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Issues: (i) Whether the statement recorded before the Tribunal amounted to an unconditional concession by the appellants against the challenge to retention of the cash amount. (ii) Whether the Tribunal was required to decide the appeals by a reasoned order under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
Issue (i): Whether the statement recorded before the Tribunal amounted to an unconditional concession by the appellants against the challenge to retention of the cash amount.
Analysis: The statement recorded before the Tribunal was only a reservation of liberty to approach the Special Court if the appeals were not accepted. It was not an unconditional abandonment of the challenge to retention of the cash amount, nor did it dispense with adjudication on merits by the Tribunal.
Conclusion: The statement was not an unconditional concession.
Issue (ii): Whether the Tribunal was required to decide the appeals by a reasoned order under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
Analysis: Under Section 26 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the appellate authority was bound to pass a reasoned order. Giving reasons is also an element of natural justice. Since the appeals were not validly abandoned, the Tribunal could not dispose of them without a speaking order.
Conclusion: The Tribunal was required to decide the appeals on merits by a reasoned order.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside, and the appeals were restored to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication without being influenced by the earlier order. The parties' contentions were left open.
Ratio Decidendi: A reservation of liberty to pursue relief before another forum does not amount to an unconditional concession, and an appellate authority acting under Section 26 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 must pass a reasoned order when deciding the appeal.
Issues: Whether the money-laundering prosecution could continue against the petitioner when the petitioner was not arraigned as an accused in the predicate offence, the CBI had not attributed criminality or diversion of funds to the petitioner, and the complaint rested mainly on the statement of a co-accused without independent supporting material.
Analysis: The offence under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 depends on the existence of proceeds of crime derived from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, and liability under Section 3 attaches to any process or activity connected with such proceeds, including concealment, possession, acquisition, use, or projection as untainted property. Although a person need not be named in the scheduled offence to face proceedings under the Act, there must still be material showing involvement with proceeds of crime. Here, the transactions involving warehouse receipts and the movement of funds did not yield independent material establishing that the petitioner had handled proceeds of crime. The CBI investigation had not implicated the petitioner in the predicate offence, had not found diversion of funds in relation to the petitioner, and the allegation in the money-laundering case was substantially built on the statement of a co-accused recorded under Section 50 of the Act. Such a statement, without more, was insufficient to found a prima facie case for trial.
Conclusion: The petitioner could not be proceeded against on the material then available, and continuation of the money-laundering case against the petitioner was unjustified.
Final Conclusion: The revisional application succeeded and the prosecution was quashed against the petitioner, while the case continued against the other accused persons.
Ratio Decidendi: Proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 require independent prima facie material showing involvement with proceeds of crime, and a co-accused's statement alone is insufficient to sustain prosecution where the predicate-investigation materials do not implicate the person proceeded against.
Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to anticipatory bail in view of the prima facie material showing his role in the alleged coal levy scam, the need for custodial interrogation, and the claim of parity with co-accused who had obtained bail.
Analysis: The material in the case diary and the supplementary statement of a co-accused indicated prima facie involvement of the applicant in the alleged offence, including influence over administrative functioning and the alleged switching of coal transport verification from online to offline mode. The Court found that the accusations disclosed a serious economic offence involving a deep-rooted conspiracy and substantial public loss, and that custodial interrogation was necessary to confront the applicant with the statements and material collected by the prosecution. The plea of parity was rejected because the other accused persons had been granted bail in different factual circumstances and the present applicant had sought anticipatory bail while the investigation was still pending. The Court also relied upon the applicant's criminal antecedents in other cases while assessing the bail request.
Conclusion: Anticipatory bail was not justified and the application was rejected.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the investigation discloses a prima facie role in a serious economic offence, custodial interrogation is necessary, and the accused has relevant criminal antecedents, anticipatory bail may be refused notwithstanding a claim of parity.
Issues: (i) whether the Enforcement Case Information Report and the connected proceedings could be quashed on the ground that the later ECIR was a parallel or repetitive investigation arising from the same facts; (ii) whether the summons issued under the PMLA and the communication of material under Section 66(2) of the PMLA could be interfered with; (iii) whether the statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA were liable to be quashed for want of safeguards against self-incrimination; and (iv) whether the petitioner, being a private and not a public servant, could resist the proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Issue (i): whether the Enforcement Case Information Report and the connected proceedings could be quashed on the ground that the later ECIR was a parallel or repetitive investigation arising from the same facts.
Analysis: The challenge to the later ECIR was held to be premature and unsustainable because an ECIR is an internal document without statutory basis, unlike an FIR. The Court held that, absent a challenge to the predicate offences and in the absence of the ECIR being placed in public domain with demonstrable sameness, it could not be quashed merely on apprehension. The Court also accepted the distinction between the earlier and later predicate offences, noting the allegation of a larger conspiracy and relying on the settled principle that multiple FIRs are permissible where the incidents, offences, or conspiracy angles are distinct.
Conclusion: The challenge to the ECIR and the plea that it amounted to evergreening or parallel investigation failed and was rejected.
Issue (ii): whether the summons issued under the PMLA and the communication of material under Section 66(2) of the PMLA could be interfered with.
Analysis: The Court held that the power to summon under Section 50 of the PMLA forms part of the investigative machinery and cannot ordinarily be interdicted in writ jurisdiction at a pre-trial stage. It further held that Section 66(2) casts a duty on the Enforcement Directorate to share material with the competent law-enforcement agency where cognizable offences emerge, and that registration of an FIR on such information is a legally recognised consequence. The prayer to restrain further coercive action was therefore treated as premature and unsupported by any illegality in the statutory exercise of power.
Conclusion: The challenge to the summons and to the forwarding of information under Section 66(2) failed and was rejected.
Issue (iii): whether the statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA were liable to be quashed for want of safeguards against self-incrimination.
Analysis: The Court held that the petitioner had not been formally arraigned as an accused when the statements were recorded, and therefore the protections under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India and the safeguards applicable to confession of an accused under Section 164(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were not attracted. It further held that the special scheme of the PMLA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, does not import Miranda-style warnings or the full procedural regime applicable to police confessions into Section 50 statements. The belated retraction was also not treated as a basis for quashing at this stage.
Conclusion: The request to quash the recorded statements was rejected.
Issue (iv): whether the petitioner, being a private person and not a public servant, could resist the proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Analysis: The Court held that a private person can be proceeded against for aiding, abetting, or conspiring in offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, even if not himself a public servant. The alleged role attributed to the petitioner, as reflected in the larger conspiracy allegations, was therefore not a legal bar to the proceedings.
Conclusion: The objection based on the petitioner's status as a private person was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was found to be devoid of merit. The Court declined to interfere with the impugned ECIR, the summons, the recorded statements, or the inter-agency communication, and left the parties to proceed in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: An internal ECIR under the PMLA cannot be quashed on mere apprehension of repetition when the predicate offences and alleged conspiracy are distinct, and statements recorded under Section 50 before formal arraignment as an accused do not attract the protections applicable to accused-person confessions under Article 20(3) or Section 164(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to anticipatory bail in an alleged large-scale economic offence involving organised illegal online betting, corruption, and laundering of proceeds of crime.
Analysis: The allegations concerned a wide-ranging illegal online betting syndicate involving criminal conspiracy, forgery, cheating, corruption, and laundering through fake bank accounts, hawala channels, shell entities, and foreign transfers. The material disclosed that the investigation was still continuing and that digital and financial trails, conspiracy linkages, and the role of public servants and other associates were under active examination. The Court applied the settled principle that economic offences constitute a distinct class and require a stricter approach at the stage of bail, particularly where custodial interrogation may assist in unearthing the full chain of transactions and where there exists a possibility of influencing witnesses or tampering with evidence. The plea based on non-naming in earlier proceedings, alleged mala fides, and parity was not accepted at this stage, as these contentions required a fuller evidentiary appraisal and did not override the need for an effective investigation.
Conclusion: Anticipatory bail was declined. The applicant did not make out a case for discretionary protection against arrest in the facts of the case.
Final Conclusion: The application failed because the allegations were serious, the investigation was ongoing, and the Court found that granting pre-arrest protection would risk impeding a fair and effective probe.
Ratio Decidendi: In serious economic offences involving organised conspiracy and continuing investigation, anticipatory bail may be refused where custodial interrogation and unhindered collection of digital or financial evidence are necessary and the applicant has not established a compelling case for pre-arrest protection.
Issues: (i) Whether the material on record disclosed scheduled offences and a prima facie basis to invoke the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 against the accused petitioner. (ii) Whether the accused petitioner satisfied the twin conditions for bail under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
Issue (i): Whether the material on record disclosed scheduled offences and a prima facie basis to invoke the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 against the accused petitioner.
Analysis: The record showed that the prosecution was founded on FIRs which included offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the Arms Act, 1959 and later invoked offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, all of which were treated as scheduled offences. The Court noticed material indicating recovery of arms, statements recorded under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and financial transactions through accounts controlled by the petitioner, family members and the trust. On that basis, the contention that no scheduled offence existed or that the PMLA could not be invoked was found to be contrary to the material on record.
Conclusion: The existence of scheduled offences and a prima facie basis for proceeding under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was accepted against the accused petitioner.
Issue (ii): Whether the accused petitioner satisfied the twin conditions for bail under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
Analysis: The Court relied on the investigation material showing substantial cash deposits, immediate withdrawals, routing of funds through multiple accounts, and exclusive control over trust accounts. It further noted the absence of proper books of account, audited statements and income tax returns for the relevant period, and treated the statements recorded under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 as material admissible at this stage. Applying the mandatory twin conditions under Section 45 and the statutory presumption under Section 24, the Court held that the petitioner had not shown reasonable grounds for believing that he was not guilty or that he would not commit an offence while on bail.
Conclusion: The accused petitioner did not satisfy the twin conditions for bail under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
Final Conclusion: Bail was declined because the Court found a prima facie case under the money-laundering statute and held that the statutory bail threshold was not met on the material then available.
Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, bail can be granted only if the accused satisfies the mandatory twin conditions under Section 45, and prima facie material showing scheduled offences, proceeds of crime, and fund-layering justifies refusal of bail.
Issues: (i) Whether a writ petition challenging a provisional attachment order under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is maintainable despite the statutory adjudicatory and appellate remedies; (ii) Whether the provisional attachment was ex facie without jurisdiction, arbitrary, or otherwise liable to be interfered with at the threshold.
Issue (i): Whether a writ petition challenging a provisional attachment order under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is maintainable despite the statutory adjudicatory and appellate remedies.
Analysis: The statutory scheme requires the Adjudicating Authority to determine, under Section 8, whether the attached property is involved in money-laundering, followed by appeals under Sections 26 and 42. This constitutes an efficacious alternative remedy. The exceptional grounds for exercising judicial review despite an alternative remedy-patent absence of jurisdiction, breach of principles of natural justice, or manifest illegality-were not established. Questions concerning the source of assets, their nexus with proceeds of crime, and the evidentiary basis for attachment involve disputed questions of fact reserved for the statutory forums.
Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable at this stage; the petitioner must pursue the statutory remedies under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. This conclusion is against the petitioner.
Issue (ii): Whether the provisional attachment was ex facie without jurisdiction, arbitrary, or otherwise liable to be interfered with at the threshold.
Analysis: A declaration of gold under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 and payment of tax do not establish its lawful source or immunise it from proceedings for money-laundering if it is connected with criminal activity. Retention proceedings following search and seizure under Sections 17 and 20 are distinct from provisional attachment under Section 5; the earlier retention proceedings did not create res judicata or preclude a later attachment upon material giving rise to a reason to believe that the property represented proceeds of crime. At the provisional stage, the sufficiency of the investigative material cannot be reassessed through writ jurisdiction where no patent jurisdictional error is apparent.
Conclusion: The provisional attachment was not shown to be ex facie without jurisdiction, contrary to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, or manifestly arbitrary. This conclusion is against the petitioner.
Final Conclusion: The legality and evidentiary basis of the attachment are to be tested before the Adjudicating Authority and through the statutory appellate process, with all factual and legal contentions remaining available there.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 provides a complete mechanism for adjudication and appeal against provisional attachment, writ jurisdiction is ordinarily unavailable absent a patent jurisdictional defect, breach of natural justice, or manifest illegality.
Issues: Whether the excess amount recovered as proceeds of crime was liable to be released to the appellant pending adjudication of the respondent's challenge to the reduced quantification.
Analysis: The appellant had obtained a reduction in the quantified amount of proceeds of crime before the Adjudicating Authority and was therefore entitled to the consequential release of the excess amount, unless restrained by any order passed in the respondent's challenge. The refusal to release the amount rested only on the pendency of the respondent's appeal, without any consideration of the prima facie merits of that appeal. The merits of the respondent's challenge could not be decided in the appellant's application, and the impugned refusal was based on an irrelevant consideration.
Conclusion: The excess amount was directed to be released to the appellant on furnishing a bank guarantee of an equivalent sum, and the amount was made subject to the outcome of the respondent's pending appeal/application.
Issues: Whether the orders rejecting discharge and framing charge under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 suffered from legal error, and whether the materials collected in investigation disclosed a prima facie case against the petitioner.
Analysis: The proceedings arose from allegations that the petitioner had generated and routed proceeds of crime through structured financial transactions, including payments routed through intermediaries, purported loan arrangements, and documents said to be fabricated or backdated. The Court reiterated that at the stage of discharge or framing of charge, the exercise is limited to seeing whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, discloses sufficient grounds to proceed; the defence version, disputed explanations, and probative worth of material cannot be examined in a mini trial. The Court also noted that statements recorded under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 are admissible material and may corroborate the banking trail and other documentary evidence. On the material available, the Court found that the alleged routing, layering, concealment, and projection of funds as untainted property furnished grave suspicion and satisfied the threshold for proceeding.
Conclusion: The discharge application was rightly rejected and the charge was rightly framed; no interference was warranted in revision.
Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of discharge or framing of charge in a money-laundering case, the Court must confine itself to whether the prosecution material discloses a prima facie case or grave suspicion of involvement in the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime, without undertaking a mini trial or weighing the defence on merits.
Issues: Whether regular bail should be granted in a PMLA prosecution after completion of investigation and filing of the prosecution complaint, in the context of the statutory restrictions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
Analysis: The applicant had remained in custody for a substantial period and the ECIR arose out of the predicate offence. The investigation qua the applicant stood concluded and the prosecution complaint had already been filed. The record also showed that the applicant was arrested after a long delay, despite earlier searches and availability of the applicant in custody, and that further custodial interrogation was no longer required. The Court treated the continued detention as serving no fruitful purpose, and held that Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 cannot be used to justify indefinite incarceration where the investigative stage has ended and trial is likely to take time.
Conclusion: Regular bail was held to be warranted and was granted in favour of the applicant.
Final Conclusion: The applicant was enlarged on bail because the investigation was complete, the complaint had been filed, and further pre-trial custody was found unnecessary.
Ratio Decidendi: Once investigation is complete and custody is no longer required for inquiry or evidence collection, prolonged pre-trial detention cannot be sustained merely by invoking the restrictive bail conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
Issues: (i) Whether the orders rejecting discharge and framing charge in a money-laundering prosecution suffered from legal error warranting interference in revision. (ii) Whether the material collected in investigation disclosed a prima facie case against the accused for offences under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. (iii) Whether the objections based on absence of money trail, non-naming in the predicate offence, and want of prior sanction justified discharge.
Issue (i): Whether the orders rejecting discharge and framing charge in a money-laundering prosecution suffered from legal error warranting interference in revision.
Analysis: The revisional court reiterated that interference with an order refusing discharge or framing charge is confined to cases of patent illegality or jurisdictional error. At the stage of discharge, the court is only required to see whether sufficient ground exists for proceeding and is not expected to conduct a mini trial or weigh the evidence as if deciding guilt. Revisional scrutiny is therefore narrow, and the trial court's satisfaction based on the prosecution material is not to be disturbed unless it is perverse or unsupported by record.
Conclusion: No legal error warranting revisional interference was found in the impugned orders.
Issue (ii): Whether the material collected in investigation disclosed a prima facie case against the accused for offences under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
Analysis: The court held that the prosecution material, including search recoveries, diaries and notes, statements recorded under Section 50 of the Act, and the disclosed commission-sharing modus operandi, showed an organised collection and concealment of proceeds of crime. It held that Section 3 of the Act is an independent and continuing offence and that involvement in concealment, possession, acquisition or use of proceeds of crime is sufficient. The court also held that the prosecution need not establish the entire downstream money trail once foundational material shows generation and handling of proceeds of crime.
Conclusion: A prima facie case for proceeding against the accused was made out.
Issue (iii): Whether the objections based on absence of money trail, non-naming in the predicate offence, and want of prior sanction justified discharge.
Analysis: The court rejected the contention that absence of a complete money trail or absence of the accused's name in the original predicate FIR defeated the prosecution, holding that PMLA liability is not confined to persons named in the scheduled offence and may extend to those knowingly involved in laundering proceeds of crime. It further held that the alleged acts of collecting and concealing commission could not be treated as acts done in discharge of official duty, so the plea of sanction under Section 197 CrPC did not assist the accused at this stage. The court also treated the Section 50 statements as admissible material for the limited purpose of discharge and charge.
Conclusion: The objections did not entitle the accused to discharge.
Final Conclusion: The impugned discharge and charge orders were sustained, and the revision petitions failed, leaving the prosecution to proceed to trial on the money-laundering allegations.
Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of discharge or framing of charge in a PMLA case, the court must proceed on the prosecution material as true, and if that material discloses a prima facie nexus with proceeds of crime and involvement in concealment, possession, acquisition or use, discharge is unwarranted even without proof of the entire money trail or inclusion of the accused in the predicate offence FIR.
Issues: Whether bail for an offence of money-laundering could be sustained where the trial court granted it on parity and cooperation without recording satisfaction of the mandatory twin conditions.
Analysis: The parity relied upon arose from anticipatory bail granted to another person for offences not under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, and was therefore inapplicable. For an accusation under Section 3 punishable under Section 4, Section 45 required satisfaction that the accused was not guilty and unlikely to commit an offence while on bail. Cooperation with investigation alone did not satisfy those statutory requirements.
Conclusion: The bail order was unsustainable for failure to apply and record satisfaction of the mandatory twin conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002; the bail was cancelled.
Issues: (i) Whether a woman accused of offences under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is entitled to the benefit of the proviso to Section 45 without being subjected to the twin conditions; (ii) Whether the petitioner was entitled to release under Section 479 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 on account of custody already undergone and the nature of pending proceedings; (iii) Whether parity with similarly placed co-accused supported grant of bail.
Issue (i): Whether a woman accused of offences under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is entitled to the benefit of the proviso to Section 45 without being subjected to the twin conditions.
Analysis: The proviso to Section 45 expressly extends a special bail treatment to a woman accused. The statutory benefit is not confined to a narrowly defined category of vulnerable women, and the Court noted that the precedent relied upon by the enforcement agency did not limit the proviso in that manner. The mere seriousness of the allegations or the quantum of proceeds allegedly handled was held insufficient to deny the statutory benefit in the absence of exceptional circumstances.
Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to the benefit of the proviso to Section 45, and the twin conditions were not treated as an absolute bar.
Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner was entitled to release under Section 479 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 on account of custody already undergone and the nature of pending proceedings.
Analysis: Section 479 was construed as a liberty-protective provision intended to prevent prolonged pre-trial incarceration. The Court held that the custody threshold had been crossed, and that delay attributable to the accused could not defeat relief where the petitioner had already remained in custody for more than half of the maximum sentence. It further held that multiplicity of proceedings under sub-section (2) is a relevant factor, but not an absolute bar that eclipses the discretion under sub-section (1). Given the length of custody, the stage of the case, and the likelihood of trial delay, the petitioner was found entitled to the statutory benefit.
Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to release under Section 479.
Issue (iii): Whether parity with similarly placed co-accused supported grant of bail.
Analysis: Several co-accused, including persons attributed roles in handling, layering, moving, or benefiting from the proceeds of crime, had already been granted bail. The Court held that the petitioner's alleged role did not stand on a graver footing than those co-accused and that parity was relevant, especially where the allegations against her were confined to handling and enjoying the proceeds of crime.
Conclusion: Parity favoured the petitioner.
Final Conclusion: Bail was granted on a combined consideration of the statutory bail protections, the custody already undergone, the stage and likely duration of trial, and parity with co-accused.
Ratio Decidendi: A woman accused under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is not automatically subjected to the twin conditions of Section 45, and prolonged pre-trial custody beyond the statutory threshold under Section 479 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 may justify bail even where multiple proceedings are pending, if no exceptional reason to deny relief is shown.
Issues: Whether the applicants were entitled to regular bail in a prosecution under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002, in the light of the twin conditions under Section 45, the statutory presumption under Section 24, and the right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: The applications were considered on the basis that bail under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 is governed by the special restrictions in Section 45, which require reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty of money-laundering and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The Court held that the statutory presumption under Section 24 arises only after the prosecution establishes foundational facts, namely the commission of the scheduled offence, derivation of the property as a result of that offence, and involvement of the accused in any process or activity connected with the property. The Court found that the self-incriminating statements recorded under Section 50 while the accused were in custody could not safely be treated as voluntary and were liable to be discarded. The Court also found the WhatsApp material insufficient to outweigh liberty at the bail stage and noted that the investigation had not firmly connected the alleged monetary trail with the predicate offence. The prolonged incarceration of the applicants, coupled with the continuing investigation and the absence of any apparent likelihood of early trial conclusion, was held to engage Article 21.
Conclusion: The applicants satisfied the bail standard under Section 45 and were held entitled to release on bail.
Issues: Whether the order taking cognizance under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act could be sustained in the absence of previous sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 makes previous sanction a condition precedent before a court can take cognizance of offences alleged against a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. The accused were public servants, and the sanction was not obtained on the date cognizance was taken. The settled position that Section 197(1) applies to proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act by virtue of Section 65 of that Act, and is not displaced by the overriding clause in Section 71, governed the decision.
Conclusion: The cognizance order and process could not be sustained and were set aside for want of prior sanction.
Ratio Decidendi: Where prior sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is required, cognizance taken against a public servant in proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act without such sanction is invalid, and the special statute does not override that requirement where the Criminal Procedure Code is made applicable by Section 65.
Issues: Whether a bank could freeze a customer's current account on its own, on the basis of an alleged suspicious transaction, and whether Section 12 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 or the Reserve Bank of India circular on suspicious transaction reporting authorized such freezing.
Analysis: The account was frozen without any FIR, complaint, or order of a competent authority. The statutory provisions relied upon by the bank dealt with maintenance of records, confidentiality, and reporting obligations of a reporting entity, and did not confer a power on the bank to unilaterally freeze an account. The cited RBI circular clarified that filing of a suspicious transaction report does not justify placing restrictions on account operations. The Court further held that freezing of an account can be justified only when supported by lawful authority, such as action by an investigating agency or a lawful lien, and that a bank cannot assume the role of an investigating agency or act on unverified suspicion.
Conclusion: The freezing of the account was illegal and unsustainable. The petitioners were entitled to de-freezing and to continue operating the account.
Issues: (i) Whether the restrictions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 barred grant of regular bail in the facts of the case. (ii) Whether the applicant was entitled to regular bail having regard to the alleged role, the link with the scheduled offence, and the prolonged custody.
Issue (i): Whether the restrictions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 barred grant of regular bail in the facts of the case.
Analysis: The conditions under Section 45 require opportunity to the prosecution to oppose bail and a prima facie conclusion that the accused is not guilty and is not likely to commit an offence while on bail. The Court considered the nature of money-laundering as dependent on proceeds of crime arising from a scheduled offence and noted that the provision does not create an absolute restraint on bail. The Court also treated the bail inquiry as one guided by judicial discretion on the available material, not by a final determination on merits.
Conclusion: The statutory bar did not operate as an absolute prohibition, and bail could be considered on the facts.
Issue (ii): Whether the applicant was entitled to regular bail having regard to the alleged role, the link with the scheduled offence, and the prolonged custody.
Analysis: The alleged role was limited to conversion of proceeds of crime into cryptocurrency for commission, and the applicant was not shown to be the principal offender in the scheduled offence. The Court noted that the alleged activity was dependent on the principal offence and that the applicant was not attributed concealment, possession, acquisition, use, or projection of tainted property in a broader sense. The Court further considered the length of custody, the stage of the proceedings, the large number of witnesses, and the absence of any immediate prospect of trial completion, and held that continued detention would impinge upon the right to speedy trial under Article 21.
Conclusion: The applicant was entitled to regular bail.
Final Conclusion: The application succeeded and the applicant was ordered to be released on regular bail on conditions.
Ratio Decidendi: In a money-laundering bail application, Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 does not impose an absolute bar; where the alleged role is derivative of the scheduled offence, the prosecution material is only prima facie, and custody has become unduly prolonged with no near prospect of trial completion, bail may be granted consistently with Article 21.
Issues: Whether the provisional attachment orders passed under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 should be set aside and the matter relegated to the Lodha Committee in view of the Supreme Court's scheme under Article 142 of the Constitution.
Analysis: The Court held that the statutory scheme of provisional attachment and confiscation under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 operates differently from the Supreme Court's special mechanism for the PACL assets under Article 142 of the Constitution. It found that restoration under Section 8(8) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 and Rule 3A of the Prevention of Money-laundering (Restoration of Confiscated Property) Rules, 2016 is a limited route controlled by the Special Court, and that the Enforcement Directorate had earlier acted in aid of the Lodha Committee mechanism. The Court also noted that the attachment orders had served their purpose, the petitioners had given an undertaking against alienation, and the matter had remained pending for years without meaningful adjudication.
Conclusion: The provisional attachment orders were set aside and the matter was relegated to the Lodha Committee for decision in accordance with the Supreme Court's scheme.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were disposed of after granting the respondent's applications, with the attached properties directed to remain protected from alienation or encumbrance until final determination by the Lodha Committee.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a special restitution mechanism has been devised by the Supreme Court for a defined class of assets under Article 142, provisional attachment under the money-laundering statute may be displaced in favour of that mechanism when the statutory process has served its purpose and the matter is appropriately remitted to the designated committee.
Issues: Whether the writ petition ought to have been relegated to the statutory appellate remedy under Section 26 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 despite the interim order and the plea of lack of jurisdiction in the provisional attachment proceedings.
Analysis: The availability of an efficacious statutory appeal is a relevant consideration while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. An interim order passed at an earlier stage does not compel final adjudication in writ proceedings in every case. The Court noted, however, that where an interim order makes impending action subject to the writ petition, the legality of the action would ordinarily be examined, though this is not an inflexible rule. The impugned order did not disclose a clear basis showing why the learned Single Judge declined to exercise writ jurisdiction or what aspect of the adjudication under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 led to relegation to the appellate remedy.
Conclusion: The writ court's order relegating the appellant to the statutory appeal was set aside and the writ petition was restored for fresh consideration, with all issues and pleas left open.
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