutory entries, definition of information technology software and applicable service classifications; the appellate tribunal was also not functional when the petitions were instituted.

Conclusion: The writ petitions were entertainable notwithstanding the statutory appellate remedy, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether licensing by an original copyright holder of cinematographic films before 1 October 2021 was licensing of information technology software taxable at 18%, or licensing of intellectual-property rights in goods other than information technology software taxable at 12%.

Analysis: Entry 17 distinguished intellectual-property rights in goods other than information technology software from rights in information technology software. The statutory definition required a machine-readable representation capable of manipulation or providing interactivity to a user. The classification scheme separately identified licensing of computer software and databases under SAC 997331 and licensing rights to broadcast and show original films under SAC 997332.

Analysis: A cinematographic film is a passive audio-visual work and does not become information technology software merely because it is supplied electronically or through a hard disk. The essential character of the licensed supply, rather than its delivery mode, governed classification. The impugned orders neither applied the statutory definition nor explained the disregard of the specific entry for original films; reliance on an undisclosed statement concerning the transmission mode could not cure that defect.

Conclusion: Licensing copyright in cinematographic films was classifiable under Entry 17(i) at 12%, and not under Entry 17(ii) at 18%, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the pre-1 October 2021 GST regularisation on an as-is-where-is basis extended to producer-to-distributor licensing of theatrical rights.

Analysis: The circulars acknowledged overlap between competing classifications for licensing theatrical rights before the rate rationalisation and regularised tax paid at the lower rate on an as-is-where-is basis. That ambiguity concerned the nature of theatrical-rights licensing throughout the chain of exploitation and did not turn on whether the licensor was the original copyright holder, distributor or sub-distributor.

Conclusion: The as-is-where-is regularisation extended to producer-to-distributor licensing of theatrical rights, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The differential GST treatment was unsupported by the pre-amendment classification scheme and the applicable regularisation of the acknowledged classification overlap.

Ratio Decidendi: GST classification is determined by the essential character of the supply under the applicable tariff entry; the physical or electronic mode of delivering cinematographic content does not render it information technology software absent the statutory attributes of manipulability or user interactivity.

Issues: Whether an assessment order is sustainable when the date fixed for personal hearing precedes the deadline for filing a reply to the show-cause notice.

Analysis: The statutory procedure requires a meaningful opportunity of hearing before an adverse determination. Fixing the hearing before expiry of the time granted for filing a reply deprives the taxable person of an effective opportunity to respond and breaches the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The assessment order was invalid for breach of the principles of natural justice; the petitioner must be afforded an opportunity to file a reply followed by a personal hearing.