Issues: Whether a prosecution complaint filed after 01.07.2024 under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 is governed by Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and whether cognizance could be taken without first affording the accused an opportunity of being heard.

Analysis: The complaint in question was filed after the BNSS came into force. The Court relied on the statutory scheme and the Supreme Court's view that, for complaints filed after 01.07.2024, the procedure under Section 223 of the BNSS applies to complaints under the PMLA by virtue of the relevant statutory linkages. The proviso to Section 223 expressly bars cognizance without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard. Since the impugned cognizance order had been passed without complying with that safeguard, the order could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The complaint was held to be governed by Section 223 of the BNSS and the cognizance order was set aside for non-compliance with the requirement of hearing the accused before cognizance.

Ratio Decidendi: For a complaint filed after the commencement of the BNSS, cognizance cannot be taken without first giving the accused an opportunity of being heard where Section 223 applies.

* Whether the petitioner is entitled to regular bail under the stringent provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), particularly Section 45, given the allegations of involvement in money laundering activities.

* Whether the absence of the petitioner's name in the charge-sheet of the predicate offence affects his prosecution or bail under the PMLA.

* Whether the long period of incarceration (approximately 27 months) and delay in trial constitute sufficient grounds for grant of bail in a scheduled offence under PMLA.

* Legality and validity of the petitioner's arrest and remand, including compliance with Section 19(1) of the PMLA regarding communication of grounds of arrest.

* Whether the material on record discloses reasonable grounds to believe the petitioner's involvement in the offence of money laundering as defined under Section 3 of the PMLA.

* Applicability and interpretation of the definitions of "proceeds of crime", "property", and the scope of offence under Section 3 of the PMLA in the context of the present case.

* Whether the petitioner's official position as Deputy Commissioner and alleged misuse thereof aggravates the gravity of offence and impacts bail considerations.

* Whether any fresh or changed circumstances exist to reconsider the earlier rejected bail applications.

Issue 1: Entitlement to Bail under Section 45 of the PMLA

* Legal Framework: Section 45 of the PMLA mandates that no person accused of an offence under the Act shall be released on bail unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose and the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty and is not likely to commit an offence while on bail. Sub-section (2) further restricts bail, making offences under PMLA cognizable and non-bailable.

* Court's Reasoning: The Court noted the stringent nature of the PMLA and the twin conditions under Section 45. It emphasized that the offence of money laundering is a special and aggravated offence with serious societal impact, warranting strict bail conditions. The Court relied on authoritative Supreme Court judgments affirming the mandatory nature of these conditions and the overriding effect of the PMLA over other laws.

* Application to Facts: The Court found that the petitioner, despite being a public functionary, allegedly facilitated acquisition of proceeds of crime and misuse of official position, which aggravates the gravity of offence. The Court held that the petitioner failed to satisfy the twin conditions and thus is not entitled to bail under Section 45.

* Conclusion: Bail under Section 45 was properly denied, given the seriousness of allegations and statutory mandate.

Issue 2: Impact of Non-Inclusion in Predicate Offence Charge-sheet

* Legal Framework: The offence of money laundering under Section 3 PMLA is independent and does not require that the accused be named in the charge-sheet of the predicate offence. The definition of "proceeds of crime" and "property" under Sections 2(1)(u) and 2(1)(v) respectively, and the explanation inserted by Act 23 of 2019 broaden the scope to include property derived directly or indirectly from scheduled offences.

* Court's Reasoning: The Court referred to Supreme Court precedents clarifying that a person can be prosecuted under PMLA even if not an accused in the predicate offence, provided they are involved in any process connected with proceeds of crime. The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that non-inclusion in the predicate offence charge-sheet absolves him.

* Application to Facts: The petitioner's role as Deputy Commissioner allegedly involved facilitating forged documents and transfer of property constituting proceeds of crime. This satisfies the criteria for prosecution under PMLA despite absence in predicate offence charge-sheet.

* Conclusion: Non-inclusion in predicate offence charge-sheet does not affect prosecution or bail under PMLA.

Issue 3: Long Incarceration and Delay in Trial as Grounds for Bail

* Legal Framework: While personal liberty is a fundamental right, Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that delay or prolonged custody alone is not sufficient ground for bail in scheduled or special offences. The seriousness and societal impact of the offence must be considered.

* Court's Reasoning: The Court acknowledged the petitioner's long custody but emphasized that the gravity of the offence and statutory bail conditions under PMLA outweigh mere delay. Reliance was placed on recent Supreme Court rulings refusing bail despite protracted proceedings in economic offences.

* Application to Facts: The petitioner has been in custody since May 2023, but the trial involves multiple accused and complex evidence. The Court noted efforts to expedite trial and that delays are partly due to petitions filed by accused persons themselves.

* Conclusion: Delay and long custody do not justify bail in the present case.

Issue 4: Legality of Arrest and Remand under Section 19(1) of PMLA

* Legal Framework: Section 19(1) requires that the competent authority must have "reason to believe" recorded in writing for arrest and must inform the arrested person of grounds of arrest as soon as may be.

* Court's Reasoning: The Court examined the remand order and found that the competent authority had sufficient material and reason to believe the petitioner's involvement in money laundering. The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that grounds of arrest were inadequate or incomplete due to subsequent addition of allegations.

* Application to Facts: At the time of arrest, at least one imputation related to transfer of land was present, justifying arrest. Subsequent allegations do not vitiate the legality of arrest or remand.

* Conclusion: Arrest and remand were lawful and compliant with Section 19(1).

Issue 5: Existence of Reasonable Grounds to Believe Involvement in Money Laundering

* Legal Framework: For prosecution under PMLA, there must be reasonable grounds to believe the accused is involved in any process or activity connected with proceeds of crime.

* Court's Reasoning: The Court reviewed investigation details and prosecution complaint, which alleged that the petitioner, as Deputy Commissioner, knowingly facilitated forged documents and illegal transfer of property constituting proceeds of crime. The Court found prima facie material supporting involvement.

* Application to Facts: The petitioner allegedly directed subordinate officials to verify ownership based on forged documents, influenced registration processes, and overlooked disputes regarding ownership, thereby aiding concealment and acquisition of proceeds of crime.

* Conclusion: Reasonable grounds exist to believe the petitioner's involvement in money laundering.

Issue 6: Interpretation of "Proceeds of Crime" and Scope of Offence under Section 3 PMLA

* Legal Framework: "Proceeds of crime" includes any property directly or indirectly derived from scheduled offence. Section 3 defines money laundering broadly to include any direct or indirect involvement in processes connected with proceeds of crime, including concealment, possession, acquisition, use, or projecting as untainted property.

* Court's Reasoning: The Court emphasized the wide ambit of Section 3, which criminalizes even indirect assistance or attempts connected with proceeds of crime. The Court cited Supreme Court rulings clarifying that the offence is continuing and independent of the predicate offence timeline.

* Application to Facts: The petitioner's alleged actions in facilitating registration and transfer of disputed land at undervalued consideration, based on forged documents, fall within the ambit of activities connected with proceeds of crime.

* Conclusion: The offence under Section 3 PMLA is attracted by the petitioner's alleged conduct.

Issue 7: Impact of Petitioner's Official Position and Misuse Thereof

* Legal Framework: Public officials hold a higher duty to protect public interest and property. Misuse of official position to facilitate criminal activity aggravates the offence and affects bail considerations.

* Court's Reasoning: The Court noted the petitioner's role as Deputy Commissioner and custodian of public land and money. The petitioner's alleged misuse of power to influence subordinate officials and facilitate illegal land transfer was considered a serious aggravating factor.

* Application to Facts: The petitioner's directions to Circle Officer and Sub-Registrar to overlook rightful ownership and register forged documents demonstrate misuse of office.

* Conclusion: The petitioner's official position and alleged misuse thereof justify stringent bail conditions and denial of bail.

Issue 8: Fresh Grounds or Changed Circumstances for Bail

* Legal Framework: Bail applications after prior rejection require fresh or changed circumstances to justify reconsideration.

* Court's Reasoning: The Court found no new or cogent grounds in the present application. The petitioner's reliance on non-inclusion in predicate offence charge-sheet and long custody were considered insufficient to alter the earlier conclusions.

* Application to Facts: Earlier bail applications were dismissed on merits, including by the Supreme Court. No material change in facts or law was demonstrated.

* Conclusion: No fresh grounds exist to warrant grant of bail.

Additional Observations

* The Court underscored the societal impact of corruption and money laundering, citing authoritative judgments that call for strict measures and "iron hand" approach.

* The Court acknowledged the importance of personal liberty but balanced it against the gravity of offence and public interest.

* The Court noted ongoing efforts to expedite trial and the complexity of multi-accused economic offences.

* The Court clarified that observations made are for bail consideration only and do not prejudice trial merits.

Final Conclusion

The petitioner's bail application is rejected. The Court finds no merit in arguments based on delay, non-inclusion in predicate offence charge-sheet, or alleged procedural infirmities. The stringent statutory framework of the PMLA, the serious allegations of misuse of official position, and the prima facie material justify continued custody pending trial.

Issues: Whether the accused was entitled to an opportunity of hearing under the proviso to Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 before cognizance was taken on the prosecution complaint filed under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The complaint had been presented before the Sessions Court before the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 came into force, but no judicial application of mind had then taken place because the matter was only being processed administratively for transfer to the competent Special Judge. A mere presentation or registration of the complaint did not amount to the commencement of an inquiry within the meaning of the savings provision. Cognizance was in fact taken only after the new Code came into force. The provision in Section 223, which introduces a prior hearing before cognizance, was held to be a beneficial procedural safeguard flowing from natural justice and fair trial principles, and was therefore applied to the pending complaint.

Conclusion: The accused was entitled to a hearing before cognizance, and the impugned orders were unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The complaint proceedings had to be reconsidered afresh after affording the accused an opportunity of hearing under the new procedural regime.

Ratio Decidendi: Where cognizance is taken after the commencement of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the accused must be afforded the prior hearing mandated by the proviso to Section 223, and a mere administrative presentation of the complaint before the change in law does not attract the savings clause.

Issues: Whether cognizance taken on a complaint under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 could be sustained without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard under the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and without considering the question of sanction before taking cognizance.

Analysis: Section 223(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 requires the Magistrate, while taking cognizance on a complaint, to give the accused an opportunity of being heard before cognizance is taken. The proviso is mandatory and operates as an embargo on the power to take cognizance. The materials showed that cognizance had been taken and summons issued without complying with that requirement. The Court also noted that, in prosecutions of this nature, the question of sanction under Section 218 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 or the corresponding provision under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 had to be examined before cognizance.

Conclusion: The cognizance order was unsustainable and was set aside. The proceedings were returned to the pre-cognizance stage with a direction to comply with the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and to consider the question of sanction before taking cognizance again.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a complaint is governed by Section 223(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, cognizance cannot be taken unless the accused is first given an opportunity of being heard, and non-compliance vitiates the cognizance order.

Issues: (i) Whether a dissolved company, which is no longer in existence, can still be prosecuted for offences alleged to have been committed during its existence; (ii) Whether the prosecution can array a director or other responsible person as the representative of such dissolved company under the criminal procedure framework.

Issue (i): Whether a dissolved company, which is no longer in existence, can still be prosecuted for offences alleged to have been committed during its existence.

Analysis: Section 305 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 contemplates prosecution of a corporation through a representative only where the corporation is in existence and capable of appointing one. Where the company has been struck off or dissolved, the Court held that the liability of the company and its officers survives by virtue of the Companies Act, 2013 and the special provisions under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002. The Court further reasoned that a dissolved company may be restored to the register and, until appropriate legislative or procedural accommodation is made, the offence committed during its existence cannot be treated as immune from prosecution merely because the company has ceased to exist in the corporate register.

Conclusion: Yes. A dissolved company can still be proceeded against in law, and restoration to existence is the proper course where available.

Issue (ii): Whether the prosecution can array a director or other responsible person as the representative of such dissolved company under the criminal procedure framework.

Analysis: The Court held that, where restoration of the dissolved company is not immediately possible, the prosecution may indicate a person who was in charge of the company in the final report so that the proceedings can continue. The action of the prosecution in showing the petitioner, who had been a director of the company, as the representative of the dissolved company was found to be justified in the interest of justice. The Court also relied on the continuing liability provisions under the Companies Act, 2013 and the deeming scheme under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 to hold that dissolution does not wipe out the underlying liability.

Conclusion: Yes. The prosecution was justified in arraying the director as the representative of the dissolved company for continuation of the case.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the order refusing removal of the petitioner as representative of the company failed, and the prosecution against the dissolved company was permitted to proceed through the person shown as its representative.

Ratio Decidendi: Dissolution or striking off of a company does not extinguish its criminal liability for offences committed during its existence, and where the procedural law is silent, prosecution may continue by restoring the company or, if necessary, by proceeding through a responsible person shown as its representative.

Issues: Whether anticipatory bail should be granted in a case where the investigation was continuing, the evidence was largely documentary, and no material showed a likelihood of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses.

Analysis: The allegations arose from an economic offences investigation, but the predicate proceedings had not culminated in a charge-sheet or complaint. The record indicated that the applicant had joined the investigation and there was no material showing persistent non-cooperation. The evidence was essentially documentary in nature, and the Court found no real basis to apprehend tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses. In these circumstances, the considerations relevant to grant of anticipatory bail weighed in favour of protection from arrest.

Conclusion: Anticipatory bail was granted.

ISSUES:

Whether the foundational facts for invoking the presumption under Section 24 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) have been established.Whether the attachment of properties under the PMLA is valid in absence of a predicate scheduled offence.Whether the Enforcement Directorate (ED) had "reason to believe" that the attached properties constitute proceeds of crime (PoC) as defined under Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA.Whether the appellants are bona fide purchasers entitled to protection against attachment under the PMLA.Whether the procedure followed in confirming the Provisional Attachment Order (PAO) complied with the principles of natural justice.Whether the composition and constitution of the Adjudicating Authority (AA) under Section 6 of the PMLA was valid and not suffering from coram non-judice.Whether statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA, including those of co-accused, are admissible and sufficient to establish the case.Whether the concept of "equivalent value" property attachment under the PMLA applies to properties acquired prior to the commission of the scheduled offence.Whether the sharing of information by the ED with other law enforcement agencies under Section 66(2) of the PMLA is lawful and proper.Whether the appeals raise any substantial question of law warranting interference with the orders of the AA and Appellate Tribunal.

RULINGS / HOLDINGS:

The Court held that the foundational facts for presumption under Section 24 of the PMLA were established by the material on record, including financial transactions and linkages to the scheduled offence, and the appellants failed to rebut the statutory presumption.The absence of cognizance of the scheduled offence in the initial FIR or charge-sheet does not vitiate the attachment proceedings, as the scheduled offence was subsequently registered and investigated by competent authorities, and the ED's action under the PMLA was lawful and within jurisdiction.The ED had recorded "reason to believe" supported by material evidence, including seized documents, diary entries, and statements under Section 50 of the PMLA, sufficient to provisionally attach the properties as PoC.The appellants claiming to be bona fide purchasers failed to satisfactorily prove the legitimate source of funds for acquisition, and the properties were held to be involved in money laundering, including those acquired through sham transactions or as benami assets.The procedure adopted by the AA in confirming the PAO complied with the principles of natural justice, including issuance of show cause notices and consideration of replies; rejection of cross-examination requests at this stage was justified to prevent delay.The constitution of the AA as a single member bench, including non-judicial members, was held valid and not vitiated by coram non-judice, consistent with judicial precedents.Statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA, including those of co-accused, are judicial proceedings and admissible as evidence, though corroboration is necessary; the Court found sufficient corroboration in the case.The concept of attachment of property of "equivalent value" under Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA applies to properties acquired prior to the commission of the scheduled offence if the actual PoC properties are not available, to prevent frustration of proceedings.The sharing of information by the ED with other investigative agencies under Section 66(2) of the PMLA is lawful, and subsequent FIR registration by those agencies is proper and does not affect the validity of PMLA proceedings.No substantial question of law arose warranting interference; the orders of the AA and Appellate Tribunal were upheld as well-reasoned and based on material evidence.

RATIONALE:

The Court applied the statutory framework of the PMLA, particularly Sections 3 (offence of money laundering), 5 (attachment of property), 8 (adjudication), 24 (burden of proof), and 50 (powers of authorities), along with relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and procedural laws.The Court recognized that money laundering offences involve complex layering and integration of proceeds of crime, often requiring reliance on circumstantial evidence and financial analysis rather than direct proof.The presumption under Section 24 of the PMLA shifts the burden to the accused to prove innocence regarding PoC, and the Court found the appellants failed to discharge this burden adequately.The Court relied on judicial precedents affirming that attachment of properties prior to commission of offence is permissible under the "equivalent value" doctrine to prevent siphoning off of proceeds.The Court upheld the validity of the AA's composition and procedure, rejecting challenges based on natural justice and quorum, citing authoritative case law confirming single-member benches and administrative members' jurisdiction.Regarding statements under Section 50 of the PMLA, the Court emphasized their judicial nature and admissibility, subject to corroboration, and found sufficient corroboration in the present case.The Court held that the ED's sharing of information under Section 66(2) facilitates coordinated investigation and does not breach jurisdictional or procedural norms.The Court noted that the Appellate Tribunal conducted a detailed and reasoned analysis of individual appellants' cases, rejecting claims of mechanical or non-application of mind.The Court observed that the PMLA's scheme aims to prevent dissipation of illicit assets during investigation and trial, thus the attachment and confirmation orders serve a preventive and protective purpose rather than final adjudication of guilt.The Court rejected appellants' reliance on absence of scheduled offence in initial FIR or charge-sheet, noting subsequent registration and cognizance by competent authorities and Supreme Court observations affirming the continuing investigation.

ISSUES:

Whether violation of the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) vitiates the order of taking cognizance and consequential proceedings.Whether the absence of the words "including any complaint filed by a person authorised under Special Law" in Section 223, BNSS excludes the operation of the first proviso to Section 223 to cognizance in respect of such complaints.Whether the accused bears the burden to show "prejudice" and "miscarriage of justice" to vitiate an order taking cognizance on the ground of depriving the accused of a pre-cognizance opportunity of hearing.Whether complaints under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) are in the nature of charge sheets and not "complaints" under Sections 210 and 223 of the BNSS.Whether concessions given by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) and divergent stands taken by it in previous cases can be taken note of while deciding the issues involved.

RULINGS / HOLDINGS:

The denial of opportunity of hearing to the accused prior to taking cognizance under Section 210, BNSS, in violation of the first proviso to Section 223(1), BNSS, is fatal and vitiates the order of cognizance as well as subsequent proceedings; such non-compliance is not a mere irregularity but an incurable illegality.The absence of the phrase "including any complaint filed by a person authorised under Special Law" in Section 223, BNSS does not exclude the operation of the first proviso to Section 223(1) in respect of complaints under Special Laws; the first proviso applies to such complaints.The accused is not required to demonstrate "prejudice" or "miscarriage of justice" to vitiate cognizance taken without affording the pre-cognizance opportunity of hearing; the right to hearing is a substantive right and its denial itself constitutes prejudice and miscarriage of justice.Complaints under the PMLA are to be treated as "complaints" within the meaning of Sections 210 and 223 of the BNSS and not as charge sheets; the PMLA does not treat such complaints as charge sheets, and the procedural provisions of BNSS apply accordingly.Concessions made by the ED or divergent stands taken by it before different courts, including consent orders, are not binding precedents and are immaterial for statutory interpretation; counsel's concessions cannot override legal interpretation.

RATIONALE:

The Court applied the statutory framework of the BNSS, particularly Sections 210 and 223, which govern the power and procedure for taking cognizance of offences, emphasizing that Section 223 circumscribes Section 210 and mandates a pre-cognizance hearing as a mandatory procedural safeguard.The Court relied on constitutional principles under Article 21, holding that deprivation of personal liberty must be "according to procedure established by law," which includes the right to be heard before cognizance is taken, reflecting the principle of audi alteram partem embedded in natural justice.Precedents from the Supreme Court, including Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement and related judgments, were applied to affirm that complaints under the PMLA are subject to procedural safeguards under the BNSS and that non-compliance with mandatory provisions vitiates cognizance.The Court distinguished between "empowerment" of Magistrates under Section 210 and procedural requirements under Section 223, clarifying that Section 506(e) BNSS, which mitigates irregularities relating to lack of authority, does not apply to non-compliance with the first proviso to Section 223.The Court rejected the ED's argument that prejudice must be shown, holding that the right to pre-cognizance hearing is substantive and mandatory, and that denial of such right itself constitutes prejudice and miscarriage of justice.The Court noted the legislative intent to balance the authority to take cognizance under special laws with safeguards against abuse by introducing the first proviso to Section 223 simultaneously with amendments to Section 210, thereby applying the hearing requirement to complaints under special laws like the PMLA.Regarding conflicting stands by the ED, the Court referenced the principle that consent orders and counsel's concessions are not binding precedents and cannot alter statutory interpretation or constitutional mandates.The Court emphasized the severity of PMLA offences and the reverse burden on the accused, underscoring the necessity of strict compliance with procedural safeguards to protect fundamental rights.

Issues: Whether the freezing of the petitioner company's bank accounts and records on 08.03.2025 by the Enforcement Directorate was lawful in the absence of an express order under Section 17(1-A) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 recording impracticability of seizure and communicating that order to the petitioner.

Analysis: The Court examined the material placed by the parties and the affidavits filed by the Enforcement Directorate and found no proof that any express order was passed under Section 17(1) recording that seizure was not practicable, nor that any such order under Section 17(1-A) was communicated to the petitioner prior to freezing. The Court considered the statutory scheme of PMLA which prescribes procedural safeguards for use of the extraordinary power to freeze property and noted authorities upholding the need to follow the procedure set out in the statute. In view of absence of the mandated order and communication, the procedural pre-requisites for invoking Section 17(1-A) were not satisfied. The Court also weighed the public interest in combating money laundering and observed that the matter involves alleged laundering of tainted funds and is pending adjudication before the adjudicating authority.

Conclusion: The freezing of the bank accounts and records of the petitioner company dated 08.03.2025 is unlawful for non-compliance with the procedure prescribed under Section 17(1-A) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; relief of immediate release is withheld and the frozen funds remain in possession of the Enforcement Directorate subject to orders of the Adjudicating Authority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the writ petition challenging the freezing order under Section 17(1-A) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) is maintainable despite the existence of alternative statutory remedies.
2. Whether the Enforcement Directorate (ED) has jurisdiction to investigate and freeze properties in the absence of a predicate offence under PMLA.
3. Whether the impugned freezing order under Section 17(1-A) of PMLA is valid when the alleged proceeds of crime are not established or linked to the predicate offence.
4. Whether "round tripping" allegations and other financial irregularities fall within the jurisdiction of ED under PMLA or are matters under Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) or Customs Act.
5. The scope and limits of jurisdictional error in the context of orders passed under PMLA and the principles governing judicial review of such orders.
6. Whether the ED can expand its investigation beyond the predicate offence without a fresh complaint or new material.

RULINGS / HOLDINGS:

1. The writ petition is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution despite the availability of alternative statutory remedies, as "maintainability" and "entertainability" are distinct concepts, and the existence of an alternative remedy does not oust the High Court's jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition.
2. The ED lacks jurisdiction to investigate or freeze properties under PMLA in the absence of a predicate offence; the "terminus a quo" for ED's jurisdiction is the existence of a predicate offence and "proceeds of crime."
3. The impugned freezing order under Section 17(1-A) of PMLA is set aside as the authority failed to record a reasoned conclusion that the fixed deposits were "the result of proceeds of a crime," rendering the order a jurisdictional error and void ab initio.
4. Allegations of "round tripping" and Customs Duty irregularities fall outside the scope of PMLA investigation as they pertain to FEMA and Customs Act, which are not scheduled offences under PMLA; therefore, ED cannot proceed under PMLA on these grounds.
5. Jurisdictional error includes errors of law and fact that are decisive, such as acting without jurisdiction or ignoring material facts; such errors render the decision "no decision at all" and liable to be quashed.
6. ED cannot expand its investigation beyond the predicate offence without a fresh complaint or new material; reliance on ancillary or unrelated allegations without predicate offence is impermissible.

RATIONALE:

1. The Court applied the Supreme Court's clarification distinguishing "maintainability" and "entertainability" of writ petitions under Article 226, emphasizing the plenary nature of writ jurisdiction and discretion in entertaining petitions despite alternate remedies.
2. The statutory framework under PMLA, particularly Sections 2(1)(p), 2(1)(u), 3, and 17, was examined to establish that ED's powers to investigate and attach property are contingent upon the existence of a predicate offence and proceeds of crime.
3. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & others v. Union of India & others, which held that money laundering investigation under PMLA requires a predicate offence and that mere existence of a crime does not automatically trigger PMLA jurisdiction.
4. The Court referred to authoritative principles on jurisdictional error from the High Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of India, including the distinction between want of jurisdiction and irregular exercise of jurisdiction, and the modern approach that all errors of law are jurisdictional errors warranting judicial review.
5. The Court noted that the ED's impugned order merely recited statutory provisions without a reasoned conclusion linking the frozen fixed deposits to proceeds of crime, constituting a jurisdictional error as per the redefined test of jurisdictional error.
6. The Court emphasized that ED's role is not that of a "super cop" with unfettered powers to conduct roving enquiries; it must confine itself to investigating offences listed in the schedule to PMLA and predicate offences with established proceeds of crime.
7. The Court further held that the ED must notify and coordinate with appropriate agencies for offences outside PMLA's scope and cannot proceed suo motu without a complaint or fresh material, consistent with Section 66(2) of PMLA.
8. In light of the CBI's charge sheet and the Supreme Court's directions in the coal allocation scam case, the Court held that ED's jurisdiction is limited to proceeds of crime traceable to the predicate offence and not to ancillary or unrelated allegations.

Issues: (i) whether the petitioner satisfied the twin conditions for bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; (ii) whether the materials collected during investigation, including statements under Section 50 and seizure material, prima facie established involvement in money-laundering; (iii) whether parity, long incarceration, and medical grounds justified grant of bail.

Issue (i): whether the petitioner satisfied the twin conditions for bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Bail under Section 45 requires reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The statutory scheme, read with the presumption under Section 24, places the initial burden on the accused to displace the prosecution case at the bail stage. The Court found that the material collected in investigation disclosed an organised commission-collection syndicate, the petitioner's alleged share in the tender-linked proceeds, and routing through his personal secretary and associates. On that material, the Court was not satisfied that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner was not guilty.

Conclusion: The twin conditions were not satisfied, and bail was refused.

Issue (ii): whether the materials collected during investigation, including statements under Section 50 and seizure material, prima facie established involvement in money-laundering.

Analysis: The Court treated statements recorded under Section 50 as admissible material in PMLA proceedings and relied on the recovery of large cash amounts, diaries, code words, mobile contacts, and documents to hold that the prosecution had prima facie shown generation, possession, concealment, acquisition, and use of proceeds of crime. The Court also held that an offence under Section 3 is not confined to the final act of projection as untainted property and that the prosecution need not establish the complete money trail at the bail stage where the surrounding material already indicates involvement in a continuing process connected with proceeds of crime.

Conclusion: The investigation material was found sufficient to prima facie implicate the petitioner in money-laundering.

Issue (iii): whether parity, long incarceration, and medical grounds justified grant of bail.

Analysis: The Court held that parity applies only where the factual role is materially identical, and the petitioner's alleged position at the top of the commission-collection structure made his case distinct from co-accused who had obtained bail. Long custody and filing of the complaint were found insufficient by themselves to dilute the rigour of Section 45. The medical plea was not accepted as the material placed did not show a fatal or otherwise exceptional condition warranting release on that basis.

Conclusion: Neither parity nor incarceration nor medical grounds justified bail.

Final Conclusion: The Court held that the petitioner had not made out a special case for bail in a grave economic offence involving alleged laundering of proceeds of crime, and the bail application was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: In a PMLA bail application, where the prosecution material prima facie shows involvement in a continuing process connected with proceeds of crime, the Court must apply the twin conditions under Section 45 along with the presumption under Section 24, and bail cannot be granted unless those statutory thresholds are affirmatively overcome.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ court should interfere with provisional attachment proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 in view of the statutory appellate and adjudicatory remedies; (ii) Whether the directions issued by the Assistant Director under Section 54 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 restraining bank transactions could survive after the provisional attachment order.

Issue (i): Whether the writ court should interfere with provisional attachment proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 in view of the statutory appellate and adjudicatory remedies.

Analysis: The Act creates a complete mechanism for attachment, adjudication, confirmation, appeal, and further challenge. A provisional attachment under Section 5 is only an interim measure, followed by adjudication under Section 8 and appeal under Section 26, with further recourse under Section 42. The existence of this tiered statutory scheme makes writ interference inappropriate except in exceptional circumstances. The nature of the remedy under the Act therefore justified relegating the appellants to the statutory forums.

Conclusion: The challenge to the provisional attachment was not maintainable in writ jurisdiction and the appellants were rightly relegated to the statutory remedies.

Issue (ii): Whether the directions issued by the Assistant Director under Section 54 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 restraining bank transactions could survive after the provisional attachment order.

Analysis: Section 54 only enables specified officers and authorities to assist in the enforcement and inquiry process. It does not confer an independent power to issue binding interdictory directions freezing bank operations. Once a provisional attachment order is made under Section 5(1) in respect of identified properties, any earlier general restraint issued by an officer under Section 54 loses efficacy to the extent it is inconsistent with the attachment order. The affected parties may still pursue their objections before the adjudicating authority under the Act.

Conclusion: The Assistant Director's restraint directions had no continuing legal effect beyond the properties specifically covered by the provisional attachment order.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed on the main challenge and the appellants were directed to work out their remedies under the statutory scheme, while the bank restraint was clarified to be inoperative except as to properties covered by the provisional attachment proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute provides a complete hierarchy of remedies for provisional attachment and adjudication, writ interference is ordinarily unwarranted, and a general assistance power cannot be used to create an independent restraint on property or bank operations beyond the limits of a valid provisional attachment order.

1. Whether the applicant is entitled to interim bail under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, in the case registered by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) involving allegations of fraud and financial irregularities.

2. Whether the applicant's claim of being the sole person knowledgeable about the accounts and financial affairs of multiple companies justifies the grant of interim bail for the purpose of filing Income Tax and GST returns.

3. Whether the applicant's need to secure a loan for his daughter's educational fees and to safeguard interests in a petrol pump allotment constitutes sufficient grounds for interim bail.

4. Whether the investigation is complete and the charge-sheet filed, and if so, how this affects the grant of interim bail.

5. Whether the applicant has misused previous interim bail granted and the implications of such conduct on the present application.

6. Whether the applicant's fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution are engaged in the context of the interim bail application.

7. Whether the strict parameters laid down by the Supreme Court for granting interim bail, especially in cases involving economic offences, have been satisfied.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Entitlement to Interim Bail under Section 483 of BNSS, 2023

The legal framework governing the applicant's bail application is Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The Court examined whether the applicant meets the criteria for interim bail considering the nature of the offence and stage of investigation. The ED opposed the bail, citing the applicant's involvement in a fraudulent scheme harming the government exchequer and vulnerable students.

The Court noted that the investigation was complete and the charge-sheet filed, implying that the applicant was no longer required for custodial interrogation. The Court also considered the applicant's prior conduct during earlier interim bail periods, which had not been misused.

Applying the law to facts, the Court found that the applicant's entitlement to interim bail could be considered, especially given the absence of any fresh grounds to deny bail and the applicant's compliance with previous bail conditions.

Issue 2: Applicant's Claim of Exclusive Knowledge of Accounts

The applicant claimed to be the sole person with knowledge of the accounts and financial affairs of several companies and societies, necessitating his release to file Income Tax and GST returns. The respondent contested this, submitting a detailed table showing multiple directors in these companies, including the applicant's father and others, thereby negating the claim of exclusive knowledge.

The Court analyzed the table and found that while the applicant was not a director in some companies, he was a director in others alongside his father and other directors. The Court held that the presence of multiple directors does not automatically disqualify the applicant's claim to manage taxation matters, as denying bail on this ground alone would infringe the applicant's fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) relating to the right to carry on business.

The Court emphasized that the applicant's assertion, though contested, was not wholly refuted at this stage, and thus, the claim warranted consideration in the bail context.

Issue 3: Grounds Relating to Daughter's Education and Petrol Pump Allotment

The applicant sought bail to secure a loan for his daughter's second-year fees at an American university in Dubai and to attend meetings concerning the allotment of a petrol pump by Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, which was under scrutiny.

The Court found no reason to doubt the genuineness of these claims. The respondent did not challenge these grounds substantively. The Court held these reasons as legitimate personal and business-related grounds that supported the grant of interim bail.

Issue 4: Completion of Investigation and Filing of Charge-sheet

The applicant contended that the investigation was complete and the charge-sheet had been filed, with his property attached, implying no further recovery or custodial interrogation was necessary.

The Court accepted this position, noting that once the investigation is complete and charge-sheet filed, the purpose of custodial detention diminishes, strengthening the applicant's case for interim bail.

Issue 5: Applicant's Conduct During Earlier Interim Bail Periods

The Court reviewed the applicant's history of interim bail, granted on multiple occasions between July and November 2024, and found no evidence of misuse of this liberty.

This favorable conduct weighed in the applicant's favor, indicating compliance with bail conditions and reducing the risk of absconding or tampering with evidence.

Issue 6: Fundamental Rights under Article 19(1)(g)

The Court considered the applicant's right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. It held that denying interim bail solely on the basis that other directors were involved in the companies would amount to an infringement of this right, especially when the applicant's business interests were directly affected.

The Court balanced the interests of the State and the applicant's fundamental rights, concluding that the applicant's business-related grounds justified interim bail.

Issue 7: Compliance with Supreme Court Guidelines on Interim Bail in Economic Offences

The respondent relied on Supreme Court precedents, including judgments in Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI, Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Nittin Johari, and P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, which set stringent parameters for interim bail in economic offence cases.

The Court acknowledged these precedents and noted that the present application did not involve any medical emergency or violation of fundamental rights beyond business interests. However, the Court found that the applicant had provided undertakings and the relief sought was limited and specific, thus satisfying the strict parameters to some extent.

The Court also emphasized that the interim bail was subject to strict conditions to prevent misuse and ensure cooperation with the trial process.

SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

"Merely, the fact that in the Companies at Serial No. 2 to 6, father of the applicant is also one of the directors, is too short to decline the relief to the applicant, as declining the relief would amount to violation of his fundamental rights, as enshrined under Article 19 (1)(g) of the constitution of India and the prayer as made in para 2'A, directly connected with his business."

"There is nothing in the reply to raise any suspicion, with regard to the genuineness of the requests, as made in para 2'B and C."

"Considering the given facts and circumstances, of the case, this Court is of the opinion that the prayer of the applicant for interim bail can be allowed."

The Court established the principle that in cases where the investigation is complete and the charge-sheet filed, interim bail may be granted if the applicant's fundamental rights and legitimate business interests are engaged, provided the applicant complies with stringent conditions to prevent interference with the investigation or trial.

The Court's final determination was to allow the interim bail from 10th July 2025 to 4th August 2025, subject to furnishing personal bond and sureties, and compliance with conditions including non-tampering with evidence, appearance before the trial court, restrictions on travel, and limited movement to necessary places only.

Issues: (i) Whether references in the Schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 to offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 continue to operate, after repeal of the IPC, as references to the corresponding offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; (ii) whether the Central Government notification dated 16 July 2024, purporting to substitute IPC references with BNS references, has the force of law or validly alters statutory references.

Issue (i): Whether references in the Schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 to offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 continue to operate, after repeal of the IPC, as references to the corresponding offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

Analysis: The Schedule to the PMLA refers to IPC offences by section number as predicate offences, without reproducing their text. Such drafting was treated as legislation by reference, not incorporation. In a repeal-and-reenactment situation, Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applies unless a different intention appears. The PMLA contains no contrary indication showing that Parliament intended the Schedule to freeze the references to the IPC as it stood at enactment. The purpose of the PMLA would be frustrated if its operation were made to depend on the continued existence of the IPC nomenclature, especially when the same offences are substantially re-enacted in the BNS.

Conclusion: The IPC references in the PMLA Schedule are to be read as references to the corresponding BNS provisions, and the BNS offences in question continue to qualify as scheduled offences.

Issue (ii): Whether the Central Government notification dated 16 July 2024, purporting to substitute IPC references with BNS references, has the force of law or validly alters statutory references.

Analysis: Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act is only a rule of interpretation and does not confer legislative power on the Executive. The power to construe statutory references remains with the Court. Article 73 does not authorise the Executive to amend or rewrite statutes, and Article 77 requires proper authentication of executive acts. A notification issued without statutory authority or valid authentication cannot create binding legal norms or alter the meaning of enacted law.

Conclusion: The notification does not amount to law, does not validly substitute statutory references, and has no independent legal effect for the present purpose.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the maintainability of the PMLA proceedings on the ground that the predicate offences stand excluded by the repeal of the IPC fails, and the bail application is rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute refers to offences in a repealed penal law by way of reference and not incorporation, the references continue to operate under Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 as references to the corresponding re-enacted provisions, unless a contrary intention clearly appears.

Issues: (i) Whether the ECIR and supplementary complaint could be quashed at the pre-charge stage on the ground that the petitioner was not an accused in the predicate offence and was shown as a witness there; (ii) Whether the alleged absence of knowledge or mens rea regarding the proceeds of crime, and the contention of discriminatory or pick-and-choose prosecution, justified quashing.

Issue (i): Whether the ECIR and supplementary complaint could be quashed at the pre-charge stage on the ground that the petitioner was not an accused in the predicate offence and was shown as a witness there.

Analysis: The offences under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and the predicate offence were treated as independent. A person need not be an accused in the scheduled offence to face prosecution under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 if the scheduled offence exists and the person is alleged to have assisted in the concealment, possession, acquisition or use of proceeds of crime. The Court also treated the challenge as premature because charges had not yet been framed and the material could not be tested in quashing jurisdiction as if it were a trial.

Conclusion: The contention was rejected and the petitioner could not secure quashing on this ground.

Issue (ii): Whether the alleged absence of knowledge or mens rea regarding the proceeds of crime, and the contention of discriminatory or pick-and-choose prosecution, justified quashing.

Analysis: Knowledge, concealment, continuing activity, and the effect of the petitioner's statements and disclosures were held to be matters for trial, particularly in view of the statutory presumption under Section 24 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 once the foundational facts are shown. The Court held that it could not conclusively accept the defence version at the quashing stage, nor determine disputed questions about whether the petitioner was truly misled or whether the prosecution had selectively proceeded against her, because those matters required evidentiary assessment.

Conclusion: The plea based on absence of knowledge, mens rea, or selective prosecution was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The proceedings were allowed to continue and the quashing petition failed in limine, leaving all merits to be examined by the Special Court at the appropriate stage.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, a person need not be an accused in the predicate offence, and questions of knowledge, mens rea, concealment, possession, and rebuttal of the statutory presumption are ordinarily matters for trial rather than for quashing at the pre-charge stage.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner had locus standi to file the writ petitions; (ii) Whether the writ petitions seeking court-monitored investigation were maintainable.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioner had locus standi to file the writ petitions.

Analysis: A writ petitioner under Article 226 must ordinarily show a personal or individual legal right, or a legally cognisable injury, in the subject matter. A stranger cannot ordinarily invoke writ jurisdiction unless the case falls within a genuine public interest exception. Here, the petitioner was neither a homebuyer nor otherwise directly affected by the alleged transactions. The petitions were also not instituted as public interest litigations in accordance with the applicable High Court rules. The criminal law had already been set in motion through registration of an ECIR, filing of prosecution complaints, and cognizance by the Special Court, so reliance on the general proposition that any person may set the criminal law in motion did not assist the petitioner in maintaining these writ petitions.

Conclusion: The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petitions seeking court-monitored investigation were maintainable.

Analysis: Judicial supervision over investigation is permissible only in rare cases where there is abuse of power, mala fides, or violation of law. Investigation ordinarily lies within the exclusive domain of the investigating agency. On the record, the Enforcement Directorate had already investigated the matter, filed prosecution complaints, obtained cognizance, and secured identified proceeds of crime by attachment orders. The petitioner did not establish any inaction or infirmity requiring further judicial monitoring. The material also showed that the loan-related allegation was not being investigated by the agency for want of a predicate offence, which did not justify a direction to monitor the investigation. The successive petitions were accompanied by non-disclosure of earlier proceedings and false assertions, which further undermined maintainability.

Conclusion: The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were not maintainable and were liable to be dismissed, with costs imposed for suppression of material facts and misrepresentation.

Ratio Decidendi: A person who is neither aggrieved nor acting in a genuine public interest capacity cannot invoke Article 226 to demand a court-monitored investigation where the competent agency is already investigating and the criminal process is already in motion; such extraordinary interference is justified only in exceptional cases of abuse of power or illegality.

1. Whether the attachment of properties acquired by the appellant under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) was justified, given that the properties were purchased in 2003, while the alleged predicate offences were registered only in 2010.

2. Whether the offence of money laundering under PMLA can be applied retrospectively to properties acquired before the scheduled offences were registered.

3. Whether the appellant discharged the burden of proof under Section 24 of PMLA to establish that the attached properties were not proceeds of crime.

4. The interpretation and application of the definitions of "proceeds of crime" under Section 2(1)(u) and the offence of money laundering under Section 3 of PMLA, particularly in relation to continuing offences and indirect derivation of property.

5. The validity of the Enforcement Directorate's attachment order and the Appellate Tribunal's confirmation thereof.

Issue-wise detailed analysis:

1. Justification of Attachment of Properties Acquired Prior to Registration of Scheduled Offences

The legal framework centers on the definition of "proceeds of crime" under Section 2(1)(u) of PMLA, which includes any property derived directly or indirectly from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. Section 3 defines the offence of money laundering as any process or activity connected with proceeds of crime, including concealment, possession, acquisition, use, or projecting as untainted property. The explanation clarifies that the offence is continuing in nature.

The Court relied heavily on precedents, particularly the Apex Court's decision in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, which held that money laundering is a continuing offence and that property acquired indirectly from criminal activity, even if before the scheduled offence was registered, may be subject to attachment if the accused continues to possess or use proceeds of crime. The Court emphasized that the relevant date for the offence is when the person indulges in activities connected with proceeds of crime, not the date of the predicate offence.

Key evidence included the appellant's criminal history dating back to 1997, involvement in organized immoral trafficking, and accumulation of wealth to the tune of approximately Rs. 1.5 crores. Investigations revealed extensive material such as diaries, cheque books, cash, insurance policies, and vehicles linked to illegal trade. The appellant's income tax returns showed insufficient declared income to justify the acquisition of properties and investments.

The Court applied the law by concluding that the appellant's properties, although acquired in 2003, were linked directly or indirectly to criminal activity ongoing since 1997. The continuing nature of money laundering meant that the attachment was justified despite the temporal gap between acquisition and registration of offences.

Competing arguments by the appellant that the properties were acquired legally prior to offences and that PMLA does not apply retrospectively were rejected based on the continuing offence doctrine and the extensive material indicating illicit sources of income.

The Court concluded that the attachment was lawful and supported by evidence and legal principles.

2. Burden of Proof Under Section 24 of PMLA

Section 24 places the burden on the person from whom property is seized to prove that it is not proceeds of crime. The appellant contended that he earned income from lawful religious ceremonies and had saved legitimately to acquire the properties.

The Court noted the appellant's failure to provide credible evidence or satisfactory explanation for the source of funds, especially given the discrepancies in income tax filings and the extensive material seized during investigation indicating involvement in illegal activities. The appellant's claim that possession of unaccounted property acquired legally does not constitute proceeds of crime was found insufficient in light of the evidence.

The Court held that the appellant did not discharge the burden of proof, reinforcing the attachment order.

3. Interpretation of "Proceeds of Crime" and Continuing Offence

The Court reiterated the Apex Court's interpretation that "proceeds of crime" includes property derived directly or indirectly from criminal activity, and that money laundering is a continuing offence. The explanation to Section 3 clarifies that the offence continues as long as the person enjoys or deals with proceeds of crime.

The Court cited the Apex Court's observations that the offence is not dependent on the date of commission of the scheduled offence but on the date of indulging in activities connected with proceeds of crime. This principle was crucial in rejecting the appellant's contention that the attachment was invalid due to the time gap.

The Court also referenced the judgment in Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma, which emphasized that money laundering is an ongoing process, and possession or use of proceeds of crime at any point constitutes the offence.

4. Validity of Enforcement Directorate's Attachment Order and Appellate Tribunal's Confirmation

The Adjudicating Authority, after considering the Respondent/ED's complaint and evidence, confirmed the provisional attachment order. The Appellate Tribunal upheld this confirmation, noting the appellant's habitual criminality and ongoing involvement in immoral trafficking since 1998.

The appellant's contention that the Appellate Tribunal failed to specify the predicate offence and reasons to believe was addressed by the Court's finding that the offences under the Immoral Trafficking (Prevention) Act and MCOCA formed the basis of the money laundering investigation. The Court found no infirmity in the Tribunal's reasoning or the confirmation of attachment.

The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the attachment of bank accounts, insurance policies, vehicle, and immovable property as proceeds of crime.

Significant holdings include the following verbatim excerpts:

"The offence of money laundering is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever."

"It is only such property which is derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence that can be regarded as proceeds of crime."

"The relevant date is the date on which the person indulges in the process or activity connected with such proceeds of crime."

"Merely because the FIR was registered in 2010 would not be sufficient to draw an adverse inference against the Respondent/ED and conclude that the attached properties have no link to the predicate offences."

Core principles established:

- Money laundering under PMLA is a continuing offence, not confined to the date of the predicate offence.

- "Proceeds of crime" includes property derived directly or indirectly from criminal activity, regardless of when acquired.

- The burden of proof lies on the person claiming the property to be untainted to establish lawful acquisition.

- Attachment orders under PMLA can be sustained even if properties were acquired prior to registration of scheduled offences, if linked to ongoing criminal activity.

Final determinations:

- The attachment of the appellant's properties was justified and lawful under PMLA.

- The appellant failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that the properties were not proceeds of crime.

- The Appellate Tribunal's confirmation of the attachment order was upheld.

- The appeal was dismissed with all pending applications disposed of.

Issues: (i) Whether the trial court could recall its earlier order directing supply of documents in view of the statutory bar on altering a judgment or order; (ii) whether denial of access to relied-upon documents at the charge stage infringed the accused's right to fair trial.

Issue (i): Whether the trial court could recall its earlier order directing supply of documents in view of the statutory bar on altering a judgment or order.

Analysis: The impugned order was treated as a recall of the court's own earlier direction. The statutory bar against a criminal court altering its own judgment or order was applied, and the later order was found to be inconsistent with that prohibition.

Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the revisionist; the recall of the earlier order was held impermissible.

Issue (ii): Whether denial of access to relied-upon documents at the charge stage infringed the accused's right to fair trial.

Analysis: The right to access documents relied upon by the prosecution was linked to the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, because effective defence depends upon access to such material. The Court distinguished the charge stage from the stage of entering upon defence and held that the accused may seek production of documents at the defence stage, but not as a matter of right at the charge stage.

Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the revisionist to the extent that the accused's fair-trial right was held to be infringed by the impugned order, while the request to shift the document-production exercise to the charge stage was not accepted.

Final Conclusion: The revision succeeded and the impugned order was set aside, with the accused's entitlement to seek such documents preserved for the defence stage.

Ratio Decidendi: A criminal court cannot recall its own earlier order where the statute prohibits alteration, and an accused's fair-trial right does not entitle access to prosecution documents at the charge stage when the appropriate remedy lies at the defence stage.

Regarding the entitlement to anticipatory bail under the PMLA, the Court examined the statutory framework, particularly Sections 3, 4, 24, 44, 45, and 70 of the Act. Section 3 defines the offence of money laundering, Section 4 prescribes punishment, Section 24 creates a statutory presumption of guilt upon possession of proceeds of crime, and Section 45 mandates satisfaction of twin conditions before bail is granted. Section 70 imputes vicarious liability to directors or persons in control of companies involved in money laundering. The Court noted that the PMLA creates a stringent regime for bail in economic offences, emphasizing custodial interrogation and investigation.

The Court interpreted the statutory presumption under Section 24 as a significant burden on the accused to rebut the inference that possession of property linked to scheduled offences amounts to guilt. The applicant's company was alleged to have received approximately Rs. 20.75 crores through layered transactions involving forged documentation, forming part of a larger scheme involving over Rs. 300 crores. The Court found that the applicant failed to place any material to rebut this presumption or demonstrate the legitimacy of the transactions beyond self-serving assertions supported by documentary evidence, which were contested by the Enforcement Directorate (ED).

On the applicant's non-compliance with summons issued under Section 50 of the PMLA, the Court relied on binding precedents affirming the mandatory nature of such summons and the serious consequences of evasion. The applicant was intercepted at the airport and served summons but failed to appear on multiple occasions, citing personal exigencies without adequate substantiation. The Court held that such conduct undermines the bona fides necessary for equitable relief like anticipatory bail and may justify coercive action.

The Court addressed the applicant's contention that he was implicated only vicariously as the sole director of the company and not personally liable. It held that the corporate veil could be lifted where the individual is the controlling mind and actively involved in the company's affairs, particularly in one-person companies. Reliance was placed on authoritative decisions establishing that vicarious liability under Section 70 of the PMLA is not automatic but justified on prima facie material showing control and involvement. The Court found that the applicant's role as the sole director receiving substantial funds through suspicious transactions warranted his arraignment both in representative and personal capacities.

The Court distinguished precedents cited by the applicant, such as those where accused cooperated with investigation or were named personally in complaints at the investigation stage. It emphasized that anticipatory bail is not a matter of right, especially in serious economic offences, and must be granted sparingly. The Court noted that in cases like the present, where investigation is ongoing, and the accused evades summons, custodial interrogation is necessary to prevent obstruction and ensure effective inquiry.

Regarding the applicability of Section 45 of the PMLA, the Court reiterated the twin conditions that must be satisfied before anticipatory bail can be granted: (i) reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty of money laundering, and (ii) assurance that the accused will not commit any offence while on bail. The Court found that the applicant failed to discharge this burden, as no material negated the prima facie case or statutory presumption. The applicant's evasive conduct further negated any assurance against future offences.

The Court also considered the transnational nature of the offence, the scale of alleged laundering, and the use of forged documentation to facilitate illicit remittances. It held that premature bail would impede investigation and compromise the objectives of the PMLA. The Court underscored the necessity of custodial interrogation in white-collar and economic offences to unravel complex financial transactions and prevent flight risk, especially given the applicant's residence abroad and lack of substantial ties to India.

In conclusion, the Court held that the applicant was not entitled to anticipatory bail at the current stage of investigation. The statutory presumption under Section 24 remained unrebutted, the twin conditions under Section 45 were not satisfied, and the applicant's non-compliance with summons and evasive conduct weighed heavily against bail. The Court emphasized that custodial interrogation was warranted to ascertain the applicant's role and facilitate the investigation. The application for anticipatory bail was accordingly dismissed.

Significant holdings include the following verbatim excerpts and principles:

"The twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA are not satisfied. As clarified in SFIO v. Aditya Sarda, the Court must be satisfied that (i) there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty of the offence, and (ii) he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail."

"In terms of Section 24 of the PMLA, a statutory presumption arises once it is shown that a person is in possession of property linked with a scheduled offence. It is for the applicant to rebut the presumption by demonstrating that such proceeds are untainted."

"The applicant's non-compliance reveals a pattern of evasion and undermines the presumption of bona fides essential for seeking equitable relief."

"The applicant is not merely a nonexecutive or nominal director, but the controlling mind of a oneperson company... the material on record prima facie justifies his arraignment both in representative and personal capacities under Sections 3 and 70 of the PMLA."

"Anticipatory bail in economic offences should be granted only in exceptional cases... custodial interrogation may be warranted to ascertain the applicant's role in facilitating or benefiting from the alleged money laundering operation."

"Premature grant of bail would impede investigation and compromise the statutory objectives of the PMLA."

"The applicant's conduct, marked by sustained non-cooperation despite issuance of repeated notices, weighs heavily against the grant of prearrest protection."

"Having regard to the totality of the circumstances... this Court finds no justifiable reason to exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant."

Outcome: The matters were taken up for hearing, leave was sought to file reports, and the matters were directed to be listed again on 15 July 2025.