Issues: Whether the remand order granting custodial remand to the Directorate of Enforcement was vitiated for want of compliance with Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, including the requirement of written grounds of arrest and the existence of reason to believe that the accused was guilty of money laundering.

Analysis: The petition challenged only the remand order and not the arrest memo or arrest order. The remand record showed that the Sessions Court had perused the written grounds of arrest and had recorded that they were supplied to the accused. The order also reflected consideration of the investigation material, the petitioner's alleged role in the incorporation and operation of the company structure, and the basis on which the investigating officer formed the view that the petitioner was involved in the offence of money laundering. The Court distinguished the case from the precedent relied upon by the petitioner, noting that the impugned order did not suffer from the absence of any finding on the grounds of arrest or the statutory requirements. The Court further held that the remand was not founded merely on non-cooperation or evasive replies, but also on the material indicating the petitioner's alleged involvement in the larger conspiracy and the proceeds of crime.

Conclusion: The remand order was valid and no infirmity was shown in the custody granted to the Directorate of Enforcement.

Issues: Whether the petitioner, being accused in a PMLA case, was entitled to bail on medical grounds by invoking the proviso to Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 despite the twin conditions ordinarily applicable under that provision.

Analysis: The bail jurisdiction is informed by the constitutional value of personal liberty under Article 21, but in a PMLA prosecution the statutory restriction under Section 45(1) remains operative unless the case falls within the proviso. The proviso permits relaxation for a sick or infirm accused, and the sickness must be of a serious nature requiring medical attention that cannot be effectively provided in jail. On the medical board's report, the petitioner's tracheostomy tube required hospital-based treatment and could not be removed in custody. The Court also considered the prolonged pre-trial detention, the uncertainty about commencement of trial, and the absence of substantial flight-risk, tampering, or witness-influencing concerns, subject to suitable conditions.

Conclusion: The petitioner's ailment brought the case within the proviso to Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and the rigour of the twin conditions was relaxed. Bail was therefore granted on terms and conditions.

Issues: Whether proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 could continue after the petitioner had been acquitted in the predicate offences on which the enforcement case was based.

Analysis: Liability under the Act depends on property being derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The definition of "proceeds of crime" and the offence of money laundering require an underlying scheduled offence, even though the offence under the Act is otherwise independent in its operation. Once the person concerned has been finally absolved by acquittal in the predicate offences, the property linked to those offences cannot be treated as proceeds of crime for continuing action under the Act.

Conclusion: The proceedings under the Act could not be sustained after the petitioner's acquittal in the predicate offences, and the order taking cognizance and issuing summons was liable to be quashed in favour of the petitioner.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the person concerned is finally acquitted of the scheduled offence, action for money laundering in relation to property linked to that offence cannot continue because such property no longer qualifies as proceeds of crime.

Issues: Whether the applicants were entitled to bail in a prosecution under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The complaint had already been filed in respect of the scheduled offence and the material collected in the PMLA enquiry, including statements recorded under Section 50 of the Act, disclosed a prima facie role of the applicants in the alleged laundering activity. The Court applied the stringent bail standard under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and noted the statutory presumptions under Sections 23 and 24 of that Act. On the record before it, the Court was not satisfied that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the applicants were not guilty of the offence or that they were unlikely to commit an offence while on bail.

Conclusion: Bail was not granted and the applications were rejected.

Final Conclusion: The prosecution material was found sufficient at the bail stage to justify continued custody under the special bail regime of the PMLA.

Ratio Decidendi: For offences under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, bail can be granted only when the court is satisfied that the accused is not guilty and is unlikely to commit an offence while on bail; prima facie material showing involvement in laundering and possession of proceeds of crime justifies of bail.

Issues: Whether the impugned orders transgressed the limits of a court-monitored investigation by interfering with the investigating agency's domain and whether the appellant had a maintainable grievance against the orders.

Analysis: The directions for disclosure of documents and information were read in the context of the investigation already underway and the incomplete status of the material placed before the Court. The Court held that monitoring an investigation to secure a fair, impartial, and time-bound inquiry does not amount to the Court acting as a prosecutor or dictating the manner of investigation, so long as the agency remains free to act in accordance with law. It further held that the appellant could not show any prejudicial observation in the impugned orders themselves, and the apprehension based on the transcripted proceedings did not by itself establish a maintainable challenge to the orders. The Court also emphasised that investigation materials and reports should remain confidential and that the investigating agency must act with probity and fairness.

Conclusion: The impugned orders were not found to be beyond jurisdiction or invalid, and the appellant's challenge was not entertained as disclosing a sufficient grievance against the orders.

Final Conclusion: The directions for disclosure and further investigation were left undisturbed, with the investigation to proceed in accordance with law, confidentiality, and expedition.

Ratio Decidendi: Court supervision over an investigation is permissible to secure fairness and expedition, but it cannot be used to direct the investigation in a manner that prejudices the rights of the person under inquiry; a challenge requires a prejudicial order, not merely apprehensions drawn from proceedings outside the impugned order.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to discharge on the ground that the 2013 amendment to Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was prospective and therefore inapplicable to the alleged offence, and whether the material on record disclosed a prima facie case warranting continuation of the prosecution.

Analysis: The amendment to Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was treated as clarificatory and not as a merely prospective change. The explanation inserted by the amendment was held to apply to the offence of money-laundering from the inception of the enactment, and the process connected with proceeds of crime was treated as a continuing activity. On the material placed before the Court, the recovery of cash from the locker of A.2, the custody of the locker keys with the petitioner, and the documentary material relied upon by the prosecution were sufficient to show complicity at the threshold stage. The plea for discharge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was therefore not accepted.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to discharge, and the revision failed.

Issues: Whether anticipatory bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 should be granted in view of the applicant's serious medical condition, the medical board's report, and the statutory restrictions under Section 45.

Analysis: The applicant's claim of serious illness was supported by medical material and by the report of a five-member medical board constituted by SGPGI, which described him as a post-renal transplant patient requiring close observation, immunosuppressive medicines, and careful management of associated conditions. The Court also noticed the proviso to Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, which recognises sickness as a relevant ground, and relied on the view that the restrictions under Section 45 do not operate so as to defeat the constitutional court's powers where the circumstances justify relief. The Court further found no reliable basis to disbelieve the medical board's assessment and noted that the applicant's alleged non-cooperation and witness-influencing allegations were denied and did not dislodge the medical basis for relief.

Conclusion: Anticipatory bail was warranted and the application was allowed.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the ground that the prosecution complaint was allegedly incomplete and investigation was still pending.

Analysis: The Court held that the complaint filed on 12.06.2023 was a final report filed after completion of the investigation in the first ECIR, and cognizance had already been taken. It accepted that further investigation is permissible even after filing of the report and that, under Section 44 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, a subsequent complaint may be filed in respect of further evidence. The mere fact that some facets of the matter were to be pursued further did not make the filed report an incomplete report so as to attract default bail. Since the report was filed within the statutory period, the right under Section 167(2) did not survive.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to default bail and the plea under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Default bail is unavailable where the investigation in the relevant case stands completed and a final report has been filed within the statutory period, even if further investigation on other facets or by subsequent complaint remains permissible.

Issues: (i) Whether a third party claiming to be a journalist had a right to implead himself in the proceedings under Section 301(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (ii) Whether summons issued in ECIR-based proceedings under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 were liable to be quashed after closure of the predicate offence.

Issue (i): Whether a third party claiming to be a journalist had a right to implead himself in the proceedings under Section 301(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: Section 301(2) was held to operate in the limited sphere of assisting the prosecution and submitting written arguments with permission of the Court. The claim for impleadment was tested against the nature of the applicant's grievance, which was directed essentially against closure of the predicate offence and not against any independent victim-based entitlement in the PMLA proceedings. Authorities on public interest, representative participation, and victim rights were distinguished on facts and on the basis that they did not confer a general right of audience in the present setting.

Conclusion: The impleadment request was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether summons issued in ECIR-based proceedings under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 were liable to be quashed after closure of the predicate offence.

Analysis: The Court treated closure of the scheduled offence as the factual basis. It applied the principle that money-laundering under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 depends on illegal gain from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, and that proceedings under the Act cannot be sustained on a purely notional foundation when the predicate offence has attained closure. The Court found the dispute to be a private transaction resolved through arbitration and settlement, with no material showing public funds or demonstrable proceeds of crime. The reasoning also adopted the caveat recognised in later precedent that revival remains open if the predicate offence is resurrected.

Conclusion: The summons were quashed and the main petitions were allowed, subject to preservation of rights if the predicate offence is revived.

Final Conclusion: The Court granted relief against the PMLA summons on the footing that closure of the predicate offence removed the immediate basis for continuation of the ECIR-linked proceedings, while preserving liberty to proceed again if the predicate case is reopened.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the scheduled offence has been finally closed, money-laundering proceedings premised on that offence cannot continue in the absence of a surviving predicate basis, though liberty may remain to revive such proceedings if the predicate offence is later restored.

Issues: (i) Whether the continued enforcement of the look-out circular and repeated summoning of the petitioner under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 could be sustained on the basis of suspicion alone without reasonable ground; (ii) Whether the writ petition challenging the impugned order and the look-out circular was maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issue (i): Whether the continued enforcement of the look-out circular and repeated summoning of the petitioner under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 could be sustained on the basis of suspicion alone without reasonable ground.

Analysis: The petitioner had already appeared on several occasions in response to summons and his statements were recorded. The materials placed did not show any cognizable offence registered against him, nor was there any non-bailable warrant issued against him. The basis for further restraint was only that he was related to an accused and that his information was considered unsatisfactory. Section 50 contemplates summons for investigation on valid grounds, and repeated summons or coercive restraint cannot rest on suspicion alone. In the absence of credible material showing reasonable ground or probable cause to link the petitioner with any incriminating material, continuation of the look-out circular became arbitrary and inconsistent with fairness and the protection against self-incrimination.

Conclusion: The continued enforcement of the look-out circular on suspicion alone was impermissible and liable to be set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petition challenging the impugned order and the look-out circular was maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The challenge was directed against action taken in the course of investigation that affected the petitioner's liberty and right to travel. The court treated the petition as one invoking its constitutional jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice. Since the grievance involved infringement of fundamental rights and the legality of the coercive restraint, the objection as to maintainability was not accepted.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner succeeded in challenging the coercive restraint, and the impugned order and the enforceability of the look-out circular were brought to an end, while liberty was preserved for the authorities to proceed if incriminating material emerged later.

Ratio Decidendi: A look-out circular and repeated investigative summons cannot be sustained indefinitely on mere suspicion in the absence of reasonable ground or credible material, especially where the action curtails personal liberty and the right to travel.

Issues: (i) Whether the revisional application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was premature so as to warrant quashing of the ECIR and summons; and (ii) whether, on the materials then available, coercive steps could be taken against the petitioner without compliance with Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Issue (i): Whether the revisional application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was premature so as to warrant quashing of the ECIR and summons.

Analysis: The ECIR related to an ongoing money-laundering investigation arising from a registered predicate offence, and the investigation had progressed further by the time the matter was heard. The petitioner had already responded to summons, the Enforcement Directorate had carried out further investigation, and materials were being placed before the court in the connected proceedings. In that setting, the challenge to the ECIR was held to have been moved at an incipient stage and the court declined to interfere with the investigation.

Conclusion: The prayer for quashing of the ECIR was rejected as premature and was held not to be maintainable on the facts then existing.

Issue (ii): Whether, on the materials then available, coercive steps could be taken against the petitioner without compliance with Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The court noted that the Enforcement Directorate had produced only limited material before it, principally the statement of a co-accused, and that the investigative record did not then justify coercive action against the petitioner without the statutory safeguards governing arrest. The court therefore directed that any coercive measure must conform to the statutory requirements governing arrest under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Conclusion: Coercive steps against the petitioner were restrained unless taken in accordance with Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Final Conclusion: The revision was disposed of by refusing to quash the ECIR, while extending limited protection to the petitioner against coercive action except in accordance with the mandatory statutory procedure.

Ratio Decidendi: A challenge to an ongoing money-laundering investigation may be declined as premature where the investigation is still progressing, but any proposed arrest must satisfy the statutory safeguards prescribed for arrest under the special enactment.

Issues: Whether bail should be granted in a prosecution under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 where the allegation was that the petitioner, a chartered accountant, had aided the laundering process by filing returns and handling financial matters.

Analysis: The material was assessed at the bail stage on the standard of broad probabilities and prima facie satisfaction, not on a conclusive determination of guilt. The Court noted that in special statute bail matters, the issue is whether the accused appears unlikely to be guilty on the record presently available and whether release is likely to prejudice the process of justice. The petitioner's role was stated to be confined to professional work performed as a chartered accountant, and the larger question whether he acted beyond the scope of professional instructions was held to require examination at trial. The Court also held that a bail hearing cannot become a mini trial or require detailed appreciation of evidence.

Conclusion: Bail was granted to the petitioner, subject to conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of bail under a special statute, the Court applies a prima facie assessment on broad probabilities and does not conduct a mini trial; allegations against a professional functionary must be tested at trial if the record does not clearly establish culpable participation.

Issues: Whether anticipatory bail should be granted in a case involving alleged economic offences and disproportionate assets linked to offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The relief under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is an extraordinary one and is to be exercised sparingly, particularly in economic offences. The Court relied on the statutory rigour under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and the settled approach that such offences affect the economic fabric of society. It concluded that the allegations and the value of the property involved did not justify pre-arrest protection.

Conclusion: Anticipatory bail was not granted.

Issues: (i) Whether the Asset Disposal Committee should be accommodated with office space and allied administrative support for continuation of its functions.

Issue (i): Whether the Asset Disposal Committee should be accommodated with office space and allied administrative support for continuation of its functions.

Analysis: By consent, the Committee was permitted to use and occupy Rooms 401 and 402 on the fourth floor of the specified premises as an additional office until alternative accommodation is provided by the State Government. The order also facilitated the Committee's functioning by directing creation of a dedicated website, publication of notices for claims and asset sales, supervision of sales by the Committee, fixation of the Chairman's remuneration, and provision for necessary staff and expenses from sale proceeds and company payments.

Conclusion: The requested administrative arrangements and supporting directions were granted.

Final Conclusion: The order granted interim administrative and operational relief to facilitate the functioning of the Asset Disposal Committee and related claim and asset-disposal processes.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to quashing or suspension of the look out circular and permission to travel abroad for medical treatment.

Analysis: The Court noted that the right to travel abroad forms part of personal liberty, but the request had to be tested against the seriousness of the allegations, the need for the accused to remain available for trial and confiscation proceedings, and the risk of absconding. The Court relied on the fact that the medical treatment sought was available in India, as reflected in the medical opinions placed on record, and also considered the earlier conduct attributed to the petitioner in attempting to leave the country. In these circumstances, the Court held that the trial court had dealt with the matter in accordance with law and that no case was made out for interference in exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to the requested relief and the challenge to the impugned order failed.

Issues: Whether an application under Section 4 of the Fugitive Economic Offenders Act, 2018 was liable to be rejected for want of a separate affidavit under Section 297 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and whether the verification given on the basis of records satisfied the statutory requirement.

Analysis: The application under the Fugitive Economic Offenders Act, 2018 had to be filed in the form and manner prescribed by the Act and the Rules. The special procedure under the Act and Rule 3 of the Declaration of Fugitive Economic Offender (Forms and Manner of Filing Application) Rules, 2018 was held to be self-contained. Section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 did not displace that special procedure, and Section 21 of the Fugitive Economic Offenders Act, 2018 gave the Act overriding effect. The verification stated that the contents were true and correct to the best of the deponent's knowledge derived from records, which was treated as a sufficient disclosure of the source of knowledge. The application was found to comply with the prescribed format and the objection based on the absence of a separate affidavit was rejected.

Conclusion: The challenge to the application failed, as the verification and statutory form requirements were held to be properly complied with.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute prescribes its own application procedure, compliance with that special procedure is sufficient and the general procedural requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure will not override it absent inconsistency.