Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to bail for the alleged offence of money laundering.

Analysis: The material on record, including the allegation of substantial misappropriation and the statement recorded during investigation, disclosed the petitioner's alleged connection with the proceeds of crime. Bail under the applicable statutory framework requires satisfaction of the twin conditions: an opportunity to the prosecution to oppose bail and reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty and unlikely to commit an offence while on bail. Those conditions were not satisfied.

Conclusion: Bail was refused; the finding was against the petitioner.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to permission to travel to Canada and stay there for six months during pendency of the PMLA complaint, subject to safeguards.

Analysis: The proceedings in the prosecution complaint remained stayed because the final report in the predicate offence had not been filed. The petitioner had earlier been permitted to travel abroad, had complied with the direction to return to India, had been appearing through video conferencing, and had not breached any condition imposed by the Court. No material was produced to show a prima facie apprehension that he would flee from justice merely because he had acquired Canadian citizenship. In these circumstances, and in view of the availability of virtual appearance and physical presence of counsel, the request for travel permission could be granted with protective conditions.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to travel to Canada and stay there for six months, subject to furnishing surety and bank guarantee and complying with the conditions imposed.

Final Conclusion: Permission to travel abroad was granted with safeguards to secure the petitioner's presence and participation in the proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the proceedings are already stayed, the accused has complied with prior travel conditions, and no prima facie material shows a risk of absconding, travel abroad may be permitted subject to conditions securing attendance.

Issues: (i) Whether the show-cause notice issued under the PMLA was liable to be quashed on the ground that the adjudicating authority acted coram non judice and that the notice was issued by a non-judicial member or a single-member bench; (ii) Whether the writ petition was maintainable in view of the availability of an alternative statutory remedy under the PMLA.

Issue (i): Whether the show-cause notice issued under the PMLA was liable to be quashed on the ground that the adjudicating authority acted coram non judice and that the notice was issued by a non-judicial member or a single-member bench?

Analysis: Section 6 of the PMLA was read as a whole. The composition provision in sub-section (2) does not exclude functioning through benches, because sub-sections (5), (6), (7), (13) and (14) expressly permit constitution of benches with one or two members, transfer between benches, and discharge of the Chairperson's functions by the senior-most member when required. On that construction, a proceeding is not vitiated merely because it is taken up by a single member or by a member who is not a judicial officer. The earlier decisions relied on by the Court supported the view that the statutory scheme permits single-member functioning and that the adjudicating authority is not rendered without jurisdiction for that reason.

Conclusion: The challenge based on coram non judice and improper composition of the adjudicating authority was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petition was maintainable in view of the availability of an alternative statutory remedy under the PMLA?

Analysis: The PMLA provides an internal adjudicatory and appellate framework, including adjudication under Section 8 and further statutory challenge before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 26. The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is ordinarily not to be invoked where an effective remedy exists, especially where the statute creates a complete mechanism for redress. No exceptional ground warranting bypass of that mechanism was found.

Conclusion: The writ petition was held to be not entertainable in view of the available alternative statutory remedy.

Final Conclusion: The impugned show-cause notice was not quashed, and the writ petition failed on both the jurisdictional challenge and the maintainability objection.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 6 of the PMLA, the adjudicating authority may validly function through benches, including a single-member bench, and writ interference is ordinarily barred where the statute provides an effective appellate remedy.

Issues: (i) Whether the orders rejecting discharge and framing charge under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 suffered from legal error. (ii) Whether the materials collected in investigation disclosed a prima facie case for proceeding against the petitioner.

Issue (i): Whether the orders rejecting discharge and framing charge under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 suffered from legal error.

Analysis: The governing test at the stage of discharge and framing of charge is whether, on the prosecution record alone, there is sufficient ground for proceeding or ground for presuming commission of the offence. The accused cannot invite a mini trial, rely on defence material, or seek a meticulous appraisal of probative value. Revisional interference is confined to patent legal error, jurisdictional error, or a case where the allegations accepted at face value do not disclose the offence.

Conclusion: The impugned orders do not suffer from any legal error warranting interference.

Issue (ii): Whether the materials collected in investigation disclosed a prima facie case for proceeding against the petitioner.

Analysis: The record disclosed a scheduled offence generating proceeds of crime, fake bitumen invoices, receipt of the disputed amount by the contractor company, and subsequent movement of those funds into related entities controlled by the petitioner. The statutory definition of proceeds of crime and the offence of money laundering under the Act cover direct or indirect involvement in possession, use, acquisition, concealment, and projecting tainted property as untainted. On that material, the court held that the petitioner's role as director and controlling person was sufficiently reflected at the threshold stage.

Conclusion: A prima facie case was made out against the petitioner for trial.

Final Conclusion: The revisions failed because the threshold for discharge was not met and the charge was properly allowed to stand on the material produced by the prosecution.

Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of discharge or framing of charge, the court must accept the prosecution material at face value, may only sift it to see whether a prima facie case or grave suspicion exists, and must not conduct a mini trial or assess defence material.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1. Whether the petitioner's arrest under Section 19(1) of the PMLA was vitiated for non-compliance with the statutory safeguards, including the requirement of "material in possession", recording "reasons to believe" in writing, and informing the arrestee of the "grounds of arrest" as soon as may be.

2. Whether Section 19(2) of the PMLA was violated because the arrest order and accompanying material were forwarded to the Adjudicating Authority three days after arrest, and whether such forwarding satisfied the statutory requirement of being done "immediately after arrest".

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Validity of arrest under Section 19(1) PMLA (material in possession; recorded reasons to believe; communication of grounds)

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court identified three pre-conditions for a valid arrest under Section 19(1): (i) the authorised officer must have "material in his possession"; (ii) on that basis, the officer must form and record in writing "reasons to believe" that the person is guilty of an offence punishable under the PMLA; and (iii) the person arrested must be informed of the "grounds of arrest" as soon as may be. The Court further confined writ scrutiny to checking compliance with these safeguards and not to evaluating the sufficiency/adequacy of the material at the investigative stage.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found it undisputed that the "grounds of arrest" and "reasons to believe" were furnished to the petitioner immediately upon arrest, satisfying the communication requirement. On the petitioner's contention that the arrest was based merely on investigation "borrowed" from the predicate offence, the Court examined the documents produced and held that they prima facie suggested an independent investigation by the enforcement agency, resulting in collection of material against the petitioner and a recorded "reasons to believe" note. The Court held that the arresting officer's subjective satisfaction regarding the material and necessity to arrest appeared to be in accordance with law, and that the Court could not, at this stage, scrutinise the sufficiency or correctness of the underlying facts and material.

Conclusion: Section 19(1) was held to have been sufficiently and adequately complied with; the arrest was not vitiated on the ground of non-compliance with Section 19(1).

Issue 2: Compliance with Section 19(2) PMLA (forwarding arrest order and material to Adjudicating Authority "immediately after arrest")

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court treated forwarding of the arrest order and the material to the Adjudicating Authority under Section 19(2) as a mandatory safeguard, while considering the practical content of the statutory phrase "immediately after arrest" in the factual context presented.

Interpretation and reasoning: The petitioner was arrested on April 4, 2025, and the forwarding to the Adjudicating Authority occurred on April 7, 2025. The Court accepted the explanation that the documents were handed over to the petitioner after working hours on April 4, and that the intervening two days were holidays, making April 7 the earliest working day for dispatch. The Court also relied on its prior holding (as applied to the present facts) that where "grounds of arrest" and "reasons to believe" are furnished immediately upon arrest, the Court can ascertain that the arresting officer already had the material prior to arrest, supporting compliance. In this backdrop, the three-day gap was treated as justified on the attending circumstances and not as a breach of Section 19(2).

Conclusion: Section 19(2) was held complied with on the facts; forwarding on the next working day after intervening holidays did not vitiate the arrest.

Overall dispositive holding: Since the petitioner sought release solely on alleged non-compliance with Section 19, and the Court found Section 19(1) and Section 19(2) complied with, the petitioner was held not entitled to release on that ground and the writ petition was dismissed. The Court expressly did not examine the case on merits, leaving bail on merits to be considered independently by the appropriate court.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 on the ground of prolonged incarceration and delay in trial, and whether the rigours of Section 45 stood satisfied in the facts of the case.

Analysis: The application was considered in the backdrop of long custody, a large number of witnesses, voluminous documentary material, and the fact that the trial in the predicate offence had not commenced. The delay in framing of charge was found not attributable to the applicant. The Court applied the settled principle that the statutory restrictions on bail under special enactments do not oust constitutional jurisdiction where continued detention would amount to denial of the right to speedy trial under Article 21. The Court further relied on the principle that the rigours of Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 must be harmonised with constitutional protections, and that prolonged incarceration without a realistic prospect of early conclusion of trial can justify bail.

Conclusion: The applicant was held entitled to bail, and the twin conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 were treated as satisfied in his favour.

Final Conclusion: Bail was granted on the ground that continued custody, in the circumstances of the case, could not be justified when the trial was unlikely to conclude in the near future.

Ratio Decidendi: In a case under a special statute with stringent bail conditions, constitutional courts may grant bail where prolonged incarceration and no realistic prospect of timely trial would otherwise defeat the right to personal liberty and speedy trial.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to bail in a money-laundering prosecution under the stringent conditions of the special statute, and whether the circumstances of arrest, further investigation, parity, and prolonged custody justified release.

Analysis: The bail court examined the statutory rigour governing money-laundering offences alongside constitutional safeguards of liberty and fair trial. It held that the satisfaction contemplated by the bail restrictions is only prima facie and does not amount to a finding of guilt. On the material placed, the applicant was not shown to hold any official role in the excise administration or to have any direct documentary trail linking him to procurement decisions, official orders, or identifiable proceeds of crime. The court also noted that the investigation was largely documentary and digital, that relevant material had already been secured, and that no specific custodial necessity was demonstrated to justify continued detention. The omission to issue summons before arrest, the selective non-arrest of certain co-accused, and the existence of bail granted to similarly placed accused were treated as relevant circumstances. The court further considered the likelihood of a protracted trial, the applicant's custody since 18.07.2025, and the inability of the prosecution to show that continued incarceration was necessary to protect the investigation or trial.

Conclusion: The applicant was held entitled to bail, subject to stringent conditions, because continued custody was found disproportionate and unnecessary in the facts of the case.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under a stringent money-laundering regime, bail may be granted when the court finds only a prima facie case, no demonstrated custodial necessity, a substantial risk of prolonged trial, and a custody regime that would otherwise amount to pre-trial punishment inconsistent with Article 21.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether, in the case of a woman accused, the embargo of the twin conditions under Section 45(1)(ii) of the PMLA applies, or whether bail is to be assessed on general bail principles under the first proviso to Section 45(1).

(ii) Whether, on a prima facie appraisal of the material and the circumstances highlighted in the record, continued judicial custody of the applicant was warranted, or regular bail ought to be granted in the PMLA case.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i): Applicability of Section 45 PMLA twin conditions to a woman accused

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court examined Section 45 of the PMLA, specifically the first proviso to Section 45(1) in relation to clause (ii) (the "twin conditions"). The Court also applied the principle stated in a Supreme Court decision referred to in the judgment, which the Court treated as settling the position for women accused.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court accepted that, for a woman accused, the first proviso operates as an exception to the twin conditions in Section 45(1)(ii). The Court held that the statutory embargo can be relaxed for such an accused, and that bail may be considered on general principles, while still keeping in view the nature and gravity of allegations.

Conclusion: The Court conclusively held that, since the applicant is a woman, the twin conditions under Section 45(1)(ii) need not be satisfied, and the bail request falls to be assessed on general bail considerations, with due regard to seriousness of allegations.

Issue (ii): Whether the applicant made out a case for regular bail on the Court's prima facie assessment

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court evaluated the prosecution's core allegation that proceeds of crime from the scheduled offence were routed to the applicant and used for acquisition/holding of immovable properties, and that the applicant thereby participated in acquisition, possession, use and projection of proceeds of crime as untainted. At the same time, the Court weighed multiple record-based circumstances cumulatively: (a) the applicant was not charge-sheeted in the predicate case and the Magistrate, in the private complaint proceedings, declined to take cognizance against her, recording no offence made out even for summoning; (b) the alleged underlying transactions were old (2008-2013), with the scheduled-offence FIR in 2016 and the ECIR only in 2025; (c) a substantial amount (about Rs. 2.7 crores) had been returned to the complainant, so the case could not, at that stage, be treated as involving projection/concealment of the entire alleged amount; (d) the principal accused in the predicate matter had been declared a proclaimed offender yet remained unarrested, and the Court noted absence of effective steps to arrest him despite his appearance through counsel in the PMLA proceedings; (e) the applicant had remained in custody for over four months; (f) the investigation qua the applicant was complete and the prosecution complaint had been filed; and (g) trial would take time since 24 witnesses were cited and the predicate trial was not progressing due to the absconding of the only accused there.

Conclusion: On the cumulative assessment, the Court found "no ground" to further keep the applicant in judicial custody and granted regular bail, subject to conditions including furnishing bonds/sureties, surrender of passport, travel restriction, keeping contact number active, providing residence details, cooperation with investigation, non-tampering with evidence/non-influencing witnesses, and regular attendance before the trial court.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner was entitled to have the cognizance order set aside on the ground that no pre-cognizance hearing was afforded under Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. (ii) Whether the delay in challenging the cognizance order deserved condonation.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioner was entitled to have the cognizance order set aside on the ground that no pre-cognizance hearing was afforded under Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Analysis: The challenge was founded on alleged denial of hearing before cognizance was taken on a prosecution complaint under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002. The record showed that the petitioner and counsel were present when cognizance was taken, and the petitioner had also been heard on merits at the stage of bail. The Court held that cognizance denotes judicial notice of an offence and does not require a formal speaking order. In the absence of any specific material showing how the petitioner was actually prevented from being heard, and in the absence of demonstrated prejudice, the plea of violation of Section 223 could not succeed.

Conclusion: The cognizance order was not liable to be set aside on the ground of denial of pre-cognizance hearing.

Issue (ii): Whether the delay in challenging the cognizance order deserved condonation.

Analysis: The petition was filed belatedly after substantial delay, despite the petitioner being represented before the Trial Court on multiple occasions after cognizance was taken. The explanation that the petitioner was in custody and later required new legal advice was found unsatisfactory. The Court held that sufficient cause was not shown and that the delay explanation lacked credibility, particularly when the issue was never raised earlier.

Conclusion: The delay was not condoned.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the cognizance order failed on both the merits and the explanation for delay, and the petition was not entertained.

Ratio Decidendi: A belated challenge to a cognizance order on the ground of denial of pre-cognizance hearing will not succeed unless actual prejudice is shown, especially where the accused was present or represented and was later heard on merits.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1) Whether, on the facts found, the Applicant satisfied the statutory "twin conditions" for bail under Section 45 PMLA and the general "triple test" (flight risk, influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence), warranting regular bail.

2) Whether "necessity of arrest", in the context of long-standing investigation, prior cooperation, and documentary nature of evidence, was relevant and could be examined in bail proceedings to assess entitlement to bail.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Satisfaction of Section 45 PMLA "twin conditions" and the "triple test"

Legal framework: The Court proceeded on the basis that bail under PMLA must satisfy Section 45 "twin conditions" in addition to ordinary bail considerations, and assessed the "triple test" of (i) flight risk, (ii) possibility of influencing witnesses, and (iii) possibility of tampering with evidence.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated as significant that the Applicant was not alleged to have conceived, controlled, or executed the predicate investment scheme, but was implicated primarily due to alleged directorships in overseas entities through which proceeds of crime were said to have been laundered. The Court found it material that large parts of the alleged fund diversions occurred before the Applicant assumed directorial positions, making the allegation of "active and knowing" laundering based only on office-holding less persuasive at the bail stage. The Court also considered that the Applicant had been on bail in the predicate offence without misuse, had repeatedly travelled abroad with court permission and returned on time, and had "deep roots in society," supporting the conclusion that he was not a flight risk. Since the case was "essentially" documentary and the investigation had been completed with the supplementary complaint already filed, the Court found little likelihood of tampering with evidence or obstructing investigation; conditions could ensure attendance and compliance.

Conclusions: The Court held that the Applicant satisfied both the Section 45 PMLA twin conditions and the triple test, and granted regular bail with conditions ensuring appearance, non-interference, and travel restrictions.

Issue 2: Relevance and examinability of "necessity of arrest" in bail proceedings

Legal framework: The Court considered "necessity of arrest" as a relevant factor while deciding bail, particularly where the Applicant had been granted liberty to agitate it in bail proceedings.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court accepted that, given the predicate investigation commenced years earlier and the Applicant had "throughout joined the investigation," the contention that there was no necessity to arrest had "some substance." The Court rejected the objection that this issue could not be examined because a writ challenging arrest had been withdrawn, holding that liberty had been expressly granted to raise it in bail. The Court also did not accept that conduct attributed to the Applicant's wife or other suspects could be used to deny bail to him. As to the allegation of deletion of WhatsApp data, the Court treated it as a "moot point" and a matter for trial; in any case, with investigation complete, the likelihood of interference was low.

Conclusions: The Court held that "necessity of arrest" could be considered in the bail determination on these facts; the long prior investigation, consistent cooperation, and documentary nature of evidence supported bail rather than continued custody.

Issues: (i) Whether a party can, in an appeal against the same judgment, challenge the recording of its own submissions, stand, admissions or concessions as reflected in that judgment; (ii) Whether Rs. 141.50 crores advanced by SPCL to the Nilesh Thakur Group could be treated as 'proceeds of crime' under the PMLA.

Issue (i): Whether a party can, in an appeal against the same judgment, challenge the recording of its own submissions, stand, admissions or concessions as reflected in that judgment?

Analysis: Statements of fact as to what transpired in court, when recorded in a judicial order, are conclusive unless corrected before the very court that made the record. The proper course for a party alleging wrong recording of concessions or submissions is to seek clarification, correction or review before that court. A party cannot, in an appeal against the judgment itself, contradict the record through later assertions, especially when no corrective steps were taken and the recorded statements continue to form part of the order.

Conclusion: The challenge to the recorded admissions and concessions was not entertained in the appeal; the parties remained bound by the record.

Issue (ii): Whether Rs. 141.50 crores advanced by SPCL to the Nilesh Thakur Group could be treated as 'proceeds of crime' under the PMLA.

Analysis: 'Proceeds of crime' under the PMLA requires property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The Court found that the money was advanced through banking channels under a commercial agreement for land acquisition, was reflected in SPCL's accounts, and had already been judicially found by income-tax authorities to be a lawful and valid business transaction. No material showed that the funds were generated from criminal activity or had any nexus with the discharge of public duties by the public servant concerned. The Court also noted that the Prevention of Corruption Act offence became a scheduled offence only from 1 June 2009, whereas a substantial part of the transfers had occurred earlier. In the absence of the essential ingredients of a scheduled offence and a causal link to criminal activity, the attachment under PMLA could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The amount of Rs. 141.50 crores was not 'proceeds of crime' and the PMLA attachment could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were held to be without merit, the impugned tribunal order was affirmed, and the attached properties were directed to be released, with modification only as to the apportionment of accrued interest on the deposited sums.

Ratio Decidendi: For property to fall within 'proceeds of crime' under the PMLA, there must be a proven nexus between the property and criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence; absent that nexus, and absent a sustainable basis to dispute the recorded court concessions, attachment cannot stand.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether a restoration order under Section 8(8) PMLA, insofar as it affects a specific attached asset, can be sustained when the Special Court has not complied with the mandatory safeguard in Rule 3A(4) of the 2016 Restoration Rules requiring an opportunity of hearing to the owner/affected claimant.

(ii) What relief is warranted where the restoration order is procedurally infirm only in relation to one identified asset, and the parties seek reconsideration confined to that asset.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i): Validity of restoration direction affecting an attached asset in absence of hearing under Rule 3A(4)

Legal framework: The Court examined Section 8(8) PMLA in conjunction with the Prevention of Money Laundering (Restoration of Confiscated Property) Rules, 2016, specifically Rule 3A. The Court noted two embedded safeguards: (a) Rule 3A(1) contemplates consideration "after framing of the charge" and envisages publication of notice inviting claims; and (b) Rule 3A(4) imposes an express bar against passing a restoration order without giving an opportunity of being heard to the owner of the property.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that, even if the question of timing under Rule 3A(1) were to be kept aside, the hearing requirement under Rule 3A(4) "admits of no dilution". Where a restoration direction operates upon identified attached property and an affected owner asserts a stake, the Special Court must at minimum issue notice and afford a fair opportunity of hearing. The Court found that the impugned order neither recorded submissions on behalf of the affected claimants nor reflected compliance with Rule 3A(4), and that no hearing had been afforded at all. Such non-compliance rendered the restoration direction unsustainable, apart from the broader audi alteram partem requirement.

Conclusion: The restoration direction, insofar as it related to the identified attached asset (17% equity shares in the specified company), was set aside for failure to comply with Rule 3A(4) and lack of hearing to affected owners/claimants.

Issue (ii): Appropriate scope of interference and remand when infirmity is confined to a single asset

Legal framework: The Court exercised revisional interference to the extent necessary to cure the procedural illegality identified, while preserving the statutory adjudication by the Special Court under Section 8(8) PMLA read with Rule 3A.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court accepted that the challenge was confined to one asset entry in the attachment table and found it appropriate to set aside the impugned order only to that limited extent. Given the acknowledged absence of hearing and the stated willingness of the applicant seeking restoration to have a fresh decision confined to that asset, the Court remanded the Section 8(8) application for reconsideration limited to the said asset. To ensure a procedurally compliant adjudication, the Court directed that the Special Court decide the matter uninfluenced by observations on merits in the impugned order and ensure compliance with Rule 3A, including hearing to affected owners under Rule 3A(4). The Court further kept all rights and contentions open (including maintainability, stage, and Rule 3A compliance) and structured timelines for filing reply and rejoinder, with directions for appearance and expeditious decision.

Conclusion: The impugned restoration order was partially set aside only for the specified asset; the restoration application was remanded for fresh, limited reconsideration with mandatory compliance of Rule 3A (notably Rule 3A(4)) and with all merits and objections expressly left open.

Issues: (i) Whether the ECIR and the connected PMLA proceedings could survive after the predicate Kolkata FIRs had ended in closure reports accepted by the Magistrate. (ii) Whether the Enforcement Directorate could sustain the Kolkata ECIR and complaint by additionally relying on the Kochi charge sheet, despite a separate PMLA proceeding already pending at Kochi. (iii) Whether section 66(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 could justify continuation of the impugned proceedings in the facts of the case.

Issue (i): Whether the ECIR and the connected PMLA proceedings could survive after the predicate Kolkata FIRs had ended in closure reports accepted by the Magistrate.

Analysis: The predicate offences were the two Kolkata FIRs on which the ECIR was founded. Both FIRs ended in closure reports on the ground of mistake of fact, and those reports were accepted by the Magistrate. The Court held that the foundation of the alleged proceeds of crime had therefore disappeared. Applying the post-Vijay Madanlal Choudhary line of authorities, the Court treated the existence of a live predicate offence and corresponding proceeds of crime as essential for the continuation of PMLA action. Once the scheduled offences stood negated and the acceptance of closure reports remained unaltered, the PMLA proceedings could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The ECIR and the connected PMLA proceedings could not survive on the basis of the two Kolkata FIRs alone.

Issue (ii): Whether the Enforcement Directorate could sustain the Kolkata ECIR and complaint by additionally relying on the Kochi charge sheet, despite a separate PMLA proceeding already pending at Kochi.

Analysis: The Court found no reliable material showing that the Kolkata ECIR was originally predicated on the Kochi charge sheet. The record instead showed that the Kolkata proceedings were tied to the two Kolkata FIRs and that the alleged proceeds of crime were quantified with reference to those FIRs. The Kochi charge sheet was already the subject of a separate PMLA proceeding at Kochi, where cognizance had been taken. The Court held that attempting to add the Kochi charge sheet to the Kolkata ECIR at that stage would amount to a second cognizance based on the same predicate material and would not be legally sustainable on the facts presented.

Conclusion: The Kochi charge sheet could not validly be used to preserve the Kolkata ECIR or the Kolkata complaint in the manner attempted.

Issue (iii): Whether section 66(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 could justify continuation of the impugned proceedings in the facts of the case.

Analysis: The Court held that section 66(2) is a mechanism for sharing information with the appropriate agency and does not, by itself, create or sustain a scheduled offence or generate proceeds of crime. It cannot revive a proceeding where the predicate offences have already been negated by accepted closure reports. The Court also held that the existence of pending applications under section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 did not alter the present legal position, because the original closure orders had not been set aside.

Conclusion: Section 66(2) did not furnish a valid basis to continue the impugned proceedings.

Final Conclusion: The impugned ECIR and complaint were quashed, with liberty reserved to seek revival if the predicate position changes in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the predicate offences underlying a PMLA proceeding are concluded by accepted closure reports and the alleged proceeds of crime are traced only to those closed offences, the PMLA action cannot continue unless the predicate foundation is lawfully restored or otherwise survives independently.

Issues: Whether prior sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was mandatory before the Special Court could take cognizance of offences under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 against a public servant, and whether absence of such sanction vitiated the cognizance order.

Analysis: The governing test is whether the alleged act is reasonably connected with the discharge of official duty. Section 197 protects public servants only for acts done while acting or purporting to act in the course of official duty, and the protection does not extend to wholly unconnected personal illegal acts. Section 65 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 applies the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to PMLA proceedings unless inconsistent, and the Court treated the sanction requirement as applicable in principle. On the facts, however, the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten money and siphoning of State funds was held to be personal illegal conduct and not an act reasonably connected with official duty. The issue of sanction could also be examined at the trial stage, and the absence of prior sanction did not, on the facts, invalidate the cognizance order.

Conclusion: Prior sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not held to be a ground to quash the cognizance order in this case, and the challenge to cognizance failed.

Ratio Decidendi: The protection under Section 197(1) applies only where the alleged offence has a reasonable nexus with official duty; it does not extend to personal corrupt acts such as siphoning public funds, even when committed by a public servant.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to bail under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 in view of prolonged incarceration and the unlikely early conclusion of the trial.

Analysis: The application was considered in the backdrop of the statutory restriction under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and the requirement to satisfy the twin conditions. The Court found that no role could be attributed to the applicant in delaying the proceedings and that the adjournments were attributable to other accused persons. It also noted that charges had not been framed, that the case involved a large number of witnesses and voluminous documentary material, and that the trial of the predicate offences had not commenced. Relying on the constitutional principle against prolonged pre-trial detention and the need to harmonise statutory restrictions with the right to personal liberty and speedy trial, the Court held that continued incarceration could not be justified merely by reference to the statutory bar.

Conclusion: The twin conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 were held to be satisfied in favour of the applicant, and bail was granted on conditions.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether, on the material placed, the applicant satisfied the threshold for bail in a prosecution under the PMLA, including consideration of the mandatory bail rigours and the statutory presumption relating to "proceeds of crime".

(ii) Whether the applicant's statement recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA, when recorded during custody, could be relied upon against him for deciding bail.

(iii) Whether prolonged pre-trial incarceration, with investigation complete and trial yet to commence, warranted release on bail on the touchstone of Article 21, notwithstanding restrictive statutory provisions.

(iv) Whether apprehensions of flight risk, witness influence, or evidence tampering were sufficient to deny bail, or could be addressed by stringent conditions, having regard to the nature of witnesses and custody of documents.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i): Bail under the PMLA-assessment of prima facie material, mandatory bail rigours, and presumption regarding proceeds of crime

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court noted that the conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA are mandatory. The Court also considered Section 24 of the PMLA, under which a presumption operates that proceeds of crime are involved in money-laundering unless the contrary is proved, and that once foundational facts are established the onus shifts to the accused to rebut the presumption by evidence within personal knowledge. The Court further treated money-laundering as an independent offence connected with "proceeds of crime", requiring prima facie existence of proceeds of crime and a process or activity connected therewith.

Interpretation and reasoning: On the available record, the Court found no prima facie material connecting the applicant to opening of the relevant bank accounts or to inducing investors to invest on the concerned platform in the manner alleged. The Court also noted that the listed witnesses in the complaint were official witnesses, and that investors whose statements were recorded during investigation did not appear in the list of witnesses. While the applicant's receipt of substantial sums and acquisition of property required verification, the Court held that such verification was to occur at the appropriate stage and did not, on the present material, supply a prima facie link sufficient to treat him as similarly placed with a co-accused alleged to have opened dummy accounts and received commission on credits routed through such accounts. The Court therefore distinguished the applicant's role from that co-accused and held they were not similarly circumstanced for bail purposes.

Conclusions: The Court was not satisfied that the record, at the bail stage, prima facie connected the applicant with the core account-opening/transaction-routing conduct alleged, and treated the applicant's role as distinguishable from the co-accused whose bail had been refused. This supported grant of bail, subject to conditions.

Issue (ii): Admissibility/reliance on a Section 50 PMLA statement recorded during custody

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court applied the principle that where an accused is in custody under the PMLA, any statement recorded under Section 50 to the same investigating agency is inadmissible against the maker because the maker cannot be regarded as operating with a free mind.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that the applicant's Section 50 statement recorded during custody was inadmissible against him. Although the statement contained disclosures about commission, promotional activity, and purchase of assets, the Court did not treat the custodial statement as usable against the applicant to deny bail.

Conclusions: The custodial Section 50 statement was held inadmissible against the applicant and was not relied upon as incriminating material for refusing bail.

Issue (iii): Article 21-prolonged incarceration with investigation complete and trial not commenced

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court weighed the right to speedy trial and the right to liberty under Article 21 and held that these protections apply irrespective of the nature of crime. The Court further held that a constitutional court cannot be restrained from granting bail by restrictive statutory provisions where Article 21 rights are infringed, and that prolonged incarceration prior to guilt should not become punitive detention.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court emphasized that the applicant had been in custody since December 2023; investigation had been completed; the last Section 50 statement was recorded in early January 2024; searches and seizures concluded shortly thereafter; and trial was yet to commence. On this footing, the Court treated continued custody as prolonged pre-trial incarceration and considered it decisive that liberty and speedy trial concerns required release on bail.

Conclusions: Bail was granted primarily on the touchstone of Article 21, given prolonged pre-trial incarceration, completion of investigation, and non-commencement of trial.

Issue (iv): Flight risk, tampering, and witness influence-whether manageable through conditions

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court applied general bail considerations relevant to economic offences (including securing presence at trial and preventing tampering), and evaluated whether risk factors could be mitigated by stringent conditions.

Interpretation and reasoning: Although the prosecution asserted the applicant had earlier evaded arrest and posed a flight risk, and might influence witnesses or tamper with evidence, the Court found these concerns could be addressed by stringent conditions. It reasoned that (a) attendance could be secured by conditions; (b) the cited witnesses were official witnesses with little scope for influence; and (c) the case was based on documentary evidence in the custody of the enforcement agency, leaving no real scope for tampering.

Conclusions: The Court held that the stated risks did not justify continued detention and could be neutralised by strict bail conditions, including surrender of passport, travel restrictions, mandatory appearance, and prohibitions on contacting witnesses or tampering with evidence.

Issues: (i) Whether the petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was maintainable when filed through a power of attorney holder. (ii) Whether non-bailable warrants could be issued against the petitioner in the absence of the statutory preconditions under section 73 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issue (i): Whether the petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was maintainable when filed through a power of attorney holder.

Analysis: The petitioner was a resident outside India and the impugned warrants prevented personal appearance in India. The Court held that the exceptional nature of proceedings under section 482 of the Code did not justify rejection solely because the petition was presented through a power of attorney holder, particularly where the circumstances explained the absence of the petitioner himself.

Conclusion: The petition was maintainable and the objection was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether non-bailable warrants could be issued against the petitioner in the absence of the statutory preconditions under section 73 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The power to issue non-bailable warrants during investigation exists only within the confines of section 73 of the Code, which applies to an escaped convict, a proclaimed offender, or a person accused of a non-bailable offence and evading arrest. The petitioner was shown in the summons and MLAT request as a witness, and not as an accused. In these circumstances, non-compliance with summons could at most attract proceedings under section 174 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, but did not satisfy the statutory basis for issuance of non-bailable warrants. The Court further held that a court cannot resort to a coercive process unless the statute authorises it in the manner prescribed.

Conclusion: The non-bailable warrants were unsustainable and stood cancelled.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the petitioner obtained complete relief against the non-bailable warrants, while no finding was returned on the merits of the underlying enforcement proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: Non-bailable warrants can be issued only on fulfilment of the specific statutory conditions in section 73 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and a person shown merely as a witness in investigation cannot be subjected to that coercive process on the basis of non-compliance with summons alone.

Issues: Whether a successive application for regular bail could be entertained in the absence of any fresh ground.

Analysis: The petitioner sought regular bail for an offence under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002. The prayer had earlier been rejected by a coordinate Bench, and the later challenge before the Apex Court had been permitted to be withdrawn. A subsequent attempt for the same relief was also rejected. In the present application, no new circumstance or fresh ground was shown, the plea being only a repetition of the earlier request and the period of custody.

Conclusion: The Court held that there was no reason to entertain the repeated bail application and dismissed it.

Ratio Decidendi: A successive bail application is not entertainable on the same material unless supported by fresh grounds or changed circumstances.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether the confirmed attachment of the specified immovable property as "proceeds of crime" under the PMLA was sustainable on the material considered by the Adjudicating Authority and the Appellate Tribunal.

(ii) Whether the appellant's claim that he was required to explain only his alleged 50% share in the consideration, and that his disclosed income/returns sufficiently established a lawful source, warranted setting aside the concurrent findings confirming attachment.

(iii) Whether the impugned appellate order suffered from any error of law justifying interference under Section 42 of the PMLA in the face of concurrent factual findings.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i) & (ii): Sustainability of attachment as "proceeds of crime" and adequacy of appellant's explanation of source (including 50% share contention)

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court proceeded on the basis that the attachment and its confirmation were undertaken under the PMLA mechanism (including attachment, adjudication, and appellate scrutiny), and examined whether the impugned orders, on the record, correctly treated the property as "proceeds of crime" and part of a laundering arrangement.

Interpretation and reasoning: On appraisal of the record and the impugned orders, the Court found that the attached property was supported by material indicating it was derived from tainted funds and that there was a deliberate attempt to launder such money. The Court accepted the inference drawn by the authorities that the accused persons, including the appellant, gave "colorable statements" concerning the source of funds and the payment of consideration, and that an attempt was made to provide a false appearance of legitimacy through loan-related pleas described as "false and fabricated." The Court treated as materially supportive: the manner of formation and operation of the HUF arrangement (including the asserted dormant role/ignorance of its karta), the nexus between the principal accused and the appellant (including appointment as power-of-attorney holder for property purchases), and statements of accused persons recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. as sufficient to draw an inference that the property was linked to proceeds of crime. In light of this evidentiary picture, the Court did not accept that the appellant's "50% share" argument and documents relied upon by him displaced the conclusion of taint; it held that such contentions had already been examined in detail by the authorities and did not undermine the attachment.

Conclusions: The Court upheld the determination that the attached property constituted proceeds of crime and that the appellant's explanations regarding source of funds (including limitation to a 50% share and reliance on returns/records) did not warrant reversal of the attachment as confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority and the Appellate Tribunal.

Issue (iii): Interference under Section 42 PMLA-existence of error of law despite concurrent findings

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The appeal was considered under Section 42 of the PMLA, requiring the Court to examine whether the impugned appellate order disclosed an error of law warranting interference.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court emphasized that both the Adjudicating Authority and the Appellate Tribunal had considered the appellant's materials and contentions in "minute details" and recorded concurrent findings of fact supporting attachment. The Court found "no valid reason" to interfere because the appellant's arguments had already been dealt with by "well-reasoned" orders, and the record supported the inference of laundering and tainted origin. The Court expressly concluded that it found no error of law in the impugned order calling for interference.

Conclusions: The Court declined to interfere under Section 42 PMLA, upheld the concurrent findings confirming attachment, and dismissed the appeal.

Issues: Whether the petitioners were entitled to invoke writ jurisdiction to challenge the auction proceedings despite suppressing binding directions permitting the Enforcement Directorate to auction the attached properties.

Analysis: The petitioners had knowledge that the Supreme Court had directed the Enforcement Directorate to proceed with attachment and auction of the properties in accordance with law, and had further directed that the auction proceedings continue uninterrupted. The challenge was instituted without disclosure of those material directions. Deliberate withholding of facts capable of affecting the grant of relief constitutes suppression of material facts and disentitles a litigant from discretionary relief under Article 226.

Conclusion: The petitioners were not entitled to discretionary writ relief because of suppression of material facts and violation of the Supreme Court's directions.