Issues: Whether general insurance services availed by a manufacturer after 1 April 2011 qualify as input services eligible for CENVAT credit under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Analysis: The post-amendment definition in Rule 2(l) deleted the expression "activities relating to business" to align the scope of input services with inputs. The specified exclusions concern, inter alia, construction-related services, motor-vehicle-related services and services primarily meant for employees' personal use or consumption. General insurance used in relation to the manufacturing activity was not covered by those exclusions and retained a direct or indirect nexus with manufacture of final products. The departmental clarification on sales commission did not restrict credit for services otherwise satisfying the principal limb of the definition.

Conclusion: General insurance service used in relation to manufacture remains an input service eligible for CENVAT credit after 1 April 2011; no substantial question of law arose.

Issues: Whether an inordinate delay of 1,141 days in filing the appeal was supported by sufficient cause for condonation.

Analysis: The order-in-original had been duly communicated to the appellant in July 2021. Remote working, internal communication failures, subsequent resignation of an employee, and failure to capture the order in the litigation-tracking system did not establish that the appellant was prevented from filing the appeal within the prescribed period. The appellant also remained inactive after responsibility for the matter was transferred in 2022. COVID-19 disruptions could not justify the delay, particularly as normalcy had returned by the time of communication and the appellant had been represented in the adjudication proceedings. Examination of the merits was unnecessary for deciding limitation.

Conclusion: The delay was not supported by sufficient cause and was not liable to be condoned.

Issues: Whether continuation of the pre-amendment payment method during the initial part of the financial year constituted exercise of the option under Rule 6(3)(i), thereby barring the assessee from subsequently electing proportionate CENVAT-credit reversal under Rule 6(3)(ii).

Analysis: The amended scheme permitted a manufacturer not maintaining separate accounts to choose either the prescribed payment route or proportionate reversal of credit. Rule 6(3A) contemplated written intimation of the date from which the option under clause (ii) was exercised. Explanation 1 restricted withdrawal only after an option had actually been exercised. The Rules neither deemed an option to have been exercised on the first day of a financial year nor required an election to be made on that date. Continuance of payments under the earlier regime did not, by itself, establish an election under Rule 6(3)(i).

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to exercise the option under Rule 6(3)(ii) during the financial year. The contrary finding that the assessee had already exercised the option under Rule 6(3)(i) was incorrect.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory option under Rule 6(3) becomes irrevocable only upon its actual exercise; a prior payment practice cannot be treated as a deemed election in the absence of an act of election contemplated by the Rules.

Issues: Whether the High Court had jurisdiction under Section 35G to entertain an appeal involving determination of the value of taxable service for assessment.

Analysis: Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 excludes High Court appeals concerning questions relating to the rate of duty or value of goods for assessment. Section 35L assigns appeals involving such valuation-related questions to the Supreme Court. The proposed questions substantially concerned valuation of service under the applicable service-tax valuation mechanism.

Conclusion: The appeal concerning determination of value for assessment lay before the Supreme Court under Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and was not maintainable before the High Court under Section 35G.

Issues: (i) Whether full CENVAT credit was available on specified input services used for both taxable management, maintenance and repair services and exempt renting of immovable property services for 16.06.2005 to 01.06.2007; (ii) Whether CENVAT credit relating to renting of immovable property services after 01.06.2007 could be denied under Board Circular No. 98/1/2008-ST dated 04.01.2008; and (iii) Whether fit-out charges forming part of leased office premises were liable to service tax despite payment of VAT.

Issue (i): Whether full CENVAT credit was available on specified input services used for both taxable management, maintenance and repair services and exempt renting of immovable property services for 16.06.2005 to 01.06.2007.

Analysis: Rule 6(5) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 permits whole credit of service tax on the specified taxable services notwithstanding Rule 6(1) to Rule 6(3), except where the input service is used exclusively in relation to exempt goods or exempt services. Management, maintenance and repair services were taxable output services, and the credit was used for both those services and renting of immovable property services. The requirement of exclusive use for exempt services was therefore not met, notwithstanding that separate credit accounts were not maintained.

Conclusion: Full CENVAT credit was available under Rule 6(5) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether CENVAT credit relating to renting of immovable property services after 01.06.2007 could be denied under Board Circular No. 98/1/2008-ST dated 04.01.2008.

Analysis: After 01.06.2007, renting of immovable property was a taxable output service. The Circular incorrectly addressed eligibility of input-service credit with reference to immovable property rather than the taxable output service of renting. Eligibility was required to be determined by the nexus between the input services and the output service under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Conclusion: The Circular could not justify denial of the credit, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether fit-out charges forming part of leased office premises were liable to service tax despite payment of VAT.

Analysis: The lease documentation showed that the fit-outs included infrastructure forming part of the leased office premises, rather than merely movable articles independently supplied to tenants. The related consideration formed part of the value of the leasing arrangement. Payment of VAT does not, by itself, exclude service-tax liability where the factual requirements for both levies are satisfied; additionally, proof of VAT payment on the fit-outs was absent.

Conclusion: Fit-out charges were liable to service tax, in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The assessee's common-credit claims for the relevant periods remain valid, but consideration attributable to fit-outs supplied as part of the leased premises is includible for service-tax purposes.

Ratio Decidendi: Full CENVAT credit under Rule 6(5) is available where the specified input service is used for both taxable and exempt output services, unless its use is exclusively attributable to exempt services.

Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit was admissible on furnace oil used in a captive power plant for generating electricity supplied to the grinding unit and jetty; and (ii) whether penalties under Rule 15(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit was admissible on furnace oil used in a captive power plant for generating electricity supplied to the grinding unit and jetty.

Analysis: Section 2(e) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the CENVAT credit scheme were applied in light of the accepted factual finding that the clinker unit, grinding unit and jetty formed part of the manufacture of the assessee's final products. The electricity generated by the captive power plant was supplied exclusively to those units and was neither sold nor diverted to outsiders. The distance between the units and their separate registration did not affect eligibility. Inputs could be directly used for producing intermediate electricity through a job-work arrangement, and failure to follow the prescribed procedure was only a procedural irregularity that could not defeat the substantive credit benefit.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit on furnace oil used to generate electricity supplied to the grinding unit and jetty was admissible, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalties under Rule 15(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 were sustainable.

Analysis: Since the assessee was substantively entitled to the disputed CENVAT credit, the foundation for imposing penalty did not survive.

Conclusion: The penalties under Rule 15(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Credit entitlement extends to inputs used for captive generation of electricity consumed in the connected manufacturing units and jetty where the electricity is not sold or diverted outside the manufacturing operations.

Ratio Decidendi: CENVAT credit cannot be denied for inputs used to generate electricity outside the immediate factory premises when the electricity is captively consumed in manufacturing final products, and a procedural lapse in following job-work formalities does not defeat substantive entitlement.

Issues: Whether CENVAT credit is admissible for 1%/2% additional duty of customs paid on imported coal under the applicable customs exemption notification despite the restriction on credit of excise duty under the proviso to Rule 3(1)(i) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Analysis: Rule 3(1)(i) concerns credit of specified duties of excise and its proviso restricts such credit where the prescribed central excise exemption is availed. Rule 3(1)(vii), however, independently permits credit of additional duty of customs equivalent to the enumerated excise duties. The imported coal attracted additional duty of customs under the customs notification; it was not cleared on payment of excise duty after availing the central excise exemption. The restriction attached to Rule 3(1)(i) could therefore not be imported into Rule 3(1)(vii).

Conclusion: CENVAT credit of the 1%/2% additional duty of customs paid on imported coal is admissible, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Issues: (i) Whether an encumbrance recorded in a sale notice and sale certificate may be removed from the encumbrance certificate without payment of the secured dues; (ii) Whether the statutory priority of secured creditors over government dues overrides the mandatory sale procedure governing known encumbrances; (iii) Whether the secured creditor became functus officio after issuance and registration of the sale certificate; (iv) Whether a departmental attachment recorded in the encumbrance certificate constitutes an encumbrance.

Issue (i): Whether an encumbrance recorded in a sale notice and sale certificate may be removed from the encumbrance certificate without payment of the secured dues.

Analysis: Rules 9(6) to 9(10) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 require disclosure of known encumbrances in the sale certificate. Rule 9(7) requires deposit of the amount necessary to discharge such encumbrances, and Rule 9(9) permits delivery free from known encumbrances only upon that deposit. A purchaser acquiring property with express notice of statutory encumbrances cannot obtain removal of the recorded entries without their discharge.

Conclusion: Removal of the recorded departmental encumbrance without payment of the disclosed statutory dues is impermissible. This issue is against the appellant bank and the auction purchaser.

Issue (ii): Whether the statutory priority of secured creditors over government dues overrides the mandatory sale procedure governing known encumbrances.

Analysis: Statutory priority under Section 26E of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and Section 31B of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 enables secured creditors to realise secured debts in priority to government dues. That priority does not dispense with mandatory compliance with Rules 9(6) to 9(10) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, particularly the obligation to settle disclosed encumbrances before delivery of the property free from them.

Conclusion: Secured-creditor priority does not override the mandatory procedure for discharge of known encumbrances. This issue is against the appellant bank's claimed relief.

Issue (iii): Whether the secured creditor became functus officio after issuance and registration of the sale certificate.

Analysis: Issuance and registration of a sale certificate do not by themselves terminate the secured creditor's statutory rights where its entire debt remains unrecovered and recovery proceedings concerning the borrower continue.

Conclusion: The secured creditor had not become functus officio, and the objection to maintainability fails. This issue is in favour of the appellant bank.

Issue (iv): Whether a departmental attachment recorded in the encumbrance certificate constitutes an encumbrance.

Analysis: An attachment imposing a legal burden on property and restricting its transfer, further mortgage, or charge is an encumbrance. Its entry in the encumbrance certificate gives notice of the restriction, and its effect is consistent with the concept of a charge under Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Conclusion: The departmental attachment is an encumbrance that must be discharged in accordance with Rule 9(7). This issue is against the appellant bank and the auction purchaser.

Final Conclusion: A sale expressly made subject to known statutory encumbrances remains so burdened until the prescribed amounts are deposited and the encumbrances are discharged; statutory priority cannot be used to erase those recorded burdens without compliance with the mandatory sale rules.

Ratio Decidendi: A secured creditor's statutory priority over government dues does not dispense with mandatory compliance with Rules 9(6) to 9(10) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 for discharge of known encumbrances before delivery of property free from them.

Issues: Whether a duplicate amount deposited as mandatory appellate pre-deposit is refundable with interest, and whether the refund procedure under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 applies to such deposit.

Analysis: Section 11B concerns refund claims for excise duty and interest paid on that duty. A statutory pre-deposit made for exercising the right of appeal under Section 35F is not payment of duty. Therefore, retention of the duplicate pre-deposit could not be justified by requiring recourse to the procedure under Section 11B. The admitted duplicate credit and the absence of a bona fide basis for withholding it warranted refund with interest and costs.

Conclusion: The duplicate pre-deposit of Rs.1,24,175/- is refundable to the petitioner with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the second receipt until payment, along with litigation costs of Rs.25,000/-.

Issues: (i) Whether AED (GSI) credit paid on unprocessed nylon tyre cord fabric could be availed and utilised towards basic excise duty where the intermediate TCWS was exempt from AED (GSI) and tyres were not chargeable to AED (GSI); (ii) Whether refund of AED (GSI) credit was available for inputs used in exported tyres.

Issue (i): Whether AED (GSI) credit paid on unprocessed nylon tyre cord fabric could be availed and utilised towards basic excise duty where the intermediate TCWS was exempt from AED (GSI) and tyres were not chargeable to AED (GSI).

Analysis: Rule 57C of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 denied credit on inputs used in manufacture of exempt or nil-rated final products. The second proviso to Notification No. 5/94-C.E. (N.T.) dated 01.03.1994 confined AED (GSI) credit to payment of excise duty leviable under the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957, on final products. TCWS was exempt from AED (GSI), while tyres were not chargeable to AED (GSI); consequently, no dutiable final product under that enactment existed against which the credit could be utilised. The subsequent CENVAT amendment and circular could not apply to the 1998-99 period. The retrospective amendment under Section 88 of the Finance Act, 2004 applied only to AED (GSI) paid on or after 1 April 2000.

Conclusion: The assessee was not eligible to avail or utilise AED (GSI) credit towards basic excise duty. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether refund of AED (GSI) credit was available for inputs used in exported tyres.

Analysis: Refund under Rule 57F(13) depended upon valid entitlement to the underlying AED (GSI) credit. Since the credit itself was unavailable under Rule 57C and Notification No. 5/94-C.E. (N.T.) dated 01.03.1994, export of the tyres did not create entitlement to refund of that credit.

Conclusion: The assessee was not entitled to refund of the disputed AED (GSI) credit. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: AED (GSI) credit under the MODVAT regime could be used only against liability under the same additional-excise-duty enactment; later CENVAT provisions did not alter the position for the earlier disputed period.

Ratio Decidendi: Credit of a specified additional excise duty is unavailable where no final product is liable to that duty, and cannot be diverted towards payment of a different excise duty unless the governing credit scheme expressly permits it.

Issues: (i) Whether the extended period under the proviso to Section 11-A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 could be invoked for recovery of Additional Excise Duty; (ii) Whether the equivalent penalty founded on alleged suppression and intent to evade duty could survive.

Issue (i): Whether the extended period under the proviso to Section 11-A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 could be invoked for recovery of Additional Excise Duty.

Analysis: The proviso is an exceptional limitation provision and requires the Revenue to establish fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade duty. The disclosed manufacturing activity, the declaration furnished under Rule 174 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, the claimed small-scale exemption, and departmental awareness of the unit negated deliberate concealment. Deficiencies in registration or declaration, and subsequent discovery of the quantum of clearances, did not by themselves establish wilful suppression or intent to evade. The contemporaneous uncertainty regarding liability to Additional Excise Duty also supported the bona fide nature of the assessee's understanding. The separate substantive question whether Additional Excise Duty was otherwise payable did not dispense with proof of the conditions for extended limitation.

Conclusion: The extended period was unavailable, and recovery for the period beyond normal limitation could not be sustained. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the equivalent penalty founded on alleged suppression and intent to evade duty could survive.

Analysis: The penalty under Section 11-AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 rested upon the same unproved allegation of wilful suppression and deliberate evasion that was necessary to sustain the extended period.

Conclusion: The equivalent penalty could not survive in the absence of established wilful suppression or intent to evade duty. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Failure to establish the statutory preconditions for exceptional limitation removed the legal basis for the impugned fiscal demand and its accompanying penalty; the substantive applicability of Additional Excise Duty and marketability of the goods remained undecided.

Ratio Decidendi: Extended limitation for excise recovery is unavailable unless wilful suppression or other specified conduct coupled with intent to evade duty is established; mere non-registration, non-payment, or procedural omission does not suffice where the manufacturing activity was disclosed and the duty position was genuinely uncertain.

Issues: Whether the applicant should be granted regular bail in relation to allegations of cess and excise-duty evasion.

Analysis: A prima facie doubt was recorded regarding computation of suspected evasion solely from the recovery and seizure of machinery under the prescribed formula. The observation was confined to bail and did not determine the validity of the Rule or bind the trial court. In the absence of antecedents, and since the machinery had already been seized, an unsupported apprehension of repetition was insufficient to justify continued custody.

Outcome: Regular bail granted.

Issues: Whether an appeal challenging the Tribunal's classification of the respondent's services as not falling within the category of Goods Transport Agency service was maintainable before the High Court under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944, or lay exclusively before the Supreme Court under Section 35L of that Act.

Analysis: Sections 35G and 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944 form a mutually exclusive appellate scheme. Section 35G excludes questions relating to the rate of duty or value for assessment, while Section 35L(1)(b), read with Section 35L(2), channels questions concerning taxability or excisability for assessment to the Supreme Court. The Tribunal's determination that the services did not meet the requirements of Goods Transport Agency service involved classification and taxability of the services and was directly connected with assessment.

Conclusion: The appeal was outside the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944; the proper statutory forum was the Supreme Court under Section 35L of that Act.

Issues: Whether an appeal challenging the determination that services provided to an overseas entity are not intermediary services and qualify as export of services is maintainable before the High Court under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: Sections 35G and 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944 create mutually exclusive appellate forums. Section 35G excludes matters relating to the rate of duty or value for assessment, while Section 35L channels such matters to the Supreme Court; taxability and excisability are included within that excluded category. The determination concerning the characterisation of the services as intermediary services and their qualification as export services concerns classification, excisability and value of the services for assessment.

Conclusion: The appeal under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was not maintainable; the challenge lies before the Supreme Court under Section 35L of that Act.

Issues: Whether an appeal challenging the Tribunal's determination on intermediary status and export of services was maintainable before the High Court under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: Section 35G excludes High Court appeals relating to questions having a relation to the rate of duty or value for assessment, while Section 35L(1)(b) assigns such matters to the Supreme Court. Section 35L(2) includes questions of taxability or excisability within that excluded category. The Tribunal's determination of whether the services were intermediary services and whether they qualified as export of services involved classification, excisability and valuation of the services for assessment; it therefore fell within the statutory exclusion from the High Court's jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable before the High Court; the proper forum was the Supreme Court under Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Issues: (i) Whether a three-month delay in pronouncing the Tribunal's order vitiated the order; (ii) Whether the rejection of rectification and objections requiring reappreciation of evidence warranted interference; (iii) Whether personal penalties could be imposed under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002.

Issue (i): Whether a three-month delay in pronouncing the Tribunal's order vitiated the order.

Analysis: Delay in pronouncement caused by heavy pendency, without more, does not invalidate an order. A delay of approximately three months after completion of hearing was not sufficient to set aside the Tribunal's decision.

Conclusion: The delay did not vitiate the Tribunal's order; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the rejection of rectification and objections requiring reappreciation of evidence warranted interference.

Analysis: The rectification challenge sought reappreciation of evidence, which is outside the limited scope of rectification in the absence of an error apparent on the record. The remaining objections involved factual disputes, which could not be revisited in an appeal confined to substantial questions of law.

Conclusion: No interference with the rejection of rectification or the factual findings was warranted; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether personal penalties could be imposed under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002.

Analysis: Rule 26 authorises penalty against a person concerned with transporting, removing, depositing, keeping, concealing, selling, purchasing, or otherwise dealing with excisable goods known or reasonably believed to be liable to confiscation. Nothing established that the competent authority lacked power to invoke that provision on the facts found.

Conclusion: The personal penalties under Rule 26 were validly sustainable; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The challenges to the findings concerning confiscation and penalties fail, and the impugned orders remain effective.

Ratio Decidendi: Rectification cannot be used to obtain reappreciation of evidence, and factual disputes cannot be reopened in a statutory appeal confined to substantial questions of law.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation for recovery of allegedly short-paid central excise duty was validly invoked on the basis of suppression of material facts with intent to evade duty.

Analysis: Invocation of the extended period under the proviso to Section 11A(1) required allegations and supporting material establishing collusion, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with intent to evade duty. The show-cause notice and adjudication order did not establish those essential ingredients. The assessee had regularly filed monthly returns verified by the Department, and its claim to concessional duty under the notification involved an interpretative issue supporting a bona fide belief of eligibility. The Tribunal's finding that the audit objection did not establish suppression was factual and disclosed no substantial question of law.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable; the demand founded entirely on that period was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the second appeals were barred by limitation where the first appellate orders were received on 31.03.2025 and prior service did not comply with the prescribed statutory mode; (ii) Whether the first appeals filed on the next working day after the limitation period expired on a Sunday were maintainable.

Issue (i): Whether the second appeals were barred by limitation where the first appellate orders were received on 31.03.2025 and prior service did not comply with the prescribed statutory mode.

Analysis: Section 37C of the Customs Act requires service through registered post or speed post with acknowledgement due. A Document Identification Number merely authenticates the appellate order and does not establish its electronic upload or service. The material did not establish service in the prescribed manner before 31.03.2025; the information regarding dispatch by speed post did not show that acknowledgement due had been sought. Limitation for the second appeals consequently ran from actual receipt on 31.03.2025, making the filing on 03.06.2025 timely.

Conclusion: The second appeals were within limitation, and the dismissal by the appellate tribunal as time-barred was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the first appeals filed on the next working day after the limitation period expired on a Sunday were maintainable.

Analysis: Where the final day for filing fell on a Sunday, Section 4 of the Limitation Act permitted institution on the immediately succeeding working day. The first appeals filed on 30.05.2022 were therefore within time.

Conclusion: The first appeals were maintainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The demands have not been adjudicated on merits and require determination at the first appellate stage in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute prescribes a particular mode of service, limitation for challenging an appellate order commences only upon service effected in accordance with that mode; a Document Identification Number alone does not establish service.

Issues: Whether the High Court had jurisdiction under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 to entertain an appeal concerning the classification and taxability of services as intermediary services and their qualification as export of services.

Analysis: Sections 35G and 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944 constitute a mutually exclusive appellate scheme. Appeals involving questions relating to the rate of duty or value for assessment, including taxability or excisability, fall outside the High Court's jurisdiction and lie to the Supreme Court. The Tribunal's determination whether the services supplied to the overseas entity were intermediary services and whether they qualified as export services involved classification, taxability and the value of the services for assessment.

Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable before the High Court; the appropriate appellate forum was the Supreme Court under Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Issues: Whether Education Cess and Higher Education Cess refunded under appellate orders, but subsequently redeposited under protest after a later overruling decision, must be refunded notwithstanding pending appeals against certain appellate refund orders.

Analysis: The appellate refund orders had applied the legal position prevailing at the time, under which the cess paid along with exempted excise duty was refundable. The subsequent overruling of that position could not reopen refunds settled under decisions that had attained finality. Although certain appeals concerning the petitioner's appellate refund orders remain pending, parity with similarly situated assessees and protection of revenue interests warranted release of the redeposited amount with appropriate safeguards.

Conclusion: The petitioner is entitled to refund of the entire Education Cess and Higher Education Cess redeposited under protest, subject to furnishing an equivalent bank guarantee and to the outcome of pending appeals or other proceedings before the Supreme Court.