Issues: Whether the petition should be entertained by the High Court when only a part of the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction and the substantial factual foundation of the dispute lay outside Delhi.

Analysis: Territorial jurisdiction was not determined by the location of the respondent's head office alone. The summons, the ECIR, and the underlying FIR were all connected with Punjab, showing that the genesis of the controversy and the material facts giving rise to the grievance were outside Delhi. A small or incidental part of the cause of action within Delhi did not compel the Court to exercise writ jurisdiction, especially where the doctrine of forum conveniens applied and the dominant facts were elsewhere.

Conclusion: The petition was not entertained on territorial grounds and was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Mere presence of a decision-making authority or a small part of the cause of action within the Court's territorial limits does not mandate exercise of writ jurisdiction where the dominant, material, and integral facts lie outside that territory, and the Court may decline to entertain the matter on the basis of forum conveniens.

Issues: (i) Whether immovable property purchased from proceeds of a scheduled offence before the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) came into force can be provisionally attached under Section 5(1) of the PMLA if the person continues in possession of and continues to use the property after the PMLA came into force.

Analysis: Section 5(1) permits provisional attachment of "such property" which, read with Section 2(1)(u), covers any property derived or obtained directly or indirectly as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. Section 3 defines the offence of money-laundering and, by use of the word "includes" and the Explanations, expressly encompasses concealment, possession, acquisition or use of proceeds of crime; Explanation (ii) confirms the process or activity is continuing so long as the person enjoys the proceeds by concealment, possession, acquisition, use or by projecting/claiming it as untainted. Sections 3, 5 and 8 form an integrated scheme where provisional attachment under Section 5(1) is in aid of adjudication under Section 8. The PMLA, being penal, does not apply retrospectively to completed acts prior to its commencement, but where one or more acts constituting money-laundering continue after the Act came into force (for example, continued possession or use of property that itself constitutes proceeds of crime), the offence continues and the PMLA applies from the date of continued activity. On the facts accepted for the purpose of certiorari review, the property purchased before the PMLA was in continued possession and use after the PMLA came into force and the provisional attachment decision recorded reasons to believe the property was proceeds of crime and likely to be dealt with so as to frustrate confiscation; such a subjective reasoned belief, supported by material, is amenable to provisional attachment under Section 5(1).

Conclusion: The provisional attachment under Section 5(1) is sustainable; the attachment of the subject immovable property is upheld and the writ petition challenging the provisional attachment is dismissed.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to supply of the complete relied upon documents in terms of Rule 13(2) of the Adjudicating Authority (Procedure) Regulations, 2013 before the matter proceeded further, and whether the Adjudicating Authority should first decide if the requested documents formed part of the relied upon documents.

Analysis: Rule 13(2) requires service of the summon or notice along with complete relied upon documents in a bound paper book, while Rule 13(3)(iii) and Rule 13(11) recognise service by e-mail as valid service. The petitioner had already filed para-wise comments and sought further documents, and the controversy was whether the materials already supplied were the complete relied upon documents. The proper course was for the Adjudicating Authority to examine that question first, since it was the statutory authority competent to determine whether any additional relied upon documents remained to be supplied. If further relied upon documents were found to exist, they were to be furnished and a supplementary reply was to be permitted. Any grievance against the supply order could be pursued under Section 26 of the PMLA, 2002.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to a consideration of the request for further relied upon documents and, if warranted, supply of those documents before the adjudication proceeded further, with liberty to file a supplementary reply thereafter.

Issues: Whether the petitioners were entitled to supply of the complete relied upon documents before the adjudicating authority proceeded with the matter, and whether the service of notice through electronic mode was valid.

Analysis: Rule 13(2) of the Adjudicating Authority (Procedure) Regulations, 2013 requires service of the noticee along with complete relied upon documents in a bound paper book, while Rule 13(3) permits service by electronic mail and Rule 13(11) treats communication through electronic mode as valid service. The petitioners had already participated by seeking inspection, requesting additional documents, and filing para-wise comments, but they continued to dispute whether the documents supplied constituted the complete relied upon documents. The Court held that it was for the adjudicating authority to determine whether the documents already furnished were the complete relied upon documents and, if not, to direct supply before further hearing. The Court also found no illegality in the recording of reasons to believe and noted the availability of proceedings before the adjudicating authority and the statutory appellate remedy.

Conclusion: The petitioners succeeded to the extent that the adjudicating authority was directed to first decide the question of complete supply of relied upon documents and, if further relied upon documents were found necessary, to ensure their supply before proceeding further. Electronic service of notice was treated as valid.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of with directions securing adjudicatory fairness at the stage of consideration of the show cause notice and document supply.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute or regulatory scheme requires service of notice along with complete relied upon documents, the adjudicating authority must first determine whether the supplied materials are complete before proceeding to further hearing, and valid electronic service does not by itself cure any omission in supplying the required documents.

Issues: Whether the petitioner detained under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is entitled to bail despite the rigours of the PMLA and having been in custody for over three years.

Analysis: The Court examined whether the foundational facts required under the PMLA for invoking the statutory presumption are established and noted that the petitioner has been granted bail in the predicate offence, his discharge application before the trial Court is pending on appeal such that trial is not likely to commence in the near future, and investigation in respect of the petitioner is complete with custodial interrogation no longer necessary. The Court observed that statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA while the accused is in custody cannot be treated as substantive evidence and at best provide corroboration. The Court balanced the seriousness of economic offences and the statutory twin conditions applicable under the PMLA against the petitioner's prolonged pre-trial incarceration of over three years and the petitioner's limited ability to tamper with documentary evidence which remains in possession of the Enforcement Directorate. The Court held that potential flight risk and risk of tampering could be mitigated by stringent bail conditions, and that Article 21 of the Constitution protects against prolonged preventive or punitive detention prior to conviction even under a stringent penal statute.

Conclusion: The petitioner's prayer for bail is allowed and he is directed to be released on bail on furnishing a bond of Rs. 10,00,000 with adequate sureties subject to specified stringent conditions; the observations in the judgment are limited to the bail application and shall not influence the trial Court.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to anticipatory bail in connection with an investigation under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Anticipatory bail is an extraordinary discretionary remedy to be granted sparingly, particularly in economic offences. Bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is subject to the twin conditions under Section 45, besides the applicable safeguards governing arrest and bail. Necessity of arrest is an additional consideration under Section 19(1), but the material on record disclosed prima facie involvement of the petitioner in the alleged offence.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to anticipatory bail; the issue was decided against the petitioner.

Issues: Whether the order restoring the property to the second respondent under section 8(8) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act was valid when the appeal against the adjudication order was still pending and charges under section 4 had not been framed.

Analysis: Section 8(8) permits restoration of confiscated property to a claimant with a legitimate interest, but the second proviso operates only in the manner prescribed by the Rules. Rule 3A of the Prevention of Money Laundering (Restoration of Confiscated Property) Rules, 2016 makes framing of charge under section 4 a necessary precondition for moving an application for restoration during trial. The pending challenge to the adjudication order also meant that the confirmation process had not attained the finality contemplated for the statutory scheme. In view of these unmet statutory requirements, the Special Court could not grant restoration at that stage.

Conclusion: The impugned restoration order was not sustainable and was set aside in favour of the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: An application for restoration under the second proviso to section 8(8) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act can be entertained only after the statutory conditions prescribed by the Rules are satisfied, including framing of charge where required, and it cannot override a pending appellate challenge to the adjudication order.

Issues: Whether a scheme of arrangement or settlement approved in company proceedings can provide for quashing, compounding, dismissal, or discharge of pending criminal proceedings and thereby dilute the effect of criminal prosecution.

Analysis: The scheme clause seeking joint applications for quashing or dismissal of criminal proceedings was found impermissible. Serious offences alleged in the case were required to be carried to their logical conclusion before the competent criminal court. A civil forum could not determine or dilute the consequences of criminal prosecution by incorporating or accepting a settlement covenant to that effect. The clarification was also recorded that lifting of attachment or disbursement of settlement amounts would not affect the criminal case.

Conclusion: Such a covenant in the scheme could not be sustained to the extent it sought to affect criminal proceedings, and the criminal prosecution would continue independently.

Issues: Whether the learned Single Judge erred in directing payment of salaries from amounts frozen under Section 17(1A) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and in relegating the respondent to seek remedy before the Adjudicating Authority; and whether the appeal by the Authority should be allowed.

Analysis: The Court reviewed the scheme of the PMLA including the definitions of "proceeds of crime" and the statutory provisions governing provisional attachment, search, seizure and freezing of property (notably Sections 2(1)(u), 3, 5, 17, 20 and Section 8 procedure). The Apex Court's guidance that property can be regarded as "proceeds of crime" only if it is derived or obtained directly or indirectly as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence was applied. The Court noted that the Adjudicating Authority is the forum for adjudication of whether frozen property amounts to proceeds of crime and that the Adjudicating Authority has no power under Section 8 to grant interim directions for partial defreeze to make payments from frozen amounts. The Single Judge's order relegated the respondent to the statutory remedy before the Adjudicating Authority while directing limited payment of salaries; the High Court considered whether that exercise of judicial discretion was perverse in view of the statutory scheme and binding precedents and concluded it was not.

Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed and the exercise of discretion by the learned Single Judge in relegating the respondent to its statutory remedy and in the incidental direction regarding payment of salaries is upheld; the High Court's order stands.

Issues: Whether the petitioner's arrest under section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was illegal for want of statutory compliance and absence of material linking him to money laundering; and whether the remand orders deserved to be quashed.

Analysis: The statutory standard for judicial review of arrest under special enactments is limited to cases of manifest arbitrariness or gross non-compliance with the safeguards prescribed by law. The record showed recording of statements, search and seizure operations, communication of grounds of arrest and reasons to believe, production before the designated court, and successive remand orders. The material relied upon by the enforcement authority included unaccounted cash, diamond-studded jewellery, digital material, statements under section 50, and an explanation that the alleged bribe-related receipts constituted proceeds of crime. The Court held that the definition of proceeds of crime is broad, that money laundering is an independent offence connected with the process or activity involving such proceeds, and that the existence of prima facie material at the stage of arrest is sufficient. The challenge based on lack of prior arraignment in the earlier FIRs, alleged absence of quantification at the time of arrest, and reliance on cooperation with investigation did not establish patent illegality.

Conclusion: The arrest was held to be valid and the challenge to the remand orders failed.

Final Conclusion: The petition was found to be devoid of merit, with no ground made out for writ interference, while leaving the parties free to pursue their remedies in the appropriate forum.

Ratio Decidendi: Interference with an arrest under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is warranted only on manifest illegality or non-compliance with statutory safeguards, and prima facie material showing involvement with proceeds of crime is sufficient to sustain the arrest at the investigation stage.

Issues: (i) Whether, on an application under Section 44(1)(c) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, the court taking cognizance of the scheduled offence must commit that case to the Special Court seized of the money-laundering complaint. (ii) Whether the same course applies when the scheduled offence is under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the court trying that offence is itself a Special Court competent to try both matters.

Issue (i): Whether, on an application under Section 44(1)(c) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, the court taking cognizance of the scheduled offence must commit that case to the Special Court seized of the money-laundering complaint.

Analysis: Section 44(1)(c) contemplates a situation where the court dealing with the scheduled offence is different from the Special Court that has taken cognizance of the money-laundering complaint. In that event, once an application is made by the authorised authority, the court dealing with the scheduled offence has no discretion to retain the matter and must commit the case to the Special Court. The scheme of Sections 43 and 44 shows that the scheduled offence and the money-laundering complaint are intended to be dealt with by the Special Court under the Act, and the later trial must follow the forum seized of the money-laundering case.

Conclusion: The application for committal under Section 44(1)(c) is maintainable and the court concerned must commit the scheduled-offence case where the statutory conditions are satisfied.

Issue (ii): Whether the same course applies when the scheduled offence is under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the court trying that offence is itself a Special Court competent to try both matters.

Analysis: The factual position was that the court trying the predicate offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was also a designated Special Court under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, while the Special Court under the money-laundering complaint was not designated under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In that situation, the transfer of the money-laundering case to the Special Court already seized of the predicate offence was treated as the proper course, keeping open the larger question of law. The impugned refusal to transfer was therefore unsustainable.

Conclusion: The case was directed to be tried before the Special Court already seized of the predicate-offence trial, and the order refusing transfer was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded, and the prosecution under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 was ordered to be tried along with the predicate-offence proceedings before the competent Special Court already in seisin of the corruption case.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statutory scheme requires the scheduled offence to be dealt with by the Special Court connected with the money-laundering case, a court cannot refuse committal on convenience grounds; and where the predicate-offence court is itself competent to try both enactments, transfer to that court is the appropriate course.

Issues: Whether the complaint and summons under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act disclosed a prima facie offence against the petitioner, including whether property acquired before the alleged period of illegal mining could still be treated as involved in money laundering.

Analysis: The complaint, read as a whole, traced five connected predicate FIRs involving illegal granite quarrying, quantified the loss to the exchequer, and specifically linked the petitioner's partnership firm and quarry land to the laundering of proceeds of crime. The property acquisition in 2000 did not conclude the enquiry, because the complaint alleged that the same property was later used in the laundering activity through transfer and renewal of mining lease and was part of the overall process of concealment, possession, acquisition, use, and projection of proceeds of crime as untainted property. The statutory definitions of proceeds of crime and property, together with the offence provision under the Act, were treated as covering property derived from or used in connection with scheduled criminal activity, and the Court held that the complaint contained sufficient particulars for trial. The Court also reiterated that, at the stage of quashing, it was not required to conduct a roving enquiry into the eventual truth or sufficiency of the prosecution case.

Conclusion: The complaint disclosed a prima facie offence under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act against the petitioner, and the petition for quashing was not maintainable on the pleaded grounds.

Ratio Decidendi: Property used in the laundering process may constitute proceeds of crime even if its original acquisition pre-dates the predicate period, and a complaint under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act is not liable to be quashed at the threshold when it discloses sufficient particulars of the laundering activity.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 in view of the twin conditions under Section 45, the nature of the material relied upon by the prosecution, the stage of investigation, and the parity claimed with co-accused.

Analysis: The prosecution case rested mainly on statements recorded under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, digital chats, diary entries and inferential allegations suggesting a supervisory role in the alleged liquor-scam network. The Court held that at the bail stage it was not required to conduct a mini trial or undertake a detailed appraisal of evidentiary value, and that only a prima facie assessment was permissible. The Court also noted that the investigation had substantially progressed, the prosecution complaint had been filed, and the applicant had remained in custody only for a short period. Further, the Court treated parity with co-accused, including persons alleged to be similarly placed and already enlarged on bail, as a relevant consideration, and also noted the Supreme Court's direction that the matter be considered keeping prior bail orders in view.

Conclusion: The twin conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 were held to be prima facie satisfied, and the applicant was held entitled to bail subject to stringent conditions.

Issues: Whether the petitioners are entitled to bail in proceedings under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, where investigation is complete, trial has not commenced, there is no likelihood of conclusion of trial within a reasonable time, and petitioners have been in custody for a prolonged period.

Analysis: The legal framework comprises Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 which prescribes twin conditions for grant of bail in PMLA matters, and Article 21 of the Constitution of India guaranteeing the right to personal liberty including the right to a speedy trial. Recent authoritative decisions have held that while Section 45 imposes restrictions, it does not extinguish judicial discretion and that 'bail is the rule and jail is the exception'. Constitutional courts must consider prolonged pre-trial detention, the documentary nature of evidence already seized, the stage of proceedings, the likelihood of trial concluding within a reasonable time, and whether continued custody would convert pre-trial detention into punishment. On the facts here, prosecution relies on documentary evidence; investigation is complete; the prosecution proposes 27 witnesses and about 4,408 pages of documents; trial had not commenced and there was no prospect of conclusion in the near future; and the petitioners had been in custody for more than a year. The petitioners have undertaken to cooperate and there is no convincing material showing risk of flight or real prospect of tampering with evidence that cannot be mitigated by suitable conditions.

Conclusion: Bail is granted to the petitioners on furnishing bonds of Rs. 1,00,000 each with two sureties of like amount, and subject to conditions concerning attendance, no leaving the country without permission, provision of contact details, and non-influence of witnesses. This conclusion is in favour of the petitioners.

Issues: (i) Whether the applicant satisfied the twin conditions for grant of bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; (ii) Whether the material on record, including the status of the predicate offence and the alleged role attributed to the applicant, justified continued custodial detention.

Issue (i): Whether the applicant satisfied the twin conditions for grant of bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is governed by the stringent requirements that the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. At the bail stage, the Court does not undertake a mini-trial, but examines the record on broad probabilities. The alleged proceeds of crime, the connection of the applicant with the laundering chain, and the evidentiary value of co-accused statements were considered only to the extent necessary for a prima facie assessment.

Conclusion: The applicant was found to have satisfied the bail parameters, and the twin conditions did not stand in the way of release on bail.

Issue (ii): Whether the material on record, including the status of the predicate offence and the alleged role attributed to the applicant, justified continued custodial detention.

Analysis: The applicant was not named in the predicate FIR, was not charge-sheeted there, and that FIR had already been quashed on compromise. The Court also noted that the principal witnesses did not name the applicant in their earlier statements, and the later attribution of role appeared materially improved. The connection sought to be drawn from shareholding, common transactions, and statements of co-accused was treated as insufficient at this stage to establish a firm prima facie nexus with the alleged laundering activity. The Court further observed that continued detention served no substantial investigative purpose after filing of the complaint.

Conclusion: The material was held insufficient to justify further custody, and bail was granted.

Final Conclusion: The regular bail application was allowed and the applicant was directed to be released on terms and conditions imposed by the Court.

Ratio Decidendi: For grant of bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the Court must make a prima facie assessment on broad probabilities, and where the applicant is not shown in the predicate case, the predicate FIR has been quashed, and the evidence linking him to proceeds of crime remains weak or improved at a late stage, continued custody is not warranted.

Issues: Whether the complaint under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and the process order issued against the applicant were liable to be quashed for want of material showing that the alleged property or transaction was connected with proceeds of crime and for absence of sufficient ground to proceed.

Analysis: The complaint alleged that the scheduled offence and the alleged generation of proceeds of crime arose during 2020-2021, whereas the property relied on against the applicant had been acquired in 2005-2007. On the material placed, that property could not be linked to the proceeds of crime said to have arisen much later. The existence of proceeds of crime was treated as the foundational requirement for an offence under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and the material did not disclose that the applicant knowingly assisted concealment, possession, acquisition, use, or projection of such proceeds as untainted property. The process order also did not show application of mind to the material against the applicant, so the test of sufficient ground for proceeding was not satisfied.

Conclusion: The complaint and the order issuing process were held unsustainable qua the applicant, and relief was granted in favour of the applicant.

Ratio Decidendi: For an offence under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, there must be material showing a nexus between the applicant's acts and proceeds of crime derived from a scheduled offence, and a process order lacking such material or lacking application of mind to it is liable to be quashed to prevent abuse of process.

Issues: Whether the dismissal of the discharge petition in the prosecution under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 suffered from non-application of mind or perversity warranting interference in revision.

Analysis: The stage of discharge requires only a prima facie assessment to see whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding, and not a roving enquiry or final determination of guilt. The order under challenge was read as a whole, together with the materials noticed in it, including the predicate crime, the ECIR, the recorded statement under section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and the property-related materials relied upon by the prosecution. On that reading, the trial court had applied its mind to the relevant record and reached a prima facie view that there were materials to proceed. The revisional challenge did not establish that the order was non-speaking in substance, perverse, or based on no consideration of the record.

Conclusion: The dismissal of the discharge petition was upheld and no interference in revision was warranted.

Ratio Decidendi: At the discharge stage, the court is confined to a prima facie evaluation of the material and, where the order shows consideration of the relevant record as a whole, revisional interference is not justified merely because the court does not finally adjudicate the merits.

Issues: Whether the appeal under Section 42 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is maintainable before this High Court on the ground that the appellant "ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain" within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

Analysis: Section 42 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 provides that an appeal to the High Court is maintainable within the jurisdiction where the aggrieved person ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. The material facts show that the appellant has given his address as Kolkata and the subject matter of seizure, as well as search and seizure proceedings, are situated in Kolkata. The partnership deed annexed by the appellant records the registered office and principal place of business of the partnership in Kolkata, with provision for branch offices; this establishes the ordinary place of residence and ordinary place of business as Kolkata. A GST registration alone, without further averments or proof that the appellant ordinarily carries on business or personally works for gain within this Court's territorial limits, is insufficient to establish jurisdiction. The appellant's appearances before fora located in this Court's territory do not, on their own, demonstrate that he "ordinarily" works for gain within the jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The appeal is not maintainable before this High Court for want of territorial jurisdiction and is dismissed.

Issues: Whether the attachment of an ancestral property as "equivalent value" under Section 5 read with Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is permissible where the actual tainted property cannot be traced and the property was not purchased by the accused from proceeds of crime.

Analysis: The adjudicatory framework permits provisional attachment of property believed to be proceeds of crime. The definition of "proceeds of crime" in Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 encompasses not only property derived from criminal activity but also the value of such property and property equivalent in value when the tainted property is taken or held outside the country. Where the investigating authority is unable to locate the actual tainted property, the statute allows attachment of untainted property equivalent in value. There is no statutory exemption for ancestral or inherited property; prior acquisition does not automatically preclude attachment as equivalent value if evidence supports that the attached property represents the value equivalent of proceeds of crime. The impugned findings recorded by the Adjudicating Authority that the property represented value equivalent to proceeds of crime were considered on the material placed on record, and the appellate forum applied the statutory scheme to uphold the attachment.

Conclusion: The attachment of the subject ancestral property as equivalent value under Section 5 read with Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is permissible; the appeal is dismissed in favour of the respondent.

Ratio Decidendi: Where actual tainted property cannot be traced, Section 2(1)(u) read with Section 5 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 authorises attachment of property equivalent in value, and ancestral or prior acquisition of property does not by itself prevent such attachment.

Issues: (i) Whether the plea of absence of sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 barred the prosecution at the stage of discharge. (ii) Whether the offence under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was liable to be rejected as impermissible on the ground of temporal application and want of material showing proceeds of crime. (iii) Whether the impugned order refusing discharge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 suffered from any illegality or impropriety.

Issue (i): Whether the plea of absence of sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 barred the prosecution at the stage of discharge.

Analysis: The governing test is whether the alleged act bears a reasonable nexus with official duty. Protection under Section 197(1) is not automatic and is not to be invoked mechanically at the threshold. The requirement of sanction may arise at a later stage and, in an appropriate case, depends upon the evidence that emerges during trial. The plea is therefore not a complete jurisdictional bar merely because it is raised before charge.

Conclusion: The plea of absence of sanction did not warrant discharge at the threshold and does not help the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether the offence under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was liable to be rejected as impermissible on the ground of temporal application and want of material showing proceeds of crime.

Analysis: The offence of money laundering is independent of the scheduled offence and is of continuing nature so long as the proceeds of crime are concealed, possessed, acquired, used, or projected as untainted property. The expression proceeds of crime is expansive and includes transformed property and equivalent value. At the stage of discharge, the Court is not to conduct a mini-trial or weigh probative value; it is sufficient if the materials disclose a prima facie nexus with the alleged laundering activity. Whether the property is genuinely acquired or otherwise is a matter for trial.

Conclusion: The temporal objection and the challenge to the existence of proceeds of crime did not justify discharge and are rejected.

Issue (iii): Whether the impugned order refusing discharge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 suffered from any illegality or impropriety.

Analysis: At the stage of Section 227, the Court is required to see whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, discloses the ingredients of the offence and gives rise to grave suspicion. The materials referred to in the charge-sheet were sufficient to bring the matter to trial, and the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction or undertake any impermissible exercise. No patent illegality or impropriety is shown in the order refusing discharge.

Conclusion: The refusal to discharge was legally sustainable and called for no interference.

Final Conclusion: The revision failed because the petitioners did not establish any ground to prevent the trial from proceeding on the existing material, and the prosecution was allowed to continue.

Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of discharge, the Court must assume the prosecution material to be true and interfere only if the record clearly fails to disclose a prima facie offence; sanction under Section 197 is not an automatic threshold bar, and money-laundering liability may continue so long as proceeds of crime are dealt with in any proscribed manner.